ML20245B419

Forwards Comments & Recommendations from Training Staff in Response to NRC 881212 License Exams

ML20245B419
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	12/16/1988
From:	Lorek M TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Munro J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20245B400	List: ML20245B399 ML20245B407 ML20245B419
References
NUDOCS 8904260095
Download: ML20245B419 (5)

Text

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.. 4 O. O

. TENNESSEE VALLEY : AUTHORIT.Y Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

• P.O. Box 2000 3 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 ENCLOSURE 3 December 16, 1988 Mr. John'Munro, Chief Operator Licensing Section U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II,: Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, N.W.

Atlanta, Georgia 30323

SUBJECT:

RESPONSE TO NRC LICENSE EXAMS Enclosed are.the comments and recommendations'from the Sequoyah Training Staff concerning.the SQN NRC License Exams given December 12, 1988. If you have any questions, please contact Clyde T. Benton at (615) 874-1305. Thank you.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 4

M. J. Lorek Manager, SQN Training Enclosure 8904260095 890417 PDR Y ADOCK 05000327'.pnu An Equal Opportunity Employer

[.

- = b,rs td QUESTION 2.10 (1.50)

List SIX design functions of the Emergency Core Cooling System during a design basis accident.

ANSWER 2.10 (1.50)

(0.25) each)

1. Ensure core is flooded and decay heat is being removed.

2. Minimize cladding failure

3. Maintain RCS integrity, (unless already lost).

4. Stop positive reactivity additions.

5. Maintain reactor in a suberitical condition.

6. Restore core parameters to stable conditions.

REFERENCE l

SQN Lesson Plan, Emergency Core Cooling, OPL271CO25, p. 4 00600G004 ..(KA's)

TVA Comments: Please accept answer to objective #10 on above referenced lesson plan as a correct response to your question.

ECCS design criteria:

1. Limit peak clad temperature <2200*F

2. Limit clad oxidation <17% total clad thickness

3. Limit max H2 generation <1% of the hypothetical amount if all clad were to melt (except plenum area)

4. Maintain coolable geometry

5. Maintain long term cooling capability This is what was stressed during training as a learning objective.

Please see attached copy of lesson plan # OPL271CO25

. O O QUESTION 6.06 (1.00)

Briefly explain the effect on pressurizer level indication following a break in the bellows separating the reference les fluid from the pressurizer fluid.

INCLUDE your reasoning for the effect. Assume steady state power and level conditions.

ANSWER 6.06 (1.00)

NO CHANGE (0.5) since the bellows only separates the RCS/Pzr water from the DP cell internals to prevent flashing of the reference leg fluid on transients.

(0,5)

REFERENCE SQN Lesson Plan, Pze and Control System, OPL271C019, pp. 10-12.

Lesson Objective, OPL271C019, #2.e KA: 011000K604 (3.1/3.1) ...(KA's)

TVA Comments: Candidate must assume upper bellows and not D/P Cell diaphragm failure to conclude correct answer.

- If D/P cell diaphragm is assumed to fail then differential pressure goes to zero and indicated level to 100%.

- Both upper bellows and D/P diaphragm separate pressurizer fluid from reference leg fluid.

- Reference lesson plan does not discuss result of bellows failure.

Suggest grading be based on candidates assumptions.

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.. O o-QUESTION- 6.10 ~(2.50) '

As a result of a Safety Injection signal, certain signals generated from the SI will " latch in" (seal in), While others will automatically' reset.or clear.

List FIVE' signals Which are " latched in" (seal'in) as a result of the SI signal.

ANSWER 6.10 (2.50)

(any five: 0.25) each)

(1) Containment Isolation phase A (2) Feedwater isolation (3) Diesel generator emergency start (4) Reactor Trip y- _5)

( Safeguard Sequence (6) Containment Ventilation (7) Start EGTS & ABGTS REFERENCE SQN System Description, Solid State Protection System, OPL2710048, p. 31.

KA: '012000K406 (2.2/3.5)

.006020K406 (3.9/4.2) 012000K406 006020406 ...(KA's)

TVA Comments: Additional acceptable answers should be:

Auxiliary Building Isolation Control Room Isolation

- Auxiliary building isolation correintes to Start ABGTS

-- Control Room Isolation is not listed but is equipped with Reset / Actuate switches on 1-M-6 in the main control room.

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ENCLOSURE 4 SIMULATION FACILITY FIDELITY REPORT 4 Facility Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority Facility Licensee Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 Facility Licensee Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79 Operating Tests Administered At: TVA Power Operations Training Center Operating Tests Given On: December 13 - 14, 1988 During the conduct of the simulator portion of the operating tests identified above, the following hoparent performance discrepancies were observed:

1. Malfunction Number 119, Nonisolable Leak on Auxiliary Air Train As a result of this failure, pressurizer spray valve, FCV-68-3400 (Loop 1) should have failed shut, but it did not.

2. Malfunction Number 088, PT-3-1 Failes to 92% (1104 lbs).

As a result of this malfunction a plant trip was experienced due to oscillating S/G 1evels, causing a feed pump trip. It was supposed to runback the feed water pumps to a minimum.

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