ML20244B226

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Rev 1 to Rept on Test of Fresh Fuel Shipping Container
ML20244B226
Person / Time
Site: 07105450
Issue date: 05/26/1989
From:
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20244B218 List:
References
25571, NUDOCS 8906130035
Download: ML20244B226 (40)


Text

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ATDGMENT 1 mart CN TEST OF MESH Pig N CCNDLINER Docket No. 71-5450 Initial Submittal Date:

12/20/85 Page No.1-1 Revision Submittal Date:

05/26/89 Rev. No..1 m

8906130035 890526 ADOCK 07105450 FDR PDC C

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e MI)EL B FRESH RE SHIPPIlra GNAltER M-CFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206

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SECTION:. SHIPPiliG SAFEiY NMLYSIS EXHIBIT B PART B.

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE 1.0 Purpose 1

2.0 Sumary 1

3. 0 Conclusions 1

4.0 Recommendations -

1 5.0 Container Description 2

6.0 Method of Test 2

7. 0 Tests 2

7.1 Drop #1 Bottom Drop - Rotational 2

7.2 Drop #2 Cover Drop - 30' Angle 3

7. 3 -

Drop #3 40 in. Pin Drop 3

8.0 Test Results 4

APPENDIX A Test Diagrams APPENDIX B Test Photographs

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l DATE 4-10-85 REVISION NO.

O PAGE ii CLRRENT REVISION:

SUPERCEDESI PAGE-USNRC APPROVAL RE ERENCE j

.DATE' REV1SION j

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MDEL B FPESH FLEL SHIPPIfE ONfAllER B&W-GFP PACKAGEIDUSA/6206/AF DOCKET 714206 SECTION: SHIPPl!E SAFEiY #MLYSIS EXHIBIT B

1.0 PURp0SE

1.1 The purpose of the tests herein is to verify by phototype testing that the design and construction of the FRESH FUEL SHIPPING CONTAINER will retain the contents in a nuclear safe cor.figura-tion through a hypothetical accident condition of a 30 ft. Free Drop. NUCLEAR SAFE CONFIGURATION is defined for this purpose as the two fuel assemblies, the boron-steel poison plates, and the steel strongback plates retained in essentially design relationship; and all retained within the container shell.

2.0

SUMMARY

2.1 All of the required elements for a nuclear safe configuration were maintained upon complete inspection of the container follow-ing the final drop test.

2.2 The final clearances as well as a record of damage to the container are listed in Section 8.0 TEST RESULTS.

3.0 CONCLUSION

S:

3.1 Based on the satisfactory final container configuration, both internal and external, it was unanimously concluded by all 1

attending witnesses as well as the report writer that the container more than adequately performed its desired functions.

Much greater damage was anticipated than was actually experi-enced and no further modification of the container is required to improve its performance under these extremely severe test conditions.

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Since the tests herein were performed en a prototype container which had previously been qualification tested and documented

(

Reference:

Part A of this test report), there is every reason DATE 4-10-85 REVISION fC.

O PAGE 1

~

CLERENT REVISION:

SUPERCEDES: PAGE US'GC AFFROVAL REFERENCE DATE REVISION

.4.,..

mDEL B FRESH FUEL SHIPPifE OMAl!ER paw-OFP PACKAGEIDUSA/6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SHIPPILE SAFEIY NiALYSIS EXHIBIT B 4.1 to believe that this container design has the structural integrity required to fulfill its mission.

4.2 It is hereby recomended that this container P/N 208R001-1 be granted approval for shipment of production fresh fuel cells.

5. 0 CONTAINER DESCRIPTION:

5.1 The container description in Section 4.0 of Part A of the test report applies with the exception of Para. 4.2 Physical Data which is modified below:

WEIGHTS:

Container & Frame 3940 lbs.

(same) 1 Fresh Fuel Cells (2) 3360 lbs.

(was 3000) 7300 lbs.

(was 6940) 6.0 METHOD OF TEST:

6.1 GENERAL

Two dummy fuel cells (1680 lbs. ea.), were installed in the prototype container and the container cover was secured as ready for shipment.

6.1.1 The container *. s t',er 6 bjected to the following test sequence:

a.) Drop #1 Bote... Sr. 30* Rotational b.) Cover removed for examination of contents c.) Drop #2 Cover Drop - 30' to horizontal d.) Drop #3 40 inch Pin Drop (inverted) e.) Cover removed for examination of contents

6.2 INSTRUMENTATION

NOT REQUIRED - NOT PROVIDED.

7.0 TESTS

l 7.1 DROP #1 BOTTOM DROP-ROTATIONAL:

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The loaded container was placed on the ground on its skids. A j

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DATE 4-10-85 REV1SION tc, O

PAGE 2

CLERENT REVISION:

1 SUPERCEDES: PAGE US!E APFROVAL REFERECE PATE REVISION

f.

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I WDEL B FRESH FUEL SHIPPIfE C0tMItER P2W-CWP i

PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 EXHIBIT B l

SECTION: SHIPPItE SAFETY A R YSIS l

)

7.1 DROP #1 BOTTOM DROP-ROTATIONAL:

(continued) cable sling was attached to the lifting eyes in the stacking brackets (one hook in each stacking bracket). The sling was then attached to a quick release mechanism on the crane. The container was then lifted off the ground in such a manner that the AFT END raised off the ground first to an angle of 30" to the horizontal (see sketch in Appendix A) before the FUD END left the ground. The container was raised to a height of 30 ft. from the bottom of the skids at the FWD END to the ground. This was detemined by a 30 ft. length of string attached to the I

FWD END skids with a small weight at the end of the string which just left the ground when the correct height was attained. The quick release was then actuated and the container fell freely to the ground in the same attitude which it was suspended

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causing the AFT END to rotate to the ground after the FWD END

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1 struck. See Appendix B for photographs of results.

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7.1.1 The container was then opened and examined for damage. See

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Section 8 for TEST RESULTS.

7.2 DROP #2 COVER OR0p - 30' ANGLE:

The container was placed on its cover with the four skids sticking straight up. The container was then rolled over 30' toward its side until the sealing flange was at a 30' angle from the horizontal (.see sketch in Appendix A). A sling was attached to the container and the quick release mechanism on the crane. The container was raised to a height of 30 ft. from the cover to the ground. The quick release was actuated and the container fell freely to the ground on its cover. The container was not opened after this test for fear of not being able to replace the cover for the pin drop test.

7. 3 40 INCH PIN DROP TEST:

A steel pin (size 6 in. dia. x 8 in.19. with 1/4 in. radius DATE 4-10-85 REVISION NO.

O PAGE 3

CtRRENT REVISION:

S*SERCEDES: PAGE USNRC APPROVAL REFERE'4CE DATE REVISION

.,m WDEL B FPESH REL SHIPPilE C0hTAlfER Bdi-GFP PACKAGEIDUSA/6205/AF DOCKET 71-6206

.. EXHIBIT B~

SECTION: SHIPPiliG SAFETY #MLYSIS '

7. 3 40 INCH Pt_N DR0p TEST: (continued) r.round top circumference) was placed on the ground and the container raised above the pin to a height of 40 inches to the top of the pin..The container was angled.in such a manner as to present the undamaged side of the cover to the pin. Upon. release, the container cover struck the pin squarely and rolled over on its side to the floor. Photographs were taken of the container and pin imediately thereafter.

7.3.1 The container was then uprighted and the cover removed for examination of the container contents.

7.3.2 See Section 8 for RESULTS OF THE TEST SERIES.

8.0 TEST RESULTS:

8.1 Photographs were taken during the test series and are included in Appendix B.

I 8.1.1 The following is a list of the photographs and an explanation of what they depict:

PHOTO NO.

DEPICTION 1

Showing container prior to release during drop #1 1

Bottom Drop -- 30'. Rotational. NOTE: That the l

container angled in relation to crane boom.

2 Immediately after Drop #1. NOTE: The splintered l

skids (FWD END) 3 AFT END - this end suffered the rotational impact l

and bottom end plate distortion of 1 in out of-

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vertical plane. Also the pork chop was severely distorted.

i 4

Showing cover removed - general view looking P4D.

The support rod broke loose from its storage position and is leaning against clamp bow. Frame and fuel cells essentially intact.

4-10-85 DATE REVISION NO.

O PAGE 4

CURREKr REVISION:

SUPERCEDES:' PAGE USSRC APPR'?.'AL REFERE';CE DATE REV1SiON

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5DDEL B FPESH REL SHIPPIra CDUTAltER B&W-OFP 4

PACKAGEIDUSA/6206/AF DOCKER 71-6206 EXHIBIT B 3CT10N: SHIPPING SAFETY #MLYSIS 8.1.1 Continued PHOTO NO.

DEPICTION l

5.

General view looking AFT.

6.

Showing P4D END - Left side shock mount broken loose from suspension frame. Also note container l

shell directly under frame is formed around skid angle.

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7.

Showing AFT END - right side shock mount broken f

loose and locally distorted channel adjacent to

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shock mount. Also side and top pressure pads loose I

as a result of end gate pivot rods slipping out of sleeve brackets when frame bottomed out on skid angle. This caused permanent set in frame rails which in turn loosened top and side pressure pads. The fuel cell on this side slid AFT 5/8".

j 8.

Showing FWD END with 5/8" clearance between end gate end fuel cell as a result of cell shifting AFT.

9.

Showing local distortion of vertical poison plate caused by longitudinal bending (1/2" out of plane).

10.

Showing local distortion of frame alongside broken shear mount at AFT END.

11.

Showing FWD END - bottom inside container - NOTE:

skin formed over skid angle from frame bottoming out.

12.

Showing AFT END view immediately after Drop #2 COVER DROP - INVERTED.

13.

Showing 3/4 view from AFT END.

14.

Showing container in upright position after Drop #2.

15.

Showing stacking bracket depressed and tear in skin.

16.

Showing container suspended above pin for Drop #3 DATE 4-10-85 REVISION 10.

O PAGE 5

CURRENT REVISION:

SUPERCEDES: PAGE USNRC A:?ROVAL REFERE'CE DATE REVISION

mDEL B FRESH FUEL SHIPPlf6 C0fEAliER B&W-GFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SHIPPlfiG SACETY A'MLYSIS EXHIBIT B 8.1.1 Continued PHOTO NO.

DEPICTION 16.

40 in. PIN DROP TEST.

17.

Same as #16 - opposite side.

18.

Showing container on its side immediately after 40 in. PIN DROP. A 6 in. long cut through the skin resulted from the sharp edge of the dummy fuel cell inside the container striking the skin directly on the pin.

19.

Showing container opened for examination after l

40 in. PIN DROP. NOTE: The frame is still suspended by the shock mounts with thE exception of one mount at each end which broke from Drop #1.

Close inspection reveals all of the clamp bows on the right side are bent as a result of impact from Drop #2 COVER DROP but still retain the fuel cells in a " NUCLEAR SAFE CONFIGURATION."

20.

Showing view looking AFT (right side) - NOTE:

cracks in clamp bows where they contact the pressure pads. Full force of the impact from Drop #2 was taken by these members and although four were loose after the drop, the remaining five on this side were quite adequate to retain the fuel cell in its relative position to the other cell.

21.

Showing view looking AFT - Left Side. NOTE:

clamp bows and pressure pads undamage.1 but pressure pads at 3 stations were loose from frame distortion.

22.

Showing close-up view of AFT END, NOTE: broken shock mount attachment to the frame and end DATE 4-10-85 REVISION NO.

O PAGE 6

CURRENT REVISION:

SUPERCELES: PAGE USNRC AP? ROYAL REFEF.E!CE MTE REVISION,,

mDEL B FRESH FUEL SHIPPIfra C0!!TAINER B&JI-GFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SHIPPING SAFEiY RMLYSIS EXHIBIT B 8.1.1 Continued PHOTO NO.

DEPICTION 22.

gate pivot pins out of their sockets. Also note that clamp bow on near side is cracked and loose but clamp bow next to it is still tight and capable of restraining fuel cell.

23.

Showing AFT EilD with fuel cell and end gate ass'y removed to expose "T" support casting which cama through tests undamaged and maintained a " NUCLEAR St.FE CO.FIGU".?.TI0'!" lateral spe 7g between cells of 2 11/16".

)

8.2 Measurements of container shell distortion disclosed that that basic configuration of the base had been little affected by the drop tests and the maximum cistortion resulted from the COVER DROP (Drop #2).

8.2.1 The ends of the cover received the full force of the impact directly on the two stacking brackets which were depressed to a greater degree than the cover shell itself. Actual measurement disclosed the cover shel:1 had been uniformly depressed 3 inches throughout its length.

(See Fig. I)

ORIGINAL SHELL C U RVAW Ry

'g 3 m. Dsn.E5 510 Ff I"T'" E I U N #'T H FIG I 4__ __ _ _. _.

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DATE 4-10-85 REVISION NO.

O PAGE 7 CU'3E!ir REVISION:

SUPERCEDES: PAGE USSRC APPROVAL REFERE!CE DATE REVISION

mDEL B FRESH FUEL SHIPPIfra Q!ITAltER P&I-GFP PACKAGEID' USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SHIPPIf5 SAFETY A W.YSIS EXHIBIT'B 8.2.2

.At no time during the testsidid the' sealing flange' hardware.

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either break or even locsen. All we' e checked after each drop.

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-8.2.3 The photographs'.in APPENDIX B clearly show external areas of-local container distortion which,. considering the. drop heights. were.of minor consideration.

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DATE 4YoV5 REVISION NO.

O PAGE B

CURRErff REVISION:

SUPERCEDES: PAGE USNRC A?? ROYAL REFERENCE DATE REVISION l

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ITDEL B FESH REL SHIPPIIE ONAiER -

. BFM-GFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: - SHIPPING SATlY #MLYSIS APPENDIX A'to EXHIBIT B TEST DIAGRAfts J

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j Docket No. 71-5450 Initial Subnittal Date:

12/20/85 Page No. 2-1 Revision Subnittal Date:

05/26/89 Rev. No.

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ATIAGMDC 3 DE!rERMDOCION OF MINIMUM DISTANG BETIWEEN PAIRS OF FUEL ASSDEZES cuter.wz2E 'IO 102R71 ACCIDENT SEQUDiG D:xist No. 71-5450 Initial Sutnittal Date:

12/20/85 Page No._lL-l_

Revision Sutnittal Date:

05/26/89 Rev. No. 1

s

.j ATTACHMENT 3 l

I Determination of minimum distance between pairs of fuel assemblies subsequent to 10CFR71, Appendix B, accident sequence.

1.

PURPOSE Determination of -the minimum separation between pairs of fuel assemblies subsequent to the accident sequence outlined in 10CFR71,-

)

Appendix B, is provided in this section.

If the separation between j

i fue) assemblies in adjacent containers is greater than seven (7)'

inches, then the accident sequence will. not produce.

arrangement I

an that is more reactive than that analyzed under General Criticality

?

Standards (Attachment 19).

2.

METHOD

/

l Using the test results (Attachment 1) from a similar container that l

vas subjected to the drop tests outlined in 10CFR71, Appendix B, and

.i deCign comparison data for the tested container and the RCC j

l designated class of containers (Attachment 2), the minimte distance j

j between pairs of fuel assemblies can be quantified.

j 3.

ASSUMPTIONS a.

Each container sustains a three (3) inch depression in its lid relative to the exterior container skin (Figure 3-1).

)

b.

When subjected to the thermal test, the shock mounts of both containers burn away.

c.

A zero gravity condition is assumed to allow the container internals ad fuel assemblies to be mobile within the container shell.

d.

A top-to-top container configuration will be used since the I

structural material in the support frame limits spacing of assemblies in b)ttom-to-top and tcp-to-bottom configuration (Figure 3-2).

e.

The two (2) fuel ass?mblies, the neutron poison plates, and the steel strongback are retained within the design relationship and all are retained within the container shell.

4.

RESULTS From the information contained in Westinghouse Drawings 2851C58, 1596E22, and 1596E23, together with the information in Attachments 1 and 2,

the minimum distance between pairs of fuel assemblies is considered to be seven (7) inches.

This is conservative with respect to actual measurements in that the.

container shell was considered to be crushed to the level of the internal structural members for its full length and entire periphery 1

(Figure 3-2).

1 WP2991E:3p.12 1

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l FIGURE 3-1.

THREE (3) INCH DEPRESSION IN LID RELATIVE TO EXTERIOR SKIN

-]

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i l

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N m y yj k(4d8

..y w

gs Ef/)fdx i.

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FIGURE 3-2.

MINIMUM DISTANCE IN RCC TOP-TO-TOP CONTAINER CONFIGURATION OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES WITH SKIN OMITTED FOR CLARITY.

2 o

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WESTINGICUSE SHIPPING CINDLINER i

mmcatm matusIs 1

i 4

a y

1 1

4

- l l

l I

i i

Docket No. 71-5450~

Initial Submittal Date:

12/20/85' Pege No. 19-1 Revision Submittal Date:

05/26/09-Rev. No.

3 l

i i

(

MESTINECUSE SKEPPDG CulmdNER OtITIQWITY ANALYSIS IN2BODUCTI M critimlity em1rm1meirma are parfamed usirg the AMPX acxkles NIThWL arx1 XSG4NPM fcar E-

- ---% Wim and IGN>-IV for. eigerwalue calcm21ations. 2hase authods have been benchmariced to various critical experiments and are ncar used exclusively far fuel assembly criticality-calculations.

In addition to the standard 3t00 container (copper ah plates), an

~

u g.ded ROC ocmtainer with Gd 0 oonted carbon steel h plah-r 23 is analyzed.

The Westinghouse design criterion'for the general criticality. standards for the shippirq oantainers is that Qg'is less than or equal to.0.95-en a best estimate basis with welate biases and one-sided 95/95 uncertainties for the==v4== credible accident (MCA) for "r*f4==

moderation" canditions.-

The MCA model for the ROC container analysis'was either two flooded ocntainers crushed together such that the amammhlies are separated by seven inches of moderator or an infinha number of containers crushed together such that the amaamblies are separated by seven irx:hes of.

l noderator en one side, sixteen inches en two sides,- and 30 inches of acderator en the fourth side. The container shall is assumed to be'in place, with adjacent container shells in contact with each other.

i Docket No. 71-5450-Initial Subnittal Date:

12/20/85 Page No. 19-2 Revision Subnittal Date:

'05/26/89- - Rev. No. -

3

.j l

- _ - _ _ - - _ - _ _ - - _ _ = _ _ _ -

4

' with an ir. finite raaber of crushed caritainers (Figure IA)'

In the worst case, the best estimate K,gg was found to be less.than 0.865. As a i

result, the fuel abi.T ng ocmtainers with carbon steel or copper abarn+=r

' plates under q+4== moderation canditices, are bounded by the full moderator density cases and exhibit no critionlity, safety problems.

. Se WestincAouse 14x14,16x16,15x15 and 17x17 fuel types with U-235 anri&ments of up to 4.0, 4.0, 3.65 and 3.65 w/o respsatively can be ahiW with copper aharwhar plates under finite and infinite array Ita canditions and not avr==4 the criticality criterian of K,gg less than or equal to 0.95 for full density water and K,gg less than or equal to 0.98' for opHun moderation conditions. S e Westindha w 17x17 standard fuel anaambly with the carbon steel absorber plates and U-235 enrichment yp to 3.55 w/o can also be shipped under the same canditions.

Figure 3 shows th9 relationship (calculated by IEOPARD) ~ between K,ff and j

rod pitch for a

  • hree rod types. In an d case it is obvious that the drier the lattik, the less reactive it is. A square tight-packed lattice of individual fuel rods is, therefore, less reactive than those same fuel 1

rods in a fuel amaambly. 'Ibe fuel maaambly is, therefore, the limiting case for fuel rod abi= =nts.

I

'Ihe u gadhi ROC shipping container has two mF= M2 plates made of carbon r

steel, 0.035 inches in thickness, with 0.02g - Gd 0 /cm2 23 affixed to each side of the plate. S e MCA problem used in this analysis consists of an infinite number of crushed containers as given in Figure 1A. Five i

Westinghouse fuel assembly types were analyzed in this RCC shipping container. R ose were the 14x14 OTA, 15.15 OFA, 16x16 C-80 and 17x17 OFA/STD. S e applicable fuel types for the OFA fuel==aanblian are shown

.in Table 3.

l Table 8==narizes the RENO r=Ta> lated ntninal K,gg for each of the five problems analyzed. Se EENO itput listings are in Tables 9 thraucA 12A, l

Docket No. 71-5450 Initial Sutnittal Date:

12/20/85 Page No. 19-6 Revision Sutnittal Date:

05/26/89 Rev. No.

3

_2___

y 1

und tb rmclide/rmelide number wu.w.Lv is given in Table 13.

'!he '

Westinghouse 17x17 OFA, STD and Westin @rulaa 15x15 OFA fuel namamblies' with U-235 enrichments of g to 4.45, 4.7 and 4.3, w/o~can be shiW under l

'KA conditions and not exceed the criticality criterion of K,gg'less than or equal to 0.95.

Furthermore, Westinghouse 14x14 0FA,16x16 and

~16x16 C-80 fuel ammamblies with U-235 anrid tus of up to 5.w/o can also be shiW under MCA conditions. Enrichments greater than 5 w/o were not ocnsidered in this study for those three fuel amammbly types.

The w ded Roc shippirg container with the two Gd 02 3 coated absorber plates was also analyzed usirq the 4.vaiation of the MCA problem with an infinite number of crushed containers (Figuilt la) under optimum moderation conditions. It' was again found that the optimum moderation cases are bounded by the full moderator density cases, with the worst case best estimate K,gg under optimum moderation conditions less than 0.92.

As a result the shipping containers with two Gd 02 3 coated absorter plates exhibit no criticality safety problems under optimum moderation conditions.

, Ihe Westinghouse 17x17 OFA, 17x17 STD and 15x15 OFA fuel assemblies with U-235 areWmir..nt.s of up to 4.45, 4.70 and 4 3 w/o can be shipped under the l

infinite array MCA conditions and not exceed the criticality criterion of a

K,gg less than or equal to 0.95 for optimum moderation conditions (full density water). Furthermore, Westinghouse 14x14 OFA,16x16 and C-8016x16 fuel assemblies with U-235 enrictiments of up to 5.0 w/o can also be sh1 % under the same coniitions.

CONCIllSION A Monte Carlo criticality. analysis of the ROC shipping container under finite array and infinite array conditions, with copper a'w-a-2 plates

.j has demonstrated that, at enrichments of 4.0, 3.65, 4.0, and 3.65 w/o, the'.

i Docket No. 71-5450 Initial S'.:bmittal Date:

12/20/85 Page No. 19-7 Revision Submittal Date:

05/26/89 Rev. No.

3

t e

a

, Westdrgbr=== 14x14 OFA,15.15 OFA,16x 16, and 17.17 OFA fuel ammamblies, r===+1vely, can be. safely sh4W without risk of criticality. 'Jhe analysis has also shown that, since loose fuel rods in a tight lattion are less reactive than fuel assemblies, loose fuel rods of the above I

enrid ius can also be safely ah4W in the ROC ocntainer. With the carbon steel absorber plates, the Merite Carlo criticality analysis of the ROC shipping oantainer has demonstrated that, at an enrichment of 3.55 j

4 w/o, the 17x17 fuel ammamblies can be safely sh4W without risk of I

criticality.

'Ihe Monte Qtrio criticality analysis of the upgraded ROC shipping container under infinite array canditions, using Gd 02 3 abso**r plates has Miini= Lated that, at enrichments of 5.0, 4.3, 5.0, 5.0, 4.45 and 4.7

)

w/o, the 14x14 OFA,15x15 OFA,16x16, C-8016x16 and the 17x17 OFA and STD fuel assemblies, respectively, can be safely ah4W without risk of criticality.

i i

I i

I Docket No. 71-5450 Initial Subnittal Date:

12/20/85 Pege No. 19-8

\\

Revision Subnittal Date:

_05/26/89 Rev. No.

3 l

J I

a

. sg * - ;

TMEER 3GNO ChIGIATED RESUIES l

.i ren um unxmm au:orats arrmwr (ROC Caritainer with Gd203 ' Aharw'wr Plates)

KENO U-235' NCMINAL PUEL TYPE ENRICHMDrP K-eff~

l' SIGR 1

W 15x15 OFA 4.3 W/O I0.93906 0.00335' W 17x17 STD 4.7 W/O 0.95479-O.00309_

h W 17x17 OFA 4.45 W/O 0.92697' 0.00366 W 14x14 OFA 5.0 W/O 0.92391

.0.00311 W 16x16 5.0 W/O 0.92391 0.00311

'I C-80 16x16 5.0 W/O!

0.92935.

0.00307 l

Docket No. 71-5450 Initial Subnittal Date:

12/20/85 Page No. 19-20 Revision Suhnittal' Date:

05/26/89 Rev.'No.

3 I

e

+

3 TABLE 12 LISTING OF KENO INPUT OATA POR THE W 17Xt7 0FA FUEL PROBLEM j

'4.45 W/0170FA IN 00 PO!$0NED CASK WITH 7* CRU$H GAP H20=1.0 0/CC 3.7 000 300 s 27 27.20 e 23 30 10 18 is 1 -20 1 0 1011 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 l

00 0 0 51888 1

-1. -1. at.

-1.

-1. -1.

1 -192235 0.0060574 1

192338 0.022417 1

18018 0.048848 2

240302 0.043330 31001 0.006054 8

88018 0.033427 4

834000 0.017386 4

325085 0.001732 4

1 4

329000

0. AS019 4

328000 0.008142

.l 5

380iG 0.00981210 B

364152 0.000013083 5

394154 0.000142503 5

394155 0.000985129 5

3841H 0.001339027 5

304157 0.001023731 5

394158 0.001024888 8

304100 0.001428952 i

8 320000 0.0842012 5

38012 0.00047290 8

325085 0.00028871 8

315031 0.00005607 8

316032 0.00006642 BOX TYPE 1 CYL!NDER 1 0.392178 366.76 -0.0 27*0.5 CYLINDER 0 0.40005 385.76 -0.0 27*0.5 l

CYLINDER 2 0.4R'20 366.76 -0.0 27*0.6 I

cuto!D 3

0.02892 -0.02882 0.02992 -0.820s2 366.78 -0.0 27*0.5 l

toX TYPE 2 i

CYLINotR 3 0.59898 356.76 -0.0 27*0.5 CYLINORR 2 0.00198 306.16 -0.0 2780.5 C300!0 3

0.82002 -0.82892 0.82902

-0.82582 388.76 -0.0 2780.5 BOX TYPE 3 1

Cut 0!D 8

0.4572 0.0 0.0

-0.45720 366.76 -0.0 27*0.5 0UB010 3

2.9872 0.0 0.0

=0.45720 385.78 -0.0 27*0.8 80X TYPE 4 00B010 5

0.82002 -0.62002 0.0

-0.45720 365.78 -0.0 27*0.5 BOX TYPE 5 Ous010 8

0.89789 0.80859 0.82002 *0.82982 385.78 -0.0 27 0.5 Cus3!O 5

0.90805- 0.79883 0.62892 -0.82992 365.78 -0.0 27 0.3 j

Cut 010 3

2.99710 0.45720 0.82002 -0.82882 365.75 -0.0 27*0.5 CUB 0!O 3

2.99720 4.0 0.82992

-0 (2982 305.76 -0.0 27*0.5 toX TYPE 5 CUB 0!D 8

0.45720 0.0 0.02992 -0.02892 388.78 -0.0 2780.8 CU30!O 3

2.90720 0.0 0.82992 -0.82882 308.76 -0.0 27*0.6 00X TYPE 7 0U0010 3

0.82992 -0.82982 8.88000 0.0 305.76 -0.0 27*0.5 90K TYPE 8 CU50!D 8

0.48720 0.0 2.71272 0.0 365.78 -0.0 27*0.5

)

Cue 0!O 3

2.es720 t,. 0 s.s0000 0.0 385.7e -0.0 27*0.5 i

l Docket lio. 71-5450 Initial Subitittal !bte:-

_12/_2_0/,8,5__

Page lio. 19-27 Revision submittal Date:

05/26/89 Rev. 110.

3 1

J

i og **

s

,l 7ABLE 12 l

(CONTINUtD)

Box 7YPE 9 CUSOID 8

0.88788 0.80899 0.82992 0.18285 365.75 -0.0 27*0.5 CUSOID 5

0.00805 0.79083 0.82992 0.18288 305.78 -0.0 27*0.5 CUS010 3

2.pe720 0.48730 0.82992 -0.02002 305.78 -0.0 2780.5 0USOID 8

2.98720 0.0 0.82902 -0.82992 305.78 -0.0 27*0.5 BOX TYPE to OUROIO 8

0.89789 0.50058 =0.20072 -0.82992 305.76 0.0 27*0.6 CUBOID E

0.00405 0.70887 -0.28872 -0.82882 305.78 -0.0 2780.5

)

CUBOID 3

3.99720 0.45720 0.02882 -0.92302 305.78 -0.0 2780.5 J

OUB0!D 8

2.99720 0.0 0.02982 *0.02902 395.78 -0.0 27*0.5 CORE BDY 0 12.20724 -fa.20724 17.28724 -13.47Y24 365.78 +0.0 2780.5 4

CUB 030 3

12.20724 -32.52724 17.28724 -B1.12004 395.78 -0.0 27*0.5 0U0010 8

12.30724 -32.75230 17.51330 -51.34010 365.75 -0.0 2780.5 1 1 18 1 1 1s 1

1 1

1 0

2 3 15 3 7 13 3

1 1

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1 2 4 14 to s 15 to 1

1 1

0

)

2. e 12 3 4 to 12 1

1 1

0 3 1s 18.1 1

1 1

1 i

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4 1 17 1 1 1

1 1

1 1

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1 1

1 0

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1 1

1 0

g 7 1 17 t 19 19 1

1 1

1 0

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1 1

1 0

9 18 is t 2 2

1 1

1 1

0 10 18 18 1 17 17 1

1 1

1 1

+1 END ktN0

( EOP.)

i i

l l

Docket No. 71-5450 Initial Submittal Date:

_1,2/_20/85_

Page No.19-28 Revision Submittal I:ete:

05/26/89 Rev. No.

3

U.

. p..

)

i ABSORBER l

PLATE}

BOUNDARY CONDIT10N: J=0 l

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$~

'ty STEEL $ KIN}

l l

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1 I

g u - -.L - - - - - - - -

x. - - - - - - - -... J SOUNDARY CONDITION:

(=0 i

FIGURE 1 RCC SHIPPING CONTAINER MCA GEOMETRY 1

Docket No. 71-5450 Initial Submittal Inte:

_J2j_20],85_

Page No.19-33 Revision Submittal Date:

05/26/89 Rev. No.

3 b

. d ** I,

4 ABSORBER PLATE}

BOUNDARY CONDITION: #D -

s.'s "

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1

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o BOUNDARY CONDITION:

  1. 0 Steel Container Shell FIGURE L A

-RCC SHIPPIllG CONTAINER GE0!1ETRY FOR Tile INFINITE ARRAY CALCULATI0fl!

Docket No. 71-5450 Initial Submittal Date:

_12L20/85_

Fage No.19-34 Revision Submittal Date:

05/26/89 Rev. No.

3-