ML20244C560

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Amend 21 to License NPF-62,revising Tech Spec & Bases Section 3/4.6.6 to Provide Appropriate Values for Secondary Containment Drawdown Test
ML20244C560
Person / Time
Site: Clinton Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/10/1989
From: Muller D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20244C558 List:
References
NUDOCS 8904200273
Download: ML20244C560 (8)


Text

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4 UNITED STATES .

8 o . NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

.- D -l WASHINGTON, D. C. 20585 k....a /

ILLIN0IS POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

DOCKET NO.'50-461 CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 21- ,

License No. NPF-62

1. The' Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. Illinois Power Company * (IP), and Theapplicationforamendmentby(thelicensees)datedDecember21, Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc. 't 1988 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic 4 Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR' Chapter I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C. There is reasonable assurance'(i) that the activities. authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D. - The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements-have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifica-tions as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and para-graph 2C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-62 is hereby amended to read as follows:
  • Illinois Power Company is authorized to act as agent for Soyland Power Cooperative, Inc. and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

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. Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environ-mental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 21 , are hereby incorporated into this license.

Illinois Power Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Daniel R. Muller, Director Project Directorate III-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications <

Date of Issuance: April 10, 1989 l

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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 21 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-62 DOCKET NO. 50-461 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

F!emove Insert Xi Xi 3/4 6-66 3/4 6-66 3/4 6-66a B 3/4 6-8 8 3/4 6-8 83/46-9 B 3/4 6-9 l

INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (Continued)

Primary Containment Average Ai r Temperature. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-11 Containment Building Ventilation and Purge Systems........ 3/4 6-12 3/4.6.2 DRYWELL D rywe l l I nte g r i ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-14 Drywell Bypass Leakage.................................... 3/4 6-15 D rywe l l A i r Lo c ks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-16 Drywell Structural Integrity.............................. 3/4 6-18 D rywel l I nte rnal P re s s u re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-19 Drywell Average Air Temperature........................... 3/4 6-20 Drywell Vent and Purge System............................. 3/4 6-21 3/4.6.3 DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEMS Suppression P001.......................................... 3/4 6-23 Containment Spray......................................... 3/4 6-26 Suppression Pool Cooling.................................. 3/4 6-27 Suppression Pool Makeup System............................ 3/4 6-28 i

3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES.............................. 3/4 6-29 Table 3.6.4-1 Containment Isolation Valves......................... 3/4 6-31 Table 3.6.4-2 Containment Isolation Trip Signals................... 3/4 6-62 3/4.6.5 DRYWELL POST-LOCA VACUUM RELIEF VALVES.................... 3/4 6-63 3/4.6.6 SECONDAR'f C0F AINMENT Secondary Containment Integrity........................... 3/4 6-65 Figure 4.6.6.1-1 Secondary Containment Drawdown Time for 1500 CFM Boundary Leakage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 6-66a Secondary Containment Automatic Isolation Dampers ........ 3/4 6-67 CLINTON - UNIT 1 xi Amendment No. 21

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY I

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.6.1 (Continued)

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:
1. Each standby gas treatment subsystem will draw down the secondary containment to greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge from the test start pressure in less than or equal to the time period corresponding to the measured flow rate specified in Figure 4.6.6.1-1.
2. By operati.ng each standby gas treatment subsystem for one hour and maintaining > 0.25 in. of vacuum water gauge in the secondary con-tainment at a flow rate not exceeding 4000 cfm 10%.

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, CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.5 DRYWELL POST-LOCA VACUUM RELIEF VALVES Drywell vacuum relief valves are provided on the drywell to pass sufficient quantities of gas from the containment to the drywell to prevent an excess negative pressure from developing in the drywell.

3/4.6.6 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT The secondary containment completely encloses the primary containment, except for the upper personnel hatch. It consists of the fuel building, gas control boundary, and portions of the auxiliary building enclosed by the extension of the gas control boundary and the ECCS cubic 1.es and areas as. described in FSAR Figure 6.2-132. The standby gas treatment system (SGTS) is designed to achieve and maintain a negative 1/4" W.G. pressure within the secondary containment following a design basis accident. This design provides for the capture within the secondary containment of the radioactive releases from the primary ~contain-ment, and their filtration before release to the atmosphere.

Establishing and maintaining a vacuum in the secondary containment with the standby gas treatment system once per 18 months, along with the surveillance of the doors, hatches, dampers, and valves, is adequate to ensure that there are no violations of the integrity of the secondary containment. The inleakage values are not verified in the surveillance since no credit for dilution was taken in the dose calculation. As noted however, adequate drawdown is verified once per 18 months. The acceptance criteria spet Jied in Figure 4.6.6.1-1 for the drawdown test is based on a computer model, verified by actual performance of drawdown tests, in which the drawdown time determined for accident conditions is adjusted to account for performance of the test during normal plant conditions. The acceptance criteria indicated per Figure 4.6.6.1-1 is based on conditions corresponding to power operation (with the turbine building ventilation system in operation) and wind speeds less than or equal to 10 mph. The acceptance criteria for plant conditions other than those assumed will be adjusted as necessary to reflect the

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conditions which exist during performance of the surveillance test.

The OPERABILITY of the standby gas treatment systems ensures that sufficient iodine removal capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The reduc-tion in containment iodine inventory reduces the resulting site boundary radia-tion doses associated with containment leakage. The operation of this system and resultant iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions used in the LOCA analyses. Continuous operation of the system with the heaters OPERABLE for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> during each 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the absorbers and HEPA filters.

3/4.6.7 ATMOSPHERE CONTROL The OPERABILITY of the systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that these systems will be available to maintain the hydrogen con-centration within the containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA l

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CLINTON - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-8 Amendment No. 21

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1 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.7 ATMOSPHERE CONTROL (Continued) conditions. Either containment hydrogen recombiner system is capable of con-trolling the expected hydrogen generation associated with (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. The containment-drywell hydrogen mixing systems are pro-vided to ensure adequate mixing of the containment atmosphere.following a LOCA.

This mixing action will prevent localized accumulations of hydrogen from exceed-ing the flammable limit.

Two 100% hydrogen mixing systems are the primary means of H2 control within the drywell, purging hydrogen produced following a LOCA into the containment volume. Hydrogen generated from'the metal-water reaction and radiolysis is assumed to evolve to the drywell atmosphere and form a homogeneous mixture through natural forces and mechanical turbulence (ECCS pipe break flow). The drywell hydrogen mixing system forces drywell atmosphere through spargers in the suppression pool and into the containment and as a result no bypass path exists.

The hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, " Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," September 1976.

The hydrogen ignition system consists of two divisionally separated and redun-dant subsystems. Each subsystem of igniters will initiate combustion of hydro-gen when its concentratier. in containment exceeds 4% after a degraded core accident. This system will ensare burning in a controlled manner as the hydro-gen is released instead of allowing it to be ignited at high concentrations by a random ignition source. Each subsystem ensures effective coverage throughout the containment and drywell open areas by the location of igniters of the same division a maximum distance of 60 feet apart. A maximum distance of 30 feet exists between adjacent ignitors of redundant divisions. With the failure of any given number of igniters located in open areas, effective coverage is main-tained provided that the redundant division ignitors adjacent to inoperable ignitors (within 30 feet) are operable. For enclosed areas within containment, two igniter assemblies, one from each subsystem, will maintain effective coverage.

Inaccessible areas are defined as areas that have high radiation levels for the duration of the refueling outage. These areas are the heat exchanger, filter demineralized, backwash and holding pump rooms of the RWCU system.

CLINTON - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-9 Amendment No. 21

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