Text

5-CN-2020-04-Draft Operating Test 1-2-3
	ML20241A245
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	08/04/2020
From:	Greg Werner; Operations Branch IV
To:	; Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
References
	Download: ML20241A245 (518)
	v • d • e

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 4/27/2020 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: CN-2020-4 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

A1, modified SKL034-21 Drywell Average Temperature Calculation Conduct of Operations R, M (Normal Method) IAW 5.8.10 K/A G2.1.23 (4.3)

Conduct of Operations N/A A2, Determine mechanical and electrical isolation boundaries for seal Equipment Control R, N replacement on REC Pump B K/A G2.2.13 (4.1)

From Previous 2 exams randomly selected 3/2017 ILT A4 Radiation Control R, P, D A3. Determine Workers Projected Total Dose (using survey map) 2.3.14 (3.4)

A4, Calculate DW release rate IAW Emergency Plan Implementing Emergency Plan R, D Procedure 5.7.16 K/A G2.4.39 (3.9)

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)

Rev 1

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 4/27/2020 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: CN-2020-4 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

A5, From Previous 2 exams randomly selected 9/2018 NRC SA5 Conduct of Operations R, P, D Review IST stroke time surveillance for RRMG ventilation dampers (plant OE)

K/A G2.1.20 (4.6)

A6, Determine reportability for Control Room Emergency Filtration System BF-C-1A Emergency Booster Fan non-functional in Conduct of Operations Mode 1. (Group 6 occurs due to R, N inadvertent short (invalid ESF actuation) while I&C working in panel, CREF fan motor fails) (Procedure 2.0.5)

K/A 2.1.18 (3.8), 2.1.20 (4.6)

A7, SKL0345061 (modified to rod 10-11) -

Determine TS Actions for Removal of a Equipment Control R, M Single CRD during Refueling K/A 2.2.40 (4.7)

A8, Determine emergency dose limit, estimated exposure, and whether KI authorization is Radiation Control required for operator to manually close R, N RCIC-MO-15 K/A G2.3.4 (3.7)

A9, SKL034-30-64 (Emergency Classification)

Emergency Plan R, D K/A G2.4.41 (4.6)

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

Type Codes and Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1, randomly selected)

Rev 1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 12 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-1(RO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 12 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Calculate Average Drywell Temperature Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to calculate average Drywell temperature.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee interpreted the meter and recorder readings from Handout 3 and calculated Average Drywell temperature using Procedure 5.8.10 Attachment 1 IAW the answer key.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 12 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 12 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 295028 EA2.01 (4.0/4.1) 2.1.23 (4.3/4.4)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 200226A0501 Conduct Average Drywell Calculations for EOPs

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step in bold

References:

1. 5.8.10 AVERAGE DRYWELL TEMPERATURE CALCULATION (Rev 8)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

2. 5.8.10 AVERAGE DRYWELL TEMPERATURE CALCULATION

3. Pictures of the following recorders/indicators; PC-TI-508A, PC-TI-505E, PC-TI-510A, PC-TR-502 (CH 1), PC-TR-502 (CH 2)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 12 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1, 2, and 3.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 12 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.8.10, Section 3.

Critical Step NOTE - If any of instruments on Attachment 1 are not available, go to Step 3.2.

Standard Examinee read the note and then referred to pictures provided and determined that step 3.1 is the correct step to perform the calculation.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 3.1 Using Attachment 1, Normal Average Drywell Temperature Data Sheet, calculate average drywell temperature as follows:

3.1.1 Record time that data is taken.

Standard Examinee recorded the current time on Attachment 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 12

3. Procedure Step: 3.1.2 Record temperatures from following instruments (VBD-H):

Critical step 3.1.2.1 PC-TI-508A, RX HEAD FLANGE TEMP (0).

Standard Examinee recorded 205-210.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 3.1.2.2 PC-TI-505E, ZONE 2B TEMP (288).

Critical step Standard Examinee recorded 190-195.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 3.1.2.3 PC-TI-510A, ZONE 2C TEMP (0).

Critical step Standard Examinee recorded 220-225.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 12

6. Procedure Step: 3.1.2.4 PC-TR-502, RECIRC PUMPS AREA TEMP (CH 1: PUMP A).

Critical step Standard Examinee recorded 180.7.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: 3.1.2.5 PC-TR-502 RECIRC PUMPS AREA TEMP (CH 2: PUMP B).

Critical step Standard Examinee recorded 179.4.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: 3.1.3 Multiply readings recorded in Step 3.1.2 by weight factor and record answer to nearest Critical step whole number.

3.1.3.1 PC-TI-508A x 0.1.

Standard Examinee multiplied reading from Step 3.1.2.1 by 0.1 and recorded result on Attachment 1 (Acceptable range 20-21).

Cue Notes Rounding answer to the nearest whole number is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 12

9. Procedure Step: 3.1.3.2 PC-TI-505E x 0.2.

Critical step Standard Examinee multiplied reading from Step 3.1.2.2 by 0.2 and recorded result on Attachment 1 (Acceptable range 38-39).

Cue Notes Rounding answer to the nearest whole number is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: 3.1.3.3 PC-TI-510A x 0.1.

Critical step Standard Examinee multiplied reading from Step 3.1.2.3 by 0.1 and recorded result on Attachment 1 (Acceptable range 22-23).

Cue Notes Rounding answer to the nearest whole number is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: 3.1.3.4 PC-TR-502 (CH 1) x 0.3.

Critical step Standard Examinee multiplied reading from Step 3.1.2.4 by 0.3 and recorded result on Attachment 1 (Acceptable range 54-55).

Cue Notes Rounding answer to the nearest whole number is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 12

12. Procedure Step: 3.1.3.5 PC-TR-502 (CH 2) x 0.3.

Critical step Standard Examinee multiplied reading from Step 3.1.2.5 by 0.3 and recorded result on Attachment 1 (Acceptable range 53-54).

Cue Notes Rounding answer to the nearest whole number is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step: 3.1.4 Add products of Steps 3.1.3.1 through 3.1.3.5 to determine average drywell temperature.

Critical step Standard Examinee added results from Step 3.1.3.1 through 3.1.3.5 and recorded Average Drywell Temperature on Attachment 1 (Acceptable range 187 to 192).

Cue Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 12 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY Do NOT give to examinee INSTRUMENT READING WEIGHT FACTOR SUM TIME PC-TI-508A 205 to 210 x 0.1 = 20 to 21 PC-TI-505E 190 to 195 x 0.2 = 38 to 39 PC-TI-510A 220 to 225 x 0.1 = 22 to 23 PC-TR-502 (CH 1) 180.7 x 0.3 = 54 to 55 PC-TR-502 (CH 2) 179.4 x 0.3 = 53 to 54 AVERAGE DRYWELL TEMPERATURE (SUM) = 187 to 192 Current time Completed By: Date:

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Reactor is scrammed.

2. Drywell pressure is 4.1 psig and rising slowly.

3. PMIS is unavailable.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to determine Average Drywell Temperature using EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE 5.8.10 AVERAGE DRYWELL TEMPERATURE CALCULATION.

/

Signature Date

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 12 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-2 (RO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 12 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine Mechanical and Electrical Isolation Boundaries Tabletop # 1 Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 30 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to identify the mechanical and electrical isolation boundaries for a clearance order.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee identified the MINIMUM mechanical and electrical boundaries to perform maintenance on REC Pump B per Procedure 0.9, Tagout, IAW the answer key. The motor space heater breaker and control switches should be identified but are not critical steps.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 12 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 12 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.2.13 (4.1/4.3)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 299012O0301, Develop Tagouts

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step in bold

References:

1. 0.9, Tagout (Rev 101)

2. Burns & Roe Drawing 2031 Sheet 2

3. Burns & Roe Drawing 3006 Sheet 5

4. Burns & Roe Drawing 3029 Sheet 1

5. Burns & Roe Drawing 3031 Sheet 3

6. Burns & Roe Drawing 3037 Sheet 6

7. SOP 2.2.65 REACTOR EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (Rev 66)

8. SOP 2.2.65.1 REC OPERATIONS (Rev 80)

9. 2.2A.REC.DIV1, REACTOR EQUIPMENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM COMPONENT CHECKLIST (DIV 1) (Rev 1)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Computer to access prints and procedures Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 12 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 12 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: May reference Procedure 0.9.

Standard Examinee referenced Procedure 0.9.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT NOTE to Examiner: Following steps can be completed in any order.

2. Procedure Step: (Procedure 0.9, Tagout)

9. GENERATING A TAGOUT SECTION NOTE 1 - All Tagouts shall be prepared using controlled plant documents (plant drawings, procedures, etc.) except as allowed by Step 3.7.

Standard Examinee references B&R 2031 Sh2, 3006 Sh5, 3029 Sh1, 3031 Sh2, 3037 Sh6, SOP 2.2.65 & 2.2.65.1, 2.2A.REC.DIV1, as necessary, to determine boundaries.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 12

3. Procedure Step: 9.5.2 Determine components to be tagged, required position of each component, and tagging sequence necessary to cover planned activity.

Standard Examinee determined REC-SW-SS(RCC-B), REC Pump B Normal/Standby Switch is required to be Caution Tagged in NORMAL.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 9.5.2 Determine components to be tagged, required position of each component, and tagging sequence necessary to cover planned activity.

Standard Examinee determined REC-SW-RECPB, Control Switch for REC Pump B is required to be Caution Tagged in NORMAL AFTER STOP.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT 5 Procedure Step: 9.5.2 Determine components to be tagged, required position of each component, and tagging sequence necessary to cover Critical step planned activity.

Standard Examinee determined breaker EE-MCC-K(4D), REC PUMP B is required to be Danger Tagged in OFF(open) .

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 12 6 Procedure Step: 9.5.2 Determine components to be tagged, required position of each component, and tagging sequence necessary to cover planned activity.

Standard Examinee determined breaker EE-PNL-LPR1F(34), REC PUMP B MOTOR HEATER is required to be Danger Tagged in OFF(open).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT 7 Procedure Step: 9.5.2 Determine components to be tagged, required position of each component, and tagging sequence necessary to cover Critical step planned activity.

Standard Examinee determined REC-V-13, REC PUMP B DISCHARGE is required to be Danger Tagged closed.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT 8 Procedure Step: 9.5.2 Determine components to be tagged, required position of each component, and tagging sequence necessary to cover Critical step planned activity.

Standard Examinee determined REC-V-12, REC PUMP B SUCTION is required to be Danger Tagged closed.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 12 9 Procedure Step: 9.5.2 Determine components to be tagged, required position of each component, and tagging sequence necessary to cover planned Critical step activity.

Standard Examinee determined REC-V-179, REC PUMP B SUCTION DRAIN is required to be Danger Tagged open, Caution Tagged, Step Tagged or No Tagged Open.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT 10 Procedure Step: 9.5.2 Determine components to be tagged, required position of each component, and tagging sequence necessary to cover planned Critical step activity.

Standard Examinee determined REC-V-685, REC PUMP B VENT is required to be Danger Tagged open, Caution Tagged, Step Tagged or No Tagged Open.

Cue Notes JPM Is COMPLETE.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 12 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY (Do NOT give to Examinee)

Component Tag Type Tagged Position

REC-SW-SS(RCC-B), REC Pump CAUTION NORMAL B Normal/Standby Switch (Examinee may not tag, not required)

REC-SW-RECPB, Control Switch CAUTION NORMAL AFTER STOP for REC Pump B Breaker EE-MCC-K(4D), REC DANGER OFF PUMP B (Critical Step)

Breaker EE-PNL-LPR1F(34), REC DANGER OFF PUMP B MOTOR HEATER Valve REC-V-13, REC PUMP B CLOSED DANGER DISCHARGE (Critical Step)

Valve REC-V-12, REC PUMP B CLOSED DANGER SUCTION (Critical Step)

DANGER,

Valve REC-V-179, REC PUMP B CAUTION, NO OPEN SUCTION DRAIN TAG OR STEP TAG OPEN

Valve REC-V-685, REC PUMP B DANGER, CAUTION, NO VENT TAG OR STEP TAG

NOT critical

ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 1 of 2)

DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The Plant is at 100% Power.

2. Work Week preparations are in progress.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to determine the minimum boundaries to tagout REC-P-B, Reactor Equipment Cooling Pump B for pump replacement.

Record the required components and corresponding tag type and tagged position on the attached sheet.

ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 2 of 2)

Component Tag Type Tagged Position (Attach additional sheets, if needed)

Performed by: Date:

(Signature)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 12 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-3 (RO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 12 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Apply Radiation and Contamination safety procedures Version 1 Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to determine a workers estimated dose and whether GMPO authorization is required in accordance with CNS radiation protection procedures.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined the projected dose a worker will receive and that CNS Administrative dose limitations that require GMPO authorization will not be exceeded, in accordance with Procedure 9.ALARA.1, Dosimetry Administration, and Answer Key.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 12 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 12 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.3.14 (3.4/3.8)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 299027O0404 Apply Radiation and Contamination safety procedures

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 9.ALARA.1, Dosimetry Administration (Rev 48)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator

2. Computer Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

3. Attachment 3 - Radiological Survey Map for Rx 903 Angle Valve Room Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

2. Attachment 3 - Radiological Survey Map for Rx 903 Angle Valve Room

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 12 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 2 and 3.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 12 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: Determine dose for area directly outside the Rx 903 Angle Critical Step Valve room.

Standard Examinee determined dose for Staging - staging time in access area directly outside the Rx 903 Angle Valve room (45 min) 0.75 Hr X 5 mr/hr = 3.75 mrem (Accept 3.7 to 3.8 mrem).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: Determine dose for area directly inside the Rx 903 Angle Valve Critical Step room.

Standard Examinee determined dose for Staging - staging time in area directly inside the Rx 903 Angle Valve room step off pad.

(15 min) 0.25 Hr X 16 mr/hr = 4 mrem.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: Determine dose for work in RHR-MO-25B area.

Critical Step Standard Examinee determined dose for work - work time at RHR-MO-25B 1.5 Hr X 325 mr/hr = 487.5 mrem (Acceptable range 487 to 488 mrem).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 12

4. Procedure Step: Determine transition dose.

Critical Step Standard Examinee determined dose for transition - an additional 5 mrem will be accumulated for transitions per initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: Determine de-staging dose.

Critical Step Standard Examinee determined dose for de-staging - an additional 15 mrem will be accumulated for de-staging activities per initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: Determine total projected dose for the worker.

Critical Step Standard Examinee determined total dose for job-Total = 3.75 + 4 + 487.5

+ 5 + 15 = 515.25 mrem (Acceptable range 514.7 to 515.8 mrem).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 12

7. Procedure Step: Determines Worker admin limit authorizations.

Critical Step Standard Examinee determined Worker would NOT require authorization due to already having greater than 2000 mrem and not reaching next admin limit of 3000 mrem since accumulated dose 2415 mrem + estimated dose 515.25 =

2930.25 (Acceptable range 2929.7 to 2930.8 mrem) per Procedure 9.ALARA.1 Step 5.5.

Cue Notes JPM is COMPLETE.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 12 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY (Do NOT give to Examinee)

WORKER INITIAL DOSE 2415 mrem PROJECTED DOSE 514.7 to 515.8 mrem PROJECTED TOTAL DOSE 2929.7 to 2930.8 mrem CNS ADMIN DOSE LIMIT REQUIRING YES NO GMPO AUTHORIZATION EXCEEDED?

(Circle Yes or No)

ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 1 of 2)

DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is operating at power

2. RHR-MO-25B has developed a leak

3. One worker is required to perform the leak repair

4. The worker has accumulated 2415 mrem this year (all CNS dose - previously authorized to receive greater than 2000 mrem)

5. The following times for the worker have been estimated for task performance:

Staging time in area directly outside the CA, at the Step-off Pad, of Rx 903 Angle Valve room: 45 min Staging time in area directly inside CA, just inside the Step-off Pad, of Rx 903 Angle Valve room: 15 min Work time directly on RHR-MO-25B: 90 min Transition dose is 5 mrem Following completion of the job, an additional 15 mrem for the worker will be received during de-staging activities INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to evaluate the leak repair job for possible performance under current plant conditions to include:

1. Determine the total projected dose the worker will receive to pre-stage, perform the leak repair and de-stage.

2. Based upon the projected total accumulated dose for this job, determine if any CNS administrative dose limitations will be exceeded requiring GMPO authorization prior to performing job.

3. Complete the attached form to document your answers.

ATTACHMENT 2 (Page 2 of 2)

WORKER INITIAL DOSE PROJECTED DOSE PROJECTED TOTAL DOSE CNS ADMIN DOSE LIMIT REQUIRING YES NO GMPO AUTHORIZATION EXCEEDED?

(Circle Yes or No)

Performed by: Date:

(Signature)

ATTACHMENT 3 CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 15 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-4 (RO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 15 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Release Rate Determination based on Drywell Curie Content and Vent Flow Rate Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to calculate the release rate based on drywell curie content and vent flow rate per Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee calculated the noble gas release rate as 9.64E4 to 1.05E5 µCi/sec and completed Attachment 7 of Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination, IAW the answer key.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 15 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 15 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.4.39 (3.9/3.8)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 200150P0501

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination (Rev 27)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 15 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 15 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: Procedure 5.7.16, Section 2. Instructions 2.1 SELECT and PERFORM appropriate release rate determination attachment per Table 1.

(Table 1)

All of following met:

ERP KAMAN Noble Gas not ERP or available. Drywell Curie Attachment 6 Ground Level Content and either PC venting and Noble Gas actual or estimated occurring or Attachment 7 Release Rate Vent Flow Rate anticipated, either controlled or uncontrolled.

Standard Examinee referred to 5.7.16 Attachments 6, 7, 8 and 10.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 15

2. Procedure Step: Attachment 6, step 1 NOTE - Reactor shutdown is met by any of following conditions:

All rods fully inserted.

Reactor scram and power below 3%.

Cold shutdown boron weight injected per EOPs.

Standard Examinee reviewed note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: Attachment 6, step 1 Critical step

1. DETERMINE time since shutdown (EFFECTIVE AGE) in hours.

1.1 OBTAIN or VERIFY time of reactor shutdown from RCM, Operations, and/or Engineering.

1.2 RECORD time in hours in Table 7-1, Column 1, EFFECTIVE AGE.

1.2.1 IF not shutdown, THEN RECORD zero (0).

Standard Examinee determined time since shutdown was 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months and recorded in Table 7-1, Column 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 15

4. Procedure Step: 2. OBTAIN highest exposure rate of high range in-containment radiation monitor in rem/hr from one of following:

Critical step In-containment monitor readouts located in Control Room behind front panel labeled PNL 9-02 DRYWELL RAD MONITOR RMA-RM-40A & RMA-RM-40B.

PMIS Display PMIS05 or SPDS01.

2.1 RECORD ACTUAL CONT. EXPOSURE RATE value in rem/hr in Table 7-1, Column 2.

Standard Examinee determined highest exposure rate from DRYWELL RAD MONITOR RMA-RM-40A and recorded 40 Rem/hr in table 7-1 Column 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: 3. USE EFFECTIVE AGE to determine projected DBA-LOCA dose rate from Attachment 8.

Critical step 3.1 RECORD PROJECTED DBA-LOCA EXPOSURE RATE AT EFFECTIVE AGE value in rem/hr in Table 7-1, Column 3.

Standard Examinee determined PROJECTED DBA-LOCA EXPOSURE RATE for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months effective age was 3.35E6 Rem/hr and recorded in Table 7-1 Column 3.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 15

6. Procedure Step: CAUTION - Error in release rate determination will occur if either IODINE or TOTAL curves are used on Attachment 10.

Standard Examinee reviewed caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step: 4. APPLY EFFECTIVE AGE to NOBLE GAS curve and DETERMINE projected DBA-LOCA noble gas drywell curie content from Critical step Attachment 10.

4.1 RECORD PROJECTED DBA-LOCA NOBLE GAS CURIE CONTENT (Ci) value in Table 7-1, Column 4.

Standard Examinee determined PROJECTED DBA-LOCA NOBLE GAS CURIE CONTENT was 2.2E8 to 2.4E8 Ci from NOBLE GASES curve on Attachment 10 and recorded in Table 7-1 Column4.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 15

8. Procedure Step: 5. CALCULATE Estimated Drywell Noble Gas Curie Content on Table 7-1.

Critical step 5.1 DIVIDE Column 2 by Column 3 to determine fraction of DBA-LOCA.

5.2 MULTIPLY results by Column 4.

(Column 2) x (Column 4) = (Column 5)

(Column 3) 5.3 RECORD ESTIMATED DRYWELL NOBLE GAS CURIE CONTENT (Ci) value in Table 7-1, Column 5.

Standard Examinee calculated ESTIMATED DRYWELL NOBLE GAS CURIE CONTENT.

(40 Rem/hr) x (2.2E8 to 2.4E8 Ci) = (2626 to 2866 Ci)

(3.35E6 Rem/hr)

Examinee recorded 2626 to 2866 Ci in Table 7-1 Column 5.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 15 3

9. Procedure Step: 6. DETERMINE Noble Gas Concentration (Ci/ft ) in drywell on Table 7-1.

Critical step 6.1 DIVIDE Column 5 by Column 6.

(Column 5) ÷ (Column 6) = (Column 7) 6.2 RECORD NOBLE GAS CONCENTRATION (Ci/ft3) value in Table 7-1, Column 7.

Standard Examinee determined Noble Gas Concentration (Ci/ft3) in drywell.

(2626 to 2866 Ci) = (1.81E-2 to 1.98E-2 Ci/ft3)

(1.45E5 ft3)

Examinee recorded 1.81E-2 to 1.98E-2 Ci/ft3 in Table 7-1 Column 7.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 15

10. Procedure Step: 7. USE Table 6-1 to determine DRYWELL VENTING FLOW RATE.

Critical step NOTE - Exact vent flow rates for containment pressures may not be available, resulting in using calculated maximum vent flow rate in Table 6-1.

7.1 SELECT Maximum Vent Flow rate based on vent flow path and Containment Pressure.

7.2 IF venting from both Drywell and Torus PC lines, THEN USE vent flow rate of 638 cfm based on calculated maximum flow rate per line in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1 ASSUMED CALCULATED CONTAINMENT MAXIMUM VENT VENTING FROM: PRESSURE FLOW RATE Torus via PC-MO-1308 and PC-MO- 65 psid 319 cfm 305 Drywell via PC-MO-1310 and PC-MO- 65 psid 319 cfm 306 15 < P 56 psig 17,850 cfm Torus via HCVS P 15 psig 14,450 cfm 7.3 RECORD DRYWELL VENTING FLOW RATE (cfm) value in Table 7-1, Column 8.

Standard Examinee determined DRYWELL VENTING FLOW RATE was 319 cfm and recorded in Table 7-1 Column 8.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 15

11. Procedure Step: 8. CALCULATE NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE on Table 7-1.

Critical step 8.1 MULTIPLY Column 7 by Column 8 by Column 9.

(Column 7) x (Column 8) x (Column 9) = (Column 10) 8.2 RECORD NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE (Ci/sec) value in Table 7-1, Column 10.

Standard Examinee calculated NOBLE GAS RELEASE RATE.

(1.81E-2 to 1.98E-2 Ci/ft3) x (319 cfm) x (1.67E4) =

(9.64E4 to 1.05E5 µCi/sec)

Examinee recorded 9.64E4 to 1.05E5 µCi/sec in Table 7-1 Column 10.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step: N/A Standard Recorded Completed By and Date on Table 7-1.

Cue Notes JPM is COMPLETE.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 15 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY Do NOT give to examinee Table 7-1 (5)

(3) ESTIMATED PROJECTED (4) DRYWELL DBA-LOCA PROJECTED NOBLE GAS (2) EXPOSURE DBA-LOCA CURIE (8)

ACTUAL RATE AT NOBLE GAS CONTENT (7) DRYWELL (9) (10)

(1) CONT. EFFECTIVE CURIE (Ci) (6) NOBLE VENTING CONV. NOBLE GAS EFFECTIVE EXPOSURE AGE CONTENT D/W GAS CONC. FLOW FACTOR RELEASE RATE (2) (Ci/min to AGE RATE (rem/hr) (Ci) x (4) VOLUME (Ci/ft3) RATE (Ci/sec)

(hours) (rem/hr) (from Att. 8) (from Att. 10) (3) (ft3) (5) ÷ (6) (cfm) Ci/sec) (7) x (8) x (9) 1.81E-2 to 1 40 3.35E6 2.2E8 to 2.4E8 2626 to 2866 1.45E5 319 1.67E4 9.64E4 to 1.05E5 1.98E-2 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 1.45E5 1.67E4 Completed By: Date:

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. A LOCA has occurred.

2. The reactor is shutdown (All Control Rods are in).

3. MSIVs are Closed.

4. The decision has been made to vent the Torus through SBGT using the 1" line via PC-MO-1308 and PC-MO-305 per Procedure 5.8.18.

5. ERP Kaman effluent monitors are out of service.

6. The reactor was scrammed at 1200.

7. Current time is 1300.

8. PMIS system is out of service.

9. RMA-RR-40, high range containment radiation recorder, is out of service.

10. RMA-RR-40A indicates 40 R/hr.

11. RMA-RR-40B indicates 35 R/hr.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to perform a release rate determination based on drywell Curie content and vent flow rate using Procedure 5.7.16, Release Rate Determination.

Another operator will perform step 9 of Attachment 6.

Record your results, including signature and date, by completing Procedure 5.7.16, .

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 12 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-5 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 12 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Perform CRS Review of Surveillance 6.SC.202 Results Revision Number: 3 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to perform CRS review of a completed surveillance data package.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined HV-AO-265 stroke time exceeded the Operability limit, requiring the valve to be declared inoperable, and HV-MO-266 stroke time was below the IST minimum and HV-MO-264 stroke time was above the IST maximum, requiring both valves to be immediately retested, IAW Procedure 6.SC.202, Secondary Containment (RRMG H&V) Valve Operability Test (IST).

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate x Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 12 Comments (Required for Unsat ):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 12 Revision Statements:

Rev 0 - new JPM Rev 1 - Changed JPM designation from A5 to SA5 per CE comments Rev 2 - Per NRC prep week comments, added that examinee may identify retest is required but that is not a critical portion of the JPM at step 4 and on answer key REV 3 - Updated to new JPM format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: 2.1.20 (4.6)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task Number: 342026W0303 Review Results of Surveillance Test

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in procedure step in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. Procedure 6.SC.202, Secondary Containment (RRMG H&V) Valve Operability Test (IST)

(Rev 16)

2. 0.26 SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM (Rev 71)

3. Tech Specification LCO 3.6.4.2 Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Computer access Attachments:

1. Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 12 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 12 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: 7.1 Values recorded in shaded blocks on Attachment 1 within Critical step OPERABILITY LIMITS. [SR 3.6.4.2.2] IST Standard Examinee determined HV-AO-265 stroke time > Operability limit and recorded these conclusions on JPM Att. 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 7.2 CLOSING STROKE TIME recorded in shaded blocks on Critical step Attachment 1 within IST ACCEPTABLE RANGE. IST Standard Examinee determined HV-MO-266 stroke time is < IST minimum, immediate retest valve is required and Examinee determined HV-MO-264 stroke time is > IST maximum, immediate retest valve is required and recorded these conclusions on JPM Att. 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: 7.3 RETEST STROKE TIME recorded in shaded blocks on Attachment 1 within IST ACCEPTABLE RANGE. IST Standard Examinee determined this step will be performed later, after valves are retested, and proceeded to step 7.4.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 12

4. Procedure Step: 7.4 IF Step 7.1 not satisfied, THEN PERFORM following:

Critical step 7.4.1 DECLARE applicable valve inoperable.

7.4.2 ENTER appropriate CONDITIONS and REQUIRED ACTIONS.

Standard Due to HV-AO-265 stroke time > Operability limit in step 7.1, examinee declared valve inoperable and determined immediate entry into TS 3.6.4.2 required actions and recorded these conclusions on JPM Att. 2.

Cue Notes Retest required may be identified but is not a critical portion of this JPM.

JPM is COMPLETE.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: __________ Total Time: ___________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 12 Attachment 1 Answer Key Do NOT give to Examinee IST CLOSING RETEST ACCEPTABLE OPERABILITY VALVE STROKE TIME STROKE TIME RANGE LIMIT NUMBER seconds seconds seconds seconds HV-MO-262 54.8 N/A 49.6 to 67.0 79 N/A HV-MO-266 48.1 48.2 to 65.0 77 N/A HV-MO-264 64.3 47.1 to 63.5 75 N/A HV-MO-268 66.5 49.4 to 66.8 79 N/A HV-AO-263 4.7 2.2 to 6.4 8 N/A HV-AO-267 6.2 2.2 to 6.4 8 N/A HV-AO-265 8.2 2.2 to 6.6 8 N/A HV-AO-269 5.2 2.1 to 6.3 8 On JPM Att. 2 List conclusions of your review below:

Examiner Note: Retest required may be identified but is not a critical portion of this JPM.

1) HV-MO-266 stroke time < IST minimum, immediate retest required ________

2) HV-MO-264 stroke time > IST maximum, immediate retest required __

3) HV-AO-265 stroke time > Operability limit, declare valve inoperable and immediately enter required actions of TS 3.6.4.2 Examinees Signature / Todays Date Signature Date

ATTACHMENT 2 (1 of 4)

(Give to Examinee)

DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The plant is operating at 100% RTP

2. BOP just completed performing 6.SC.202, Secondary Containment (RRMG H&V)

Valve Operability Test (IST)

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform the CRS review of the completed surveillance data sheet, attached.

List conclusions and any actions to be taken (if required) based on your review below:

/

Signature Date

Attachment 2 ((2 of 4) continued)

(Give to Examinee)

7. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 7.1 Values recorded in shaded blocks on Attachment 1 within OPERABILITY LIMITS. [SR 3.6.4.2.2] IST 7.2 CLOSING STROKE TIME recorded in shaded blocks on Attachment 1 within IST ACCEPTABLE RANGE. IST 7.3 RETEST STROKE TIME recorded in shaded blocks on Attachment 1 within IST ACCEPTABLE RANGE. IST 7.4 IF Step 7.1 not satisfied, THEN PERFORM following:

7.4.1 DECLARE applicable valve inoperable.

7.4.2 ENTER appropriate CONDITIONS and REQUIRED ACTIONS.

7.5 IF Step 7.2 not satisfied, THEN immediately RETEST valve.

7.6 IF valve RETEST performed, THEN PERFORM following:

7.6.1 IF Step 7.3 satisfied, THEN DOCUMENT probable cause of initial test deviation on Discrepancy Sheet.

7.6.2 IF Step 7.3 not satisfied, THEN ASSESS OPERABILITY per Procedure 0.5.OPS within 96 hours0.00111 days 0.0267 hours 1.587302e-4 weeks 3.6528e-5 months .

Procedure 6.SC.202 Revision 16 Page 11 of 16

Attachment 2 ((3 of 4) continued)

(Give to Examinee)

ATTACHMENT 1 SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE DATA SHEET Stopwatch Calibration Due Date: 2/18/2021 Stopwatch Identification Number: IS-11525 IST CLOSING RETEST ACCEPTABLE OPERABILITY VALVE STROKE TIME STROKE TIME RANGE LIMIT NUMBER seconds seconds seconds seconds HV-MO-262 54.8 N/A 49.6 to 67.0 79 N/A HV-MO-266 48.1 48.2 to 65.0 77 N/A HV-MO-264 64.3 47.1 to 63.5 75 N/A HV-MO-268 66.5 49.4 to 66.8 79 N/A HV-AO-263 4.7 2.2 to 6.6 8 N/A HV-AO-267 6.2 2.2 to 6.4 8 N/A HV-AO-265 8.2 2.2 to 6.6 8 N/A HV-AO-269 5.2 2.1 to 6.3 8 Procedure 6.SC.202 Revision 16 Page 12 of 16

Attachment 2 ((4 of 4) continued)

(Give to Examinee)

ATTACHMENT 2 SIGN-OFF AND REVIEWSHEET Initials Printed Name Initials Printed Name DB / Dan Brown /

MN / Marty Nott / _

Acceptance Criteria Satisfied: [ ] YES; [ ] NO Initials/Date:

Shift Manager Review: Date:

System Engineer Review (required): Date:

IST Engineer Review (required): Date:

Procedure 6.SC.202 Revision 16 Page 13 of 16

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 12 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-6 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 12 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Reportable Occurrences to the NRC (#9)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to determine an NRC Reportable Occurrence has occurred and correctly complete NRC Form 361 per Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined a 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months report to the NRC was required and NRC Form 361 contained the correct technical information (10 CFR50.72 non-emergency classification; 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)) per Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center. (See Answer Key).

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 12 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 12 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.1.18 (3.6/3.8) 2.1.20 (4.6)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: 341014O0303

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center (Rev 52)

2. NUREG 1022 (Rev 3)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

3. Attachment 3 - NRC Form 361, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet

2. Attachment 3 - NRC Form 361, Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 12 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 12 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center)

Standard Referred to body of Procedure 2.0.5, Section 4 and Attachments 1, 2 and 8.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 4.1 DETERMINATION OF REPORTABILITY FOR 10CFR20, 26, 37, 50.72, 70.52, 72.75, and 73.77 EVENTS 4.1.1 If immediate notification is required due to declaration of an emergency classification, perform the emergency notifications per Procedure 5.7.6.

Standard Examinee determined emergency notification was not required due to no emergency declaration exists.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 12

3. Procedure Step: 4.1.7 The SM shall determine the appropriate reporting category (i.e., immediate, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , or 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ). Guidance Critical step is provided in Attachments 1 through 4 for determining the category for immediate notifications.

4.1.7.1 NUREG 1022 shall be referenced for all 10CFR50.72 reporting decisions.

Standard Examinee reviewed Attachments 1 and 2 and NUREG 1022 as necessary and determined 8-hour report is required under 10CFR50.72 non-emergency classification; 10 CFR 50.73(b)(3)(v),

Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to:

4) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

Cue Notes IAW procedure 2.0.5 Att. 1 flowchart, Att. 2 line 8, and NUREG 1022 pages 38 and 40.

Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 4.4 PREPARE NRC FORM 361 (ATTACHMENT 8) AND CONTACT THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER Critical step 4.4.3 Preparer should ensure the worksheet is accurate and properly filled out.

Standard Examinee completed information on the NRC Form 361 IAW answer key.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 12

5. Procedure Step: Submits NRC Form 361 Critical step Standard Examinee provided NRC Form 361 to the Examiner.

Cue Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 12 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY Do NOT give to examinee NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #

NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469*, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*

[2nd] 301-415-0550 and [3rd]301-415-0553 *Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NOTIFICATION TIME NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

Cooper Nuclear Station 1 Examinees Name 402-825-5253 Event time and zone Event date Power/mode before Power/mode after Current Time Todays Date 100% / Mode 1 90% / Mode 1 Event classification 1-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC TS Deviation ADEV (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) (v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC ALERT ALE/AAEC (i) TS Required S/D ASHU X (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND UNSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC (iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS ACCS (xii) Offsite Medical AMED X 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (See Next Column) (iv) (B) RPS Actuation (Scram) ARPS (xiii) Loss Comm/Asmt/Resp ACCM PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DDDD (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)

MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV FITNESS FOR DUTY HRT (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (See Last Column) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA NONR INFORMATION ONLY NNF (iv)(A) Specified System Actuation AESF NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)

Control Room Emergency Filtration System BF-C-1A, Emergency Booster Fan was discovered to be non-functional during an invalid ESF actuation.

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NOT YES (Explain above) NO NRC RESIDENT X UNDERSTOOD?

STATE(s) X DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION YES AS REQUIRED? NO (Explain above)

LOCAL X OTHER GOV AGENCIES X MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK RESTART DATE: Date + 4 or YES NO MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE X UNTIL CORRECTED: 1 unknown at this time Examiner Note: Only items that are bolded and yellow highlighted are critical. Identification of 60-day report for invalid ESF actuation is allowed but is NOT critical, since that is the responsibility of Licensing.

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant was in Mode 1, 100% power when I&C working in Panel 9-17 cause a momentary short that caused a Group 6 isolation.

2. Reactor power has been lowered to 90%.

3. During verification of the isolation IAW Procedure 2.1.22, it was determined Control Room Emergency Filtration System BF-C-1A, Emergency Booster Fan will NOT start.

4. Group 6 isolation logic has been reset and systems are being returned to normal.

5. Shift Manager's phone number is 402-825-5253.

6. Time of event was today at 13:00.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to determine what notification requirements exist and complete the required sections of NRC Form 361. Return the completed form to the evaluator when you have finished.

ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 1 of 2)

NRC FORM 361 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OPERATIONS CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #

NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-3469*, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-951-0550 or 800-449-3694*

[2nd] 301-415-0550 and [3rd]301-415-0553 *Licensees who maintain their own ETS are provided these telephone numbers NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

Event time and zone Event date Power/mode before Power/mode after Event classification 1-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) (v)(A) Safe S/D Capability AINA GENERAL EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC TS Deviation ADEV (v)(B) RHR Capability AINB SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) (v)(C) Control of Rad Release AINC ALERT ALE/AAEC (i) TS Required S/D ASHU (v)(D) Accident Mitigation AIND UNSUAL EVENT UNU/AAEC (iv)(A) ECCS Discharge to RCS ACCS (xii) Offsite Medical AMED 50.72 NON-EMERGENCY (See Next Columns) (iv) (B) RPS Actuation (Scram) ARPS (xiii) Loss Comm/Asmt/Resp ACCM PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DDDD (xi) Offsite Notification APRE 60-Day Optional 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)

MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV FITNESS FOR DUTY HRT (ii)(A) Degraded Condition ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identify)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED REQMT. (See Last Column) (ii)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA NONR INFORMATION ONLY NNF (iv)(A) Specified System Actuation AESF NONR DESCRIPTION Include: Systems affected, actuations and their initiating signals, causes, effect of event on plant, actions taken or planned, etc. (continue on back)

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR NOT NRC RESIDENT UNDERSTOOD? YES (Explain above)

NO STATE(s) DID ALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION YES NO (Explain above)

LOCAL AS REQUIRED?

OTHER GOV AGENCIES MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK UNTIL CORRECTED: RESTART DATE: YES NO MEDIA/PRESS RELEASE

ATTACHMENT 3 (Page 2 of 2)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 10 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-7 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 10 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine TS Actions for Removal of a Single Control Rod Drive during Refueling Revision number: 6 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to determine the control rods associated with a 5X5 array during a single CRD removal during refueling.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined that all other control rods are fully inserted, all other control rods in a 5X5 array centered on the withdrawn control rod (10-11) are disarmed, a control rod withdrawal block is inserted and LCO 3.1.1. Shutdown Margin, Mode 5 requirements may be changed to allow the single control rod withdrawn to be assumed to be the highest worth control rod; and no other core alterations are in progress. Reference Technical Specification LCO 3.10.5.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 10 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 10 Revision Statements:

Rev 6-Updated JPM to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: G 2.4.40 (4.7)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No: 341030W0303 Evaluate Plant Systems performance and Coordinate the appropriate Actions per Tech Specs in the Event a LCO is Entered

4. PSA Applicability/OE: CR-CNS-2009-09138 Unplanned Entry Tech Spec required action 3.10.4 B

5. Critical Steps in the Procedure step in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. Technical Specifications

2. Technical Specification Bases Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 10 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 10 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step:

Standard Obtained copy of Technical Specifications and Bases.

Cue Notes Examinee will use computer to access Technical Specifications and Bases, or if computer is unavailable hard copies can be provided.

Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: TS LCO 3.10.5 applies.

Critical Step Standard Examinee determined that TS 3.10.5 applies in this case.

Cue Notes Operations Department expectation is both Technical Specifications and Bases are to be referenced when making Technical Specification determinations. This will NOT result in a failure, but needs to be noted if the trainee fails to reference both documents.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 10

3. Procedure Step: TS LCO 3.10.5 Standard Examinee read the LCO and determined the requirements of LCO 3.10.5 are listed on page 3.10-13.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: TS LCO 3.10.5 Critical Step Standard Examinee filled out Attachment 3 of this JPM with the requirements listed on Attachment 1 Answer Sheet.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step: N/A Critical step Standard Examinee provided the Attachment 3 to the evaluator, and the data on attachment 3 matches the data on Attachment 1 (Answer Key).

Cue Notes The JPM is Complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 10

- ANSWER KEY**

NOTE TO EXAMINER: Text in bold is required for successful completion of this JPM.

The requirements of LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation"; LCO 3.3.8.2, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring"; LCO 3.9.1, "Refueling Equipment Interlocks"; LCO 3.9.2, "Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock"; LCO 3.9.4, "Control Rod Position Indication"; and LCO 3.9.5, "Control Rod OPERABILITYRefueling," may be suspended in MODE 5 to allow the removal of a single CRD associated with a control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies, provided the following requirements are met:

a. All other control rods are fully inserted;

b. All other control rods in a five by five array centered on the withdrawn control rod (10-11) are disarmed;

c. A control rod withdrawal block is inserted, and LCO 3.1.1, "SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM)," MODE 5 requirements may be changed to allow the single control rod withdrawn to be assumed to be the highest worth control rod; and

d. No other CORE ALTERATIONS are in progress.

Rods list:

51 02-19 06-19 47 10-19 14-19 43 18-19 39 06-15 10-15 35 14-15 OR 18-15 31 06-11 14-11 27 18-11 10-07 23 14-07 19 X X X X X 18-07 18-03 15 X X X X 11 X X X 07 X X X 03 X 02 06 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50

- ANSWER KEY**

ATTACHMENT 2 (page 1 of 2)

DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The Reactor is in MODE 5 (Refuel).

2. The core is fully loaded with fuel.

INITIATING CUE:

You to determine the requirements for the removal of CRD 10-11 during refueling (with no fuel removed) in accordance with Technical Specifications. List the specific Technical Specification requirement(s) and indicate/mark any of the impacted control rods or list the impacted control rods on Attachment 2 (page 2 of 2). Provide this information to the SM when complete.

Examinee Answer Sheet ATTACHMENT 2 (page 2 of 2) 51 47 Rods list:

43 39 35 31 27 OR 23 19 15 11 07 03 02 06 10 14 18 22 26 30 34 38 42 46 50 Signature _________________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-8 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 11 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine Emergency Exposure Requirements Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to determine estimated dose for a worker, the maximum emergency dose allowed IAW Procedure 5.7.12, and whether KI is required to be authorized IAW Procedure 5.7.14.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined up to 10R is allowed for the task IAW Procedure 5.7.12, Emergency Radiation Exposure Control, the estimated dose is 7.75 R, and Potassium Iodide (KI) is NOT required to be authorized IAW Procedure 5.7.14, Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking (KI).

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 11 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 11 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 2.3.4 (3.7)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No.: N/A

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical steps stated in procedure step bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.7.12, Emergency Radiation Exposure Control (Rev 17)

2. Procedure 5.7.14, Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking (KI) (Rev 22)

3. Procedure 5.7.1, Emergency Classification, Attachment 4, Emergency Action Level Matrix (EPIPEALHOT) (Rev 18)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Calculator Attachments

1. Attachment 1 - Answer Key

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee cue sheet and answer sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 11 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task.

When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

Start Time: ____________

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.7.12, Emergency Radiation Exposure Control)

NOTE - Emergency exposures are allowed above 10CFR20 limits in emergency situation as per Emergency Exposure Guidelines (NUREG 0654, NUREG 0737, ICRP Reports, and EPA Guides).

2.3 Emergency Director EVALUATE request for exposures in excess of occupational limits by reviewing:

Scope of work.

Travel path.

Dose estimates.

Alternative measures considered to avoid exposures in excess of occupational limits, refer to Step 2.2.3.

Attachment 1, Table 1, dose limits versus activity being performed.

Standard Examinee reviewed note and steps as related to initial conditions, and referred to Attachment 1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 11

2. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.7.1, Emergency Classification)

ATT. 4 - Emergency Action Level Matrix (EPIPEALHOT)

Table 1 - GUIDE ON DOSE LIMITS FOR WORKERS PERFORMING EMERGENCY SERVICES Standard Examinee reviewed items on EPIPEALHOT Category A and determined offsite release rate was at Site Area Emergency Level (below General Emergency level).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.7.12, Emergency Radiation Exposure Critical Step Control)

ATT. 1 - EMERGENCY EXPOSURE LIMITS Table 1 - GUIDE ON DOSE LIMITS FOR WORKERS PERFORMING EMERGENCY SERVICES Standard Examinee reviewed items on Table 1 and determined up to 10 R was the EMERGENCY LIMIT associated with Isolation of radiological release less than G.E. dose as calculated by Procedures 5.7.17 and 5.7.17.1 and recorded 10 R emergency dose limit on Attachment 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 11

4. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.7.12, Emergency Radiation Exposure Critical Step Control) 2.4 IF ED determines Table 1 criteria met, THEN only ED AUTHORIZE exposure.

Standard Examinee calculated estimated dose:

6200 mR/hr X 1.25 hr = 7750 mR = 7.75 R and recorded 7.75 R (7750 mR) estimated dose on JPM Att. 2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 11

5. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.7.14, Stable Iodine Thyroid Blocking (KI))

Critical Step

1. ENTRY CONDITION 1.1 Emergency declared at CNS and one of following conditions present:

Fuel cladding determined lost per EPIP 5.7.1, Attachment 3.

Calculated dose greater than or equal to 5 rem (0.05 Sv) to thyroid (CDE) likely to be received.

Emergency workers being dispatched to areas where high levels of radio-iodine suspected and no current air sample data available.

General Emergency declared and Emergency Director (ED) expects progression of event with likely damage to fuel and radiological release.

Standard Examinee reviewed entry conditions and determined KI authorization was NOT required due to no entry condition was met and recorded KI NOT required to be authorized on Attachment 2.

Cue Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 11 ATTACHMENT 1 ANSWER KEY Do NOT give to examinee INITIATING CUE:

Note: DO NOT use Emergency Director Judgment as a basis for your conclusions

1) Determine the MAXIMUM allowed dose for this task.

2) Determine the estimated dose for the task.

3) Determine whether or not Potassium Iodide (KI) is required to be approved for the operator performing this task.

List your responses below:

1) MAXIMUM DOSE FOR TASK 10 R

2) ESTIMATED DOSE 7.75 R (7750 mR)

3) POTASSIUM IODINE (KI) is REQUIRED (Circle Yes or No) YES NO Examinees Signature / Todays Date Signature Date

- ANSWER KEY**

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. RCIC steam line has ruptured in the steam tunnel.

2. RCIC Outboard Steam Supply Isolation MO-15 is open and has lost power.

3. RCIC Inboard Steam Supply Isolation MO-16 is open and has lost power.

4. There are high radiation levels in the steam tunnel. The general area dose rate is 6,200 mR/hr, steady.

5. Fuel cladding has NOT been lost.

6. Off-site protective actions have NOT been completed.

7. A radiation release is occurring with projected dose of 300 mRem TEDE and 6 mRem Thyroid CDE at the site boundary

8. RCIC-MO-16 must be manually closed locally to terminate the release.

9. It will take one operator 75 minutes to manually close RCIC-MO-16 and is expected to incur a Thyroid CDE dose of 10 mRem based on air sample data. The operators year-to-date dose history is 200 mRem.

INITIATING CUE:

Note: DO NOT use Emergency Director Judgment as a basis for your conclusions

1) Determine the MAXIMUM allowed dose for this task.

2) Determine the estimated dose for the task.

3) Determine whether or not Potassium Iodide (KI) is required to be authorized for the operator performing this task.

1) MAXIMUM DOSE FOR TASK

2) ESTIMATED DOSE

3) POTASSIUM IODINE (KI) is REQUIRED (Circle Yes or No) YES NO

/

Signature Date

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 9 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure A-9 (SRO)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 9 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Determine Emergency Classifications EAL table top # 10 Revision number: 1 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to make an EAL classification given a set of plant conditions.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee determined an SITE AREA EMERGENCY classification (SS7.1) was required IAW procedure 5.7.1 within 15 minutes of beginning the task.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 9 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 9 Revision Statements:

Rev 1-Updated JPM to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: G 2.4.41 (4.6)

2. Safety Function: N/A

3. Task No: 344018O0303

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps denoted by Standard in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. Procedure 5.7.1, Emergency Classification (Rev 64)

2. Procedure 5.7.1 Attachment 4, EPIPEALHOT, EAL Matrix (Rev 18).

3. Procedure 5.7.6, Notification (Rev 76), Attachment 1.

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - N/A

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 9 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 9 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: 2.1 AFTER recognition of off-normal event, THEN SM shall PERFORM following:

2.1.1 COMPARE event to EALs on EAL Classification Matrix.

Standard Examinee referred to EAL Classification Matrix, Attachment 4.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 2.1.2 IF more than one EAL of different classification levels is reached (i.e., EAL for ALERT and EAL for SITE AREA EMERGENCY), THEN SELECT EAL for most severe emergency classification.

Standard Examinee determined the most severe emergency classification.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

3. Procedure Step: 2.1.3 IF event appears to meet an EAL and time permits, THEN REFER to Attachment 2 or 3 for further explanation and guidance.

Standard Examinee referred to Attachment 2 or 3 if time permitted.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 9

4. Procedure Step: 2.1.4 IF determined EAL is met, THEN PERFORM Critical step following within 15 minutes.

Standard Examinee determined classification within 15 minutes of commencing the JPM.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure 2.1.4.2 DECLARE emergency.

Step:

Critical step Standard Examinee classified the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY based on EPIP 5.7.1, SS7.1.

Cue Notes The Emergency Director should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.

Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure N/A Step:

Standard Examinee returned the completed Attachment 2 to the examiner.

Cue Notes JPM is COMPLETE.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 1 of 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

The plant has experienced the events listed on Attachment 2 page 2.

INITIATING CUE:

This is a time critical JPM.

You have been directed to use the attachment provided to classify the event at the highest EAL attained. Also identify the basis for your classification.

Immediately return Attachment 2 to the examiner when you have completed this task.

The completion time for this JPM will be documented when you hand the JPM back to the evaluator.

ATTACHMENT 2 Page 2 of 2 This is a time critical JPM.

Parameter/System/Component Status The plant was initially operating at 100% power. The following conditions have occurred:

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

Minutes

+00 Seismic activity has occurred such that the Main Turbine has tripped coincident with loss of the Startup Transformer.

Breakers 1FS and 1GS remained OPEN.

Both Emergency Diesel Generators started but failed to energize their respective critical bus.

+05 Emergency Transformer voltage was available and breakers 1FS and 1GS were locally CLOSED, energizing both 4160V Critical Buses.

Drywell pressure is 2.7 psig and rising slowly.

RPV Pressure is cycling between 1040 and 1060 psig.

RPV Level -100" by local Fuel Zone and lowering slowly.

RCIC has been started locally and is injecting to the RPV.

Voltage indication remains downscale for both 125/250 VDC Systems.

Turbine Building Operator reports extensive damage to the Control Building in the vicinity of 125/250 VDC Charger and Battery Rooms.

Compensatory Actions are in place for monitoring plant parameters via PMIS/SPDS.

Highest EAL:

Based on (Category and Description)

Signature of Operator/STE:_____________________________________________

Immediately return Attachment 2 to the examiner when you have completed this task.

The completion time for this JPM will be documented when you hand the JPM back to the evaluator.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Date of Examination: 4/27/2020 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: CN-2020-4 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO, 7 for SRO-I, and 2 or 3 for SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1. Respond to two rods drifting during 6.CRD.301 (Alt Path) N, A 1 K/A 201003 A2.03 (3.4/3.7)

S2. Restart RWCU following Group 3 isolation IAW SOP 2.2.66 sect P 2 6 (9/2018 ILT NRC JPM S2 randomly selected) 9/2018 NRC K/A 204000 A4.01 (3.1/3.0) ILT S2 S3. SKL034-20-29R0, Open MSIVs with RPV pressurized (Alt D, A, EN, L 3 Path)

K/A 239001 A4.01 (4.2/4.0)

S4. SKL034-20-137, Operate RCIC in pressure control (Alt Path) D, A, L 4 K/A 217000 A4.01 (3.7/3.7)

S5. Perform 5.2FUEL Att. 2 (Actions to minimize rad release) N, L 5 KA 295036 EK3.04 (3.1/3.4)

S6. Energize 4160V critical Bus 1G from Emergency Station Service D, EN 6 XFMR (ESST) (SKL034-20-43 Rev 0)

K/A 262001 A4.01 (3.4/3.7)

S7. Restore Level Transmitter NBI-LT-59D input to RVLC to service N 7 IAW IOP 4.4.1 section 9 K/A 216000 K1.12 (3.6/3.7)

S8. Start SGT B for HPCI operation for level control post-scram. N, A, EN, L 8 2.2.73 Section 8. (Alt Path)

KA 261000 A4.07 (3.1/3.2) page 1 of 2 Rev 0

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 In-Plant Systems:* 3 for RO, 3 for SRO-I, and 3 or 2 for SRO-U P1. new - Alt Path - Locally secure unloaded DG N, A, E 6 KA 264000 K4.07 (3.3/3.4)

P2. SKL034-10-65R9, Conduct alternate rod insertion by D, R, L, E 1 manually venting scram air header K/A 295037 EA1.05 (3.9/4.0) EK2.05 (4.0/4.1)

P3. SKL-L-0341019- Place the A Air Dryer in Service D 8 K/A 295019 AA1.02 (3.3/3.1)

All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions, all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions, and in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes Criteria for R /SRO-I/SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/4-6 /2-3 (5/5/3)

(C)ontrol room -----

(D)irect from bank 9/ 8/ 4 (6/6/3)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/ 1/ 1 (2/2/2)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1/ 1/ 1 (control room system) (3/3/1)

(L)ow-Power/Shutdown 1/ 1/ 1 (5/5/4)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/ 2/ 1 (5/5/2)

(P)revious 2 exams 3/ 3/ 2 (randomly selected) (1/0/0)

(R)CA 1/ 1/ 1 (1/1/1)

(S)imulator ------

1.9.1 Plant System Organization by Safety Function

1. Reactivity Control

2. Reactor Water Inventory Control

3. Reactor Pressure Control

4. Heat Removal From the Core

5. Containment Integrity

6. Electrical

7. Instrumentation

8. Plant Service Systems

9. Radioactivity Release.

page 2 of 2 Rev 0

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 17 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure P-1a

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 17 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Shut Down DG1 Locally IAW 5.1ASD Att. 4 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS*:(Circle one)

SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat )

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to locally secure DG1 IAW Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown and Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator).

TASK STANDARD Examinee attempted to shut down DG1 using the local EMERGENCY STOP push button in accordance with Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, recognized DG1 failed to stop, then pressed DG EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN for DG1, then manually shut off DG1 fuel racks in accordance with Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator).

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform X Plant (RCA )

X Simulate Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 17 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 17 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating : 264000 K4.07 (3.3/3.4)

2. Safety Function: 6, Electrical

3. Task No.: 264007O0104, Manually Shutdown a Diesel Generator Locally

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency DG

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown (Rev 20)

2. Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator) (Rev 107)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Examiner Aid, Procedure 2.2.20 Att. 2, Manual Fuel Rack Shutoff

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown Attachment 4, Diesel Generator Operator, Section 1.

3. Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator), Section 4 and Attachment 1 and 2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 17 Directions to Examiner:

THIS IS AN ALTERNATE PATH JPM. DG1 will fail to shut down when the local EMERGENCY STOP button is pressed, requiring the examinee to stop DG1 by manually shutting off the fuel racks.

NOTE: DO NOT give Procedure 2.2.20 to examinee until requested at JPM step 7.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2. (DO NOT give Handout 3, Procedure 2.2.20, to examinee until identified by the examinee at JPM step 7.)

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 17 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown)

Attachment 4, Diesel Generator Operator

2. Go to DG Rooms, determine position of Breakers EG-1 and EG-2, and perform following:

2.1 IF EG-1 and EG-2 are closed, THEN go to Step 2.4.

Standard Examinee determined step was N/A from Initial Conditions, DG1 and DG2 are operating unloaded, and the ESST supplying 4160V Buses 1F and 1G.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 2.2 Contact Control Building Operator to determine if 4160V Buses 1F and 1G have power.

Standard Examinee determined 4160V Buses 1F and 1G have power from initial condition ESST supplying 4160V Buses 1F and 1G, or requests bus status from Control Building Operator using suitable communications device (e.g. phone, Gaitronics, etc.)

Cue If asked as Control Building Operator, state 4160V Buses 1F and 1G are energized from ESST.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 17

3. Procedure Step 2.3 IF DG(s) are running unloaded and not needed, get permission from ASD Operator, THEN secure unloaded DG(s):

2.3.1 At Engine #1 Control Panel, place DGLO-SW-DG1(43QP), DG1 PREPOST LUBE OIL PUMP CONTROL SWITCH, to HAND.

Standard Examinee placed DGLO-SW-DG1(43QP), DG1 PREPOST LUBE OIL PUMP CONTROL SWITCH, counter-clockwise to HAND.

Cue Control switch is aligned with HAND position, red light ON, green light OFF, amber light OFF, and, IF checked, audible sound of PREPOST LUBE OIL PUMP running.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 2.3.2 At Engine #2 Control Panel, place DGLO-SW-DG2(43QP), DG2 PREPOST LUBE OIL PUMP CONTROL SWITCH, to HAND.

Standard Examinee determined step was N/A due to initiating cue stated shut down DG1, only.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 17

5. Procedure Step CAUTION - Following step will prevent DG auto start, until EMERGENCY STOP is reset.

Standard Examinee reviewed caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 2.3.3 IF alarm(s) DG-1/C-3 or DG-2/C-3, DIESEL Critical Step GENERATOR STARTED AUTOMATICALLY NO PROTECTION (third tile down, third tile from left) is in, THEN perform following for running DG:

2.3.3.1 On ENGINE CONTROL PANEL, push EMERGENCY STOP button.

Standard Examinee determined from Initial Conditions alarm DG-1/C-3, DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED AUTOMATICALLY NO PROTECTION was ON at ENGINE #1 CONTROL PANEL and pushed EMERGENCY STOP button for DG1.

Cue No change in engine sound, DG-SI-3142 ENGINE SPEED pointer at 600 rpm, red RUN light is ON, green STOP light is OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 17

7. Procedure Step N/A Alternate Path Standard Examinee determined engine did not stop and transitioned to Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator), either:

Section 4, DG 1 Shutdown Methods, OR Attachment 1, DG Shutdown Methods Hard Card.

Cue When requested, hand examinee a clean copy of Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator),

Section 4 and Attachment 1.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The remaining steps are from Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator), Section 4 with the like Attachment 1 step number in parenthesis. Steps in Section 4 and Attachment 1 contain the same steps.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 17 Examiner Note: The remaining steps can be performed in any order. The order is not critical to completion of the JPM.

8. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate Path Generator)]

Note before Section 4 and Attachment 1 step 1:

NOTE - Following is a list of methods that may be used to shut down DG during emergency conditions. Methods not listed in any particular order.

Standard Examinee reviewed note, then proceeded to section 4 (or Attachment 1 step 1) DG1 Shutdown.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 17

9. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate Path Generator)]

Section 4 step 4.1 (Attachment 1 step 1) DG 1 Shutdown 4.1 IF shutting down DG2, THEN PERFORM following:

4.1.1 (1.1)

At ENGINE #1 CONTROL PANEL, perform following:

4.1.1.1 (1.1.1)

IF DG-SW-DG1(43CM), DG1 CONTROL MODE SELECTOR, switch is in LOCAL, THEN DEPRESS DG-SW-DG1(5L),

LOCAL ENGINE STOP button until STOP light on.

Standard Examinee determined step was N/A due to DG1 CONTROL MODE SELECTOR switch was in REMOTE.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 17

10. Procedure Step Section 4 step 4.1 (Attachment 1 step 1) DG 1 Shutdown Alternate Path 4.1.1 (1.1)

At ENGINE #1 CONTROL PANEL, perform following:

4.1.1.2 (1.1.2)

IF DG-SW-DG1(43CM), DG1 CONTROL MODE SELECTOR, switch in REMOTE, THEN perform following:

a.(1.1.2.1) At PANEL C, place DIESEL GEN STOP/START switch to STOP for 1 to 2 seconds.

b. (1.1.2.2) AFTER 1 to 2 seconds, THEN RELEASE DIESEL GEN STOP/START switch.

Standard Examinee determined step cannot be performed due to Control Room abandonment.

Cue Notes Panel C is in the main control room.

Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step Section 4 step 4.1 (Attachment 1 step 1) DG 1 Shutdown Alternate Path 4.1.2 (1.2)

At ENGINE #1 CONTROL PANEL, DEPRESS EMERGENCY STOP button.

Standard Examinee determined step was already performed and marked step as complete, or pressed EMERGENCY STOP button.

Cue If examinee presses EMERGENCY STOP, indicate no change in engine sound, DG-SI-3142 ENGINE SPEED pointer at 600, red RUN light is ON, green STOP light is OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 17

12. Procedure Step Section 4 step 4.1 (Attachment 1 step 1) DG 1 Shutdown Alternate Path Critical Step 4.1.3 (1.3)

At Left Bank Air Start Panel, DEPRESS DG EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN long enough for control air to bleed off safety trip valve.

Standard Examinee pressed and held DG EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN for several seconds, then released.

Cue Indicate no sound of air flow, no change in engine sound, DG-SI-3142 ENGINE SPEED pointer at 600, red RUN light is ON, green STOP light is OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step Section 4 step 4.1 DG 1 Shutdown Alternate Path (Note before step 4.1.4.1)

NOTE - Attachment 2 provides location of Span Adjustment Lever.

Standard Examinee reviewed note and referred to Attachment 2 (photos).

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 17

14. Procedure Step Section 4 step 4.1 (Attachment 1 step 1) DG 1 Shutdown Alternate Path Critical Step 4.1.4 (1.4)

PERFORM the following to manually shut off fuel racks:

4.1.4.1 (1.4.1)

Place open end wrench (located SE corner of DG Room by EG 1 breaker) over top of Span Adjustment Lever (catwalk; south end of engine on fuel rack linkage).

Standard Examinee obtained wrench and placed over top of Span Adjustment Lever as depicted on procedure 2.2.20 Attachment 2.

Cue Wrench is fitted onto Span Adjustment Lever.

Notes Proper placement of wrench on Span Adjustment lever is depicted on Attachment 2.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 17

15. Procedure Step Section 4 step 4.1 (Attachment 1 step 1) DG 1 Shutdown Alternate Path Critical Step 4.1.4 (1.4)

PERFORM the following to manually shut off fuel racks:

4.1.4.2 (1.4.2)

Rotate wrench and lever clockwise to right and hold until engine has stopped.

Standard Examinee rotated wrench and lever clockwise to right as depicted on procedure 2.2.20 Attachment 2 and held until DG1 coasted to stop, then released.

Cue Indicate engine slows to a stop by indicating DG-SI-3142 ENGINE SPEED pointer lowers to zero, audible that engine is not turning and visible that generator shaft is not turning.

Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 16 of 17 ATTACHMENT 1 Examiner Aid (Procedure 2.2.20, Attach 2, Manual Fuel Rack Shutoff)

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Simultaneous loss of NSST and SSST occurred at 100% power.

2. DG2 is needed.

3. 4160V Buses 1F and 1G are energized from ESST.

4. DG1 and DG2 are operating unloaded.

5. Control Room was abandoned due to toxic fumes.

6. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, is in use.

7. ASD Operator determined DG1 is NOT needed and has given permission to secure DG1.

8. Following alarms are ON at ENGINE #1 CONTROL PANEL:

DG-1/C-3, DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED AUTOMATICALLY NO PROTECTION DG-1/B-3, LUBE OIL LOW PRESSURE INITIATING CUE:

The ASD Operator has directed you to shut down DG1 using Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, Attachment 4, Diesel Generator Operator, Section 2.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 17 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure P-1b

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 17 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Shut Down DG2 Locally IAW 5.1ASD Att. 4 Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to locally secure DG2 IAW Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown and Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator).

TASK STANDARD: Examinee attempted to shut down DG2 using the local EMERGENCY STOP push button in accordance with Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, recognized DG2 failed to stop, then pressed DG EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN for DG2, then manually shut off DG2 fuel racks in accordance with Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator).

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform x Plant (RCA )

x Simulate Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 17 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 17 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: 264000 K4.07 (3.3/3.4)

2. Safety Function: 6, Electrical

3. Task No: 264007O0104, Manually Shutdown a Diesel Generator Locally

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency DG

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown (Rev 20)

2. Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator) (Rev 107)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Examiner Aid, Procedure 2.2.20 Att. 2 Manual Fuel Rack Shutoff

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown Attachment 4, Diesel Generator Operator, Section 2.

3. Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator) Section 5 and Attachment 1 and 2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 17 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

THIS IS AN ALTERNATE PATH JPM. DG2 will fail to shut down when the local EMERGENCY STOP button is pressed, requiring the examinee to stop DG2 by manually shutting off the fuel racks.

Note: DO NOT give Procedure 2.2.20 to examinee until requested at JPM step 7.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handout 1 and 2. (DO NOT give Handout 3, Procedure 2.2.20, to examinee until identified by the examinee at JPM step 7.)

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 17 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown)

Attachment 4, Diesel Generator Operator

2. Go to DG Rooms, determine position of Breakers EG-1 and EG-2, and perform following:

2.1 IF EG-1 and EG-2 are closed, THEN go to Step 2.4.

Standard Examinee determined step was N/A from Initial Conditions, DG1 and DG2 are operating unloaded, and the ESST supplying 4160V Buses 1F and 1G.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 2.2 Contact Control Building Operator to determine if 4160V Buses 1F and 1G have power.

Standard Determined 4160V Buses 1F and 1G have power from Initial Conditions; ESST supplying 4160V Buses 1F and 1G, or requests bus status from Control Building Operator using suitable communications device (e.g. phone, Gaitronics, etc.)

Cue If asked as Control Building Operator, state 4160V Buses 1F and 1G are energized from ESST.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 17

3. Procedure Step 2.3 IF DG(s) are running unloaded and not needed, get permission from ASD Operator, THEN secure unloaded DG(s):

2.3.1 At Engine #1 Control Panel, place DGLO-SW-DG1(43QP), DG1 PREPOST LUBE OIL PUMP CONTROL SWITCH, to HAND.

Standard Examinee determined step was N/A due to task is to shut down DG2, only.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 2.3.2 At Engine #2 Control Panel, place DGLO-SW-DG2(43QP), DG2 PREPOST LUBE OIL PUMP CONTROL SWITCH, to HAND.

Standard Examinee placed DGLO-SW-DG2(43QP), DG2 PREPOST LUBE OIL PUMP CONTROL SWITCH, counter-clockwise to HAND.

Cue Control switch is aligned with HAND position, red light ON, green light OFF, amber light OFF, and, IF checked, audible sound of PREPOST LUBE OIL PUMP running.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 17

5. Procedure Step CAUTION - Following step will prevent DG auto start, until EMERGENCY STOP is reset.

Standard Examinee reviewed caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure 2.3.3 IF alarm(s) DG-1/C-3 or DG-2/C-3, DIESEL Step GENERATOR STARTED AUTOMATICALLY NO Critical Step PROTECTION (third tile down, third tile from left) is in, THEN perform following for running DG:

2.3.3.1 On ENGINE CONTROL PANEL, push EMERGENCY STOP button.

Standard Examinee determined from Initial Conditions that alarm DG-2/C-3, DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED AUTOMATICALLY NO PROTECTION was ON at ENGINE #2 CONTROL PANEL and pushed EMERGENCY STOP button for DG2.

Cue No change in engine sound, DG-SI-3143 ENGINE SPEED pointer at 600, red RUN light is ON, green STOP light is OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 17

7. Procedure Step N/A Standard Examinee determined engine did not stop and transitioned to Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator), either:

Section 5, DG 2 Shutdown Methods, OR Attachment 1, DG Shutdown Methods Hard Card.

Cue When requested, hand examinee a clean copy of Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator),

Section 5 and Attachment 1.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: The remaining steps are from Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator), Section 5 with the like Attachment 1 step number in parenthesis. Steps in Section 5 and Attachment 1 contain the same steps.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 17 Examiner Note: The remaining steps can be performed in any order. The order is not critical to the JPM.

8. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate path Generator)]

Note before Section 5 and Attachment 1 step 2:

NOTE - Following is a list of methods that may be used to shut down DG during emergency conditions. Methods are not listed in any particular order.

Standard Examinee reviewed note, then proceeded to section 5 (or Attachment 1 step 2) DG2 Shutdown.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 17

9. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate path Generator)]

Section 5 (Attachment 1 step 2) DG2 Shutdown 5.1 IF shutting down DG2, THEN PERFORM following:

5.1.1 (2.1)

At ENGINE #2 CONTROL PANEL, PERFORM following:

5.1.1.1 (2.1.1) IF DG-SW-DG2(43CM), DG2 CONTROL MODE SELECTOR, switch is in LOCAL, THEN DEPRESS DG-SW-DG1(5L),

LOCAL ENGINE STOP button until STOP light on.

Standard Examinee determined step was N/A due to DG2 CONTROL MODE SELECTOR switch was in REMOTE.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 17

10. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate path Generator)]

Section 5 (Attachment 1 step 2) DG2 Shutdown 5.1.1 (2.1) At ENGINE #2 CONTROL PANEL, perform following:

5.1.1.2 (2.1.2)

IF DG-SW-DG2(43CM), DG2 CONTROL MODE SELECTOR, switch is in REMOTE, THEN perform following:

a. (2.1.2.1) At PANEL C, PLACE DIESEL GEN STOP/START switch to STOP for 1 to 2 seconds.

b. (2.1.2.2) AFTER 1 to 2 seconds, THEN RELEASE DIESEL GEN STOP/START switch.

Standard Examinee determined step cannot be performed due to Control Room abandonment.

Cue Notes Panel C is in the main control room.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 17

11. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate path Generator)]

Section 5 (Attachment 1 step 2) DG2 Shutdown 5.1.2 (2.2) At ENGINE #2 CONTROL PANEL, DEPRESS EMERGENCY STOP button.

Standard Examinee determined step was already performed and marked step as complete, or pressed EMERGENCY STOP button.

Cue If examinee presses EMERGENCY STOP, indicate no change in engine sound, DG-SI-3143 ENGINE SPEED pointer at 600, red RUN light is ON, green STOP light is OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate path Generator)]

Section 5 (Attachment 1 step 2) DG2 Shutdown 5.1.3 (2.3) At Left Bank Air Start Panel, DEPRESS DG EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN long enough for control air to bleed off safety trip valve.

Standard Examinee pressed and held DG EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN for at least 10 seconds, then released.

Cue Indicate no sound of air flow, no change in engine sound, DG-SI-3143 ENGINE SPEED pointer at 600, red RUN light is ON, green STOP light is OFF.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 17

13. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate path Generator)]

Section 5 (Attachment 1 step 2) DG2 Shutdown 5.1.4 (2.4) PERFORM following to manually shut off fuel racks:

5.1.4.1 (2.4.1) PLACE open end wrench (located SE corner of DG Room by EG 2 breaker) over top of Span Adjustment Lever (catwalk; south end of engine on fuel rack linkage).

Standard Examinee obtained wrench and placed over top of Span Adjustment Lever as depicted on procedure 2.2.20 Attachment 2.

Cue Wrench is fitted onto Span Adjustment Lever.

Notes See Attachment 1 for location of Span Adjustment Lever.

Proper placement of wrench on Span Adjustment lever is depicted on Attachment 1.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 17

14. Procedure Step [Procedure 2.2.20, Standby AC Power System (Diesel Alternate path Generator)]

Critical step Section 5 (Attachment 1 step 2) DG2 Shutdown 5.1.4 (2.4)

Manually shut off fuel racks.

5.1.4.2 (2.4.2)

ROTATE wrench and lever clockwise to right and HOLD until engine stopped.

Standard Examinee rotated wrench and lever clockwise to right as depicted on procedure 2.2.20 Attachment 2 and held until DG2 coasted to stop, then released.

Cue Indicate engine slows to a stop by indicating DG-SI-3143 ENGINE SPEED pointer lowers to zero, audible that engine is not turning and visible that generator shaft is not turning.

Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 16 of 17 ATTACHMENT 1 Examiner Aid (Procedure 2.2.20, Attach 2, Manual Fuel Rack Shutoff)

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Simultaneous loss of NSST and SSST occurred at 100% power.

2. DG1 is needed.

3. 4160V Buses 1F and 1G are energized from ESST.

4. DG1 and DG2 are operating unloaded.

5. Control Room was abandoned due to toxic fumes.

6. Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, is in use.

7. ASD Operator determined DG2 is NOT needed and has given permission to secure DG2.

8. Following alarms are ON at ENGINE #2 CONTROL PANEL:

DG-2/C-3, DIESEL GENERATOR STARTED AUTOMATICALLY NO PROTECTION DG-2/B-3, LUBE OIL LOW PRESSURE INITIATING CUE:

The ASD Operator has directed you to shut down DG2 using Procedure 5.1ASD, Alternate Shutdown, Attachment 4, Diesel Generator Operator, Step 2.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 12 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure P-2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 12 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Conduct Alternate ROD insertion by manually venting the scram air header Revision number: 10 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to conduct alternate rod insertion by manually venting the scram air header.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee manually vented the scram header IAW Procedure 5.8.3 Section 8 and restored the scram air header to pressurize the scram air header.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform x Plant (RCA )

x Simulate Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 12 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 12 Revision Statements:

Rev 10-Updated JPM to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: 295037 EA1.05 (3.9/4.0) 201003 A2.05 (4.1/4.1)

2. Safety Function: 1, Reactivity Control

3. Task No: 200186P0504 CONDUCT ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION BY MANUALLY VENTING SCRAM AIR HEADER

4. PSA Applicability: RPS, Reactor Protection Systems

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. EOP 5.8.3 ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION METHODS (REV 17)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. None Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - N/A

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. EOP 5.8.3 Section 8

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 12 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handout 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 12 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (EOP 5.8.3 ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION METHODS)

Section 8 CAUTION - This section may require dispatching personnel through or into potentially high radiation areas.

Standard Examinee reviewed the caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: 8.1 Refer to Section 3 when dispatching personnel to perform actions outside Control Room.

Standard Examinee reviewed Section 3.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 12

3. Procedure Step: 8.2 Close IA-985, CRD SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME & SCRAM PILOT AIR SUPPLY (R-Critical Step 903-SE; south wall; behind rack for CRD-SOV-SO164A, SS0160, S0164B; ~ 3' off floor).

Standard Examinee Closed IA-985.

Cue Resistance is felt while closing the valve and the valve will no longer turn.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 8.3 Check open IA-244, PI-229 & PS-230 ROOT (R-903-SE).

Standard Examinee verified IA-V-244 open by attempting to take valve in the clockwise direction and verifying movement and returning valve to original position.

Cue Examinee feels no resistance to turning the valve clockwise, The hand wheel is fully counter-clockwise or returned to original position.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 12

5. Procedure Step: 8.4 Remove 3/4" swagelok female connector with 1/4" plug from IA-1601, IA-PI-229 &

Critical step IA-PS-230 DRAIN (R-903-SE).

Standard Examinee removed 3/4" swagelok female connector with 1/4" plug from IA-1601, utilizing the wrench attached by lanyard to IA-1601.

Cue 1. The 3/4" swagelok female connector with 1/4" plug is turning.

2. The 3/4" swagelok female connector with 1/4" plug is removed.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: 8.5 Open IA-1601, IA-PI-229 & IA-PS-230 DRAIN (R-903-SE).

Critical step Standard Examinee opened IA-1601 by turning valve counter-clockwise direction, then positioned valve 1/2 turn clockwise to remove off the back seat.

Cue 1. While the valve hand wheel is turning counter-clockwise, there is the sound of rushing air.

2. Resistance is felt while opening the valve and the valve will no longer turn.

3. Acknowledge removing from backseat Notes Removing from the back seat is not part of the critical step Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 12

7. Procedure Step: 8.6 Inform Control Room that scram air header venting is in progress.

Standard Examinee notified the Control Room the scram air header venting is in progress.

Cue When notified:

1. Acknowledge scram air header venting is in progress and DIRECT operator to stay on the line.

2. After ~1 minute, report that all control rods are inserted and DIRECT restoration of the scram air header.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: 8.7 WHEN directed to restore scram air header, THEN perform following:

Critical step 8.7.1 Close IA-1601, IA-PI-229 & IA-PS-230 DRAIN (R-903-SE).

Standard Examinee closed IA-1601 by turning the valve in the clockwise direction.

Cue After a few seconds state resistance is felt and can no longer turn.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 12

9. Procedure Step: 9.7.2 Install 3/4" swagelok female connector with 1/4" plug on IA-Critical step 1601, IA-PI-229 & IA-PS-230 DRAIN (R-903-SE).

Standard Examinee installed and tighten the 3/4" swagelok female connector with 1/4" plug on IA-1601.

Cue 1. The 3/4" swagelok female connector with 1/4" plug is in place and turning.

2. The 3/4" swagelok female connector with 1/4" plug is tight.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 12

10. Procedure Step: 8.7.3 Open IA-985, CRD SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME & SCRAM Critical step PILOT AIR SUPPLY (R-903-SE; south wall; behind rack for CRD-SOV-SO164A, SS0160, S0164B; ~

3' off floor).

Standard Examinee slowly opened IA-985 by turning valve counter-clockwise until IA-985 is full open, then positioned valve 1/2 turn clockwise to remove off the back seat.

Cue When the valve is full open, state resistance is felt.

Notes Removing from the back seat is not part of the critical step.

Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: 8.8 Inform CRS that scram air header has been restored.

Standard Examinee informed the CRS that the scram air header has been restored.

Cue CRS acknowledges the report.

Notes JPM is Complete.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 12 ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and tell me when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. A failure of RPS and ARI to insert the control rods has occurred.

2. The Control Room Operator has placed all keylock RPS test trip switches to TRIP.

3. The TSC is not yet operational.

4. No ARMs alarms exist.

5. The In-Containment Rad Monitors are reading 100 REM/HR.

INITIATING CUES:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you to manually vent the scram air header per EOP 5.8.3 section 8 and to verify with the Control room that all control rods fully inserted and then to restore the scram air header. Notify the CRS when the task is complete.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 17 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure P-3

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 17 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

PLACE THE AIR DRYER IN SERVICE (A DRYER)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinees ability to place IA Dryer A in service locally.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee placed IA Dryer A in service by closing drain valves IA-58A and IA-166B, opening filter inlet/outlet valves SA-19 and IA-12, closing MCC-L Breaker 2BL, IA-DRY-A, and depressing IA Dryer A START button IAW Procedure 2.2.59 Section 12.1.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

Perform X Plant (RCA )

X Simulate Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 17 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 17 Revision Statements:

Rev 0- New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A number and rating: 295019 AA1.02 (3.3/3.1)

2. Safety Function: 8, PLANT SERVICE SYSTEMS

3. Task No.: 278009P0104 PLACE THE AIR DRYER IN SERVICE

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure steps in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.59, Plant Air System (Rev 76)

2. Alarm Card A-4/F-4, Air Dryer Filter High DP (Rev 44)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. NONE Attachments:

1. NONE

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.59, Plant Air System, Section 12

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 17 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed.

You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 17 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.59, Plant Air System)

12. PLACING AIR DRYER IN SERVICE WARNING - There is 115V and 480V power inside control panel.

Standard Examinee reviewed warning.

Cue Tell the examinee NOT to open IA Dryer A control cabinet due to 480V present.

Notes Procedure 2.2.59 provided as handout 2 Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 12.1 Place Air Dryer A in service.

Standard Examinee determined that he is to place A Air Dryer in service from the Initiating Cues and continued with step 12.1.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 17

3. Procedure Step 12.1.1 Ensure a supply of air is available or place dryer in service per placing system in service section of this procedure.

Standard Examinee determined air supply is available from Initial Conditions IA pressure is 103 psig.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 12.1.2 Inside Air Dryer A Control Panel, ensure following switches are positioned as specified:

12.1.2.1 MODE SELECT switch to HEATED.

Standard Examinee determined MODE SELECT switch is in HEATED from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

5. Procedure Step 12.1.2.2 POWER SAVER switch to OFF.

Standard Examinee determined POWER SAVER switch is in OFF from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 17

6. Procedure Step 12.1.2.3 MANUAL SWITCHING switch is down.

Standard Examinee determined MANUAL SWITCHING switch is down from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

7. Procedure Step 12.1.3 Close IA-166B, DRYER 1A POST FILTER Critical Step UPPER DRAIN.

Standard Examinee closed IA-166B, by turning handle clockwise until resistance was felt.

Cue Resistance is felt and handle will not turn further.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step 12.1.4 Close SA-58A, DRYER 1A PRE-FILTER Critical Step LOWER MANUAL DRAIN.

Standard Examinee closed SA-58A by turning handle clockwise until resistance was felt.

Cue Resistance is felt and handle will not turn further.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 17

9. Procedure Step CAUTION - Opening SA-19 rapidly can cause desiccant bed to be disturbed.

Standard Examinee reviewed caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step 12.1.5 Slowly open SA-19, PREFILTER A INLET.

Critical Step Standard Examinee opened SA-19 by slowly turning handle counter-clockwise until resistance was felt, then positioned valve 1/2 turn clockwise to remove off the back seat.

Cue Resistance is felt and handle will not turn further; Acknowledge report if stated took off backseat.

Notes Removing from the back seat is not part of the critical step.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 17

11. Procedure Step 12.1.6 Open IA-12, INSTRUMENT AIR POST FILTER Critical Step A OUTLET.

Standard Examinee opened IA-12 by turning handle counter-clockwise until resistance was felt, then positioned valve 1/2 turn clockwise to remove off the back seat.

Cue Resistance is felt and handle will not turn further; Acknowledge report if stated took off backseat.

Notes Removing from the back seat is not part of the critical step.

Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step 12.1.7 Close MCC-T Breaker 2BL, IA-DRY-A, Critical Step INSTRUMENT AIR DRYER A.

Standard Examinee closed MCC-T Breaker 2BL by placing handle upward to ON.

Cue Handle is up, aligned with ON.

Notes Panel indications light up.

Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step NOTE - Air dryer trouble may alarm.

Standard Examinee reviewed note, and called the Control room to inform of potential alarm.

Cue Acknowledge report if given.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 17

14. Procedure Step 12.1.8 Depress START button on front of Air Dryer Critical Step A Control Panel. (north of Dryer A).

Standard Examinee depressed and released START button on front of Air Dryer A Control Panel.

Cue Notes Indications change on the panel for starting up.

Results SAT UNSAT

15. Procedure Step 12.1.9 Check IA-PI-2336A, IA DRYER A PURGE INDICATOR (back of dryer), indicates ~ 63 psig or adjust using IA-184, IA DRYER A PURGE INLET.

Standard Examinee observed IA-PI-2336A indicates ~ 63 psig or adjusted using IA-184.

Cue IA-PI-2336A indicates 63 psig.

Notes Only one person can fit in area by IA-PI-2336A. When examinee has verified the pressure indicator state the cue to him. You will not be able to point to the indicator.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 17

16. Procedure Step 12.1.10 Allow dryer to purge for ~ 30 minutes.

Standard Examinee marked time using suitable time piece for start of 30 minute purge.

Cue 32 minutes have elapsed.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

17. Procedure Step 12.1.11 Place IA-SW-5A, A LOCKOUT RESET, Critical Step switch to RESET (C-882-N north of Dryer A).

Standard Examinee placed IA-SW-5A switch to RESET.

Cue Switch IA-SW-5A is aligned with RESET.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

18. Procedure Step NOTE - Air dryer trouble may clear.

Standard Examinee reviewed note, and called the Control room to inform of potential alarm reset.

Cue Acknowledge report if given.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 17

19. Procedure Step 12.1.12 Depress START button on front of Air Critical Step Dryer A Control Panel.

Standard Examinee depressed and released START button on front of Air Dryer A Control Panel.

Cue Notes Indications change on the panel for starting up.

Results SAT UNSAT

20. Procedure Step 12.1.13 Check IA-PI-2336A indicates ~ 63 psig or adjust using IA-184.

Standard Examinee observed IA-PI-2336A indicates ~ 63 psig or adjusted using IA-184.

Cue IA-PI-2336A indicates 63 psig.

Notes Only one person can fit in area by IA-PI-2336A. When examinee has verified the pressure indicator state the cue to him. You will not be able to point to the indicator.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 17

21. Procedure Step 12.1.14 Test SA-TMR-614, A DRYER PREFILTER DRAIN TIMER, as follows(C-882-N):

12.1.14.1 Observe setting on "off time" knob.

Standard Examinee observed setting on the knob.

Cue Notes Ensure that wherever the setting is now, that in step 12.1.14.4 it is restored to this value.

Results SAT UNSAT

22. Procedure Step NOTE - There is small delay before filter blows down.

Standard Examinee reviewed the note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 17

23. Procedure Step 12.1.14.2 Take "off time" knob to test.

Standard Examinee placed the off time to test.

Cue Point to the test position.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

24. Procedure Step 12.1.14.3 Ensure SA-F-PFA blows down for approximately time set on "drain time" knob (cycle will repeat while in test).

Standard Examinee verified the filter blew down the amount of time set on the drain time knob.

Cue Acknowledge the blowdown was completed.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 16 of 17

25. Procedure Step 12.1.14.4 Place "off time" knob back to setting observed in Step 12.1.14.1.

Standard Examinee restored the off time knob to the setting observed in step 12.1.14.1.

Cue Acknowledge knob was restored to the previous position.

Notes Ensure that wherever the setting is now that in step 12.1.14.4 it is restored to this value.

Results SAT UNSAT

26. Procedure Step 12.1.15 Inform Control Room to update AIR DRYER IN SERVICE placard on Panel A.

Standard Examinee informed Control room that IA Dryer A is in operation and to update the placard on Panel A.

Cue Acknowledge report.

Notes JPM is complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: _________________Total Time: _______________

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The plant is at 100% power.

2. IA Dryer B is in service.

3. Annunciator A-4/F-4, Air Dryer Filter High DP is in alarm.

4. IA header pressure is 103 psig, slowly lowering.

5. IA Dryer A is in standby with the following switch alignment inside Air Dryer A Control Panel:

MODE SELECT switch is in HEATED.

POWER SAVER switch is in OFF.

MANUAL SWITCHING switch is down.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to place Instrument Air Dryer A in service IAW Procedure 2.2.59, Section 12.

Notify the CRS when IA Dryer A is in service.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 19 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-1

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 19 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Respond to a Control Rod Drifting In (Alternate Path)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to perform control rod exercise testing IAW Procedure 6.CRD.301 and then respond to two control rods drifting in IAW Alarm Card 9-5-1/C-4, Rod Drift or Procedure 2.4CRD, CRD Trouble.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee exercised control rod 22-07 one notch and inserted control rod 26-07 IAW Procedure 6.CRD.301 section 3.7, recognized control rods 22-07 and 26-07 were drifting in, and inserted a manual scram IAW Alarm Card 9-5-1/C-4, Rod Drift or Procedure 2.4CRD, CRD Trouble.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 19 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 19 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 201003 A2.03 (3.4/3.7)

2. Safety Function: 1, Reactivity Control

3. Task No.: 201020O0401 - Respond to a Control Rod Drifting In

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 6.CRD.301, Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test (Rev 32)

2. Procedure 2.4CRD, CRD Trouble (Rev 20)

3. Procedure 2.1.5 Reactor Scram (Rev 77)

4. Procedure 2.3_9-5-1 (Rev 36)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 2 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. 6.CRD.301, Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test, with Attachment 3 and associated steps marked up to the point of testing control rod 22-07 per Step 3.7)

3. 2.4CRD, CRD Trouble

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 19 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Note: This is an ALTERNATE PATH JPM. While performing 6.CRD.301, control rods 22-07 and 26-07 will drift in, requiring the examinee to scram the reactor IAW Procedure 2.4CRD.

Note: DO NOT give Procedure 2.4CRD to examinee until requested.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed.

You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

(DO NOT give Handout 3 (2.4CRD CRD TROUBLE) to examinee until identified by the examinee at JPM step 22, 23, or 24 if asked for.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 19 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301, Withdrawn Control Rod Operability Critical Step IST Test) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.1 Using Concurrent Verification, SELECT desired control rod.

Standard Pressed select switch for rod 22-07 on ROD SELECT MATRIX.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.2 ENSURE following:

3.7.2.1 Desired control rod only button backlit on ROD SELECT MATRIX.

Standard Checked only rod 22-07 switch on ROD SELECT MATRIX was backlit.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 19

3. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.2 ENSURE following:

3.7.2.2 Desired control rod only control rod backlit on FULL CORE DISPLAY.

Standard Checked only rod 22-07 on FULL CORE DISPLAY was backlit.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.2 ENSURE following:

3.7.2.3 Desired control rod indicated on FOUR ROD DISPLAY.

Standard Checked rod 22-07 as selected on FOUR ROD DISPLAY.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 19

5. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.2 ENSURE following:

3.7.2.4 LPRM signals on 16 LPRM readout windows normal or as expected for power level and rod selected.

Standard Checked LPRM meters on panel 9-5 and determined readings were normal for peripheral rod 22-07 at 90% power.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.3 RECORD in DESIRED ROD SELECTED block for selected rod.

Standard Inscribed check mark in DESIRED ROD SELECTED column on Attachment 3 for rod 22-07.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 19

7. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

Critical Step

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.4 INSERT selected control rod one notch.

Standard Placed ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL SWITCH momentarily to left to IN, then released switch and observed ROD IN light illuminate and extinguish, ROD SETTLE light illuminate and extinguish, and rod position on FOUR ROD DISPLAY change from 48 to 46 for rod 22-07.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

Critical Step

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.5 WITHDRAW selected control rod by performing following:

3.7.5.1 APPLY continuous withdraw signal.

Standard Simultaneously placed ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL SWITCH momentarily to right to OUT NOTCH and EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE to right to OVERRIDE and held both switches.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 19

9. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.5 WITHDRAW selected control rod by performing following:

3.7.5.2 CHECK red DRIFT light on full core display for selected rod not on.

Standard Checked drift light for rod 22-07 on FULL CORE DISPLAY was not lit.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.5 WITHDRAW selected control rod by performing following:

3.7.5.3 CHECK Annunciator 9-5-1/B-4, ROD OVERTRAVEL, does not alarm.

Standard Checked Annunciator 9-5-1/B-4, ROD OVERTRAVEL, did not alarm Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 19

11. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.5 WITHDRAW selected control rod by performing following:

3.7.5.4 RECORD WITHDRAW STALL FLOW from CRD-FI-305 for selected control rod.

Standard Noted flow indicated on CRD-FI-305, DR WTR FLOW.

Cue Examiner reads stall flow.

Notes Examinee cannot record stall flow due to 2-handed operation to hold rod control switches until completed with coupling check.

Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

Critical Step

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.5 WITHDRAW selected control rod by performing following:

3.7.5.5 RELEASE continuous withdraw signal.

Standard Released ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL SWITCH and EMERGENCY NOTCH OVERRIDE switches.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 19

13. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.6 IF Steps 3.7.5.2 and 3.7.5.3 satisfied, THEN RECORD in COUPLING CHECK block for selected control rod.

Standard Inscribed check mark in COUPLING CHECK column on Attachment 3 for rod 22-07.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

14. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 22-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.7 IF control rod inserted and withdrew one notch, THEN RECORD in CONTROL ROD EXERCISED block for selected control rod.

Standard Inscribed check mark in CONTROL ROD EXERCISED column on Attachment 3 for rod 22-07, and initialed in PERFORMED BY column on Attachment 3 for rod 22-07.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 19

15. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301)

Critical Step (Control rod 26-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.1 Using Concurrent Verification, SELECT desired control rod.

Standard Pressed select switch for rod 26-07 on ROD SELECT MATRIX.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 26-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.2 ENSURE following:

3.7.2.1 Desired control rod only button backlit on ROD SELECT MATRIX.

Standard Checked only rod 26-07 switch on ROD SELECT MATRIX was backlit.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 19

17. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 26-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.2 ENSURE following:

3.7.2.2 Desired control rod only control rod backlit on FULL CORE DISPLAY.

Standard Checked only rod 26-07 on FULL CORE DISPLAY was backlit.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

18. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 26-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.2 ENSURE following:

3.7.2.3 Desired control rod indicated on FOUR ROD DISPLAY.

Standard Checked rod 26-07 as selected on FOUR ROD DISPLAY.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 19

19. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 26-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.2 ENSURE following:

3.7.2.4 LPRM signals on 16 LPRM readout windows normal or as expected for power level and rod selected.

Standard Checked LPRM meters on panel 9-5 and determined readings were normal for peripheral rod 26-07 at 90% power.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

20. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 26-07)

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.3 RECORD in DESIRED ROD SELECTED block for selected rod.

Standard Inscribed check mark in DESIRED ROD SELECTED column on Attachment 3 for rod 26-07.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 16 of 19

21. Procedure Step: (Procedure 6.CRD.301) (Control rod 26-07)

Critical Step

3. Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test 3.7 For each control rod at 48, PERFORM following:

3.7.4 INSERT selected control rod one notch.

Standard Placed ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL SWITCH momentarily to left to IN, then released switch and observed ROD IN light illuminate and extinguish, ROD SETTLE light illuminate and extinguish, and rod position on FOUR ROD DISPLAY change from 48 to 46 for rod 26-07.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

22. Procedure Step: N/A Alternate Path Standard Recognized and responded to Annunciator 9-5-1/C-4, ROD DRIFT.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Note to Examiner: Examinee may reference Alarm Card 9-5-1/C-4 or may enter Procedure 2.4CRD. If Examinee states they are entering Procedure 2.4CRD and requests a copy, give the examinee Handout 3 (Procedure 2.4CRD).

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 17 of 19

23. Procedure Step: (Alarm Card 9-5-1/C-4)

Alternate Path 2.1 Check full core display for rod drift light(s) to determine which rod(s) is drifting.

Standard Checked red drift LEDs for control rods 22-07 and 26-07 on FULL CORE DISPLAY were lit, and reported to the CRS that the drift lights for 22-07 and 26-07 were on and scram action is met.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Note to Examiner: Both Alarm Card 9-5-1/C-4 and Procedure 2.4CRD contain a step to insert a manual scram if more than one control rod is drifting in.

24. Procedure Step: (Alarm Card 9-5-1/C-4)

Alternate Path 2.2. IF more than one rod is drifting, THEN SCRAM and Critical Step concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

and/or (2.4CRD) 4.2 If more than one rod drifting, SCRAM and concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

Standard Inserted SCRAM by depressing RX SCRAM CH A and CH B push buttons on panel 9-5.

Cue JPM is complete Notes Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 18 of 19 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC - 320; ~90% power C. Run schedule File 2020-4JPMS1 D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None Scram Outlet

2. Malfunctions RD03C Valve Leakage 1 N/A 20.5 N/A N/A 22-07 Scram Outlet RD03H Valve Leakage 1 N/A 20.5 N/A N/A 26-07

3. Remotes None

4. Overrides None

5. Panel Setup a. Ensure RX Power is ~90% and both RR Pump Controllers in P.

Time Event Action Description 00:00 Insert malfunction RD03C at Scram Outlet Valve Leakage 22-07 20.5 on event 1 00:00 Insert malfunction RD03H at Scram Outlet Valve Leakage 26-07 20.5 on event 1 00:00 create event 1 rdsdrpos(128) <= Control rod 26-07 inserted to position 736 46 00:00 1 create event 11 zlorpsds1a == 0 Scram logic lights OFF

& zlorpsds1b == 0 11 Delete malfunction RD03C Scram Outlet Valve Leakage 22-07 11 Delete malfunction RD03H Scram Outlet Valve Leakage 26-07

ATTACHMENT 2 Directions to Examinee:

Read the following, and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Reactor is at 90% power.

2. The WCO is available to act as the second checker.

3. Reactor Engineer is present in the control room.

4. All fully withdrawn control rods through rod 18-07 on 6.CRD.601 Attachment 3 have already been tested.

INITIATING CUE:

You are directed to perform operability testing of fully withdrawn control rods IAW Procedure 6.CRD.301, Withdrawn Control Rod Operability IST Test, step 3.7, beginning at control rod 22-07.

Inform the CRS when testing is complete.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 23 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-2

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 23 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Place the Reactor Water Cleanup system in operation with the reactor at rated temperature Revision number: 1 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to place the RWCU system in service at rated RPV temperature.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee placed RWCU Pump A in service by closing RWCU-MO-68, opening RWCU-MO-74, opening RWCU-MO-15, opening RWCU-MO-18 without causing a Group 3 isolation on high RWCU system flow, and starting RWCU Pump A while throttling open RWCU-MO-68 and achieving 200 psig on RWCU-PI-131, IAW Procedure 2.2.66 section 6 using the alternate method.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 23 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 23 Revision Statement:

Rev 1-Updated 9/2018 ILT NRC JPM S2 to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 204000 A4.01 (3.1/3.0)

2. Safety Function: 2, Reactor Water Inventory Control

3. Task No.: 204012O0101 - Place the reactor water cleanup system in operation with the reactor at rated temperature

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.66 Reactor Water Cleanup (Rev 118)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 1 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Section 6 of Procedure 2.2.66 marked complete through Step 6.6

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 23 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 23 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

Examiner Note: Valves that have oval fluted control switches are throttle MOVs in at least one direction. When fully closing or opening these valves in a throttle direction, the control switch is required to be held for ~5 seconds after fully closed/open indication, as applicable, is received.

Holding switch for 5 seconds is not a critical portion of a JPM step.

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.66, Reactor Water Cleanup)

Critical Step 6. PLACING SYSTEM IN SERVICE 6.7 ENSURE RWCU-MO-68, RETURN LINE TO RX VLV, closed.

Standard Examinee closed RWCU-MO-68 by placing and holding control switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE and observed green light ON, red light OFF and held control switch in CLOSE for ~5 seconds after red light extinguished.

Cue Notes Holding switch to CLOSE for ~5 seconds after green light extinguished is not a critical portion of this step.

Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 6.8 ENSURE output of RWCU-RMC-143, BD VLV 55 FLOW CONTROL, adjusted to zero.

Standard Examinee checked output meter on RWCU-RMC-143 indicated zero.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 23

3. Procedure Step 6.9 ENSURE RWCU-MO-56, BLOWDOWN TO MAIN CNDSR VLV, closed.

Standard Examinee checked RWCU-MO-56 was closed, indicated by green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 6.10 ENSURE RWCU-MO-57, DRAIN TO RW COLL TK, closed.

Standard Examinee checked RWCU-MO-57 was closed, indicated by green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 23

5. Procedure Step 6.11 ENSURE RWCU-MO-74, DEMIN SUCTION Critical Step BYPASS VLV, open.

Standard Examinee opened RWCU-MO-74 by placing control switch clockwise to OPEN and holding until red light ON and the green light OFF, then releasing.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 6.12 IF RWCU-MO-15 closed, THEN ENSURE RWCU-MO-18, OUTBD ISOL VLV, closed.

Standard Examinee checked RWCU-MO-18 was closed, indicated by green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 23

7. Procedure Step 6.13 ENSURE RWCU-MO-15, INBD ISOL VLV, open.

Critical Step Standard Examinee opened RWCU-MO-15 by placing control switch clockwise to open, then releasing and observing red light ON, green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step (Caution is prior to step 6.14)

CAUTION - Group 3 High System Flow isolation may result if RWCU-MO-18 throttled open too quickly.

Standard Examinee read caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 23

9. Procedure Step 6.14 IF RWCU-MO-18, OUTBD ISOL VLV, closed, THEN Critical Step slowly THROTTLE valve full open to equalize RWCU System pressure with reactor pressure.

Standard Examinee opened RWCU-MO-18 slowly by momentarily placing control switch to OPEN, then releasing, and repeating as necessary, while observing pressure indicated on REGEN HX IND RWCU-PI-131 until it reads approximately equal to reactor pressure without causing a Group 3 isolation on high RWCU system flow.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step (Note is prior to step 6.15)

NOTE - Once RWCU pump shutdown after operation without mini-purge for any period of time, mini-purge required for RWCU pump restart.

Standard Examinee read Note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 23

11. Procedure Step 6.15 IF any of following:

MODE 1, 2, or 3.

MODE 4 or 5 and CRD available.

RWCU pump being started after operation without mini-purge.

THEN at CRD System Valve Station (R-903-SE),

PERFORM following to align mini-purge to available RWCU pumps:

6.15.1 ENSURE CRD-189 open.

6.15.2 ENSURE CRD-257, RWCU PUMP A MINI-PURGE ROOT, open.

6.15.3 ENSURE CRD-258, RWCU PUMP B MINI-PURGE ROOT, open.

6.15.4 IF CRD-FI-130A, RWCU PUMP A SEAL PURGE FLOW, not 1 to 2 gpm, THEN ADJUST CRD-FREG-1A, RWCU PUMP A MINI-PURGE FLOW REGULATOR, as follows: (Steps 6.15.4.1 thru 6.15.4.3).

6.15.5 IF CRD-FI-130B, RWCU PUMP B SEAL PURGE FLOW, not 1 to 2 gpm, THEN ADJUST CRD-FREG-1B, RWCU PUMP B MINI-PURGE FLOW REGULATOR, as follows: (Steps 6.15.5.1 thru 6.15.5.3).

Standard Examinee called NLO to complete step 6.15.

Cue NLO reports that all steps of 6.15 are complete, RWCU-FI-130A and RWCU-FI-130B are reading 1.8 gpm.

Booth Operator Align mini-purge by inserting the following remote functions Action to OPEN:

(CU01) RWCU A CRD Mini Purge PCV-FREG-1A (CU02) RWCU B CRD Mini Purge PCV-FREG-1B Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 23

12. Procedure Step (Note is prior to step 6.15)

NOTE - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months RWCU pump run time limit without mini-purge not cumulative (i.e., allowable to run RWCU pump up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months without mini-purge, align mini-purge 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months , then restart RWCU pump for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months without mini-purge).

Standard Examinee read Note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step 6.15.6 IF both of following:

MODE 4 or 5.

CRD not available.

THEN PERFORM following:

Standard Examinee N/Ad step since the plant is currently in Mode 3 as stated in the Initial Conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 23

14. Procedure Step 6.16 In RWCU Pump Rooms (R-931-W), CHECK following for available RWCU pumps:

Pumps free of debris.

Oil reservoir levels satisfactory.

Mechanical seals appear to be operational.

Standard Examinee called NLO to complete pre-start checks for RWCU Pump A per step 6.16.

Cue NLO reports that pre-start checks for RWCU Pump A are complete and SAT, step 6.16 is complete.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

15. Procedure Step 6.17 IF RWCU pump maintenance affecting pump integrity performed, THEN perform following:

Standard Examinee determined step 6.17 was N/A due to no maintenance being performed in Initial Conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 23

16. Procedure Step 6.18 MAINTAIN REC flow to NRHX less than or equal to 400 gpm.

Standard Examinee read step.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

17. Procedure Step 6.19 IF in MODE 1, 2, or 3, THEN THROTTLE REC-56, NON REGEN HX OUTLET, to obtain less than or equal to 400 gpm on REC-FI-459, REC TO NON-REGEN HEAT EXCHANGER (R-931-SW).

Standard Examinee called NLO to perform step 6.19.

Cue NLO reports step 6.19 is complete and flow on REC-FI-459 is ~390 gpm.

Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 23

18. Procedure Step (Notes are prior to step 6.1.20)

NOTE 1 - Events with lower potential effect on RWCU System chemistry:

Routine RWCU System maintenance.

Normal RWCU System and F/D removal from service.

NOTE 2 - Events with lower potential effect on RWCU System chemistry:

Prolonged RWCU System out of service time.

Intrusive RWCU System maintenance (e.g., piping replacement, etc.).

Standard Examinee read note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

19. Procedure Step (Caution is prior to step 6.20)

CAUTION - Resin injection may result from placing RWCU in service using ALTERNATE METHOD after events affecting chemistry.

Standard Examinee read caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 16 of 23

20. Procedure Step 6.20 SM/CRS determine how RWCU will be placed in service as follows:

6.20.1 IF any of following:

Placing system in service after maintenance affecting chemistry.

System requires heatup.

Resin injection likely.

THEN PLACE system in service per normal method (preferred) in Step 6.21.

6.20.2 IF all of following:

System heatup not required.

Maintenance affecting chemistry not performed.

Resin injection not likely.

THEN PLACE system in service per alternate method in Step 6.22.

Standard Examinee determined steps 6.20.1 was N/A and that 6.20.2 was required, because CRS has instructed ALTERNATE METHOD per step 6.20.2 is to be used based on Initiating Cue and proceeded to step 6.22.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 17 of 23

21. Procedure Step 6.22 IF placing RWCU in service using alternate method, THEN PERFORM following:

NOTE - Operator needed locally to validate pump low flow trip instrument greater than trip setpoint for pump being started prior to releasing switch.

Standard Examinee read note and called and briefed NLO of requirement.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 18 of 23

22. Procedure Step 6.22.1 STATION Operator locally to monitor pump low flow trip instrument for pump being started.

Standard Examinee called and briefed NLO of requirement.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

23. Procedure Step (Cautions are prior to step 6.22.2)

CAUTION 1 - Pump runout could result from allowing pressure on RWCU-PI-131 to drop below 200 psig.

CAUTION 2 - RWCU pump motor damage could result from repeated RWCU pump starts.

Standard Examinee read cautions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 19 of 23 Examiner Note: Two-handed operation is required in the next JPM step.

24. Procedure Step 6.22.2 IF starting RWCU PUMP A, THEN PERFORM Critical Step following:

6.22.2.1 PERFORM following concurrently:

a. Place and hold RWCU PUMP A switch to START.

b. Slowly THROTTLE OPEN RWCU-MO-68 to maintain pressure on RWCU-PI-131, REGEN HX IND, as follows:

As steady as possible.

Greater than or equal to 200 psig.

Standard Examinee placed and held RWCU-P-A control switch clockwise to START AND throttled open RWCU-MO-68 by placing its control switch clockwise to OPEN until >

200 psig was indicated on RWCU-PI-131, then released switch for RWCU-MO-68.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

25. Procedure Step 6.22.2.2 ENSURE RWCU-DPIS-125A, RWCU PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW (R-931-NW on LR 25-2-1),

greater than 2" wg.

Standard Examinee called NLO to verify if RWCU-DPIS-125A was >

2 WG.

Cue NLO reports that RWCU-DPIS-125A is > 2 WG.

Notes Booth Operator On INSIGHT ensure point CUF(14) is above 13.9. There is Action no indication in the control room to monitor DPIS. This point is monitored to ensure adequate RWCU flow.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 20 of 23

26. Procedure Step 6.22.2.3 RELEASE RWCU PUMP A switch Critical Step Standard Examinee released RWCU-P-A control switch.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

27. Procedure Step 6.22.3 IF starting RWCU PUMP B, THEN PERFORM following:

Standard Examinee determined step was N/A because Initiating Cue stated to start RWCU Pump A, not B.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 21 of 23

28. Procedure Step 6.23 PLACE available F/D(s) in service per one of following:

Procedure 2.5RWCU.F/DA.

Procedure 2.5RWCU.F/DB.

Section 10.

Section 11.

Standard Informed CRS RWCU Pump A has been started IAW procedure 2.2.66 section 6 ALTERNATE METHOD to the point of placing F/Ds in service.

Cue Acknowledge report as CRS Notes JPM is COMPLETE Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 22 of 23 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC319 (performed with S5)

C. Load Schedule File None D. Change the simulator conditions Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial as follows:

1. Events None

2. Malfunctions N/A

3. Remotes None

4. Overrides None The IC has the following conditions:

a. Rx Scrammed and Plant has stabilized

b. insert mf rp10a to cause Group 3

c. insert mf rp10b to cause Group 3

d. delete mf rp10a to allow Group 3 to be reset

e. delete mf rp10b to allow Group 3 to be reset

f. RWCU-MO-15 closed

g. RWCU-MO-18 closed

5. Panel Setup h. RWCU Pumps tripped

i. Group 3 isolation has been reset

j. Throttle open RWCU-MO-74 just until red light comes on

k. RWCU Mini-purge isolated per SOP 2.2.66 step 6.5 (RFs for CU01 and CU02 are closed)

Open Insight and monitor point CUF(14). This point will need to be above 13.9 to ensure adequate RWCU flow to avoid the low flow trip setpoint while starting RWCU-P-A.

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following, and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin:

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The plant scrammed from 100% power and is in Mode 3.

2. RWCU Pump A tripped due to a spurious Group 3 isolation signal.

3. The cause of the Group 3 isolation signal has been corrected.

4. Group 3 isolation has been verified AND reset per 2.1.22.

5. No maintenance has been performed on the RWCU System.

6. CRD mini purge was in service to RWCU prior to isolation.

7. ALL steps of Procedure 2.2.66 section 6 up to step 6.7 have been completed.

8. An operator with a copy of the procedure is standing by to perform local steps, as necessary.

INITIATING CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you to place RWCU Pump A in service IAW Procedure 2.2.66, section 6, beginning at step 6.7 AND to use the ALTERNATE METHOD per step 6.22.

Inform the CRS when RWCU Pump A has been started and RWCU pressure is stable.

Another operator will place the RWCU F/Ds in service.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 16 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-3

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 16 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Open MSIVs with Reactor Pressurized (Alternate Path)

Revision number: 1 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

FRAME:

PERFORMANCE Validation Time (min): 11 Actual Time (min):

TIME:

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to place MSLs in service from an isolated condition with the reactor pressurized.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee opened Outboard MSIVs and began warming main steam lines IAW 2.2.56 section 6, recognized a main steam line leak, isolated the main steam lines by closing MS-MO-74 and/or MS-MO-77 and/or MS-MO-78 IAW Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 16 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 16 Revision Statement:

Rev 1-JPM updated to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 239001 A4.01 (4.2/4.0)

2. Safety Function: 3, Reactor Pressure Control

3. Task No.: 239020P0101 Open MSIVs with Reactor Pressurized

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - PCIS

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System (Rev 53)

2. Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations (Rev 104)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-up: See Attachment 1.

Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System section 6, marked up through step 6.10 complete

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 16 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Note: This is an ALTERNATE PATH JPM. MSL B will rupture as MSLs downstream of inboard MSIVs are being pressurized, requiring manual isolation of MSL warmup steam supply valves.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed.

You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 16 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

Examiner Note: Valves that have fluted oval control switches are throttle MOVs in at least one direction. When fully closing or opening these valves in a throttle direction, the control switch is required to be held for ~5 seconds after fully closed/open indication, as applicable, is received.

Holding switch for 5 seconds is not a critical portion of a JPM step.

Examiner Note: Order is not critical for the next 4 JPM steps.

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System)

Critical Step 6. Opening MSIVs with Reactor Pressurized 6.11 ENSURE following open:

MS-AO-86A.

MS-AO-86B.

MS-AO-86C.

MS-AO-86D.

Standard Examinee opened MS-AO-86A, Outboard MSIV, by placing its control switch clockwise to OPEN on panel 9-3, checked red light ON and green light OFF at the control switch and on the Isolation Valve Positions mimic on panel 9-3.

Cue Notes Verifying position on the Isolation Valve Position mimic on Panel 9-3 is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 16

2. Procedure Step 6.11 ENSURE following open:

Critical Step MS-AO-86A.

MS-AO-86B.

MS-AO-86C.

MS-AO-86D.

Standard Examinee opened MS-AO-86B, Outboard MSIV, by placing its control switch clockwise to OPEN on panel 9-3, checked red light ON and green light OFF at the control switch and on the Isolation Valve Positions mimic on panel 9-3.

Cue Notes Verifying position on the Isolation Valve Position mimic on Panel 9-3 is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 16

3. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System)

Critical Step Section 6 Opening MSIVs with Reactor Pressurized 6.11 ENSURE following open:

MS-AO-86A.

MS-AO-86B.

MS-AO-86C.

MS-AO-86D.

Standard Examinee opened MS-AO-86C, Outboard MSIV, by placing its control switch clockwise to OPEN on panel 9-3, checked red light ON and green light OFF at the control switch and on the Isolation Valve Positions mimic on panel 9-3.

Cue Notes Verifying position on the Isolation Valve Position mimic on Panel 9-3 is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 16

4. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System)

Critical Step Section 6 Opening MSIVs with Reactor Pressurized 6.11 ENSURE following open:

MS-AO-86A.

MS-AO-86B.

MS-AO-86C.

MS-AO-86D.

Standard Examinee opened MS-AO-86D, Outboard MSIV, by placing its control switch clockwise to OPEN on panel 9-3, checked red light ON and green light OFF at the control switch and on the Isolation Valve Positions mimic on panel 9-3.

Cue Notes Verifying position on the Isolation Valve Position mimic on Panel 9-3 is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 16

5. Procedure Step 6.12 ESTABLISH drain path by ensuring following open:

Critical Step MS-MO-74 MS-MO-77 MS-MO-79, RO BYPASS VLV Standard Examinee opened MS-MO-74, (MSL Drain) INBD ISOL VLV, by placing its control switch clockwise to OPEN on panel 9-4, checked red light ON and green light OFF at the control switch and on the Isolation Valve Positions mimic on panel 9-3.

Cue Notes Verifying position on the Isolation Valve Position mimic on Panel 9-3 is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 6.12 ESTABLISH drain path by ensuring following open:

Critical Step MS-MO-74 MS-MO-77 MS-MO-79, RO BYPASS VLV Standard Examinee opened MS-MO-77, (MSL Drain) OUTBD ISOL VLV, by placing its control switch clockwise to OPEN on panel 9-4, checked red light ON and green light OFF at the control switch and on the Isolation Valve Positions mimic on panel 9-3.

Cue Notes Verifying position on the Isolation Valve Position mimic on Panel 9-3 is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 16

7. Procedure Step 6.12 ESTABLISH drain path by ensuring following open:

Critical Step MS-MO-74 MS-MO-77 MS-MO-79, RO BYPASS VLV Standard Examinee opened MS-MO-79, (MSL Drain) RO BYPASS VLV by placing its control switch clockwise to OPEN on panel 9-4 and holding the control switch until red light ON and green light OFF at the control switch and on the Isolation Valve Positions mimic on panel 9-3.

Cue Notes Verifying position on the Isolation Valve Position mimic on Panel 9-3 is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step 6.13 AFTER drain path established ~ 1 minute, THEN Critical Step PERFORM following:

6.13.1 CLOSE MS-MO-79.

Standard Using a suitable chronograph (simulator clock, stopwatch, wristwatch, etc.), the examinee verified at least 50 seconds had elapsed after MS-MO-79 reached fully open in previous step, the examinee CLOSED MS-MO-79, (MSL Drain) RO BYPASS VLV, by placing its control switch counter-clockwise to CLOSE on panel 9-4 and holding until green light ON and red light OFF at the control switch and on the Isolation Valve Positions mimic on panel 9-3, then releasing switch.

Cue Notes Closing MS-MO-79 is the only critical portion of this step, verifying elapsed time is NOT critical.

Verifying position on the Isolation Valve Position mimic on Panel 9-3 is not critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 16 Examiner Note: For the next step, Examiner states that a plant announcement Admitting steam to Main Steam Lines was made to preempt examinee using PA system.

Examiner Note: In the next step, when equalizing header pressure reaches 200 psig, steam leak into MSL Tunnel malfunction will go active.

9. Procedure Step 6.13 AFTER drain path established ~ 1 minute, THEN Critical Step PERFORM following:

6.13.2 THROTTLE OPEN MS-MO-78 to start pressurizing main steam lines while preventing water hammer and limiting pressurization rate to less than or equal to 100 psi/min.

Standard Examinee slowly opened MS-MO-78, (MSL Drain)

OUTBD THROTTLE VLV on Panel 9-4, by jogging control switch clockwise to open and observing equalizing header pressure indicated on MAIN STEAM MS-PR-81D on panel B (and/or PMIS pt. T015 or DEH HMI throttle pressure) slowly rising 100 psig per minute.

Cue Notes Multiple indications the examinee can monitor pressurization rate. Any indication meets the critical step.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 16

10. Procedure Step: N/A Alternate Path Standard After equalizing header pressure rises to >200 psig, Examinee recognized equalizing header pressure lowering on MAIN STEAM MS-PR-81D on panel B (and/or PMIS pt.

T015 or DEH HMI throttle pressure) and 9-3-1/E-10 AREA HIGH TEMP on and 9-5-1/E1 MAIN STEAM LINE AREA HIGH TEMP CHANNEL A and 9-5-1/E2 MAIN STEAM LINE AREA HIGH TEMP CHANNEL B.

Announced EOP-5A entry condition Checked SPDS and/or panel 9-21 and determines MSL Tunnel temperature rising on MS-TE-126A/B/C/D, STEAM TUNNEL LINE A/B/C/D Cue IF examinee requests guidance, ask what examinee recommends Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: For the next step, the examinee may pull the alarm card for 9-5-1/E-1 or E-2 and be directed to insert a full group 1 isolation or may use 2.0.3 Conduct of Operations.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 16

11. Procedure Step Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations Alternate Path 10.3 SAFETY SYSTEM OPERATION Critical Step 10.3.5 Upon recognition of a failure of automatic action, the CRO shall manually perform those actions necessary to fulfill the safety function and report the completion of the manual action to the CRS as soon as possible.

Standard Examinee isolated MSLs by closing MS-MO-74 and/or MS-MO-77 by placing valve control switch to CLOSE and/or closing MS-MO-78 by placing valve control switch to CLOSE and holding until green light ON and red light OFF before SW Quad area or SE Quad area temperature reaches 195°F on SPDS.

Cue State this JPM is complete when MSLs are isolated.

Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: ____________ TOTAL TIME: __________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 322 C. Load Schedule File 2020-4JPMS3 D. Change the simulator conditions Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial as follows:

create event 3 zaomspr81d > 0.100(downstream

1. Events of MSL @200psi)

MSL B leak

2. Malfunctions ms03b 3 N/A 100 N/A N/A outside Ctmt Group 1 fail to rp04 A N/A N/A N/A N/A auto isolate

3. Remotes None

4. Overrides None

a. Ensure all four Group 1 Condenser Low Vacuum Bypass switches to BYPASS on panels 9-15 and 9-17. (Part of

5. Panel Setup IC)

b. Ensure Group 1 isolation logic is reset. (Part of IC)

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, take a SNAPSHOT after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 3 following a turbine trip at 100% power.

2. Reactor pressure is approximately 675 psig.

3. MSIVs closed on low reactor pressure with the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN.

4. Reactor Mode Switch is now in SHUTDOWN.

5. CRS directed reopening MSIVs to establish the condenser as a heat sink.

6. Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System, section 6, has been completed through step 6.10.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to reopen MSIVs IAW Procedure 2.2.56, Main Steam System, section 6, beginning at step 6.11.

Inform the CRS when you have completed the task.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 18 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-4

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 18 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Operate RCIC in Pressure Control (Hard Card) (Alternate Path #2)

Revision: 1 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): N/A Actual Time (min): N/A PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one)

SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat )

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to operate RCIC in the pressure control mode per the hard card in procedure 2.2.67.1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Operations.

TASK STANDARD Examinee aligned RCIC in a recirculation lineup in accordance with Procedure 2.2.67.1, recognized the flow controller automatic mode, manual mode, and speed test mode failed to raise RCIC turbine speed >2200 rpm and secured RCIC turbine by depressing the TURBINE TRIP pushbutton.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 18 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 18 Revision Statements:

Rev 1-2018 Audit JPM updated to new format JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 217000 A4.01 (3.7/3.7)

2. Safety Function: 4, HEAT REMOVAL from the CORE

3. Task No.: 217003O0101, Manually Initiate RCIC System

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.67.1, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Operations (Rev 45)

2. Operations Desk Guide (ODG) 2, Skill of the Craft Desk Guide (Rev 6)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator set up IAW Attachment 1 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 18 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

Note: This is an ALTERNATE PATH JPM. The examinee will be unable to raise RCIC turbine speed above 2200 rpm, requiring RCIC turbine to be shut down IAW Procedure 2.2.67.1.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handout 1.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 18 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.67.1 Attachment 1 RCIC System Operation Hardcard)

2. RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH RCIC 2.1 ENSURE RCIC auto initiation signal is clear.

Standard Checked RPV water level and verified level above -42 inches, 9-4-1/A-1 RCIC LOGIC ACTUATED alarm clear and INITIATION SIGNAL amber light on apron section OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 2.2 OPEN RCIC-MO-33.

Critical Step Standard Rotated ECST TEST LINE SHUTOFF VLV MO 33 control switch clockwise to OPEN position and released and checked Red light ON, Green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 18

3. Procedure Step 2.3 START GLAND SEAL VACUUM PUMP.

Critical Step Standard Rotated GLAND SEAL VACUUM PUMP control switch clockwise to START and checked Red light ON, Green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 2.4 OPEN RCIC-MO-132.

Critical Step Standard Rotated TURB OIL COOLING WTR SUPP VLV MO 132 control switch clockwise to OPEN position and released and checked Red light ON, Green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 18

5. Procedure Step 2.5 OPEN RCIC-MO-30.

Critical Step Standard Rotated and held TEST BYP TO ECST VLV MO 30 control switch clockwise to OPEN position until valve indicated open, red light ON green light OFF, then released.

Cue Notes When examinee opens this valve 9-4-1/C-2 RCIC PRESS MAINT SUPPY LOW PRESSURE alarm is expected to come in. Step 2.6 clears this alarm. During validation, some operators stated this and moved to the next step.

Some operators may address this alarm. Addressing 9 1/C-2 RCIC PRESS MAINT SUPPY LOW PRESSURE is not critical to this task.

Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 2.6 OPEN RCIC-MO-131.

Critical Step Standard Rotated STM SUPP TO TURB VLV MO 131 control switch clockwise to OPEN position and checked red light ON, green light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 18

7. Procedure Step 2.7 ADJUST RCIC-FIC-91, FLOW CONTROLLER, to maintain desired RPV pressure.

Standard Examinee attempted to control RCIC flow with the Controller in AUTO.

Cue Notes Flow remains at ~200 gpm due to malfunction.

Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step 2.7.1 IF less than 300 gpm and flow oscillations occurring, THEN PLACE RCIC-FIC-91 to MANUAL.

Standard Examinee determined step is N/A due to no flow oscillations occurring.

Cue Notes Flow is 200 and there are no flow oscillations occurring.

Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step N/A Alternate Path Standard Reported to CRS that RCIC controller has failed in automatic.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 18 NOTE to Examiner: Taking manual control of RCIC flow controller is Skill of the Craft (ODG-2, Approved List 1 item 74). Procedure steps are listed as reference and the Examinee may not refer to the procedure.

10. Procedure Step Procedure 2.2.67.1, Step 5.24.7 Alternate Path 5.24.7 IF transfer to RCIC-FIC-91 MANUAL control desired, THEN PERFORM following:

5.24.7.1 DEPRESS RCIC-FIC-91 A/M button until light next to "M" lit.

Standard Examinee pressed A/M button and recognized that controller RCIC-FIC-91 would not go into manual by obseving light next to M not lit.

Cue Notes Taking manual control of failed controller is Skill of the Craft.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 18 NOTE to Examiner: Taking RCIC to TURB TEST operating mode is Skill of the Craft (ODG-2, Approved List 1 item 74). Procedure steps are listed as reference and the Examinee may not refer to the procedure. Examinee may or may not perform all steps below due to inability to transfer RCIC-FIC-91 to Manual and may proceed to shutting RCIC down.

11. Procedure Step 5.24.8 IF transfer to RCIC-SIC-100 control desired, Alternate Path THEN PERFORM following:

5.24.8.1 DEPRESS RCIC-FIC-91 A/M button until light by "M" lit.

5.24.8.2 ENSURE FLOW.V displayed.

CAUTION - Turbine speed may change significantly on transfer to TURB TEST if mis-match exists between RCIC-SIC-100 and RCIC-FIC-91.

5.24.8.3 Using RCIC-SIC-100 adjusting knob, ADJUST TEST. V to match FLOW.V on RCIC-FIC-91 as close as possible.

5.24.8.4 PLACE TURB SPEED TEST control switch to TURB TEST.

Standard Examinee recognized that controller RCIC-FIC-91 did not go into manual in previous step by observing light next to M not lit.

Examinee checked ADJUST TEST. V on RCIC-SIC-100 matched FLOW.V on RCIC-FIC-91, and placed TURB SPEED TEST control switch clockwise to TURB TEST.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 18 NOTE to Examiner: Adjusting RCIC controller is Skill of the Craft (ODG-2, Approved List 1 item 74). Procedure steps are listed as reference and the Examinee may not refer to the procedure. Examinee may or may not perform next step due to inability to transfer RCIC-FIC-91 to Manual and may proceed to shutting RCIC down.

12. Procedure Step 5.26.8 PERFORM following concurrently to control Alternate Path RCIC flow and discharge pressure:

IF not injecting to RPV, THEN THROTTLE RCIC-MO-30, TEST BYPASS TO ECST VLV, to maintain discharge pressure within 100 psig of RPV pressure.

ADJUST RCIC-SIC-100 to desired flow rate by rotating adjusting knob.

Standard Attempted to raise demand on TEST CONTROLLER RCIC-SIC-100 by turning adjusting knob clockwise and recognized RCIC speed did not rise.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 18

13. Procedure Step Procedure 2.2.67.1, Precaution and Limitation step 2.5 Alternate Path RCIC turbine damage and repetitive exhaust check valve slamming may occur below 2200 rpm.

Standard Examinee identified that RCIC was required to be shut down due to potential damage from operating below 2200 rpm.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 18

14. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.67.1 Attachment 1 RCIC System Alternate Path Operation Hardcard)

Critical Step 3.1 DEPRESS and HOLD TURBINE TRIP pushbutton.

3.1.1 DEPRESS INITIATION SIGNAL RESET pushbutton.

3.1.1.1 IF amber INITIATION SIGNAL indicating light off, THEN CLOSE RCIC-MO-131, STM TO TURB VLV.

a. VERIFY RCIC-MO-14 cycles closed and open to reset TURBINE TRIP & THROTTLE VALVE.

b. VERIFY TURBINE TRIP &

THROTTLE VALVE reset.

3.1.1.2 IF amber INITIATION SIGNAL indicating light remains on, THEN ENSURE RCIC-MO-131 remains open.

3.2 RELEASE TURBINE TRIP button.

Standard Examinee tripped RCIC by pressing and holding TURB TRIP button, closing RCIC-MO-131 by placing STM SUPP TO TURB VLV MO 131 to CLOSE and checking Green light ON and Red light OFF, and verified Turbine trip and throttle valve reset by checking TRIP VALVE OPER POSITION MO 14 cycled closed (Green light ON, Red light OFF) then open (Red light ON, Green light OFF),

and checking TURBINE TRIP & THROTTLE VALVE Red light ON and Green light OFF, and then released the RCIC trip button.

Cue Notes Only depressing the RCIC Trip pushbutton is critical.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 18

15. Procedure Step 3.3 ENSURE RCIC-MO-30 closed.

Alternate Path Standard Examinee checked that RCIC-MO-30 was CLOSED by checking Green light ON, Red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step 3.4 IF initiation signal reset, Alternate Path THEN PERFORM following:

3.4.1 ENSURE RCIC-MO-21 closed.

Standard Examinee checked RCIC-MO-21 was CLOSED by checking Green light ON, Red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 16 of 18

17. Procedure Step 3.4 IF initiation signal reset, Alternate Path THEN PERFORM following:

3.4.2 CLOSE RCIC-MO-132.

Standard Examinee closed RCIC-MO-132 by placing TURB OIL COOLING WTR SUPP VLV MO 132 to CLOSE and checked Green light ON, Red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

18. Procedure Step 3.4 IF initiation signal reset, Alternate Path THEN PERFORM following:

3.4.3 STOP Gland Seal Vacuum Pump.

Standard Examinee Stopped the gland seal Vacuum pump by placing GLAND SEAL VACUUM PUMP switch to stop and checked Green light ON, Red light OFF.

Cue Notes Inform the examinee that the JPM is complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: ____________ TOTAL TIME: __________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 17 of 18 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 321 (Perform with JPM S-6)

C. Run Schedule File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None Failure to Auto

2. Malfunctions RC01 start.

A N/A N/A N/A N/A Flow controller RC04 A N/A 0 N/A N/A failure

3. Remotes None RCIC Turb

4. Overrides zdircicsws20 Speed Test NORM switch RCIC flow zdircicamsw controller AUTO Auto/Man Ensure the following is built into the IC or perform the following:

a. Place Simulator in RUN.

b. Manually scram the Reactor using 9-5 pushbuttons. Leave the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN until low Reactor pressure Group 1 isolation is received, then place RMS in SHUTDOWN.

c. Trip both RFPs when RPV water level is rising.

d. Place HPCI AOP in PTL.

e. Place MSIV control switches in CLOSE.

5. Panel Setup f. Maintain RPV water level below +30" on the Narrow Range and above

-20" on the Wide Range.

g. Let the simulator run until the first SRV opens.

h. Reset all high level trip signals (if present).

i. Place the Simulator in FREEZE.

j. Insert Malfunctions and Overrides.

Booth Operator note: CRD-V-29 is open to assist with RPV Level control.

Monitor RPV level throughout to maintain +30" on the Narrow Range and above -20" on the Wide Range.

ATTACHMENT 2 Directions to Examinee:

Read the following, and inform the Examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. The Reactor is shutdown following a scram.

2. Reactor water level is being controlled by another licensed operator.

3. Reactor pressure is currently being maintained by Low-Low Set.

4. Suppression Pool Cooling will be placed in service by another licensed operator.

5. Current pressure band is 800 - 1050 psig reactor pressure.

INITIATING CUE:

The Control Room Supervisor directs you to place RCIC in the pressure control mode using Procedure 2.2.67.1 Att. 1, RCIC System Operation hard card.

Inform the CRS when RCIC is operating in the pressure control mode.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 16 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-5

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 16 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Respond to Fuel Element Failure - Align Sump Pumps IAW 5.2FUEL Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS:(Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to align Reactor Building and Control Building sump pumps IAW Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee placed all sump pumps for sumps A, B, D, E, and L in OFF, started Sump Pump C-1 and/or C-2, and when Sump C level was less than 9.5 feet, placed Sump Pump C-1 and C-2 in OFF IAW Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure, Attachment 2.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 16 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 16 Revision Statement:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 295036 EA1.01 (3.2/3.3), EK3.04 (3.1/3.4); 290001 A4.10 (3.4/3.3),

K4.03 (2.8/2.9)

2. Safety Function: 5, Containment Integrity

3. Task No.: 200041C0401, Respond to Fuel Element Failure

4. PSA Applicability: N/A

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure (Rev 22)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Setup: See Attachment 1.

Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure, Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 16 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINER:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

1.

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 16 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.2 Fuel, Fuel Failure)

Critical Step Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release

1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

1.1 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump A pumps.

1.1.1 SUMP PUMP A-1.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump A-1 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.1 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump A pumps.

1.1.2 SUMP PUMP A-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump A-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 16

3. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.2 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump B pumps.

1.2.1 SUMP PUMP B-1.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump B-1 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.2 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump B pumps.

1.2.2 SUMP PUMP B-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump B-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 16 Examiner Note: Examinee may pull the High-High Level alarm card S-1/A-3 Reactor Building C Sump Hi-Hi Level and place the C-1 and C-2 sump pumps to run to lower the sump level before continuing with this step. This will satisfy step 13 and 14 critical steps.

5. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.3 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump C pumps.

1.3.1 SUMP PUMP C-1.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump C-1 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes This step is only critical if SUMP PUMP C-1 is not started in JPM step 13.

Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.3 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump C pumps.

1.3.2 SUMP PUMP C-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump C-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes This step is only critical if SUMP PUMP C-2 is not started in JPM step 13.

Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 16

7. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical step 1.4 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump D pumps.

1.4.1 SUMP PUMP D-1.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump D-1 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.4 Both Reactor Building Floor Drain Sump D pumps.

1.4.2 SUMP PUMP D-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump D-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 16

9. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.5 Both Reactor Building Equipment Drain Sump E pumps.

1.5.1 SUMP PUMP E-1.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump E-1 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

10. Procedure Step 1. Place following sump pumps to OFF (VBD-S):

Critical Step 1.5 Both Reactor Building Equipment Drain Sump E pumps.

1.5.2 SUMP PUMP E-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump E-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 16

11. Procedure Step 1.6 Operate sump pumps above, only as necessary, to maintain area below Maximum Safe Operating Water Level per Secondary Containment Control EOP.

Standard Examinee checked following sump levels on VBD-S:

RW-LI-828, FLOOR DRAIN AREA NW RW-LI-829, FLOOR DRAIN AREA NE RW-LI-830, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SW RW-LI-831, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SE Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step 1.6 Operate sump pumps above, only as necessary, to maintain area below Maximum Safe Operating Water Level per Secondary Containment Control EOP.

Standard Examinee determined operation of sump pumps for Sump A, B, and D not required due to Sump A, B, and D levels below Maximum Safe Operating limit of 9.5 feet, and determined operation of sump pumps for Sump E not required due to Sump E level below Maximum Safe Operating limit of 9.5 feet.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 16

13. Procedure Step 1.6 Operate sump pumps above, only as necessary, Critical Step to maintain area below Maximum Safe Operating Water Level per Secondary Containment Control EOP.

Standard Examinee determined RW-LI-830, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SW was above Maximum Safe Operating limit of 9.5 feet and placed control switch for SUMP PUMP C-1 and/or SUMP PUMP C-2 clockwise to RUN, checked red light On and green light Off for sump pump(s) started, and checked level on RW-LI-830, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SW was lowering.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

14. Procedure Step 1.6 Operate sump pumps above, only as necessary, Critical Step to maintain area below Maximum Safe Operating Water Level per Secondary Containment Control EOP.

Standard Examinee checked level on RW-LI-830, FLOOR DRAIN AREA SW was lowered below 9.5 feet, then placed control switch for Sump Pump(s) started in JPM step 13 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 16

15. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.2 Fuel, Fuel Failure)

Critical Step Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release

2. Place both Control Building Sump L pumps to OFF (VBD-S).

2.1 SUMP PUMP L-1.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump L-1 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step 2. Place both Control Building Sump L pumps to OFF Critical Step (VBD-S).

2.2 SUMP PUMP L-2.

Standard Examinee placed control switch for Sump Pump L-2 counter-clockwise to OFF and checked green light ON, red light OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 16

17. Procedure Step (Procedure 5.2 Fuel, Fuel Failure)

Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release

3. IF Control Building Sump L level must be lowered, THEN perform following:

3.1 Operate Sump L pumps only, as necessary, to lower sump to desired level.

Standard Examinee determined operation of Sump L pumps not required by observing annunciator S-1/E-1, Control Bldg Sump L Hi-Hi Level not On.

Cue Inform the examinee This JPM is complete Examinee should not perform the steps on the front panel.

Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME: ____________ TOTAL TIME: __________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC319(performed with S2)

C. Load Schedule File 2020-4JPMS5 D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

create event 5 zdirwswc1(2) == 1 l zdirwswc2(2) == 1 (modifies overrides and PMIS to cause C Sump level to trend downward when either Sump Pump C1 or C2 is placed to RUN)

1. Events create event 15 when et_array(5) ==1 and zdirwswc1(2)

== 1 and zdirwswc2(2) == 1(modifies overrides and PMIS to cause C Sump level trend to slow when Sump Pump C1 or C2 taken to off) 2.Malfunctions None

3. Remotes None SW

4. Overrides N397(PMIS) Quad/Sump 1C N/A N/A 10 N/A N/A RW-LT-830 Sump C Level zaorwli830 N/A N/A 10 N/A N/A VBD-S Sump C level p4908 Hi-Hi N/A N/A ON N/A N/A annunciator

a. Load schedule file

5. Panel Setup

b. Acknowledge annunciators Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, a SNAPSHOT can be taken after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 2 Directions to Examinee:

Read the following, and inform the evaluator when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 3.

2. Chemistry results indicate reactor coolant activity is 4.2 Ci/gm, DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

3. Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure, has been entered.

4. There is a leak from RHR Pump B suction into the RHR B pump room.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to align all sump pumps IAW Attachment 2, Actions to Minimize Rad Material Release, of Procedure 5.2FUEL, Fuel Failure.

Inform the CRS when you have completed the task.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 19 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-6

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 19 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Energize 4160V critical Bus 1G from emergency station service XFMR Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 15 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the Examinee's ability to transfer 4160V Bus 1G from 4160V Bus 1B to the ESST.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee transferred 4160 Bus G, from its normal power supply 4160 Bus B to the ESST IAW 2.2.18.1 Section 14.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

x Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate x Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 19 Comments(Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 19 Revision Statements:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A Number and rating: 262001 K4.05 (3.4/3.6); K5.01(3.1/3.4) K4.06 (3.6/3.9) A4.01 (3.4/3.7)

2. Safety Function: 6, ELECTRICAL

3. Task No: 262025C0101 Energize 4160V Critical Bus 1F and 1G from emergency station service XFMR

4. PSA Applicability: (EE) Emergency AC Power (including DC Systems)

5. Critical Steps stated in procedure steps in bold References (include revision number if applicable):

1. SOP 2.2.18.1 4160V AUXILIARY POWER DISTRUBUTION SYSTEM (REV 2)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Set-Up IAW Attachment 1 Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Examinee Cue Sheet

2. SOP 2.2.18.1 Section 14

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 19 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions. Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the Examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 19 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step: 14. TRANSFER 4160V BUS 1G FROM BUS 1B TO EMERGENCY TRANSFORMER 14.1 IF in MODE 1, 2, or 3, THEN ENSURE risk has been assessed per Procedure 0.50.5 or 0-CNS-WM-104 for placing Breaker 1FS switch, EMERGENCY XFMR BKR, for Bus 1F in PULL-TO-LOCK.

Standard Examinee determined plant in Mode 3 and risk has been assessed for this task per Procedure 0.50.5 or 0-CNS-WM-104 from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step CAUTION - Panel CDP-1B voltage is limited to less than or equal to 264V Standard Examinee reviewed caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 19

3. Procedure Step: 14.2 IF any of following met, ESST energized from Transformer T-6.

Breakers are being cycled to demonstrate OPERABILITY and 4160V Bus G will be immediately transferred back to 4160V Bus B.

THEN MARK Step 14.3 N/A.

Standard Examinee determined breakers are being cycled to demonstrate OPERABILITY and 4160V Bus G will be immediately transferred back to 4160V Bus B stated in the Initial Conditions Section and marked step 14.3 N/A.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step: 14.3 CONTACT Engineering to assist evaluation to determine if tap change on CDP1B Supply Transformer required.

Standard Examinee marked step as N/A from previous step.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 19

5. Procedure Step: 14.4 ENSURE ESST energized.

Standard Examinee verified ESST energized by observing EMERGENCY XFMR VOLTAGE meter ~4400V on Board C.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step: 14.5 IF in MODE 1, 2, or 3, THEN SM/CRS PERFORM following:

14.5.1 DECLARE both off-site circuits inoperable.

14.5.2 ENTER applicable Condition and Required Action of LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating.

Standard Examinee determined SM had declared both off-site circuits inoperable and entered applicable Condition and Required Action of LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, stated in the Initial Conditions Section.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 19

7. Procedure Step: 14.6 ENSURE SW Pump B running or not selected for Standby.

Standard Examinee determined SW Pump B running from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step: 14.7 ENSURE SW Pump D running or not selected for Standby.

Standard Examinee determined SW Pump D running from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

9. Procedure Step: 14.8 ENSURE REC Pump C running or not selected for Standby.

Standard Examinee determined REC Pump C running from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 19

10. Procedure Step: 14.9 ENSURE REC Pump D running or not selected for Standby.

Standard Examinee determined REC Pump D running from initial conditions.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

11. Procedure Step: 14.10 PLACE SYNCH SWITCH 1GS in 1GS.

Critical step Standard Inserted switch handle and placed SYNCH SWITCH 1GS in 1GS by turning switch clockwise to 1GS.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 19

12. Procedure Step NOTE 1 - OPPD maintains 69 kV line at 8 MWe available and 10.24 MWe for at least 10 minutes.

NOTE 2 - Breaker 1GB will automatically trip when Breaker 1GS closes.

CAUTION - Maximum load on Emergency Transformer is 10.7 MWe.

Standard Examinee reviewed notes and caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

13. Procedure Step: 14.11 CLOSE Breaker 1GS, EMERGENCY Critical step XFMR BKR.

Standard Closed Breaker 1GS, EMERGENCY XFMR BKR, by placing switch clockwise to close and observing red light ON, green light OFF, then releasing.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 19

14. Procedure Step: 14.12 VERIFY Breaker 1GS switch spring returns to NORMAL AFTER CLOSE.

Standard Examinee verified Breaker 1GS switch spring returned to NORMAL AFTER CLOSE by observing switch return to center position.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

15. Procedure Step: 14.13 VERIFY Breaker 1GS switch red flagged.

Standard Examinee verified Breaker 1GS switch red flagged by observing red flag indicated in switch window.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step: 14.14 VERIFY Breaker 1GB, BUS 1B TIE BKR, automatically tripped.

Standard Examinee verified Breaker 1GB automatically tripped by observing green light ON and the red light OFF at the control switch.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 19

17. Procedure Step: 14.15 VERIFY Breaker 1GB amber tripped light lit.

Standard Examinee verified that 1GB amber light above the control switch is lit.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

18. Procedure Step: 14.16 VERIFY Annunciator C-4/B-1, 4160V BUS 1G BKR 1GB TRIP, alarms Standard Examinee verified that Annunciator C-4/B-1 alarmed and acknowledged the alarm.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 19

19. Procedure Step: 14.17 IF any of following met:

4160 Bus 1G voltage less than 3950V.

Panel CDP-1B voltage greater than 264V.

THEN PEFORM any of following until voltage conditions met:

Standard Examinee determined steps 14.17.1 through 14.17.4 were N/A by observing 4160 Bus 1G voltage ~4360V (>3950V) and CDP-1B voltage ~245V (<264V) and marked steps N/A.

Cue Notes None Results SAT UNSAT

20. Procedure Step: 14.18 IF reactor in MODE 1, 2, or 3, THEN PLACE switch for Breaker 1FS in Critical step PULL-TO-LOCK.

Standard Examinee determined reactor was in Mode 3 from Initial Conditions Section, Placed switch for Breaker 1FS in PULL-TO-LOCK by pulling upward and turning switch counter-clockwise, then releasing and ensuring switch handle remained in the same position.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 19

21. Procedure Step: 14.19 PLACE Breaker 1GB switch in TRIP.

Critical step Standard Examinee placed switch for Breaker 1GB switch in TRIP by turning switch counter-clockwise to TRIP, then releasing.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

22. Procedure Step: 14.20 VERIFY Breaker 1GB switch spring returns to NORMAL AFTER TRIP.

Standard Examinee verified Breaker 1GB switch spring returned to NORMAL AFTER TRIP by observing switch return to center position when released.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

23. Procedure Step: 14.21 VERIFY Breaker 1GB switch green flagged.

Standard Examinee verified breaker 1GB switch green flagged by observing green flag indicated in switch window.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 16 of 19

24. Procedure Step: 14.22 VERIFY Breaker 1GB amber tripped light off.

Standard Examinee verified that 1GB amber light above the control switch is OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

25. Procedure Step: 14.23 VERIFY Annunciator C-4/B-1 clears.

Standard Examinee verified Annunciator C-4/B-1 cleared by observing alarm slow flash and audible reset tone, then reset annunciator.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

26. Procedure Step: 14.24 PLACE SYNCH SWITCH 1GS in OFF.

Standard Examinee placed SYNCH SWITCH 1GS in OFF by turning switch counter-clockwise to OFF.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 17 of 19

27. Procedure Step: Inform the CRS that Bus G 4160 power is supplied by the ESST.

Standard Examinee informed the CRS that the ESST is supplying 4160 Bus G.

Cue Notes JPM is Complete.

Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 18 of 19 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC 321(Perform with JPM S-6)

C. Run Schedule File None D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Triggers None

2. Malfunctions

3. Remotes

4. Overrides Ensure the following is built into the IC or perform the following:

a. Ensure SW Pumps A, B, and D running with A and D selected for Standby.

5. Panel Setup b. Ensure REC Pumps A, C, and D running with A and D selected for Standby.

c. Ensure SYNCH SWITCH 1GS is NOT in GS.

d. Ensure switch handle is removed from SYNCH SWITCH 1GS.

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 3.

2. 4160V Bus 1G is being powered from 4160V Bus 1B.

3. ESST is energized from 69kV line.

4. 4160V Bus 1G is to be transferred from 4160V Bus 1B to the ESST to demonstrate operability of breakers 1GB and 1GS.

5. 4160V Bus 1G will be immediately transferred back to 4160V Bus B.

6. Risk has been assessed per Procedure 0.50.5 and 0-CNS-WM-104 for placing Breaker 1FS switch, EMERGENCY XFMR BKR, for Bus 1F in PULL-TO-LOCK.

7. SM has declared both offsite circuits inoperable and entered applicable Condition and Required Action of LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources.

8. REC Pumps A, C, and D are running, with pumps A and D in Standby.

9. SW Pumps A, B, and D are running, with pumps A and D in Standby.

INITIATING CUES:

The CRS directs you to transfer 4160KV Bus 1G from 4160KV Bus 1B to the ESST per 2.2.18.1 Section 14.

Inform the CRS when you have completed Section 14 of 2.2.18.1.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 11 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-7

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 11 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Restore NBI Level Transmitter input to RVLC Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 5 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to return a bypassed RVLC input to service.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee unbypassed level transmitter NBI-LT-59D input to Reactor Vessel Level Control System using HMI by selecting RESET for NBI-LT-59D from the MAINT screen within RVLC function IAW Procedure 4.4.1, section 9.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 11 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 11 Revision Statement:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

1. NRC K/A: 216000 K1.12 (3.6/3.7)

2. Safety Function: 7, Instrumentation

3. Task No.: 200362A0101, Perform BOP Startup and RPV Heatup per 2.1.1 (This is related to procedure 2.1.1 step 5.41, only)

4. PSA Applicability: Top 10 Risk Significant System - Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation

5. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 4.4.1, Reactor Vessel Level Control System (Rev 10)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Setup: See Attachment 1.

Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Applicant Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Applicant Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 4.4.1, Reactor Vessel Level Control System

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 11 Directions to Examiner:

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed.

You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 11 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 4.4.1, Reactor Vessel Level Control System)

Critical Step 9. Restoring RVLC Input to Service 9.1 At RVLC/RFPT HMI, select RVLC System.

Standard Examinee selected RVLC System by touching RVLC button on HMI and observed RVLC System screen displayed on HMI.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step (Note before step 9.2)

NOTE - VALVE POSITIONS need to be verified on FEEDWATER MIMIC screen on RFPT1A or RFPT1B System.

Standard Examinee reviewed note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 11

3. Procedure Step 9.2 Select MIMIC screen and verify affected parameters are ready to be returned to service; N/A for VALVE POSITIONS parameter.

Standard Examinee selected MIMIC screen by touching MIMIC button on HMI and verified NBI-LT-59D was ready to be returned to service by observing NBI-LT-59D ~ the same value as the other narrow range level instruments displayed on HMI.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 9.3 Select MAINT. screen.

Critical Step Standard Examinee selected MAINT screen by touching MAINT button on HMI and verified MAINT screen displayed on HMI.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 11

5. Procedure Step 9.4 On MAINT. screen, select desired parameter.

Critical Step Standard Examinee selected NBI-LT-59D by touching NBI-LT-59D button on HMI and verified NBI-LT-59D pop-up menu window displayed on HMI.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 9.5 On pop-up menu, press RESET button.

Critical Step Standard Examinee pressed RESET button on pop-up menu window and observed NBI-LT-59D pop-up menu window displayed on HMI goes away.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 11

7. Procedure Step 9.6 Verify affect parameter's tile turns green.

Standard Examinee verified NBI-LT-59D input to RVLC was restored by observing tile for NBI-LT-59D turned green on HMI.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step N/A Standard Examinee informed CRS NBI-LT-59D input to RVLC has been restored.

Cue Notes JPM is Complete.

Results SAT UNSAT STOP TIME:

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 11 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC 323(Perform with JPM S-8)

C. Load Schedule File D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

1. Events none NBI-LT-RR41D (This has 59D (wide

2. Malfunctions been deleted for range N/A N/A 100 N/A N/A the IC setup) level)

Failure

3. Remotes None

4. Overrides None Ensure the following is built into the IC or perform the following:

a. Insert malfunction RR41D (wide range level) Failure

b. Remove malfunction RR41D (wide range level) Failure

c. Verify NBI-LT-59D is INVALID on RVLC MAINT Screen

d. Ensure RPV level maintained 10 to 40

5. Panel Setup

e. HPCI is in service with flow at 0 gpm. Adjust as necessary to maintain RPV level.

f. Do not place simulator in run until all HMIs are in service.

g. Ensure HMIs are NOT on the RVLC or MAINTENANCE Screen.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, a SNAPSHOT can be taken after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 2 DIRECTIONS TO EXAMINEE:

Read the following and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 3 following a scram from 100% power.

2. Reactor level transmitter NBI-LT-59D was INVALID in RVLC because of a loose wire causing it to fail high.

3. The fault with NBI-LT-59D has been corrected.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to restore the input from NBI-LT-59D to RVLC to service IAW Procedure 4.4.1, Reactor Vessel Level Control System, section 9.

Use the HMI over RFP B controls on Panel A.

Inform the CRS when you have completed the task.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 1 of 16 Cooper Nuclear Station Job Performance Measure S-8

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 2 of 16 Lesson Number: ILT SAP Course Number: ILT Lesson

Title:

Place SGT B in Service to Support HPCI Operation (Alternate Path)

Revision number: 0 NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE SRO RO NLO ALTERNATE SUCCESS PATH TIME CRITICAL OPERATOR: DATE:

EVALUATOR: EVALUATOR SIGNATURE:

CRITICAL TIME FRAME: Required Time (min): Actual Time (min):

PERFORMANCE TIME: Validation Time (min): 10 Actual Time (min):

JPM RESULTS: (Circle one) SAT UNSAT COMMENT SHEET ATTACHED: Yes / No (circle one) (Required for Unsat)

SYNOPSIS: This JPM evaluates the examinee's ability to place a SGT subsystem in service and respond to SGT high moisture condition.

TASK STANDARD: Examinee started SGT B exhaust fan IAW Procedure 2.2.73 Section 8, then after SGT B high moisture annunciator (K-2/A-2) was received, started SGT A IAW 2.2.73 Section 8.

EVALUATION METHOD: EVALUATION LOCATION:

X Perform Plant (RCA )

Simulate X Simulator or Classroom Control Room Prepared: Date:

Reviewed: Date:

Approved: N/A Date: N/A Superintendent, Operations Training (or Designee)

(Approval is N/A for NRC ILT Exams)

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 3 of 16 Comments (Required for Unsat):

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 4 of 16 Revision Statement:

Rev 0-New JPM JPM Information:

8. NRC K/A: 261000 A4.07 (3.1/3.2)

9. Safety Function: 9, Radioactivity Release

10. Task No.: 261011P0101, Perform SBGT system support for HPCI operation

11. PSA Applicability: N/A

12. Critical Steps stated in the procedure step in bold

References:

1. Procedure 2.2.73, Standby Gas Treatment System (Rev 60)

2. Alarm Card K-2/A-2, SGT B High Moisture (Rev 8)

Special Conditions, Tools, Equipment:

1. Simulator Setup: See Attachment 1.

Attachments:

1. Attachment 1 - Simulator Set-Up Instructions

2. Attachment 2 - Applicant Cue Sheet Handouts:

1. Attachment 2 - Applicant Cue Sheet

2. Procedure 2.2.73, Standby Gas Treatment System

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 5 of 16 Directions to Examiner:

THIS IS AN ALTERNATE PATH JPM. SGT B High Moisture annunciator will be received after SGT B exhaust fan is started, requiring the examinee place SGT A in service instead.

1. IF the following has not been discussed during the pre-job brief for the exam and IF this is the first performance in this setting, THEN brief the examinee as follows:

All actions associated with this job performance measure are to be performed. You will be provided access to any tools or equipment you determine necessary to perform the task. When a second checker is called for, the evaluator will perform the role of second checker and will always be in agreement with your actions.

Before you start, the evaluator will give you a sheet with the Initial Conditions and Initiating Cues, then answer any questions related to the task instructions.

2. Give the examinee Handouts 1 and 2.

3. Answer any questions the examinee may have related to task instructions.

4. When the examinee has indicated they are ready, place the simulator in run, and tell the examinee to begin.

5. Check off either Satisfactory or Unsatisfactory performance. If Unsat, state why in the comments.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 6 of 16 PERFORMANCE:

START TIME:

1. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.73, Standby Gas Treatment System)

8. Manual Operation to Support HPCI Operation (Note before step 8.1)

NOTE 1- Both SGT Subsystems may be placed in service for EOPs.

NOTE 2- Preferred fan does not set a requirement but is meant to help equalize charcoal run time. Either fan may be run at any time based upon circumstance.

Standard Examinee reviewed note.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

2. Procedure Step (Caution before step 8.1)

CAUTION - Secondary Containment pressure transient and TS LCO 3.6.4.1 entry may occur from starting SGT.

Standard Examinee reviewed caution.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 7 of 16

3. Procedure Step 8.1 PERFORM one of following (VBD-K):

8.1.1 PLACE EF R 1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN, in service.

8.1.2 PLACE EF R 1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN, in service.

Standard Examinee determined step 8.1.1 N/A by observing PREFERRED label on SGT B Exhaust Fan, not SGT A Exhaust Fan, and marked steps 8.1.1.1, and 8.1.1.2 N/A.

Examinee proceeded to 8.1.2.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

4. Procedure Step 8.1.2 PLACE EF-R-1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN in Critical Step Service:

8.1.2.1 PLACE EF-R-1F in RUN.

Standard Examinee rotated control switch EF-R-1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN, clockwise to RUN and observed red light On, green light Off.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: SGT B High Moisture annunciator occurs 30 seconds after SGT B exhaust fan is started. It is expected examinee will perform the next 2 steps before the alarm comes in. If the examinee does not perform the next 2 steps before the alarm is received, they may transition to the alarm card without ever addressing both steps.

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 8 of 16

5. Procedure Step 8.1.2 PLACE EF R 1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN in Service:

8.1.2.2 VERIFY following:

SGT-AO-250, SGT B INLET, opens.

Standard Examinee checked SGT-AO-250, SGT B INLET, opened by observing red light On, green light Off.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

6. Procedure Step 8.1.2 PLACE EF R 1F, SGT B EXHAUST FAN in Service:

8.1.2.2 VERIFY following:

SGT-AO-252, SGT B DISCHARGE, opens.

Standard Examinee checked SGT-AO-252, SGT B DISCHARGE, opened by observing red light On, green light Off.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 9 of 16

7. Procedure Step N/A Alternate Path Standard Examinee recognized receipt of annunciator K-2/A-2, SGT B High Moisture and referred to alarm card.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

8. Procedure Step Alarm Card K-2/A-2 Alternate Path 1. OPERATOR OBSERVATION AND ACTION 1.1 Check heater operation.

Standard Examinee recognized SGT B heater not operating by observing control switch SGT B HEATER CONTROL SGT-HTR-SGHB green lights on and red lights Off for HTR A and HTR B and determined heater control had malfunctioned with switch in HIGH position.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 10 of 16

9. Procedure Step (Alarm Card K-2/A-2)

Alternate Path 1. OPERATOR OBSERVATION AND ACTION 1.2 Start SGT A train and secure SGT B per Procedure 2.2.73.

Standard Examinee notified CRS of SGT B heater malfunction and intent to start SGT A and secure SGT B.

Cue As CRS acknowledge report.

Notes If examinee asks CRS for guidance, respond by asking examinee what they recommend.

Results SAT UNSAT Examiner Note: It is not an objective of this JPM to secure SGT B. IF Examinee proceeds to secure SGT B per Section 10 of 2.2.73 prior to starting SGT A, inform the examinee that another operator will perform that action.

10. Procedure Step (Procedure 2.2.73, Standby Gas Treatment System)

Alternate Path 8. Manual Operation to Support HPCI Operation Critical Step 8.1.1 PLACE EF-R-1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN in Service:

8.1.1.1 PLACE EF-R-1E in RUN.

Standard Examinee rotated control switch EF-R-1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN, clockwise to RUN and observed red light On, green light Off.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 11 of 16

11. Procedure Step 8.1.1 PLACE EF-R-1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN in Service:

Alternate Path 8.1.1.2 VERIFY following:

SGT-AO-249, SGT A INLET, opens.

Standard Examinee checked SGT-AO-249, SGT A INLET, opened by observing red light On, green light Off.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

12. Procedure Step 8.1.1 PLACE EF-R-1E, SGT A EXHAUST FAN in Service:

Alternate Path 8.1.1.2 VERIFY following:

SGT-AO-251, SGT A DISCHARGE, opens.

Standard Examinee checked SGT-AO-251, SGT A DISCHARGE, opened by observing red light On, green light Off.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 12 of 16

13. Procedure Step 8.2 At VBD-R, ENSURE SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT Critical Step DP, in MANUAL.

Standard Examinee placed SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP, in MANUAL by pressing A/M pushbutton and checked LED lit beside M and LED off beside A.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

14. Procedure Step 8.3 DEPRESS D pushbutton, as necessary, to display Critical Step Parameter V on SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP.

Standard Examinee pressed D pushbutton until V was displayed near upper right of controller SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 13 of 16

15. Procedure Step 8.4 ADJUST SGT-DPIC-546 to greater than or equal to Critical Step 800 scfm on SGT-FI-545, SGT DISCHARGE HEADER FLOW (VBD-K).

Standard Examinee rotated adjustment knob on SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP (VBD-R), as necessary, while observing SGT-FI-545, SGT DISCHARGE HEADER FLOW (VBD-K) until SGT-FI-545 indicated 800 scfm.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

16. Procedure Step 8.5 ENSURE following annunciator(s) clear for SGT train(s) in service:

K-1/A-2, SGT A HIGH MOISTURE.

Standard Examinee checked annunciator K-1/A-2, SGT A HIGH MOISTURE was clear.

Cue Notes Results SAT UNSAT

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 14 of 16

17. Procedure Step 8.5 ENSURE following annunciator(s) clear for SGT train(s) in service:

K-2/A-2, SGT B HIGH MOISTURE.

Standard Examinee recognized annunciator K-2/A-2 remained lit and determined SGT B was required to be secured per Alarm Card K-2/A-2 IAW Procedure 2.2.73.

Cue Inform the Examinee Another operator will secure SGT B. This JPM is Complete.

Notes JPM is Complete Results SAT UNSAT Stop Time: _____________ Total Time: _____________

CNS NRC Exam 2020-4 Page 15 of 16 ATTACHMENT 1 SIMULATOR SET-UP INSTRUCTIONS A. Materials Required None B. Initialize the Simulator in IC IC 323(Perform with JPM S-7)

C. Load Schedule File 2020-4JPMS8 D. Change the simulator Number Title Tgr TD Sev Ramp Initial conditions as follows:

create event 9 zlosgtswefrf(2) == 1

1. Events (SGT B exhaust fan red light on)

PMIS override 30

2. Malfunctions m604 SGT B moisture 9 high N/A N/A sec

3. Remotes None SGT B High 30

4. Overrides p4574 Moisture 9 on N/A N/A annunciator sec SGT B filter inlet zaosgtmi533b humidity 9 15 100 60 N/A SGT B HE filter zaosgtmi535b humidity 9 15 100 60 N/A CS for SGT Unit zlosgtswsghb(1)

B HTR A N/A ON N/A N/A CS for SGT Unit zlosgtswsghb(3)

B HTR A N/A ON N/A N/A CS for SGT Unit zlosgtswsghb(2)

B HTR A N/A OFF N/A N/A CS for SGT Unit zlosgtswsghb(4)

B HTR A N/A OFF N/A N/A Ensure the following:

a. Ensure PREFERRED tag is on SGT B.

b. Ensure Parameter P is displayed on SGT-DPIC-546, RX BLDG/SGT DP

5. Panel Setup c. Ensure RPV level maintained 10 to 40 to ensure Group 6 does not occur

d. HPCI is in service with flow at 0 gpm. Adjust as necessary to maintain RPV level.

Note: If this JPM is to be performed more than once, a SNAPSHOT can be taken after the panel setup is complete.

ATTACHMENT 2 Directions to Examinee:

Read the following, and inform the examiner when you are ready to begin.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Plant is in Mode 3 following loss of RFPs at 25% power.

2. HPCI has been manually started IAW the hard card for level control.

INITIATING CUE:

The CRS directs you to start SGT B to support HPCI operation IAW Procedure 2.2.73, Section 8 Manual Operation to Support HPCI Operation.

Inform the CRS when you have completed the task.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 1 of 41 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: CN-2020-04 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Shift CRD Pump B to CRD Pump A in operation

2. Respond to narrow range level transmitter NBI-LT-52C failure

3. Respond to Critical Power Panel CPP-1 loss of power

4. Respond to Condensate Pump B trip, Reactor Recirc Pump A runs back too far, trips

5. Respond to Reactor Recirc Pump B trip with Thermal Hydraulic Instability

6. Respond to a Main Steam Line D leak in the drywell

7. Respond to DW Spray A permissive switch failure

8. Respond to Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker failure with failure of RHR Loop B containment sprays Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 100% power near end of cycle.

Inoperable Equipment: Core Spray Pump A is tagged out of service for motor PMs.

Turnover:

Plant operating at operating at 100% power near end of cycle.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Continue steady state power operation.

Continue maintenance on CS Pump A.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 60 minutes Page 1 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 2 of 41 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 N/A N (ATC,CRS) Shift CRD Pumps (B to A)

I (ATC,CRS) 2 rr27c Narrow range level transmitter NBI-LT-52C failure TS (CRS)

C (BOP,CRS) 3 ed11d Critical power panel CPP-1 loss of power A (CREW)

C (ATC,BOP,CRS) fw14b Condensate Pump B trip, RR Pump A runs back 4 A (CREW) rr17a too far, Reactor Recirc Pump A trip TS (CRS)

Reactor Recirc Pump B shaft binding with Thermal Hydraulic Instability CT#1 Manually scram the reactor when both rr03b C (ATC, CRS) 5 recirculation pumps trip, prior to exceeding cr04b A (CREW) 25% peak to peak neutron flux oscillations or APRM auto scram setpoint due to neutron flux oscillations.

6 ms02d M (CREW) Main Steam Line D leak in the drywell (Override) 7 C (BOP,CRS) DW Spray A permissive switch failure zdirhrsws17a 8 pco2a C (BOP,CRS) Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker failure RHR Pumps B and D trip CT#2 When torus pressure cannot be maintained rh01b C below the Pressure Suppression Pressure 9 (PSP), the crew completes Emergency rh08d (ATC,BOP,CRS)

Depressurization prior to exceeding PCPL-A.

(Anticipating ED and fully opening Bypass valves satisfies this Critical Task)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Page 2 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 3 of 41 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-301-4 Actual Attribute Description Target

1. DW Spray A permissive switch failure Malfunctions after 2. Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker failure 1-2 3 EOP entry

3. RHR Pumps B and D trip

1. Critical power panel CPP-1 loss of power

2. Condensate Pump B trip, RR Pump A runs back too far, Abnormal Events 2-4 3 Reactor Recirc Pump A trip

3. Reactor Recirc Pump B shaft binding with Thermal Hydraulic Instability Major Transients 1-2 1 1. Main Steam Line D leak in the drywell EOP entries 1. EOP-1A requiring 1-2 2 2. EOP-3A substantive action EOP contingencies requiring 1 per set 1 1. EOP-2A Contingency #2 - Emergency Depressurization substantive action

1. (CT#1) Manually scram the reactor when both recirculation pumps trip, prior to exceeding 25% peak to peak neutron flux oscillations or APRM auto scram setpoint due to neutron flux oscillations.

Pre-identified 2. (CT#2) When torus pressure cannot be maintained below 2 2 Critical Tasks the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP), the crew completes Emergency Depressurization prior to exceeding PCPL-A. (Anticipating ED and fully opening Bypass valves satisfies this Critical Task)

Normal Events N/A 1 1. Shift CRD pumps Reactivity 1. none N/A 0 Manipulations

1. Narrow range level transmitter NBI-LT-52C failure

2. Critical power panel CPP-1 loss of power

3. Condensate Pump B trip, RR Pump A runs back too far, Reactor Recirc Pump A trip Instrument/

Component N/A 7 4. Reactor Recirc Pump B shaft binding with Thermal Failures Hydraulic Instability

5. DW Spray A permissive switch failure

6. Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker failure

7. RHR Pumps B and D trip Page 3 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 4 of 41

1. Narrow range level transmitter NBI-LT-52C failure

2. Critical power panel CPP-1 loss of power

3. Condensate Pump B trip, RR Pump A runs back too far, Reactor Recirc Pump A trip Total Malfunctions N/A 7 4. Reactor Recirc Pump B shaft binding with Thermal Hydraulic Instability

5. DW Spray A permissive switch failure

6. Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker failure

7. RHR Pumps B and D trip Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

Primary Containment, RHR, RHRSW Page 4 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 5 of 41 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 100% power near the end of the operating cycle.

After the crew takes the watch, the ATC will shift CRD pumps from CRD Pump B in operation to CRD Pump A in operation IAW Procedure 2.2.8.

After CRD pumps have been shifted, narrow range level transmitter NBI-LT-52C fails high. The crew will respond IAW the alarm card and Procedure 4.4.1 to diagnose the failure using the RVLCS HMI. The CRS will enter TS 3.3.2.2 Condition A.

After TS for the failed level transmitter have been addressed, 120V AC power panel CPP-1 will lose power. The crew will respond IAW Procedure 5.3AC120.

The BOP will start a turbine building exhaust fan to restore TB HVAC.

After response to loss of CPP-1 is complete, Main Condensate Pump 1B will trip. The crew will respond to CP B trip and enter 2.4MC-RF to address the tripped MC Pump B. At this power level the Reactor Recirc pumps should run back towards 45% speed and stop running back once Condensate pump discharge header pressure restores, which should occur at approximately 50%

Reactor Recirc pump speed. However, Reactor Recirc Pump A will continue to runback for several seconds. If the crew identifies RR Pump A continues to run back, they will lockout the RR A scoop tube. This will require entry into 2.4RR.

After a delay RR Pump A will trip. The CRS will enter TS 3.4.1 Condition A &

B due to single loop operation.

After the TS for RR Pump A failure have been addressed, RR Pump B will trip.

The ATC will respond by inserting a manual scram IAW procedure 2.4RR due to no RR Pumps operating and power above 1%. If a manual scram is delayed, thermal hydraulic instability will occur, also requiring a manual scram per 2.4RR (CT#1).

When the reactor is scrammed, a leak develops on MSL D in the drywell.

Drywell pressure and temperature rise. The crew will enter EOP-1A and EOP-3A due to high drywell pressure. Torus Spray will be required. Only RHR Loop B is available for containment spray due to failure of the spray valve control permissive for RHR Loop A. A Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker will fail open, requiring use of Drywell Spray.

Drywell Spray will fail a short time after it has been started due to trip of RHR Pumps B and D. Drywell pressure will rise above the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) limit. Emergency Depressurization will be required (CT#2).

Page 5 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 6 of 41 The exercise ends when the reactor has been depressurized, RPV water level is being controlled +3 to +54 inches.

Page 6 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 7 of 41 CRITICAL TASK BASIS Manually scram the reactor when both recirculation pumps trip, prior to exceeding 25% peak to peak neutron flux oscillations Critical Task #1 or APRM auto scram setpoint due to neutron flux oscillations.

Analyses of neutronic/thermal-hydraulic instabilities(THI) during failure-to-scram conditions have been performed. Instabilities are manifested by oscillations in reactor power, which, if the reactor cannot be shut down, may increase in magnitude. If the oscillations remain small or moderately sized, they tend to repeat on approximately a two second period. Under certain circumstances, however, the oscillations may continue to grow and become Safety Significance sufficiently large and irregular to cause localized fuel damage.

Analytical results indicate that the fuel clad may experience boiling transition during THI but that it subsequently rewets and is adequately cooled even for oscillations that resemble reactivity excursion events. For an occasional large pulse, however, rewetting of some of the highest-powered locations within the highest-powered fuel bundles may not occur; the clad could then continue to heat up over several oscillation cycles.

Cues SRM period alarms.

Oscillating power indications on neutron monitoring instrument.

Operator depresses both manual scram pushbuttons, or places the Measurable Performance Reactor Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN on panel 9-5.

Indicators On panel 9-5:

RPS status lights de-energized.

Performance Feedback Reactor power level trend.

Control rods inserted.

Applicability Operation in the Stability Exclusion Region with no Recirc pump in operation.

The threshold of 25% peak-to-peak neutron flux oscillations has been chosen to ensure an attempt to shut down the reactor using RPS for the same conditions that require boron injection during failure to scram events. Analysis has shown that APRM peak-to-peak amplitudes reach 25% of rated thermal power well before any Justification for the individual LPRM signal reaches an amplitude for which fuel damage chosen performance might be possible. Since analysis has shown THI to exhibit a limit negative decay ratio, power level would be expected to rise to the automatic high flux scram setpoint. Requiring manual reactor shutdown before an automatic scram on high neutron flux is reasonable to allow a short time to recognize and diagnose THI, communicate plant conditions, and effect the manual scram.

BWR Owners Group App. B, step RC/Q-6 Appendix Page 7 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 8 of 41 Initial power level following the recirc pump trips, with RPV level in the normal band, should be in the Stability Exclusion Region. THI malfunction CR04A must be inserted at a ramped severity that will Scenario Guide eventually cause an automatic high flux scram, but at slow enough Requirements ramp rate to allow the crew to recognize and diagnose THI and 25%

oscillations, then communicate and insert a manual scram before the high flux trip setpoint is reached.

Page 8 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 9 of 41 When torus pressure cannot be maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP), the crew completes Emergency Critical Task #2 Depressurization prior to exceeding PCPL-A. (Anticipating ED and fully opening Bypass valves satisfies this Critical Task)

If suppression pool and/or drywell sprays cannot be initiated or are ineffective in reversing the increasing trend of primary containment pressure, as evidenced by not being able to maintain torus pressure below the Pressure Suppression Pressure, the RPV is depressurized to minimize further release of energy from the RPV to the primary containment. This action serves to terminate or reduce as much as possible any continued primary containment pressure increase.

The Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP) is the lesser of:

The highest torus pressure which can occur without steam in the torus air space.

The highest torus pressure at which initiation of RPV depressurization will not result in exceeding Primary Containment Pressure Limit before RPV pressure drops to the Minimum RPV Flooding Pressure.

Safety Significance The highest torus pressure which can be maintained without exceeding the suppression pool boundary design load if SRVs are opened.

The Primary Containment Pressure Limit (PCPL) is the lesser of:

The pressure capability of the primary containment.

The maximum primary containment pressure at which vent valves sized to reject all decay heat from the containment can be opened and closed.

The maximum primary containment pressure at which SRVs can be opened and will remain open.

The PCPL is a function of primary containment water level.

Exceeding the limit may challenge primary containment vent valve operability, SRV operability, or the structural integrity of the primary containment.

Cues Rising torus pressure indicated on SPDS and panel 9-3 recorder PC-LRPR-1A.

Cursor approaching unsafe boundary on PSP graph display on SPDS.

Manipulation of any six SRV controls on panel 9-3:

SRV-71A SRV-71B Measurable Performance SRV-71E Indicators SRV-71G SRV-71H SRV-71C Page 9 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 10 of 41 SRV-71D SRV-71F If ED is anticipated, fully opening Bypass valves on Panel B DEH HMI Bypass valves selected to MANUAL on HMI Bypass valves A, B, C indicate ~100% on HMI mimic Crew will observe SRV light indication go from green to red, amber pressure switch lights illuminate, reactor pressure lowering on SPDS and panel 9-3 and 9-5 meters and recorders, and SRV tailpipe temperatures rise on recorder MS-TR-166.

Performance Feedback If ED is anticipated, fully opening Bypass valves on Panel B DEH HMI, crew will observe Bypass valves A, B, C in MANUAL at

~100% position and reactor pressure lowering on SPDS and panel 9-3 and 9-5 meters and recorders.

Applicability EOP-3A conditions with energy being added to primary containment (LOCA) and torus/drywell pressure rising.

When torus pressure cannot be maintained below PSP is the EOP-3A, step PC/P-4 criteria requiring transition to emergency depressurization. Failure to ED early enough to avert exceeding Justification for the PCPL-A could result in failure of the containment barrier.

chosen performance limit Depressuring to the Decay Heat Removal Pressure (50 psig) before PCPL-A is exceeded ensures energy discharged to the primary containment will be within the capacity of the containment vent.

BWR Owners Group App. B, step PC/P-2.

Appendix A leak with failure of torus/drywell sprays and failure of a Torus to Drywell vacuum Breaker is normally required to effect exceeding Scenario Guide PSP. It is important to design the scenario such that the crew has Requirements information early during the LOCA event to determine the rising DW pressure cannot be mitigated and that PSP will be exceeded.

Page 10 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 11 of 41 Related Operating Experience SEN 57 Malfunction of Rosemount pressure and differential pressure transmitters Various failures involving loss of sensing fluid or electronics failure.

INPO ICES 307495 Vital 120V Instrument AC Uninterruptable Power Supply Inverter Output Breaker Trip On 2/23/13 Class 1E 120V Instrument (Inst) AC uninterruptable power supply (UPS) inverter IY23 output breaker 52-23B2 tripped at approximately 04:27 and de-energized all of the Class 1E 120V Inst AC PY23 panel loads. The IY23 output breaker tripping rendered the inverter and its respective instrument AC distribution panel PY23 inoperable. Visual inspection, analysis of plant process computer data did not find evidence of a fault. The output breaker was replaced and the PY23 panel was re-energized. The Apparent Cause Analysis did not find a cause for spurious breaker trip and the presumptive cause was due to aging of the electronic trip unit.

(CNS) CR 2006-09515 ANN -ANN -(C-4/F-6), CRIT INST & CONT PNL CPP LOSS OF VOLT Received Received Annunciator ANN -ANN -(C-4/F-6), CRIT INST & CONT PNL CPP LOSS OF VOLT, in and reset. Checked MCC-TX feeder breaker. All conditions normal. No other indications of loss of panel CPP.

INPO ICES 407759 Condensate Pump Breaker Lockout and Pump Trip On 03/05/2017 steam generator water level deviation annunciators alarmed and the main feedwater reg valves were noted to be opening. Subsequently the condensate pump was discovered to be tripped. This resulted in the unit down powering to 90 percent until repairs to the condensate motor could be made. The condensate motor failed due to an electrical short caused by loose stator bolts in the motor. This event is Consequential because of the unplanned downpower.

SER 23-93 Delayed Manual Scram Following a Core Flow Reduction Event And Entry into a Region of Core Instability (Perry) On July 9, 1993, the reactor was operating at 100 percent power when both reactor recirculation pumps unexpectedly downshifted to low speed, placing the reactor in a region of the operating domain susceptible to core thermal-hydraulic instability. The operators manually scrammed the reactor several minutes after entering this region of the power-to-flow map where an immediate manual scram is procedurally required.

Page 11 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 12 of 41 (CNS) CR 2007-03555 Stability Exclusion Region of Power-to-Flow Map entered At 0030 5-19-2007 Abnormal Procedure 2.4RR was entered was entered due to entry into the stability exclusion region. The stability exclusion region was entered when the "A" RRMG was secured for planned maintenance. LCO 3.4.1 Condition A was entered and recirc flow was raised to exit the region as required by 2.4RR and LCO 3.4.1.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 13 of 41 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required - none B. Initialize the simulator in IC20 or password protected IC, 100% (EOC)

1. Ensure this schedule file is in the schedule file directory:

Schedule File Name - 2020-4sc1.sch

2. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2020-4sc1.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

3. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the schedule file is active (Running).

4. Take the simulator out of freeze.

5. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section C below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a value in the @Time column will not load into the director until the event trigger goes active.)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 14 of 41 C. File loaded verification:

(Continued on next page.)

Page 14 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 15 of 41 Page 15 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 16 of 41 Page 16 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 17 of 41 D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank.

2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.

3. Ensure CRD Drive D/P at 265 psid.

4. Ensure CRD Cooling Water flow at 50 gpm.

5. Place CS Pump A in PTL.

6. Hang a caution tag on CS Pump A control switch.

7. Ensure CS A is OOS on safety system status panel on panel 9-5.

8. Place Protected Equipment placard on Panel 9-3 within Core Spray B area.

9. Ensure SSST Y voltage to RRMGs is set to TAP 2.

10. SSST X Voltage card should read TAP POS 3, MAX 4469 and MIN 4361.

11. Ensure IC20, Rod Sequence Notebook under the RO desk.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 18 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift CRD Pumps from B to A in operation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Directs ATC to shift CRD Pumps from B to A per Procedure 2.2.8, Section 15.

Booth Role Play: If asked, as Rx Bldg NLO report 2.2.8 step 15.2 is complete for starting CRD Pump A.

Operator (Procedure 2.2.8)

15. SHIFTING CRD PUMPS 15.1 ESTABLISH communications between Control Room and CRD pump area.

15.2 IF starting CRD-P-1A, THEN ENSURE following: (step 15.2 has been completed per turnover sheet) 15.3 IF starting CRD-P-1B, THEN ENSURE following: (step is N/A) 15.4 At Panel 9-5, PERFORM following to place CRD-FIC-301, CRD FLOW CONTROL, in MAN:

15.4.1 ADJUST manual output knurled knob until DEVIATION needle centered (aligned with redline on settape).

15.4.2 PLACE selector to MAN.

15.5 START standby CRD pump.

ATC CAUTION - CRDM damage could occur during scram if charging water pressure exceeds 1510 psig.

15.6 (Directs NLO to) Locally CHECK for normal pump operation.

15.7 SHUT DOWN CRD pump being removed from service.

15.8 Slowly ADJUST manual control on CRD-FC-301, CRD FLOW CONTROL, to 50 gpm.

15.9 PERFORM following to balance CRD-FC-301:

15.9.1 ADJUST SETPOINT thumbwheel until DEVIATION needle centered (aligned with redline on settape).

15.9.2 PLACE selector to BAL.

15.10 At Panel 9-5, ENSURE following:

Charging water pressure adjusted to 1425 to 1475 psig.

Drive water P adjusted to 260 to 270 psid.

BOP Provides peer check of ATC actions.

END OF EVENT Page 18 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 19 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Shift CRD Pumps from B to A in operation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Notes Booth Proceed to next event After CRD Pump B has been stopped and at the Operator direction of the Lead Examiner.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 20 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Level transmitter NBI-LT-52C fails high Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 2, RR27C NBI-LT-52C (NR Level) Failure (LI-94C).

Operator Responds to the following alarm:

9-5-2/G-4, RVLC SYSTEM TROUBLE A-3/G-4, OWC INJECTION SYSTEM TROUBLE(No Operator action, alarm due to FW flow disturbance)

Recognizes and reports narrow range reactor water level rising on NBI-LI-94C.

Per alarm card 2.3_9-5-2/G-4:

ATC 1.1 Stop any power changes in-progress.

1.2 Verify reactor water level is stable. IF reactor water level is unstable, THEN enter Procedure 2.4RXLVL.

1.3 At a RVLC/RFPT HMI, perform following:

1.3.1 Select RVLC System.

1.3.2 Select ACT. ALARM screen.

1.3.3 Determine cause of alarm.

1.4 Refer to Procedure 4.4.1, Attachment 2, for resolution of condition(s).

CRS May direct ATC to bypass RVLC input from NBI-LT-52C per Procedure 4.4.1.

If directed to bypass NBI-LT-52C in RVLCS, per Procedure 4.4.1 section 8:

8.1 At a RVLC/RFPT HMI, select RVLC System.

8.2 Select MAINT. screen.

8.3 Review disabled parameter points to determine impact of additional bypassing of parameter points (i.e., loss of 3 element selection, loss of ATC AUTO on MASTER LEVEL Controller, loss of LT-59D, etc.). (Determines no other points are bypassed.)

8.4 On MAINT. screen, select desired parameter. (NBI-LT-52C mLT0052C)

ATC Reports that NBI-LT-52C is invalid and cannot be bypassed.

BOP Provides peer check of ATC actions.

CRS Determines entry into TS 3.3.2.2 Condition A is required.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 21 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Level transmitter NBI-LT-52C fails high Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior TS 3.3.2.2 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One feedwater and main A.1 Place channel in trip. 7 days turbine high water level trip channel inoperable.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 21 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 22 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Critical power panel CPP-1 loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 3, ED11d Loss of CPP-1 Booth Role Play: If directed as the building operator to investigate CPP-1, wait 2 Operator minutes, then report the CPP-1 supply feeder is closed and you see nothing abnormal.

WCO/BOP Respond to the following alarms:

R-1/A-1, TURBINE BLDG HV-T-1A FAN FAILURE R-1/A-2, TURBINE BLDG HV-T-1B FAN FAILURE R-1/A-3, TURBINE BLDG HV-T-1C FAN FAILURE R-1/B-1, TURBINE BLDG EXH FAN A FAILURE BOP R-1/B-2, TURBINE BLDG EXH FAN B FAILURE R-1/C-2, TURBINE BLDG EXH FAN D FAILURE R-1/B-3, TURBINE BLDG LESS THAN 2 EXH FANS ON C-3/G-1, MAIN GEN VOLTAGE REG TROUBLE Multiple Generator H2 Alarms due to loss of CPP-1 Reports loss of CPP-1 power.

Enters Procedure 5.3AC120 with priority on loss of CPP-1, Attachment 8.

CRS May enter 2.4HVAC (action only required if TB ventilation cannot be restored).

Role Play: (Note: 5.3AC120 Att 8 step 1.2.4 states Close TEC-201, HYDROGEN COOLER TCV-428 OUTLET (Heater Bay south).

Booth If contacted as TB NLO to close TEC-201, wait 2 minutes, then toggle ON and OFF override A-1 C-2 TG Bldg Corridor to SW Heater Bay Door Open Operator (an:p4228) to simulate going through door during ingress and egress, then insert Remote Function SW53 to to the position directed by the WCO/BOP or to 0% (trigger 13).

Performs 5.3AC120 Att. 8, as directed:

1.1 Place one Turbine Building exhaust fan switch to RUN.

BOP 1.2 Concurrently perform following to control Main Generator H2 temperatures:

1.2.1 Monitor Average Generator H2 Cold Gas temperature on PMIS Points G023 and/or G024 Page 22 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 23 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Critical power panel CPP-1 loss of power Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.2.2 IF PMIS Points G023 and G024 invalid, THEN monitor individual cooler temperatures: (Step is N/A) 1.2.3 Throttle TEC-MO-149 to maintain Main Generator cold gas temperature at 100°F to 110°F.

1.2.4 Directs NLO to close TEC-201, HYDROGEN COOLER TCV-428 OUTLET.

1.3 Directs NLO to control Main Generator exciter temperatures per 5.3AC120 Att. 8, step 1.3.

Role Play: If contacted as TB NLO to acknowledge alarm (CTLRSW) at the Booth Voltage Regulator Operators Panel, wait 2 minutes, then IRF EG07 Main Operator Generator Alarm Acknowledge or activate TRIGGER 23 to insert override AN:P4047, C-3/G-1 Main Gen Voltage Reg Trouble, to OFF.

Per Alarm card C-3/G-1:

1.1 Send Operator to Voltage Regulator Operator's Panel (T-903-S) to BOP acknowledge and determine which alarms remain active by using Procedure 2.2.14, Operation Of Main Gen Volt Reg Alarm System attachment, as required.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 23 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 24 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Condensate Pump B trip, RR Pump A runs back too far, Reactor Recirc Pump A trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 4, FW14A Condensate Pump A trip.

Auto trigger 14 should go active during the runback when RR Pump A scoop Booth tube lowers to 30%. These triggers cause RR Pump A speed to continue to Operator lower after the runback is complete.

Role Play: If sent to investigate CP A breaker trip, wait 5 minutes and report CP A breaker is tripped on overcurrent. If sent to CP A to investigate, wait 5 minutes and report you see nothing abnormal in the vicinity of CP A.

NOTE to Examiners: RR Pump A speed ramps to 30% in 5 seconds. It is not expected that the operator will have time to lock out the scoop tube in time to mitigate the failure.

RR Pump A trips 3 minutes after the runback.

Recognizes and responds to alarms:

A-3/A-2 Cond Pump B Trip A-3/B-2 Cond Pump B Ovld/Ground BOP Reports Condensate Pump B trip.

Checks Condensate Booster and RFP suction pressures remain above trip setpoints.

Enters 2.4MC-RF.

CRS Directs WCO/BOP perform subsequent actions of 2.4MC-RF for trip of a single CP.

Monitors RR runback and RPV water level being maintained.

Updates crew of scram actions from 2.4MC-RF.

ATC Monitors and reports point of operation on Power/Flow Map remains outside or on the edge of the Buffer Zone.

If in the Buffer Region takes action per 2.1.10, Section 12 Recognizes and reports RR runback complete but RR Pump A speed lowered ATC to 30%.

Enters 2.4RR.

CRS May direct locking out RR A scoop tube.

Assigns WCO/BOP 2.4RR Attachment 4 actions.

If directed, locks out RR scoop tube by depressing RR A Scoop Tube Lockout ATC/BOP pushbutton on panel 9-4.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 25 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Condensate Pump B trip, RR Pump A runs back too far, Reactor Recirc Pump A trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Checks and reports RR loop A and B flows exceed mismatch limit.

Reports operation on edge of Buffered Region of Power/Flow Map.

Responds to alarms:

9-4-3/A-2, RRMG A BKR 1CN TRIP 9-4-3/B-2, RRMG A BKR 1CN LOCKOUT ATC/BOP 9-4-3/C-1, RRMG A LOCKOUT 9-4-3/E-3, RECIRC LOOP A OUT OF SERVICE Reports RR Pump A trip.

Monitors and reports operation still in Buffered Region/Stability Exclusion Region of the Power to Flow Map.

Re-enters procedure 2.4RR for trip of RR Pump A and entry into Stability CRS Exclusion Region of the Power to Flow Map.

Directs 2.4RR Attachment 3 to be performed.

1.1 Inform Shift Manager LCO 3.4.1, Condition A, entry required.

1.2 Monitor for abnormal neutron flux oscillations by:

1.2.1 NOISE Program on PMIS computer to monitor peak-to-peak fluctuations of LPRMs and APRMs.

1.2.2 LPRMs using control rod select switch to display LPRM strings which surround following control rods:

10-43 26-43 42-43 10-27 26-27 42-27 ATC 10-11 26-11 42-11 1.2.3 SRM period, APRM, and LPRM indications 1.3 Exit region by performing either or both of following:

1.3.1 Raise speed of operating recirculation pump(s) per Procedure 2.1.10.

1.3.2 Insert Emergency Power Reduction Rods per Procedure 10.13.

1.4 Inform Reactor Engineering if Stability Exclusion Region has been entered.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 26 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Condensate Pump B trip, RR Pump A runs back too far, Reactor Recirc Pump A trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Determines entry into TS 3.4.1 Condition A & B is required.

TS 3.4.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Immediately A. One or two recirculation A.1 Initiate action to exit the stability loops in operation with exclusion Region.

core flow as a function of core THERMAL POWER in the Stability Exclusion Region of the power/flow map.

B. Requirements of the B.1 Satisfy the requirements of the LCO. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months LCO not met for reasons other than Condition A END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 26 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 27 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump B binding, neutron flux oscillations Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 5, RR03B Recirc Pump B Booth shaft binding/trip.

Operator NOTE to Examiners: RR Pump B trips ~ 20 seconds after Trigger 5 is activated. The next event, MSL D leak in the drywell, begins ramping in 3 minutes after the crew scrams.

Recognizes and reports RR Pump B alarms:

9-4-3/E-4, RECIRC A/B PUMP MOTOR HI/LOW TEMP 9-4-3/C-7, RECIRC B PUMP MOTOR HI VIBRATION 9-4-3/C-5, RRMG B LOCKOUT 9-4-3/A-5, RRMG B BKR 1DS TRIP 9-4-3/E-7, RECIRC LOOP B OUT OF SERVICE ATC Inserts manual scram IAW 2.4RR:

3. Immediate Operator Actions 3.1 IF both RR pumps are tripped and reactor power > 1% rated thermal, THEN perform following:

3.1.1 SCRAM 3.1.2 Enter procedure 2.1.5 Re-enters 2.4RR.

CRS Directs manual scram.

CRITICAL TASK #1: Manually scram the reactor when both recirculation pumps trip, prior to exceeding 25% peak to peak neutron flux oscillations or APRM auto scram setpoint due to neutron flux oscillations.

Perform 2.1.5 Attachment 1 Mitigating Task Scram Actions:

1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons.

1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

ATC 1.3 IF reactor power > 3%, THEN perform following:

1.3.1 Place REACTOR MODE switch to SHUTDOWN.

1.3.2 Initiate ARI.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 28 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump B binding, neutron flux oscillations Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Perform Attachment 2 Reactor Power Control of 2.1.5 as follows:

1 REACTOR POWER CONTROL 1.1 Ensure REACTOR MODE switch is in SHUTDOWN.

1.2 Verify all SDV vent and drain valves are closed.

1.3 Ensure operating RR pumps have run back to 22% speed (already ATC tripped) 1.4 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

1.5 Observe nuclear instrumentation and perform following:

1.5.1 Insert SRM detectors.

1.5.2 Insert IRM detectors.

1.5.3 Change APRM recorders to IRMs.

1.5.4 Range IRMs on scale.

1.5.5 Check reactor power is lowering.

Verifies turbine trip IAW 2.2.77 Att. 2 hard card:

1.1 Simultaneously DEPRESS TURB TRIP 1 and TURB TRIP 2 buttons, and then check following; N/A if turbine automatically tripped:

1.2 VERIFY following valves closed (Panel B, DEH Main display):

Both stop valves.

BOP All governor valves.

All reheat stop valves.

All interceptor valves.

1.3 ENSURE following breakers open(Panel C):

1.3.1 345KV BUS, PCB-3310.

1.3.2 345KV BUS, PCB-3312.

1.3.3 GEN EXCITER FIELD BKR.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 29 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump B binding, neutron flux oscillations Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-1A on low reactor water level due to scram.

Directs BOP to:

Stabilize Rx pressure <1050 psig using Table 1 systems Assigns Rx pressure band 800 - 1050 psig EOP 1A Pressure CRS Directs ATC to:

Maintain level +3 to + 54 using feedwater CRS ATC Maintains level +3 to + 54 using feedwater, as directed.

END OF EVENT Page 29 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 30 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Reactor Recirc Pump B binding, neutron flux oscillations Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Notes The next event, MSL D leak in the drywell, is automatically triggered when a scram Booth is inserted (TRIGGER 6). The steam leak begins ramping in 3 minutes after the Operator crew scrams.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 31 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

MSL D leak in the drywell, Containment Spray permissive switch failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Reports drywell pressure/temperature rising.

CREW Announces EOP-1A and EOP-3A entry condition on high DW pressure.

Re-enters EOP-1A.

Directs verifying initiations per EOP-1A step RC/L-1:

CRS Directs performing cooldown per EOP1A Step RC/P-7:

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 32 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

MSL D leak in the drywell, Containment Spray permissive switch failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-3A.

Directs PC Sprays IAW EOP-3A step PC/P-4 and/or PC/P-5.

Directs Drywell pressure maintained between +2 psig and +10 psig.

CRS Directs BOP to place DW Coolers in override IAW EOP-3A step DW/T-3:

CRS Page 32 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 33 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

MSL D leak in the drywell, Containment Spray permissive switch failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior (EOP-1A step RC/P-1) Directs WCO/BOP to prevent injection from LPCI and Core Spray.

CRS Performs EOP-1A actions as directed Verifies ECCS initiations o HPCI Controls HPCI flow rate to maintain level +3 to +54.

ATC/BOP o LPCI o Core Spray Checks DG1 and DG2 are operating, with Service Water.

Places DW FCU A, B, C, D to OVERRIDE on VBD-H Verifies group isolations as directed using 2.1.22 hard card NOTE to Examiners: The Containment Spray cooling valve permissive switch will fail for the first RHR loop attempted to be placed in Torus spray. The following steps are written assuming RHR A will be attempted first. If RHR B is started first the Containment Spray cooling valve permissive switch will requiring the operator will use RHR A to spray.

Role Play: If asked to install EOP PTM 97-100, wait 7 minutes, then insert Remote Functions RH46 (EOP PTM 97 & 98) at INSTALL, and RH47 (EOP PTM 99 & 100) at INSTALL. If already pre-staged to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 minutes then install the PTMs.

Role Play: (Note: procedure 0.31MOV step 6.4 requires de-energizing an MOV Booth before attempting manual operation)

Operator If requested to manually open RHR-MO31A, wait 2 minutes, then insert remote function rh23a to deenerg.

If requested to manually open RHR-MO26A, wait 2 minutes, then insert remote function rh19a to deenerg.

Then 1 minute later, report MO-31A and MO-26A are bound and can NOT be manually opened.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 34 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

MSL D leak in the drywell, Containment Spray permissive switch failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BEFORE torus pressure reaches 10 psig, initiates Torus spray per 2.2.69.3 hard card (depends on scenario timing and crew actions):

2.1 If required, with CRS permission, PLACE CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL OVERRD.

2.2 If required, PLACE CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL.

2.3 IF reactor pressure less than or equal to 300 psig and injection not desired, THEN CLOSE RHR MO 27A(B), OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

2.4 ENSURE RHR PUMP(s) running.

2.5 If Torus spray required, THEN PERFORM the following:

2.5.1 ENSURE RHR-MO-39A(B) open.

2.5.2 THROTTLE RHR-MO-38A(B) to maintain desired containment BOP pressure.

For RHR A, recognizes and reports MO-39A will not open, shifts to RHR Loop B, and repeats above steps, then continues at next step.

2.7 If PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, THEN ENSURE one of following open:

REC-MO-711 REC-MO-714 2.8 PLACE RHR SW System in service:

START SWBP(s).

ADJUST SW-MO-89A(B) to maintain flow between 2500 and 4000 gpm.

2.9 THROTTLE RHR-MO-66A(B) to maintain desired cooling rate.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 35 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

MSL D leak in the drywell, Containment Spray permissive switch failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Prevent injection for LPCI and Core Spray IAW EOP 5.8 Att. 4 HARD CARD:

2.1 Prevents both RHR Subsystems by performing one of following in each loop:

2.1.1 Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK. (This step will not be performed for RHR B due to it being used for PC Spray.)

2.1.2 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3; and 2.1.2.1 Bypass RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal BOP per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

2.1.3 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

2.3 Prevents CS by performing following:

2.3.1 Ensure CS-MO-12A is closed. (N/A due to CS A is out of service) 2.3.2 Ensure CS Pump A control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK. (N/A due to CS A is out of service and already in PTL))

2.3.3 Ensure CS-MO-12B is closed.

2.3.4 Ensure CS Pump B control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

NOTE to Examiners: Auto Trigger 8 initiates Events 8, and 9 Torus to DW vacuum breaker failure and RHR B (30 second delay), D (120 second delay) pump trips and RHR A Containment Spray logic will fail. Trigger 8 will go active when PC spray has reduced DW pressure to ~8 psig.

2.2.69.3, Att 1 (Hard Card)

When Torus pressure exceeds 10 PSIG Spray the Drywell:

2.6 IF drywell spray required, THEN PERFORM following:

BOP 2.6.1 OPEN RHR-MO-31A(B).

If attempted for RHR A, recognizes and reports MO-31A will not open.

2.6.2 THROTTLE RHR-MO-26A(B) to maintain desired containment pressure.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 36 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6, 7 Event

Description:

MSL D leak in the drywell, Containment Spray permissive switch failure Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior May attempt to open RHR-MO-20, CROSSHEADER VLV PER 2.2.69.3, Section 4, PLACING RHR SUBSYSTEM A SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING TO RHR SUBSYSTEM B IN SERVICE USING RHR-MO-20 END OF EVENT Notes Booth Events 8 and 9 are automatically triggered (TRIGGER 8) when DW Spray reduces Operator DW pressure to ~8psig. Proceed to next event when TRIGGER 8 goes true.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 37 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9 Event

Description:

Torus to DW vacuum breaker failure, RHR Pump B trip, RHR Pump D trip.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Reports trip of RHR Pump B.

Reports trip of RHR Pump D.

CREW Reports DW pressure rising.

Diagnoses failure of Torus to DW vacuum breaker based on reduction of Torus to DW dp.

IAW EOP-1A step RC/P-1, anticipates emergency depressurization will be required per EOP-3A step PC/P-6 due to DW pressure rising at a rate that will exceed PSP.

(EOP-3A step PC/P-6)

CRS (EOP-1A step RC/P-1)

Provides update that emergency depressurization is anticipated.

Directs WCO/BOP to fully open bypass valves IAW 2.2.77.1.

Manually opens Bypass valves IAW 2.2.77.1 Att. 1 hard card:

3.1 On BYPASS VALVE POSITION control, press OPEN to access controls.

3.2 Press MANUAL button and check it backlights yellow.

BOP 3.3 On BYPASS VALVE POSITION control, use UP/DOWN, JOG UP/JOG DOWN and FAST/SLOW controls to adjust BYPASS VALVE POSITION to desired value (fully open).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 38 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9 Event

Description:

Torus to DW vacuum breaker failure, RHR Pump B trip, RHR Pump D trip.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When Torus pressure cannot be maintained in the safe zone of the PSP graph, ensures injection source is available exits EOP-1A pressure leg and enters EOP-2A, Emergency RPV Depressurization Requests mark PC water level >6ft for EOP-2A step RC/P-12 Directs WCO/BOP to open 6 SRVs CRS CRITICAL TASK #2: When torus pressure cannot be maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP), the crew completes Emergency Depressurization prior to exceeding PCPL-A. (Anticipating ED and fully opening Bypass valves satisfies this Critical Task)

Reports PC water level.

Places control switches for 6 SRVs in OPEN.

BOP Monitors reactor pressure and when RPV pressure reaches 50 psig, reports emergency depressurization is complete.

CRS Directs ATC to maintain normal level band +3 to +54 using Condensate System.

Monitors Condensate for injection via startup level control.

ATC When ED is complete, controls Condensate to restore/maintain +3 inches to +54 inches.

NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when reactor pressure has lowered to <50 psig and level is being controlled +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 39 of 41 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 8, 9 Event

Description:

Torus to DW vacuum breaker failure, RHR Pump B trip, RHR Pump D trip.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and tell Operator the crew to stop operating.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 1 Page 40 of 41 IX. INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 100% power, steady state, near End of Cycle.

B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:

1. Day 1 of 7 day LCO per 3.5.1 A.1 for Core Spray A INOPERABLE.

C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. Core Spray Pump A tagged out for motor preventive maintenance.

2. CS B is protected.

D. Risk :

1. PRA Risk is Green

2. Aggregate Risk is Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. Per SOP 2.2.8, Section 15, shift CRD Pumps from B to A in operation.

Prestart checks are complete per step 15.2.

2. Continue full power operation.

3. Continue maintenance on Core Spray Pump A motor.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 1 Page 41 of 41 Form Password is pepetf Activities Planned or in Progress: Core Spray Pump A motor preventive maintenance window Risk Green Rev: 0 Page 1 of 1 Creation Date: Current SM Review: Shift Manager Window Start: Yesterday Window Close: Tomorrow Sign(s)

Number Installed Removed Protected Sign Placement of Initials/ Initials/

Equipment Location Sign(s)* Date Date Magnetic sign on door:

Core Spray Loop B 1 NLO R105, R-903-SE Quad CS Pump B 4160 Bkr Magnetic Sign On: EE-CB- 1 NLO 4160G(CSP1B)

MCC-Y Barrier erected and Sign 1 NLO Posted: Around MCC-Y CS-Loop B controls panel 9-3 Magnetic sign placed on 1 WCO panel 9-3: within CS B area Page 41 of 41 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 1 of 36 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CN-2020-04 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN

2. Withdraw control rods IAW the rod sequence to establish 20-25% bypass valve position

3. Respond to RMCS withdraw timer malfunction

4. Respond to control rod double notch during withdrawal

5. Respond to spurious HPCI initiation

6. Respond to HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building requiring scram

7. Respond to failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close

8. Respond to Reactor Mode Switch failing in RUN position

9. Respond to failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature

10. Respond to failure of HPCI isolation MOVs Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 5% power during startup, beginning of life Inoperable Equipment: none Turnover:

The plant is at 5% power at beginning of cycle.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Transfer to RUN Mode per Procedure 2.1.1.

Withdraw control rods IAW the rod sequence to establish 20-25% bypass valve position.

Continue startup IAW Procedure 2.1.1.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 60 minutes

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 2 of 36 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 N/A N (ATC,CRS) Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN 2 N/A R (ATC,CRS) Raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods I (ATC,CRS) 3 rd19 RMCS withdraw timer malfunction A (CREW)

C (ATC,CRS) 4 rd235027 A (CREW) Control rod double notches on withdraw TS (CRS)

Spurious HPCI initiation with failure of HPCI trip on C (BOP,CRS) high water level hp05 5 A (CREW) CT#1 rr28b@58 When HPCI spuriously initiates at low reactor TS (CRS) power, stop and prevent HPCI injection before RFPT high water level trip.

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building 6 hp06 M (CREW) requiring scram rd01a rd01b Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain 7 C (ATC,CRS) rd01c valves to automatically close rd01d (override) C 8 Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position zdirpssws1 (ATC,BOP,CRS)

Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high 9 hp09 C (BOP,CRS) area temperature Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close CT#2 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable (Override) break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by zdihpcisws1 opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating 10 C values are exceeded in two areas for the same (Remote) (ATC,BOP,CRS) parameter and prior to exceeding maximum hp04a safe operating value in a third area for that parameter. (For this scenario, HPCI-TE-105B Torus 888 WSW and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 SE would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 3 of 36 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-301-4 Actual Attribute Description Target

1. Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position

2. Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close Malfunctions after 3. Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area 1-2 4 EOP entry temperature

4. Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close

1. RMCS withdraw timer malfunction

2. Spurious HPCI initiation with failure of HPCI trip on high Abnormal Events 2-4 3 water level

3. Control rod double notches on withdraw

1. HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building requiring Major Transients 1-2 1 scram EOP entries 1. EOP-5A requiring 1-2 2 2. EOP-1A substantive action EOP contingencies requiring 1 per set 1 1. EOP-2A Contingency #2 - Emergency Depressurization substantive action

1. (CT#1) When HPCI spuriously initiates, stop and prevent HPCI injection before RFPT high water level trip.

2. (CT#2) When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when Pre-identified maximum safe operating values are exceeded in two 2 2 Critical Tasks areas for the same parameter and prior to exceeding maximum safe operating value in a third area for that parameter. (For this scenario, HPCI-TE-105B Torus 888 WSW and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 SE would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

Normal Events N/A 1 1. Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN Reactivity 1. Raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods N/A 1 Manipulations

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 4 of 36

1. RMCS withdraw timer malfunction

2. Control rod double notches on withdraw

3. Spurious HPCI initiation with failure of HPCI trip on high water level Instrument/ 4. Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position Component N/A 7 5. Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain Failures valves to automatically close

6. Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature

7. Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close

1. RMCS withdraw timer malfunction

2. Control rod double notches on withdraw

3. Spurious HPCI initiation with failure of HPCI trip on high water level

4. Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position Total Malfunctions N/A 7 5. Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close

6. Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature

7. Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

HPCI, Primary Containment Isolation System, RPS

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 5 of 36 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 5% power during startup, beginning of life.

After the crew takes the watch, the crew transfers the Reactor Mode Switch to RUN per Procedure 2.1.1.

After the Reactor Mode Switch has been transferred to RUN, the ATC will withdraw control rods IAW the startup rod sequence to establish Bypass valves 20-25% open.

During the power ascension, a RMCS withdraw timer malfunction will occur, resulting in a control rod select block and requiring entry into 2.4CRD. The ATC will reset the timer malfunction IAW 2.4CRD Att. 8.

After the RMCS withdraw timer malfunction has been cleared, the crew will resume control rod withdrawal. Control rod 50-27 (4th rod withdrawn) will double notch past the required banked position, resulting in a control rod withdrawal block. The crew will respond IAW the alarm card. The CRS will determine a LCO 3.1.6 Condition A entry is required due to rod position not in compliance with BPWS.

When response to the control rod double notch is complete, HPCI will spuriously initiate. The crew will respond IAW procedure 2.4CSCS and stop and prevent HPCI to avert a RFPT trip due to reactor water level reaching the RFPT high water level trip setpoint (CT#1). The CRS will enter TS 3.5.1 Condition C for HPCI inoperable due to it being prevented from injecting After actions for HPCI spurious initiation are complete, a small HPCI steam line break will occur in the Reactor Building. Secondary containment area temperatures and radiation levels will rise, requiring entry into EOP-5A. If HPCI area temperatures reach 195°F, MSO limit and isolation setpoint, before the crew attempts manual isolation of HPCI steam supply valves, the automatic isolation will fail to occur. When the crew attempts manual isolation of the HPCI steam supply valves, both valves will fail to fully close due to mechanical binding in their gear boxes. EOP-1A entry and reactor shutdown will be required.

When the reactor is manually scrammed, Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves will fail to automatically close. The ATC will isolate the valves using the panel 9-5 control switch. The Reactor Mode Switch will fail in RUN position. A Group 1 isolation will occur when reactor pressure lowers to 835 psig due to low decay heat and the HPCI steam leak, requiring transition to RCIC and CRD for level control.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 6 of 36 The HPCI steam leak will get worse, causing area temperatures in more than one area of the Reactor Building to approach the MSO limit. When two areas have reached the MSO limit, emergency depressurization will be required IAW EOP-1A, and the crew will enter EOP-2A to perform emergency depressurization (CT#2).

The exercise ends when the reactor has been depressurized and RPV water level is being restored to between +3 and +54 inches.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 7 of 36 CRITICAL TASK BASIS When HPCI spuriously initiates at low reactor power, stop and Critical Task #1 prevent HPCI injection before RFPT high water level trip.

An avoidable RFPT trip presents an unnecessary challenge to plant safety. Loss of FW transients are a significant contributor to core Safety Significance damage frequency (ref. CNS PRA Rev. 6).

Cues On panel 9-3:

Annunciator 9-3-2/A-1, HPCI Logic Actuated HPCI Stm to Turb Vlv MO-14 red light ON (opening)

HPCI Injection Valve MO-19 red light ON (opening)

Flow rising on Flow Controller HPCI-FC-108 Reactor water level rising on various control room indicators Reactor power rising Manipulation of HPCI controls on panel 9-3:

HPCI Turbine Trip push button depressed Measurable Performance HPCI-MO-14 control switch to CLOSE Indicators HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump control switch to PTL As HPCI is secured, on panel 9-3 crew will observe Annunciator HPCI Turbine Trip, HPCI-MO-14 Green light ON and Red light OFF, HPCI AOP Green light ON and Red light OFF, flow lowering on Performance Feedback HPCI-FIC-108, HPCI Turbine Speed lowering on HPCI-SI-2792, and reactor water level stop rising on various control room indicators Applicability Low power conditions, where HPCI rated flow 4250 gpm is higher than reactor steam flow, resulting in reactor water level rising.

CNS Procedure 2.4CSCS immediate operator action requires securing HPCI upon a spurious initiation. Procedure 2.4RXLVL Justification for the immediate operator action requires a manual scram if reactor water chosen performance limit level cannot be maintained below +50 inches on narrow range instruments. RFPTs trip on high reactor water level, +52.5 inches.

BWR Owners Group N/A Appendix Power level must be low enough for HPCI at rated flow to cause reactor water level to rise above 53.5 inches with feedwater flow reduced to zero. To reach the RFPT trip setpoint, wide range level instrument NBI-LIS-101B should be set slightly below the HPCI high Scenario Guide water level trip setpoint using malfunction rr28b, to the defeat the Requirements HPCI trip, which occurs at a lower actual water level than the narrow range RFPT high water level trip. The scenario should be designed to provide at least ~1 minute before level reaches +53.5 inches.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 8 of 36 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating values are exceeded in two areas for the same parameter and prior to exceeding maximum safe operating Critical Task #2 value in a third area for that parameter. (For this scenario, HPCI-TE-105B Torus 888 WSW and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 SE would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

Should secondary containment parameters exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area, the RPV must be depressurized to preclude further degradation. RPV depressurization places the primary system in its lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and reduces the driving head and flow of primary systems that are unisolated and discharging into the Safety Significance secondary containment.

The criteria of "two or more areas" specified identifies the rise in secondary containment parameters as a wide-spread problem which may pose a direct and immediate threat to secondary containment integrity, equipment located in the secondary containment, and continued safe operation of the plant.

Cues SPDS indication for secondary containment parameters indicate area radiation, area temperature, or area water level has exceeded its maximum safe operating value in two areas.

Manipulation of SRV controls on panel 9-3:

SRV-71A SRV-71B SRV-71E Measurable Performance SRV-71G Indicators SRV-71H SRV-71C SRV-71D SRV-71F Crew will observe SRV light indication go from green to red, amber pressure switch lights illuminate, reactor pressure lowering on Performance Feedback SPDS and panel 9-3 and 9-5 meters and recorders, and SRV tailpipe temperatures rise on recorder MS-TR-166.

Applicability EOP-5A conditions, RCS leaks into secondary containment with the RPV pressurized.

Emergency Depressurization is required due to effects of a break spreading into and potentially affecting safety equipment and operations in more than one area; however, emergency depressurization is not allowed until the second area exceeds its Justification for the Max Safe limit. Before the Max Safe limit is exceeded in a third chosen performance limit area gives reasonable time for the crew to perform emergency depressurization before the leak hampers equipment or operations in an even more widespread area.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 9 of 36 BWR Owners Group App. B, steps SC/T-4.2, SC/r-2.2, SC/L-2.2.

Appendix The scenario must be able to drive the selected parameter to its Max Safe value in three plant areas. If temperature is chosen, a failure to scram event, where RPV pressure is not allowed to be lowered, is well suited. Also, ensure the leak severity itself, or subsequent cold water injection, does not deplete RPV pressure Scenario Guide (driving head) so low that Max Safe in a third area cannot be Requirements reached. The crew should be driven to ED, versus just reducing pressure, to provide a consistent, measurable performance indicator. The CT listed in the scenario should list which instruments/areas will exceed their MSO limit first, second, and third.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 10 of 36 Related Operating Experience (CNS) CR 2006-06868 RMCS timer failure Entered Abnormal Procedure 2.4 CRD due to control rod 18-43 will not notch out from position 46 to 48. When attempting to withdraw control rod by continuous or notch withdrawal the settle light illuminates immediately and no drive water flow is observed, the drive in and drive out lights do not illuminate. Performed Attachment 6 for stuck control rod, all attempts to move control rod are unsuccessful. Based on indications, fault appears to with the timer. Method of discovery: SP 6.CRD.301. Requirement not met: RMCS should operate HCUs to position control rods as required.

(CNS) CR 2011-01763 RMCS timer test failed during surveillance test During performance of the Withdraw Timer Malfunction Test at step 5.2.2 of 6.CRD.301 the Timer Test failed to function at all to block rod withdrawal. White light did not turn on, Red light did not turn on and the selected Control Rod remained selected on the Full Core Display.

INPO ICES 306797 Control Rod double notching (CNS) On June 8, 2013, Control Rod 18-35 double notched during notch withdrawal from position 02 to 06. The control rod was being withdrawn from position 00 to 18 using notch withdrawal. All other notches were as expected. CRD Drive Water differential pressure was verified to be at 265 psig. The control rod withdrawal did not appear to be too fast. Control rod should not double notch during notch withdrawal.

After double notch occurrence, stop rod withdrawal, notify Reactivity Manager, Control Room Supervisor, and Shift Manager. Continued rod withdrawal after being evaluated by Reactor Engineering and Operation (CNS) CR 2014-01430 Control rod 18-35 has exhibited multiple double notches SEN 136 Mispositioned control rod recovery without management approval (CNS) On January 7, 1996, during a load line reduction following a reactor recirculation pump trip, the wrong control rod group was inserted when both the reactor operator and second verifier selected the wrong page of the rod movement sheet. After insertion of the first group of rods, and noting the error, the operator and verifier decided to begin recovery from the error without notifying management of the mispositioning or the plan to recover.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 11 of 36 OE26672 Mispositioned control rods during reactor startup (River Bend) On March 8, 2008, during plant startup at approximately 25 percent the rod line was being adjusted in accordance with the Reactivity Control Plan (RCP) in preparation for reactor recirculation pump up-shift. During manipulations, 6 control rods were withdrawn from position 16 to 24 instead of 16 to 20 as indicated on the control rod pull sheet. The root cause evaluation determined that the primary factor in the event was failure to appropriately utilize human performance tools and inadequate oversight.

SER 40-84 Inadvertent initiation of ESF systems due to spurious operation of trip units Various design inadequacies, component failures, and personnel errors associated with dc buses caused voltage variations resulting in tripping of inverters. Following the dc voltage transients, the inverters automatically reset. This caused analog trip units, which are powered by the inverters, to produce short duration actuation signals. The signals were caused by the trip unit's load relay becoming energized before the loop current reestablished itself above the trip setpoint. These momentary signals have inadvertently initiated emergency diesel generators, emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and other safety- related systems.

INPO ICES 466852 Unusual Event due to failure of Reactor Mode Switch to fully actuate (Peach Bottom) During GP-3 shutdown of Unit 3 on 10/21/19, when the Reactor Operator moved the Unit 3 Reactor Mode Switch to shutdown, it failed to generate a full reactor scram.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 12 of 36 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required - none B. Initialize the simulator in IC10 or password protected IC, 5% (BOC)

1. Ensure this schedule file is in the schedule file directory:

Schedule File Name - 2020-4sc2.sch

2. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2020-4sc2.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

3. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the schedule file is active (Running).

4. Take the simulator out of freeze.

5. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section C below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a value in the @Time column will not load into the director until the event trigger goes active.)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 13 of 36 C. File loaded verification:

(Continued on next page.)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 14 of 36 Page 14 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 15 of 36 (Continued on next page.)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 16 of 36 D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank.

2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.

3. Power approximately 5%.

4. Mark up 31-SU-BOL rod package to sequence step 18, Rod 26-03 at Position 0 to provide for crew turnover.

5. Ensure GARDEL initializes properly.

6. Ensure RWM initialized.

7. Ensure RCIC flow controller is set to 400 gpm.

8. Ensure HPCI flow controller is set to 4250 gpm.

9. Ensure CRD flow controller is set properly(50 gpm and drive d/p at 265).

10. Ensure IRM/APRM recorders in second speed.

11. Reset APRM back panel alarm lights.

12. Provide markup of procedure 2.1.1(Rev197) with step 4.24 marked complete through step 4.24.6 and section 5 complete up to 5.42 for crew turnover.

13. Provide copy of Procedure 2.1.10 for crew turnover.

14. Provide copy of Procedure 10.13 for crew turnover.

15. At Panel 9-4, set SSST Y Voltage Adjust to Tap 2.

16. At Panel C, set SSST X Voltage Adjust to Tap 3, min 4221, max 4333.

17. On STARTUP TRANSFORMER BACKUP VOLTAGE BUS, placard:

TAP POSITION: 3 MAX 4333 MIN 4221 Page 16 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 17 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: The beginning of shift brief and reactivity brief will have been conducted during turnover outside of the simulator.

Directs ATC to place the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN IAW procedure 2.1.1 CRS step 4.24.7 Performs procedure 2.1.1 step 4.24 to place the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN 4.24 PERFORM following to place REACTOR MODE switch in RUN:

4.24.7 PLACE REACTOR MODE switch in RUN.

4.25 PLACE all IRM/APRM recorder select switches to APRM.

4.26 PLACE all IRM/RBM recorder select switches to RBM.

4.27 MARK all APRM and RBM recorders with time and date.

4.28 PLACE all IRM recorders to normal speed.

ATC 4.29 COMPLETE LCO Tracking Log entry to establish Drywell oxygen content below Tech Spec limit within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of exceeding 15% RTP.

(Step is N/A at 5% power) 4.30 PERFORM one of following for all IRM detectors:

4.30.1 WITHDRAW IRM detector fully per Procedure 4.1.2.

4.30.2 IF any IRM detector cannot be withdrawn, THEN REFER to Procedure 4.1.2.

Withdraws IRMs IAW procedure 4.1.2

5. WITHDRAWING IRM DETECTORS 5.1 IF DETECTOR POSITION light off, THEN PERFORM following: (Step is N/A) 5.2 Momentarily DEPRESS applicable SELECT switch(s).

ATC 5.3 VERIFY applicable SELECT switch(s) lights lit.

5.4 IF at any time following conditions exist, MODE switch in RUN.

Associated APRM channels indicate above their downscale trip points. THEN fully WITHDRAW IRM(s).

5.5 DEPRESS and HOLD DRIVE OUT switch.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 18 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 5.6 WHEN IRM detectors at desired position, THEN RELEASE DRIVE OUT switch.

5.7 WHEN detector(s) fully withdrawn, THEN VERIFY applicable OUT light lit.

5.8 WHEN IRM detector operation complete, THEN PERFORM following:

5.8.1 PLACE all IRM range switches to 2.

5.8.2 Momentarily DEPRESS all lit SELECT buttons.

5.8.3 VERIFY all SELECT buttons off.

5.8.4 Momentarily DEPRESS SRM/IRM DETECTOR POS display (POWER ON) button.

5.8.5 VERIFY DETECTOR POSITION light off.

Continues procedure 2.1.1 4.31 (Informs CRS to) ENTER potential LCOs for all SRM, IRM, and APRM high flux (startup) channels.

ATC 4.32 VERIFY following conditions established per Procedures 2.1.10 and 10.13:

Pressure setpoint 926 psig.

Bypass valves ~ 10% open, or as directed by other procedural conditions.

Performs concurrent verification for 2.1.1 step 4.24.7 and peer checks for BOP other procedure steps.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 18 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 19 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 20-25% Bypass Valve position, RMCS timer malfunction, control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Trigger 3 goes true and RD19, RMCS Timer Malfunction, goes active when rod 02-27 is withdrawn to position 06. The malfunction takes effect when rod Booth 02-27 is withdrawn from position 06 to 08.

Operator Trigger 4 goes true and RD235027, Fast Rod Speed, when rod 50-27 is withdrawn to position 10. The malfunction takes effect when rod 50-27 is withdrawn from position 10 and it will double notch to position 14.

NOTE to Examiners: Example of Non-EOP Control Rod Movement Protocol per 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations, is attached for reference.

Event 3, RMCS timer malfunction will occur when control rod 02-27 is being withdrawn from position 06 to 08. Refer to page 21 for Event 3 actions.

Event 4, control rod 50-27 double notch will occur when it is withdrawn from position 10 to 12. Refer to page 23 for Event 4 actions.

Directs ATC to withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 20-25%

CRS Bypass Valve position IAW sequence 31-SU-BOL, 2.1.10 step 8.1, and 10.13 section 4.

Withdraws control rods IAW sequence 31-SU-BOL using notch withdrawal:

(For control rods 26-03, 26-51, 02-27, and 50-27 to position 12)

Selects in-sequence control rod by depressing respective Rod Select push button on panel 9-5 Rod Select matrix.

Observes OUT PERMIT light ON on panel 9-5.

Withdraws control rod one notch at a time by placing rod movement control switch on panel 9-5 to OUT NOTCH, then releasing.

ATC Observes ROD IN, ROD OUT, and ROD SETTLE lights illuminate in sequence and selected rod position indicates control rod withdrew one notch on panel 9-5.

Observes IRM recorder indication on panel 9-5 is consistent with control rod withdrawal.

Repeats notch withdrawal until control rod is at target position specified in sequence 31-SU-BOL, then initials step in 31-SU-BOL.

Repeats process for each successive control rod until bypass valve position on DEH HMI indicates 20-25%.

If directed, provides peer check for control rod selection, movement direction, BOP and step completion and initials as verifier in 31-SU-BOL.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 20 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 20-25% Bypass Valve position, RMCS timer malfunction, control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Monitors bypass valve position on HMI, panel B.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to Event 3(page 21) when RMCS timer malfunction occurs.

Booth Proceed to Event 4(page 23) when control rod 50-27 double notch to position Operator 14 occurs.

Proceed to Event 5 when directed by Lead Examiner.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 21 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RMCS timer malfunction Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior During withdrawal of control rod 02-27 from position 06 to position 08, ATC recognizes and reports reception of RMCS Timer Malfunction Select Block.

Announces entry condition for procedure 2.4CRD.

Enters 2.4CRD.

CRS Directs ATC to perform 2.4CRD Att. 8.

Performs 2.4CRD Att. 8 to reset RMCS timer malfunction ATC Notifies CRS RMCS timer is reset.

Exits 2.4CRD.

CRS Directs ATC to continue control rod withdrawal IAW the startup rod sequence.

ATC Continues control rod withdrawal, as directed.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 22 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RMCS timer malfunction Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP If directed, provides peer check for ATC.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to Event 4 when control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Operator occurs.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 23 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior During withdrawal of control rod 50-27 from position 10 to position 12, recognizes and reports rod 50-27 double notches and settles at position 14.

ATC Responds to annunciator:

9-5-1/A-5, RWM ROD BLOCK Determines alarm due to rod 50-27 out of required banked position.

Booth Role Play: When requested to develop a revised pull sheet to recover rod 50-27 to its intended position (12), state that will you will need to run a Gardel Operator case and provide will provide 10.13 Pull sheet when complete.

Directs suspending control rod withdrawal.

CRS Contacts Reactor Engineering and requests revised control rod movement step IAW procedure 10.13 step 4.2.8 to recover rod 50-27 to its intended position of 12.

Note to Examiners: Due to scenario timing and required CRS oversight for reactivity control, the CRS may not address TS 3.1.6 during the timeframe of the scenario. This may require grading TS by use of follow-up questioning.

CRS Determines entry into TS 3.1.6 Condition A is required.

TS 3.1.6 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 -----------------NOTE--------------

A. One or more OPERABLE control Rod worth minimizer (RWM) rods not in may be bypassed as compliance with allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, BPWS.

Control Rod Block Instrumentation.

Move associated control rod(s) 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to correct position.

OR A.2 Declare associated control 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months rod(s) inoperable.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 24 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to Event 5 when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 24 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 25 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Spurious HPCI initiation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 5, HP05 HPCI inadvertent initiation.

Operator NOTE to Examiners: It takes ~80 seconds from the time HPCI initiates until RPV level reaches 50. IAW procedure 2.4RXLVL immediate operator actions, the ATC will insert a manual scram if reactor water level cannot be maintained below +50. If a manual scram is inserted, Event 6, HPCI Steam Line Break will automatically become active upon the scram. RFPTs trip on high reactor water level, +54 narrow range, which is reached in ~2 minutes if HPCI is not tripped.

Responds to annunciator:

BOP 9-3-2/A-1, HPCI Logic Actuated Recognizes and reports HPCI starting, 2.4CSCS entry condition.

CRS Directs BOP to secure HPCI IAW 2.4CSCS.

CRITICAL TASK #1: When HPCI spuriously initiates at low reactor power, stop and prevent HPCI injection before RFPT high water level trip.

Stops HPCI IAW 2.4CSCS immediate operator actions:

3.1 IF HPCI initiated, THEN perform following:

3.1.1 Ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP control switch in START.

3.1.2 Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button.

BOP 3.1.3 AFTER turbine stops, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP in PULL-TO-LOCK.

3.1.4 Release TURBINE TRIP button.

Per subsequent action 4.7, informs CRS HPCI is inoperable due to Aux Oil Pump is in PTL Reports reactor power and reactor water level.

ATC If RPV level cannot be maintained below +50 on narrow range instruments, announces entry condition to procedure 2.4RXLVL and intention to insert a manual scram.

NOTE to Examiners: If a manual scram is inserted due to RPV water level, refer to Event 6 for operator actions related to scram (page 30).

CRS If required, enters 2.4RXLVL and directs ATC to scram.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 26 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Spurious HPCI initiation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Determines entry into TS 3.5.1 Condition C is required.

TS 3.5.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. HPCI System C.1 Verify by administrative means 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. RCIC System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore HPCI System to 14 days OPERABLE status.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to Event 6 when directed by the Lead Examiner or if the ATC Operator manually scrams.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 27 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 6, HP06 HPCI Steam Line Break.

HP06 is initially inserted at severity 4 on Trigger 6. Later, when Reactor Booth pressure falls below 650 psig, auto Trigger 16 raises the severity to 9 to Operator drive the crew to emergency depressurization. Later, auto Trigger 26 raises the severity to 13 when reactor pressure falls below 500 psig to ensure a third area will reach Max Safe temperature if the crew does NOT depressurize.

NOTE to Examiners: The CRS may not wait for EOP-5A entry condition to be met before directing isolation of the HPCI steam supply. The following operator actions are written from the standpoint that EOP-5A has been entered. If the crew attempts to isolate HPCI before the SW Quad reaches the HPCI isolation setpoint of 195°F, the failure of HPCI automatic isolation will not be observable.

Responds to annunciator:

BOP 9-3-1/A-9, REACTOR BLDG HIGH RAD Recognize Secondary Containment annunciator window on SPDS turns CREW yellow, and recognize radiation and temperature rising in SW and NW Quads using area temperature and radiation displays on SPDS.

Booth Role Play: As building operator sent to Reactor Bldg to investigate rising area temperatures, wait 3 minutes, then report you can hear a steam leak Operator and see steam in the vicinity of the HPCI room.

CRS Assigns BOP critical parameter of Secondary Containment temperatures.

Monitors and reports Secondary Containment temperatures using PMIS or BOP panel 9-21.

Responds to alarm:

BOP 9-3-1/E-10 Area High Temp Reports EOP-5A entry condition met due to Torus Area SW Quad reaching Max Normal Operating value (160°F).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 28 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-5A on Secondary Containment temperature above Max Normal Operating value.

CRS Directs BOP to isolate HPCI steam supply.

NOTE to Examiners: When the operator attempts to close them from panel 9-3, HPCI-MO-15 will not move and HPCI-MO-16 will de-energize.

Role Play: If sent as building operator to check breaker for HPCI-MO-16, wait 3 minutes, then report no indication at the disconnect If sent to close either valve from their LASP panels, IRF HP17A for HPCI-Booth MO-15 and IRF HP1A for HPCI-MO-16 then report MO-16 indicates no power and MO-15 will not close.

Operator If sent to ASD Panel to close HPCI isolation valves, wait 2 minutes, then report transfer switches are not functioning.

If sent to manually close HPCI-MO-16, wait 10 minutes and report the gearbox is bound and the handwheel will not turn. (This requires an RP.)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 29 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior If SW Quad temperature reaches the HPCI isolation setpoint, recognizes and reports HPCI failure to automatically isolate.

Attempts to isolate HPCI steam supply by placing HPCI control switches INBD STM SUPP ISOL VLV MO 15 and OTBD STM SUPP ISOL VLV MO 16 to CLOSE on panel 9-3.

BOP Recognizes and reports loss of power to MO-16 and failure of MO-15 to close.

Sends building operator to check power supply to MO-16:

HPCI-MO-16 Breaker EE-STR-125HPCI (MO16) on 125 VDC STARTER RACK B (EOP-5A steps SC-4&5) Determines a primary system is discharging into secondary containment and areas cannot be maintained below the Max Safe Temperature value, 195°F.

CRS Page 29 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 30 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-1A and directs ATC to insert a manual scram IAW EOP-1A step RC-2.

CRS Performs 2.1.5 Attachment 1 Mitigating Task Scram Actions:

1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons.

1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

Perform Attachment 2 Reactor Power Control of 2.1.5 as follows:

1 REACTOR POWER CONTROL 1.1 Ensure REACTOR MODE switch is in SHUTDOWN.

1.2 Verify all SDV vent and drain valves are closed.

Recognizes and reports failure of SDV vent and drain valves to close. Places ISOL TEST VLVL 29 control switch on Panel 9-5 to ATC ISOL and verifies SDV vent and drain valves close.

1.3 Ensure operating RR pumps have run back to 22% speed 1.4 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

Reports manual scram successful, all rods in.

1.5 Observe nuclear instrumentation and perform following:

1.5.1 Insert SRM detectors.

1.5.2 Insert IRM detectors.

1.5.3 Change APRM recorders to IRMs.

1.5.4 Range IRMs on scale.

1.5.5 Check reactor power is lowering.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 31 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Verifies actions for Turbine Trip IAW 2.1.5 Att. 5:

1.3 WHEN main turbine trips, THEN observe following valves close:

1.3.1 Both stop valves.

1.3.2 All governor valves.

1.3.3 All reheat stop valves.

BOP 1.3.4 All interceptor valves.

1.4 Verify station service is transferred to Startup Transformer.

1.5 Ensure PCB-3310 open (Panel C).

1.6 Ensure PCB-3312 open (Panel C).

1.7 Ensure GEN EXCITER FIELD BKR is open (Panel C).

Directs ATC to control RPV level +3 to +54 IAW EOP-1A step RC/L-3.

CRS When RPV pressure lowers below 835 psig, recognize and report MSIVs CREW close (due to Reactor Mode Switch failure).

May direct building operator to enter steam tunnel to manually close HPCI-CRS MO-16.

NOTE to Examiners: Assuming the crew does not lower RPV pressure and scrams when the first area reaches 195°F, SW Quad temperature will reach 195°F approximately 3.5 minutes after the leak begins and NW Quad temperature will reach 195°F approximately 12.5 minutes after the leak begins. If the crew does not depressurize, SE Quad, the third area, will exceed 195°F approximately 18.5 minutes after the steam leak begins.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 32 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Auto Trigger 29 sends a trip signal to all three CBPs when Rx Pressure falls below 600 psig. This is to prevent cold water injection that would reduce the driving head of the HPCI steam leak. (Only CBP C is initially in service in Booth this IC.)

Operator Role Play: If sent to investigate trip of CBP C, wait 10 minutes, then report you can NOT see anything that would have caused it to trip.

Reports when SW Quad temperature rises to 195°F (Max Safe).

BOP Reports when NW Quad temperature rises to 195°F (Max Safe).

(EOP-5A steps SC-6 & 7):

Recognizes emergency depressurization is required when two areas exceed Max Safe Operating Temperature with a primary system (RCIC) discharging into secondary containment.

CRS Page 32 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 33 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-2A Emergency Depressurization:

CRS Requests mark PC water level >6ft for EOP-2A step RC/P-12.

Directs WCO/BOP to open 6 SRVs.

Directs RO to control level 0 inches to -110 inches CFZ.

CRITICAL TASK #2: When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating values are exceeded in two areas for the same parameter and prior to exceeding maximum safe operating value in a third area for that parameter. (For this scenario, HPCI-TE-105B Torus 888 WSW and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 SE would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

Reports PC water level.

Opens 6 SRVs at panel 9-4 by placing control switches to OPEN.

BOP Monitors reactor pressure and when RPV pressure reaches 50 psig, reports emergency depressurization is complete.

Monitors Condensate injection for level control.

ATC Reports all three Condensate Booster Pumps tripped Reports status when level band is exited and restored.

Page 33 of 36 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 34 of 36 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when reactor pressure has lowered to <50 psig and level is being controlled +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and Operator tell the crew to stop operating.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 35 of 36 From Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations 9.6.3 EXAMPLE OF NON-EMERGENCY CONTROL ROD MOVEMENT STANDARD PROTOCOL 9.6.3.1 Control Rod 06-43 is to be withdrawn from Position 00 to Position 12 by notch rod withdrawal.

a. RO shall acknowledge intended target rod position prior to rod movement by circling Position 12 in the "TO" column on the Rod Movement Sheet.

b. RO points to the rod select Button 06-43 and says, "Selecting Control Rod 06-43".

c. Concurrent Verifier verifies the rod to be selected against the controlling document and says, "That's correct".

d. RO selects Control Rod 06-43, verifies it is the only rod selected, positions his hands on the Rod Movement Control Switch (such that the Concurrent Verifier is able to verify his intentions) and says:

"Control Rod 06-43 is the only rod selected, withdrawing Rod 06-43 from Position 00 to 12 using notch withdrawal".

e. Concurrent Verifier verifies the correct rod is selected, the intended movement is in accordance with the controlling document, correct controls are in use, and RO's hand position corresponds to the intended rod movement, then he gives concurrence to continue with the rod movement by saying: "I concur".

f. After hearing, "I concur" from Concurrent Verifier, RO may notch out the control rod.

g. Each subsequent notch of the rod must receive concurrence from the Concurrent Verifier. Each time Control Rod 06-43 is to be positioned, the RO should say, "Notching out", and wait for concurrence from the Concurrent Verifier.

h. After reaching Position 12, the RO says: "Control Rod 06-43 is at Position 12".

i. Concurrent Verifier says: "I agree".

j. RO and Concurrent Verifier annotate completion of the step on the applicable document(s).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 2 Page 36 of 36 INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 5% power, near Beginning of Cycle.

2. Rod Sequence Information: 31-SU-BOL at step 17, rod 02-35 complete.

Next step is 18, rod 26-03 B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:

1. None C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. Plant startup in progress D. Risk:

1. PRA Risk is Green

2. Aggregate Risk is Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. ATC transfer the Reactor Mode Switch to RUN IAW procedure 2.1.1 step 4.24.7. All verifications for step 4.24 are complete through step 4.24.6.

2. ATC withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 20-25% Bypass Valve position IAW sequence 31-SU-BOL and Procedures 2.1.1, 2.1.10, and 10.13.

3. Crew continues startup per 2.1.1 Section 5. Complete through step 5.42.

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Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 1 of 47 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: CN-2020-04 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Raise reactor power using Reactor Recirculation flow

2. Respond to a control rod drifting out

3. Respond to Service Water Pump C trip

4. Respond to Circulating Water pump inlet screen clogging and partial loss of CW pumps, resulting in degraded condenser vacuum

5. Respond to complete loss of Circulating Water pumps, loss of condenser vacuum

6. Respond to hydraulic block ATWS

7. Respond to failure of Reactor Recirc Pump B to trip on ATWS/RPT

8. Respond to SLC B relief valve failing open

9. Respond to trip of RHRSWB pump operating for Suppression Pool Cooling Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 97% power following a sequence exchange near middle of cycle.

Inoperable Equipment: Core Spray Pump A is tagged out of service for motor PMs.

Turnover:

Plant operating at 97% power following a sequence exchange near middle of cycle.

Core Spray Pump A is tagged out of service for motor PMs.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Raise power to 100% IAW Procedure 2.1.10. There are NO preconditioning holds.

Continue maintenance on CS Pump A.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 60 minutes

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 2 of 47 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description Raise reactor power using Reactor Recirculation 1 N/A R (ATC,CRS) flow Control rod 18-19 drifts out CT#1 C When an inadvertent reactivity addition occurs (ATC,BOP,CRS) (in this case, rod drift out) that would cause 2 rd101819 power to rise above 100% rated thermal power, A (CREW) crew lowers power to restore and maintain TS (CRS) power 100% rated thermal power by inserting the control rod and/or lowering Reactor Recirc flow before PMIS point NSSRP641 (30 minute power average) exceeds 2419 MWt.

C (BOP,CRS) 3 sw01c Service Water Pump C trip TS (CRS) mc06a mc05a C (ATC,CRS) Circulating Water pump inlet screen clogging and 4 partial loss of CW pumps, resulting in degraded mc03a,b,c,d A (CREW) condenser vacuum Complete loss of Circulating Water pumps, loss of mc05b,c,d condenser vacuum, hydraulic block ATWS mc01 CT#2 When control rods fail to scram and energy is rd02a discharging to the primary containment (e.g.

5 M (CREW) rd02b SRVs, LOCA), crew injects SLC or inserts all control rods to at least position 02 before (override) exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

zdiarsw150mv Failure of Reactor Recirc Pump B to trip on 6 rr24b C (ATC,CRS) ATWS/RPT 7 sl03b C (ATC,CRS) SLC B relief valve fails open 8 sw04a(b, c, or d) C (BOP,CRS) First RHRSWB pump started for Suppression Pool Cooling trips (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 3 of 47 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-301-4 Actual Attribute Description Target

1. Failure of Reactor Recirc Pump B to trip on ATWS/RPT Malfunctions after 2. SLC B relief valve fails open 1-2 3 EOP entry 3. First RHRSWB pump started for Suppression Pool Cooling trips

1. Control rod 18-19 drifts out

2. Circulating Water pump inlet screen clogging and partial Abnormal Events 2-4 2 loss of CW pumps, resulting in degraded condenser vacuum

1. Complete loss of Circulating Water pumps, loss of Major Transients 1-2 1 condenser vacuum, hydraulic block ATWS EOP entries 1. EOP-3A requiring 1-2 2 2. EOP-6A substantive action EOP contingencies requiring 1 per set 1 1. EOP-7A Contingency #5 - Level/Power Control substantive action

1. (CT#1) When an inadvertent reactivity addition occurs (in this case, rod drift out) that would cause power to rise above 100% rated thermal power, crew lowers power to restore and maintain power 100% rated thermal power by inserting the control rod and/or lowering Reactor Recirc flow before PMIS point NSSRP641 (30 minute Pre-identified power average) exceeds 2419 MWt.

2 2 Critical Tasks

2. (CT#2) When control rods fail to scram and energy is discharging to the primary containment (e.g. SRVs, LOCA), crew injects SLC or inserts all control rods to at least position 02 before exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

Normal Events N/A 1 1. none Reactivity 1. Raise reactor power using Reactor Recirculation flow N/A 1 Manipulations

1. Control rod 18-19 drifts out

2. Service Water Pump C trip

3. Circulating Water pump inlet screen clogging and partial loss of CW pumps, resulting in degraded Instrument/ condenser vacuum Component N/A 6 4. Failure of Reactor Recirc Pump B to trip on Failures ATWS/RPT

5. SLC B relief valve fails open

6. First RHRSWB pump started for Suppression Pool Cooling trips

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 4 of 47

1. Control rod 18-19 drifts out

2. Service Water Pump C trip

3. Circulating Water pump inlet screen clogging and partial loss of CW pumps, resulting in degraded condenser vacuum Total Malfunctions N/A 6

4. Failure of Reactor Recirc Pump B to trip on ATWS/RPT

5. SLC B relief valve fails open

6. First RHRSWB pump started for Suppression Pool Cooling trips Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

RPS, RHR, RHRSW

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 5 of 47 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 97% power during power ascension.

After the crew takes the watch, the crew raises power to 100% using Reactor Recirculation flow control.

After the crew has raised power, control rod 18-19 drifts out. The crew responds IAW Procedure 2.4CRD and inserts rod 18-19, but the rod does not latch. The crew scrams rod 18-19 IAW Procedure 2.4CRD and it then latches.

The crew must insert rod 18-19 and/or lower Reactor Recirc flow to prevent the 30-minute power average from exceeding the License Condition limit (CT#1).

The CRS enters TS 3.1.3 Condition C for rod 18-19.

After the TS for rod 18-19 has been addressed, Service Water Pump C will trip.

The BOP will start SW Pump B IAW the alarm card. The CRS will enter TS 3.7.2 Condition A for SW Pump C.

After the TS for SW Pump C has been addressed, Circulating Water travelling screens will begin to block due to river debris. After a delay, CW Pump A will trip, followed later by CW Pump B. Condenser vacuum will lower. The crew will respond IAW Procedure 2.4VAC and lower power to stabilize condenser vacuum.

After power has been lowered and vacuum stabilized, CW Pumps C and D will trip due to travelling screen failure. The crew will insert a manual scram IAW Procedure 2.4VAC when vacuum cannot be maintained above 23 Hg.

When the reactor is scrammed, control rods will fail to insert due to blockages in both scram discharge volumes. Reactor power will be approximately 30%.

EOP-6A and 7A are entered via EOP-1A. Reactor Recirc Pump B to trip on ATWS/RPT requiring the operator to manually tip the Recirc Pump. The crew injects SLC and installs the necessary PTMs to bypass interlocks and insert control rods individually via RMCS. MSIVs will close on low condenser vacuum. With MSIVs closed and SRV operating to control reactor pressure, either SLC must be initiated or all controls rods inserted to at least position 02 before Suppression Pool temperature exceeds the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve (CT#2). SLC B relief valve will fail open when SLC Pump B is started.

Stop and Prevent is required because reactor power is above 3%. RPV level is intentionally lowered below -60 inches wide range in order to lower core inlet subcooling and lower reactor power. ADS is inhibited when EOP-7A is entered

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 6 of 47 to avert uncontrolled depressurization due to lowering level. HPCI and RCIC are available for RPV level control.

Suppression Pool Cooling will be required due to SRV operation. The RHRSWB pump associated with the first loop of SPC attempted to be placed into service will trip, requiring the operator to start the other SWB pump in that RHR loop or transition to the other RHR loop for SPC.

Once several control rods have been inserted, the ATC begins alternately resetting RPS, driving rods individually while allowing the SDV to drain, and reinserting manual scrams. When all control rods have been inserted to at least position 02, the CRS transitions from ATWS to non-ATWS flowcharts, SLC pumps are stopped and RPV level restoration is directed.

The exercise ends when control rods are inserted or Hot Shutdown Boron weight has been injected, and the CRS has reset the level band to +3 to +54.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 7 of 47 CRITICAL TASK BASIS When an inadvertent reactivity addition occurs (in this case, rod drift out) that would cause power to rise above 100% rated thermal power, crew lowers power to restore and maintain power 100%

Critical Task #1 rated thermal power by inserting the control rod and/or lowering Reactor Recirc flow before PMIS point NSSRP641 (30 minute power average) exceeds 2419 MWt.

License Condition C.1 states 2419 MWt is the Maximum Power Level authorized. The licensed 100% power limit is a basis for assumptions in the plants safety analysis. Sustained operation above 2419 MWt may Safety Significance place unit operation outside of the plant design basis. NUREG 1021 App. D, section D states a CT must be essential to safety, and lists actions to for which operation or correct performance prevents violation of a facility license condition as one example of a CT.

Cues Annunciators 9-5-1/C-4, Rod Drift, Red drift LED lit for rod 18-19 on full core display on panel 9-5, When selected, control rod 18-19 position rising on panel 9-5, Reactor power rising indicated on IRM/APRM recorders NM-NR-46A-D, SPDS, PMIS.

Operator selects rod 18-19 and places Emergency Notch Override switch to EMER ROD IN on panel 9-5, and/or Operator Selects S on Measurable RR flow controllers RRFC-SIC-16A(B) on panel 9-4 and lowers RR Performance pump flow (by turning speed demand counter-clockwise on one speed Indicators controller at a time) until power stabilizes below 100% on IRM/APRM recorders NM-NR-46A-D.

Reactor power stabilizes below 100% on IRM/APRM recorders NM-NR-Performance 46A-D and on PMIS points NSSRP640, NSSRP641, NSSRP642, Feedback NSSRP643, and NSSRP645.

Applicability Any time a rod drift out would cause reactor power to exceed 100% with no operator intervention.

License Condition C.1 lists 2419 MWt as the Maximum Power Level for CNS. Procedure 2.1.10, Station Power Changes, sections 10 and 11 describes the methodology for adherence to this limit. A note at step 11.1 states Minor power fluctuations due to automatic control system response, random processes such as bi-stable flow, and flow meter measurement uncertainties are inherent to BWR operating characteristics. Small, short-term fluctuations in power that are not Justification for the under the direct control of a Licensed Reactor Operator are not chosen performance considered intentional. Step 11.1 states It is prohibited to intentionally limit operate greater than the applicable licensed power limit as determined in Section 10. If core thermal power 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months average calculation exceeds applicable licensed power limit, action shall be taken to ensure subsequent hourly average remains less than or equal to applicable limit. Step 11.4 directs monitoring and maintaining PMIS Point NSSRP643 (running 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months average) and PMIS Point NSSRP645 (running 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months average) below 2419 MWt. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months point is the legal

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 8 of 47 record for plant power level. PMIS point NSSRP641 (30 minute average) was chosen because it is more limiting and provides timely update to maintain adequate margin to the core thermal power limit.

BWR Owners Group N/A Appendix Scenario Guide Initial power level must be near 100% and the rod drift out must cause Requirements reactor power to rise above 100% with no operator intervention.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 9 of 47 Category EOPS When control rods fail to scram and energy is discharging to the primary containment (e.g. SRVs, LOCA), crew injects SLC or inserts all control rods to at least position 02 before Critical Task #2 exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

Failure to effect shutdown of the reactor when a RPS setting has been exceeded would unnecessarily extend the level of degradation of the safety of the plant. This could further degrade into damage to the principle fission product barriers if left unmitigated. Action to shut down the reactor is required when RPS and control rod drive systems fail.

The Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) is the greater of:

The highest suppression pool temperature at which initiation of boron injection will permit injection of the Hot Shutdown Boron Weight of boron before suppression pool temperature exceeds the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.

The suppression pool temperature at which a reactor scram is required by plant Technical Specifications.

Safety Significance The BIIT is a function of reactor power. If boron injection is initiated before suppression pool temperature reaches the BIIT, emergency RPV depressurization may be precluded at lower reactor power levels. At higher reactor power levels, however, the suppression pool heatup rate may become so high that the Hot Shutdown Boron Weight of boron cannot be injected before suppression pool temperature reaches the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit even if boron injection is initiated early in the event. Since failure-to-scram conditions may present severe plant safety consequences, the requirement to initiate boron injection is independent of any anticipated success of control rod insertion. When attempts to insert control rods satisfactorily achieve reactor shutdown, the requirement for boron injection no longer exists. (Control rod insertion is directed under Step RC/Q-7 concurrently with Step RC/Q-6.)

Cues Manual scram is initiated and numerous control rods indicate beyond position 00 and reactor power not downscale on panel 9-5 indications.

Suppression Pool temperature rising on PMIS and panel indications.

Operator manipulates keylocked switch for SLC A pump to START on panel 9-5. (SLC Pump B relief valve fails open in this scenario.)

Measurable Performance Indicators Operator selects individual control rods by depressing the respective pushbutton on the panel 9-5 matrix and inserts the rod by manipulating the emergency in switch on panel 9-5.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 10 of 47 SLC A pump red light illuminated, SLC discharge pressure rising, SLC tank level lowering by 26% on panel 9-5 (from ~80% to below

~54% for this scenario).

Performance Feedback Operator selecting and inserting control rods indicated by rod position decreasing to 00 for selected rod on panel 9-5.

Applicability ATWS with power >3% following trip of both recirc pumps per EOP-7A, energy being discharged to Primary Containment causing Torus water temperature to rise.

If boron injection is initiated or all control rods are inserted to position 02 before suppression pool temperature reaches the BIIT, emergency RPV depressurization may be precluded at lower reactor power levels. At higher reactor power levels, however, the suppression pool heatup rate may become so high that the Hot Shutdown Boron Weight of boron cannot be injected before suppression pool temperature reaches the Heat Capacity Justification for the Temperature Limit even if boron injection is initiated early in the chosen performance event. Since failure-to-scram conditions may present severe plant limit safety consequences, the requirement to initiate boron injection is independent of any anticipated success of control rod insertion.

If the failure to scram EOP were to be exited, other procedures would not provide the guidance for control rod insertion necessary to achieve reactor shutdown. Before exiting EOP-6A ensures guidance to effect reactor shutdown is not removed.

BWR Owners Group App. B, step RC/Q-6 Appendix Initial conditions, combined with the ATWS severity, should result in power >3% following trip of both recirc pumps per EOP-7A.

Scenario Guide Suppression Pool temperature must be rising due to unstoppable Requirements condition such as loss of the main condenser or LOCA. The scenario should be validated to exceed BIIT; therefore, ability to achieve control rod insertion may need to be hampered or delayed.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 11 of 47 Related Operating Experience INPO ICES 150203 Single Control Rod Drift Out During Reactor Startup Single Control Rod Drift Out During Reactor Startup On December 19, 1994, while withdrawing control rods for unit startup, Control Rod 50-35 drifted from position 06 to 48 (full out). This Control Rod was selected and being withdrawn from position 04 to 06 when the event occurred. Operations personnel recognizing the rod drift condition attempted to stop the control rod by applying an insert signal.

INPO ICES 205668 Control Rod Drift Due to Transponder Card Failure (OE16861)

(Nine Mile Point 1) Control Rod Drift Due to Transponder Card Failure During power ascension from Forced Outage, indications were received that a control rod had drifted.

At the time of the annunciation no control rods were being withdrawn. A failed transponder card was determined to be the cause of event. Previous recurring transponder card failures generally caused a lockup of the Reactor Manual Control System. This particular transponder card failure resulted in a control rod drift.

INPO ICES 230540 Service Water Pump Trip (OE26446)

(Indian Point 2) On 1/27/2008, Service Water Pump tripped on long delay overload due to failure of the 'B' phase termination at 21SWP Motor. 21 Service Water Pump was on the essential SW header at the time thus IP2 entered a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO. Service Water Pump (SWP) tripped on long delay overload due to failure of the 'B' phase termination at 21SWP Motor.

INPO ICES 443918 Service Water Pump Trip (Indian Point 2) On 9/3/2018, Service Water Pump (SWP) breaker tripped open while running, which caused Operations personnel to place the pump in trip-pullout. The 22 SWP was declared inoperable, which resulted in a Maintenance Rule Functional Failure as well as a Mitigating System Performance Index (MSPI) failure of the 22 SWP. The cause for this event was a turn to turn short of the motor. Based on the damage to the motor winding, no definitive apparent cause could be found.

(CNS) CR 2012-02665 Traveling screen trips Received D-1/D-2 traveling screen HI and HI-HI D/P alarms. Started CWP B and D. All traveling screens are in HAND and FAST, current screen coverage is 50%-75%

consisting of grass and leaves due to recent heavy rains in the area.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 12 of 47 INPO ICES 306387 Trip of Circulating Water Traveling Screen Causes Power Reduction of <10%

(CNS) On dayshift ~ 1701 received A1 Traveling water screen High differential pressure (DP), ~3 minutes later HI-HI DP and A1 Screen Trip alarms were received.

Reactor power was reduced, and Circulating Water Pump was secured. Consequences, downpower of ~9.5% and Reactivity Management Event Level 4. Cause was due to high debris in the river due to weather conditions and a restricted flowpath to 'A' Circulating Water Pump.

SEN 134 Failure of control rods to fully insert (Wolf Creek) After a manual reactor scram on January 30, 1996, five control rods failed to fully insert. One control rod indicated 18 steps out, two control rods indicated 12 steps out, and two control rods indicated six steps out.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 13 of 47 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required - none B. Initialize the simulator in IC-19 or password protected IC 318 with is at 97%

power, 100% or 97% (MOC)

1. Ensure these schedule files are in the schedule file directory:

Schedule File Names - 2020-4sc3.sch sc3event2.sch

2. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2020-4sc3.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

3. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the schedule file is active (Running).

4. Take the simulator out of freeze.

5. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section C below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a value in the @Time column will not load into the director until the event trigger goes active.)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 14 of 47 C. File loaded verification:

(Continued on next page.)

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 15 of 47 Page 15 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 16 of 47 Page 16 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 17 of 47 D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank.

2. Ensure reactor power is 97%.

3. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.

4. Ensure Service Water Pump C is running.

5. Ensure Service Water Pump C Mode is selected to AUTO.

6. Place CS Pump A in PTL.

7. Hang a caution tag on CS Pump A control switch.

8. Ensure CS A is OOS on safety system status panel on panel 9-5.

9. Place Protected Equipment placard on Panel 9-3 within Core Spray B area.

10. Ensure SSST Y voltage to RRMGs is set to TAP 2.

11. SSST X Voltage card should read TAP POS 3, MAX 4469 and MIN 4361.

12. Ensure MOL Rod Sequence Notebook is under the RO desk.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 18 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Raise reactor power to 100% using Reactor Recirculation flow Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Directs ATC to Raise reactor power using RR flow per Procedure 2.1.10 Booth Role Play: As Rx Building NLO, when requested to monitor RRMG lube oil temps and maintain 110-130°F, respond you will monitor RRMG lube Operator oil temps and maintain them in band.

Raises power using Recirculation flow IAW 2.1.10:

Selects S on RR flow controllers on panel 9-4.

6.4 Raise power by raising RR pump flow as follows:

6.4.1 IF thermal power 2413 (or 2375 if power limited to 2381 MWt),

THEN raise power by raising RR pump flow (by turning speed demand clockwise on one speed controller at a time and allowing conditions to stabilize before adjusting other controller).

6.4.1.1 Maintain rate of power change consistent with system capabilities as determined by Load Dispatcher and TG limits.

6.4.2 IF thermal power > 2413 (or > 2375 if power limited to 2381 MWt),

THEN perform following:

NOTE 1 - A change in scoop tube position indicates if change in RR pump flow will occur. RRMG A scoop tube position can be monitored ATC by PMIS Point N408 and P display on RRFC-SIC-16A, SPEED CONTROL. RRMG B scoop tube position can be monitored by PMIS Point N413 and P display on RRFC-SIC-16B, SPEED CONTROL.

NOTE 2 - Section 11 contains guidance for Operations Near Rated Thermal Power.

6.4.2.1 Raise RR pump flow with a speed demand signal rise of 0.2.

6.4.2.2 Closely monitors scoop tube position/RR pump flow response.

6.4.2.3 IF operating near rated thermal power, THEN verify compliance with both flow and thermal power per Section 11.

6.4.2.4 Repeat 6.4.2.1 through 6.4.2.3 until desired thermal power (target

~100% on PMIS display) achieved.

Closely monitors reactor power on APRMs and Main Turbine output on DEH HMI.

BOP Provides peer check of ATC actions.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 19 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Raise reactor power to 100% using Reactor Recirculation flow Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event as directed by Lead Examiner.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 20 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Control rod 18-19 drift out Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 2, to cause Control Rod 18-19 to drift out.

Trigger 2 calls schedule file sc3event2.sch, which inserts malfunction rd10189 Booth and uses multiple overrides to mask selecting and applying a drive signal to Operator 18-19, which is required initiate the rod drift. It also will delete the malfunction when the crew places the scram test switch for 18-19 to TEST.

Role Play: IF sent to CRD HCU 18-19 to investigate, as the building operator wait 5 minutes, then report you do not detect anything unusual at the HCU.

Recognizes and reports alarm:

9-5-1/C-4 Rod Drift Performs alarm card 9-5-1/C-4 actions:

2.1 Check full core display for rod drift light(s) to determine which rod(s) is ATC drifting.

2.2 IF more than one rod is drifting, THEN SCRAM and concurrently enter Procedure 2.1.5.

2.3 Take action per Procedure 2.4CRD as dictated by plant conditions.

Lowers reactor power by performing 2.4CRD actions or per 2.1.10 to restore and maintain 100% rated thermal power Enters 2.4CRD.

CRS Directs ATC to perform 2.4CRD Attachment 1 for single rod drifting out.

Critical Task #1: When an inadvertent reactivity addition occurs (in this case, rod drift out) that would cause power to rise above 100% rated thermal power, crew lowers power to restore and maintain power 100% rated thermal power by inserting the control rod and/or lowering Reactor Recirc flow before PMIS point NSSRP641 (30 minute power average) exceeds 2419 MWt.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 21 of 47 Performs 2.4CRD Attachment 1:

Ensures rod 18-19 is selected Inserts rod using ROD MOVEMENT CONTROL or EMERGENCY IN control switch on panel 9-5 Releases control switch to assess whether the rod will latch Determines the rod did not latch, applies and maintains continuous insert signal Establishes communication with BOP at panel 9-16 (scram test panel)

When rod full in, release continuous insert signal Notify BOP rod did not latch and to scram 18-19 Notifies BOP to return 18-19 scram test switch to normal.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 22 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Control rod 18-19 drift out Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior BOP Assists ATC perform 2.4CRD Attachment 1:

Places scram test switch for rod 18-19 to TEST when directed.

Returns scram test switch for rod 18-19 to NORM when directed.

Notifies BOP and CRS rod 18-19 latched following scram Performs alarm card 9-5-1/C-4 action:

ATC 2.4 IF cause of rod drift alarm known, THEN place Rod Drift Alarm Test to Reset.

IAW 2.4CRD Attachment 1, notifies Reactor Engineering and System Engineering rod 18-19 drifted out, would not latch, and has been scrammed CRS in.

Determines entry into TS 3.1.3 Condition C is required.

TS 3.1.3 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. One or more control C.1 Fully insert the inoperable control 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rods inoperable for rod.

reasons other than Condition A or B. AND C.2 Disarm the associated CRD. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 23 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Service Water Pump C trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 3, SW01C Service Water Pump C trip.

Booth Role Play: If sent to investigate SW Pump C breaker trip, wait 3 minutes, then as building operator report the 51B overcurrent relay is tripped for SW Operator Pump C.

If sent to SW Pump C itself, wait 4 minutes, then report the motor is hotter to the touch than normal, but you see no abnormality visually.

Recognizes and responds to alarms:

A-4/B-7, Service Water Pump C Trip A-4/C-7, Service Water Pump C Ovld/Ground Performs alarm card B-3/B-7 actions:

1.2 Maintain SW header pressure > 38 psig on SW-PI-2715A as follows:

1.2.1 Place available non-running SW pump MODE SELECTOR switch(es) in MAN, as necessary.

BOP 1.2.2 Start available SW pump(s), as necessary.

1.3 Ensure MODE SELECTOR switches aligned per Procedure 2.2.71.

1.4 IF cause of trip is unknown, THEN perform following:

1.4.1 (Sends operator to) Record 4160V Switchgear F relay flags 1.4.2 (Sends operator to) Inspect pump for damage.

1.4.3 Place PUMP C SELECTOR switch to MANUAL.

1.5 IF SW-PI-2715A 38 psig, THEN enter Procedure 5.2SW.

Directs starting SW Pump B.

CRS Determines no further action required due to header pressure restored by SW Pump B start.

Enters TS 3.7.2 Condition A due to SW Pump C inoperable.

CRS Determines DG1 remains OPERABLE since SW Pump A is already selected to STDBY.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 24 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

Service Water Pump C trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior TS 3.7.2 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One SW subsystem A.1 NOTES inoperable.

1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, for DG made inoperable by SW.

Restore the SW subsystem to OPERABLE status. 30 days END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 25 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Circulating Water pump inlet screen clogging and partial loss of CW pumps, degraded condenser vacuum Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 4, MC06A - Traveling screen A blockage MC05A - Circ Water Pump A trip MC03A,B,C,D - Condenser tube sheet plugging Booth Note: CW Pump A trips 3 minutes after trigger 4 is active. Condenser tube sheets begin to plug 2 minutes after trigger 4 is active. Condenser vacuum Operator degrades to ~23Hg over 10 minutes from activation of trigger 4, if the crew has not lowered power.

Role Play: If sent to investigate, wait 4 minutes, then report there is a large amount of debris on traveling screen A, and the screen appears to have been breached and is still running. The other screens are still running and ~30%

covered.

Responds to annunciator:

Alarm Card A-3/A-6, Traveling Screens High dp BOP Per alarm card A-3/A-6:

2.1 (Sends operator to) Check screen wash pump and traveling screen operation.

Responds to annunciator:

A-4/E-3, Circ Wtr Pmps Disch Tunnel High Pressure BOP Per alarm card A-4/E-3:

2.1 Sends operator to check P indicators for possible fouling of tubes.

Responds to annunciator:

A-4/A-1, Circ Water Pump A Trip A-4/A-2, Circ Water Pump A OVLD Ground BOP Per alarm card A-4/A-1:

2.1 IF condenser vacuum lowering, THEN concurrently enter Procedure 2.4VAC.

Recognizes and reports condenser vacuum lowering, procedure 2.4VAC entry condition.

Enters 2.4VAC:

CRS 3.1.1 Directs ATCO to reduce power per Procedure 2.1.10 to maintain vacuum 23" Hg.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 26 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Circulating Water pump inlet screen clogging and partial loss of CW pumps, degraded condenser vacuum Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Lowers power, as necessary, using Recirc flow IAW 2.1.10:

Selects S on RR flow controllers on panel 9-4 7.4.1 Lower power by lowering RR pump flow (by turning speed demand ATC counter-clockwise on one speed controller at a time and allowing conditions to stabilize before adjusting other controller).

Closely monitors scoop tube position/RR pump flow response on panel 9-4 and APRM recorders on panel 9-5.

BOP Reports vacuum stabilized above 23Hg.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to next event when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Booth Operator If 2.1.5 is entered by the crew the Lead Examiner may determine to proceed to the next event.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 27 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Event

Description:

Trip of Circulating Water Pumps B, C, and D, loss of condenser vacuum, ATWS, Failure of RR Pump B to trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 5(Unless RX Scram has been inserted)

MC05B - Circ Water Pump B trip MC05C - Circ Water Pump C trip MC05D - Circ Water Pump D trip Booth MC01 - Condenser inleakage Operator Note:. Condenser tube sheets begin plugging and are completely plugged 4 minutes after trigger 5 is active. CW Pump B trips 2 minutes after trigger 5 is active. CW Pumps C & D trip ~4 minutes after trigger 5 is active. MSIVs close

~5 minutes after trigger 5 is active.

Recognizes and reports condenser vacuum lowering.

BOP Reports annunciator:

Alarm Card B-1/B-3, TG Low Vacuum Pre-Trip NOTE to Examiners: At this point in the scenario guide, reactor scram, crew actions are segregated by crew position.

CRS actions begin here.

ATC actions begin on page 33.

BOP actions begin on page 40.

CRS Directs ATC to insert scram based on vacuum trend.

Enter EOP 1A and transition to EOP 6A (Power/Pressure control) and EOP 7A (RPV Level control).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 28 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Event

Description:

Trip of Circulating Water Pumps B, C, and D, loss of condenser vacuum, ATWS, Failure of RR Pump B to trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to:

Verify operation of LLS Open SRVs until pressure drops to 940 psig Stabilize pressure <1050 psig using Table 12 systems as necessary EOP 6A Pressure CRS Page 28 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 29 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Event

Description:

Trip of Circulating Water Pumps B, C, and D, loss of condenser vacuum, ATWS, Failure of RR Pump B to trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs ATC to:

Trip RR Pumps IAW EOP-6A step FS/Q-9 (RR Pump B fails to automatically trip on high reactor pressure)

Reset ARI and insert rods IAW EOP-6A step FS/Q-17 CRS Page 29 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 30 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Event

Description:

Trip of Circulating Water Pumps B, C, and D, loss of condenser vacuum, ATWS, Failure of RR Pump B to trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs ATC to inject SLC before BIIT curve is exceeded IAW EOP-6A:

CRS Page 30 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 31 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Event

Description:

Trip of Circulating Water Pumps B, C, and D, loss of condenser vacuum, ATWS, Failure of RR Pump B to trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Directs BOP to inhibit ADS IAW EOP-7A:

EOP 7A RPV Level CRS Directs BOP to stop and prevent injection to lower RPV level below -60 inches.

Need to ensure that this is correct path during validaiton.

EOP 7A RPV Level CRS CRS Direct BOP to Stop and Prevent.

Enter EOP-3A due to Suppression Pool temperature 95°F.

Direct BOP to place suppression pool cooling into service.

CRS Direct BOP to maintain RPV level between -60 inches and -183 inches using EOP 5.8.13 systems.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 32 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5,6,7 Event

Description:

Trip of Circulating Water Pumps B, C, and D, loss of condenser vacuum, ATWS, Failure of RR Pump B to trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When HSD boron weight has been injected, directs EOP-7A step FS/L-24 CRS OR When all rods have been inserted to at least position 02, exits EOP-6A and EOP-7A and re-enters EOP-1A, directs EOP-1A step RC/L-3 Directs BOP to slowly raise RPV level to new band of +3 to +54.

Notes NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when HSD boron weight has been injected, or all control rods have been inserted, and level is being raised in a controlled manner to restore it to +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 33 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,8 Event

Description:

ATWS, SLC Pump B RV fails open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Inserts manual scram:

Performs 2.1.5 Attachment 1 Mitigating Task Scram Actions:

1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons.

1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

1.3 IF reactor power > 3%, THEN perform following:

1.3.1 Place REACTOR MODE switch to SHUTDOWN.

1.3.2 Initiate ARI.

ATC Perform Attachment 2 Reactor Power Control of 2.1.5 as follows:

1 REACTOR POWER CONTROL 1.1 Ensure REACTOR MODE switch is in SHUTDOWN.

1.2 Verify all SDV vent and drain valves are closed.

1.3 Ensure operating RR pumps have run back to 22% speed 1.4 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

Recognize and report ATWS Conditions.

Reports reactor power level to CRS.

ATC When directed by CRS to trip RR Pumps, recognizes RR Pump B failed to trip on high reactor pressure and trips pump by opening breaker 1DS on panel 9-4.

CRITICAL TASK #2: When control rods fail to scram and energy is discharging to the primary containment (e.g. SRVs, LOCA), crew injects SLC or inserts all control rods to at least position 02 before exceeding the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature (BIIT) curve.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 34 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,8 Event

Description:

ATWS, SLC Pump B RV fails open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by the CRS inject SLC.

Place both keys in SLC PUMP A and SLC PUMP B keylock switches on Panel 9-5 and place switches to START.

Check both SLC pumps start.

Check white SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3A (1106A) and SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3B (1106B) lights turn off (Panel 9-5).

Check pressure on SLC-PI-65, PUMP PRESSURE (Panel 9-5), is greater than reactor pressure.

Recognizes and reports SLC discharge pressure (~1100 psig) lower than normal for two pumps running (~1300 psig).

ATC Check Annunciator 9-5-2/G-7, LOSS OF CONT TO SQUIB VLVS, alarms.

Ensure RWCU-MO-15, INBD ISOL VLV (Panel 9-4), is closed.

Ensure RWCU-MO-18, OUTBD ISOL VLV (Panel 9-4), is closed.

Ensure both RWCU pumps are off (Panel 9-4).

Ensure RWCU-MO-74, DEMIN SUCTION BYPASS VLV (Panel 9-4), is throttled open.

Provides CRS initial SLC tank level indicated on SLC-LI-66 TANK LEVEL on panel 9-5 (~80%).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 35 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,8 Event

Description:

ATWS, SLC Pump B RV fails open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Aligns CRD to insert control rods IAW 5.8.3.

ATC Page 35 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 36 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,8 Event

Description:

ATWS, SLC Pump B RV fails open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Selects the rods starting in the center and works out in a spiral pattern using the 5.8.3 Attachment 2(5.8.3 Board) depicted below.

ATC Booth If requested to install EOP PTMs 61 and 62, wait 3 minutes, then insert Operator RF RD18 and report PTMs 61 and 62 have been installed.

Page 36 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 37 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,8 Event

Description:

ATWS, SLC Pump B RV fails open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Resets scram IAW 5.8.3 Att. 1:

ATC Page 37 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 38 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,8 Event

Description:

ATWS, SLC Pump B RV fails open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When SDV has drained for > 3 minutes, inserts scram IAW 5.8.3 Att. 1:

ATC Page 38 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 39 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6,8 Event

Description:

ATWS, SLC Pump B RV fails open Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Resets the scram and repeats draining SDV/scrams as rod motion is ATC verified.

Report when >26% (HSD boron weight) has been injected based on SLC ATC tank level lowering below ~54% on SLC-LI-66, TANK LEVEL on panel 9-5, if applicable.

Report when all control rods are inserted to at least position 02, if ATC applicable.

Notes NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when HSD boron weight has been injected or all control rods have been inserted, and level is being raised in a controlled manner to restore it to +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 40 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 9 Event

Description:

ATWS, RHRSW Booster Pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Inhibit ADS when directed by CRS:

BOP At Panel 9-3 place ADS A and ADS B INHIBIT switches to INHIB.

Performs Stop and Prevent IAW EOP 5.8 Att. 4 HARD CARD:

1. STOP INJECTION 1.1 Stop HPCI by performing one of following:

1.1.1 IF HPCI is not running, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.1.2 IF HPCI is running, THEN perform one of following:

1.1.2.1 Place HPCI controller to MANUAL and lower on controller to maintain > 100 psig below low-end of RPV pressure band, BOP and

a. Maintain turbine speed > 2050 rpm.

1.1.2.2 Trip HPCI turbine by performing following:

a. Ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP control switch in START.

b. Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button.

c. After turbine stops, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

d. Release TURBINE TRIP button.

1.2 Stop feedwater by performing following:

1.2.1 IF ENABLE INJECTION button is yellow, THEN on STARTUP VALVE screen, press ENABLE INJECTION button and press "YES" to confirm cancel.

1.2.2 At a RVLC/RFPT HMI, select STARTUP VALVE screen, press STOP AND PREVENT button, and confirm "YES" in pop-up box.

1.2.3 WHEN RF-MO-29 and RF-MO-30 are closed, THEN on STARTUP VALVE screen, press ENABLE INJECTION button and confirm "YES" in pop-up box.1.2.4 1.2.4 IF RF-MO-29 or RF-MO-30 are open and cannot be closed from Control Room, THEN perform following:

1.2.4.1 Trip both RFP's.

1.2.4.2 Trip all operating condensate booster pumps.

CAUTION - If Core Spray and RHR pumps are placed in PULL-TO-LOCK before system flow is reduced to minimum, draining of system may occur.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 41 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 9 Event

Description:

ATWS, RHRSW Booster Pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 1.3 Place both core spray pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.4 Stop RHR by ensuring one of following:

1.4.1 Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

1.4.2 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

1.4.3 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3.

2. PREVENT INJECTION 2.1 Prevent both RHR Subsystems by performing one of following in each loop:

2.1.1Both RHR Systems secured with pumps in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.1.2 IF RPV pressure is maintained 500 psig, THEN operate RHR aligned to suppression pool cooling and/or containment spray per Procedure 2.2.69.3; and 2.1.2.1 Bypass RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection valves closed.

2.1.3 RHR outboard injection valves automatic open signal bypassed per Procedure 5.8.20 (PTMs 97 through 100) with injection BOP valves closed.

2.2 Prevent feedwater by performing following:

2.2.1 Ensure RF-MO-29 is closed.

2.2.2 Ensure RF-MO-30 is closed.

2.2.3 Trip condensate and condensate booster pump(s), as required.

2.3 Prevent CS by performing following:

2.3.1 Ensure CS-MO-12A is closed.

2.3.2 Ensure CS Pump A control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.3.3 Ensure CS-MO-12B is closed.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 42 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 9 Event

Description:

ATWS, RHRSW Booster Pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 2.3.4 Ensure CS Pump B control switch in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4 Prevent HPCI by performing following:

2.4.1 IF HPCI is not running, THEN ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch is in PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4.2 IF HPCI is running, THEN trip HPCI turbine by performing BOP following:

2.4.2.1 Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button.

2.4.2.2 WHEN turbine is at zero rpm, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP switch to PULL-TO-LOCK.

2.4.2.3 Release TURBINE TRIP button.

Reports injection systems are stopped and prevented.

Direct NLO to install EOP PTMs 97 through 100 for RHR injection valve BOP control.

Role Play: When directed by BOP to install EOP PTMs97-100, wait 3 Booth minutes then put in the overrides for the PTMs. Report back to BOP Operator when PTMs installed.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 43 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 9 Event

Description:

ATWS, RHRSW Booster Pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When RPV level lowers to less than -60 inches, maintain RPV level between

-60 inches and -183 inches using EOP 5.8.13 systems (HPCI and/or RCIC, CRD and SLC).

BOP Monitor and report torus level and temperature as SRVs are utilized for pressure control. Announce EOP 3A entry conditions as necessary.

BOP Page 43 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 44 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 9 Event

Description:

ATWS, RHRSW Booster Pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: The RHRSWB pump associated with the first loop of SPC attempted to be placed into service will trip, requiring the operator to start the other SWB pump in that RHR loop or transition to the other RHR loop for SPC.

Use RHR and place into suppression pool cooling (after EOP PTMs97-100 are installed) per 2.2.69.3 RHR HARD CARD.

1.1 Place RHR SW System in service:

1.1.1 Start SWBP(s).

1.1.2 Adjust SW-MO-89A(B) to maintain flow between 2500 and 4000 gpm.

Recognizes and reports RHRHSWB trip and proceeds to place other RHRSWBP in the first loop or opposite RHR loop in SPC.

1.2 If required, with CRS permission, place CONTMT COOLING 2/3 CORE VALVE CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL OVERRD.

1.3 If required, place CONTMT COOLING VLV CONTROL PERMISSIVE switch to MANUAL.

1.4 Open RHR-MO-39A(B).

1.5 If reactor pressure 300 psig and injection not desired, close BOP RHR-MO-27A(B), OUTBD INJECTION VLV.

1.6 Ensure RHR PUMP running.

NOTE - RHR pump operation at minimum flow should be limited to

< 15 minutes or pump damage may result.

1.7 Throttle RHR-MO-34A(B), as required to obtain desired cooling flow.

1.9 Throttle RHR-MO-66A(B), as required to obtain desired cooling rate.

1.10 IF directed by EOP 3A, THEN OBTAIN maximum cooling.

1.11 If PCIS Group 6 lights lit on Panel 9-5, THEN ensure one of following open:

REC-MO-711.

REC-MO-714.

1.12 If additional cooling required, initiate cooling in non-running RHR Loop and start additional pumps.

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 45 of 47 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 6, 9 Event

Description:

ATWS, RHRSW Booster Pump trip Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed, raises RPV injection and raise level between +3 inches and BOP

+54 inches.

NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when HSD boron weight has been injected, or all control rods have been inserted, and level is being raised in a controlled manner to restore it to +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and Operator tell the crew to stop operating.

Page 45 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 46 of 47 INITIAL CONDITIONS A. Plant Status:

1. 97% power, steady state, Middle of Cycle following a Control Rod sequence exchange.

B. Tech. Spec. Limitations in effect:

1. Day 1 of 7 day LCO per 3.5.1 A.1 for Core Spray A INOPERABLE.

C. Significant problems/abnormalities:

1. Core Spray Pump A tagged out for motor preventive maintenance.

2. CS B is protected.

D. Risk :

1. PRA Risk is Green

2. Aggregate Risk is Green E. Evolutions/maintenance for the on-coming shift:

1. Continue raising reactor power to 100%

2. Continue maintenance on Core Spray Pump A motor.

Page 46 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 NRC CNS 2020-4 Scenario 3 Page 47 of 47 Form Password is pepetf Activities Planned or in Progress: Core Spray Pump A motor preventive maintenance window Risk Green Rev: 0 Page 1 of 1 Creation Date: Current SM Review: Shift Manager Window Start: Yesterday Window Close: Tomorrow Sign(s)

Number Installed Removed Protected Sign Placement of Initials/ Initials/

Equipment Location Sign(s)* Date Date Magnetic sign on door:

Core Spray Loop B 1 NLO R105, R-903-SE Quad CS Pump B 4160 Bkr Magnetic Sign On: EE-CB- 1 NLO 4160G(CSP1B)

MCC-Y Barrier erected and Sign 1 NLO Posted: Around MCC-Y CS-Loop B controls panel 9-3 Magnetic sign placed on 1 WCO panel 9-3: within CS B area Page 47 of 47 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 1 of 37 Facility: Cooper Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CN-2020-04 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

Objectives: To evaluate the candidates ability to operate the facility in response to the following evolutions:

1. Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN

2. Withdraw control rods IAW the rod sequence to establish 20-25% bypass valve position

3. Respond to RMCS withdraw timer malfunction

4. Respond to control rod double notch during withdrawal

5. Respond to spurious HPCI initiation

6. Respond to HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building requiring scram

7. Respond to failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close

8. Respond to Reactor Mode Switch failing in RUN position

9. Respond to failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature

10. Respond to failure HPCI isolation MOVs Initial Conditions: Plant operating at 5% power during startup, beginning of life Inoperable Equipment: none Turnover:

The plant is at 5% power at beginning of cycle.

Planned activities for this shift are:

Transfer to RUN Mode per Procedure 2.1.1.

Withdraw control rods IAW the rod sequence to establish 20-25% bypass valve position.

Continue startup IAW Procedure 2.1.1.

Scenario Notes:

This is a new scenario.

Validation Time: 60 minutes Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 2 of 37 Event Malf. No. Event Type Event No. Description 1 N/A N (ATC,CRS) Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN 2 N/A R (ATC,CRS) Raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods I (ATC,CRS) 3 rd19 RMCS withdraw timer malfunction A (CREW)

C (ATC,CRS) 4 rd235027 A (CREW) Control rod double notches on withdraw TS (CRS)

Spurious HPCI initiation with failure of HPCI trip on C (BOP,CRS) high water level hp05 5 A (CREW) CT#1 rr28b@58 When HPCI spuriously initiates at low reactor TS (CRS) power, stop and prevent HPCI injection before RFPT high water level trip.

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building 6 hp06 M (CREW) requiring scram rd01a rd01b Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain 7 C (ATC,CRS) rd01c valves to automatically close rd01d (override) C 8 Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position zdirpssws1 (ATC,BOP,CRS)

Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high 9 hp09 C (BOP,CRS) area temperature Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close CT#2 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable (Override) break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by zdihpcisws1 opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating 10 C values are exceeded in two areas for the same (Remote) (ATC,BOP,CRS) parameter and prior to exceeding maximum hp04a safe operating value in a third area for that parameter. (For this scenario, HPCI-TE-105B Torus 888 WSW and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 SE would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Critical Task (As defined in NUREG 1021 Appendix D)

Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 3 of 37 Quantitative Attributes Table ES-301-4 Actual Attribute Description Target

1. Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position

2. Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close Malfunctions after 3. Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area 1-2 4 EOP entry temperature

4. Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close

1. RMCS withdraw timer malfunction

2. Spurious HPCI initiation with failure of HPCI trip on high Abnormal Events 2-4 3 water level

3. Control rod double notches on withdraw

1. HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building requiring Major Transients 1-2 1 scram EOP entries 1. EOP-5A requiring 1-2 2 2. EOP-1A substantive action EOP contingencies requiring 1 per set 1 1. EOP-2A Contingency #2 - Emergency Depressurization substantive action

1. (CT#1) When HPCI spuriously initiates, stop and prevent HPCI injection before RFPT high water level trip.

2. (CT#2) When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when Pre-identified maximum safe operating values are exceeded in two 2 2 Critical Tasks areas for the same parameter and prior to exceeding maximum safe operating value in a third area for that parameter. (For this scenario, HPCI-TE-105B Torus 888 WSW and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 SE would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

Normal Events N/A 1 1. Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN Reactivity 1. Raise reactor power by withdrawing control rods N/A 1 Manipulations Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 4 of 37

1. RMCS withdraw timer malfunction

2. Control rod double notches on withdraw

3. Spurious HPCI initiation with failure of HPCI trip on high water level Instrument/ 4. Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position Component N/A 7 5. Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain Failures valves to automatically close

6. Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature

7. Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close

1. RMCS withdraw timer malfunction

2. Control rod double notches on withdraw

3. Spurious HPCI initiation with failure of HPCI trip on high water level

4. Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position Total Malfunctions N/A 7 5. Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close

6. Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature

7. Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Top 10 systems and operator actions important to risk that are tested:

HPCI, Primary Containment Isolation System, RPS Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 5 of 37 SCENARIO

SUMMARY

The plant is operating at 5% power during startup, beginning of life.

After the crew takes the watch, the crew transfers the Reactor Mode Switch to RUN per Procedure 2.1.1.

After the Reactor Mode Switch has been transferred to RUN, the ATC will withdraw control rods IAW the startup rod sequence to establish Bypass valves 20-25% open.

During the power ascension, a RMCS withdraw timer malfunction will occur, resulting in a control rod select block and requiring entry into 2.4CRD. The ATC will reset the timer malfunction IAW 2.4CRD Att. 8.

After the RMCS withdraw timer malfunction has been cleared, the crew will resume control rod withdrawal. Control rod 50-27 (4th rod withdrawn) will double notch past the required banked position, resulting in a control rod withdrawal block. The crew will respond IAW the alarm card. The CRS will determine a LCO 3.1.6 Condition A entry is required due to rod position not in compliance with BPWS.

When response to the control rod double notch is complete, HPCI will spuriously initiate. The crew will respond IAW procedure 2.4CSCS and stop and prevent HPCI to avert a RFPT trip due to reactor water level reaching the RFPT high water level trip setpoint (CT#1). The CRS will enter TS 3.5.1 Condition C for HPCI inoperable due to it being prevented from injecting After actions for HPCI spurious initiation are complete, a small HPCI steam line break will occur in the Reactor Building. Secondary containment area temperatures and radiation levels will rise, requiring entry into EOP-5A. If HPCI area temperatures reach 195°F, MSO limit and isolation setpoint, before the crew attempts manual isolation of HPCI steam supply valves, the automatic isolation will fail to occur. When the crew attempts manual isolation of the HPCI steam supply valves, both valves will fail to fully close due to mechanical binding in their gear boxes. EOP-1A entry and reactor shutdown will be required.

When the reactor is manually scrammed, Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves will fail to automatically close. The ATC will isolate the valves using the panel 9-5 control switch. The Reactor Mode Switch will fail in RUN position. A Group 1 isolation will occur when reactor pressure lowers to 835 psig due to low decay heat and the HPCI steam leak, requiring transition to RCIC and CRD for level control.

Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 6 of 37 The HPCI steam leak will get worse, causing area temperatures in more than one area of the Reactor Building to approach the MSO limit. When two areas have reached the MSO limit, emergency depressurization will be required IAW EOP-1A, and the crew will enter EOP-2A to perform emergency depressurization (CT#2).

The exercise ends when the reactor has been depressurized and RPV water level is being restored to between +3 and +54 inches.

Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 7 of 37 CRITICAL TASK BASIS When HPCI spuriously initiates at low reactor power, stop and Critical Task #1 prevent HPCI injection before RFPT high water level trip.

An avoidable RFPT trip presents an unnecessary challenge to plant safety. Loss of FW transients are a significant contributor to core Safety Significance damage frequency, having a CDF of 4.35% (ref. CNS PRA Rev. 6).

Cues On panel 9-3:

Annunciator 9-3-2/A-1, HPCI Logic Actuated HPCI Stm to Turb Vlv MO-14 red light ON (opening)

HPCI Injection Valve MO-19 red light ON (opening)

Flow rising on Flow Controller HPCI-FC-108 Reactor water level rising on various control room indicators Reactor power rising Manipulation of HPCI controls on panel 9-3:

HPCI Turbine Trip push button depressed Measurable Performance HPCI-MO-14 control switch to CLOSE Indicators HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump control switch to PTL As HPCI is secured, on panel 9-3 crew will observe Annunciator HPCI Turbine Trip, HPCI-MO-14 Green light ON and Red light OFF, HPCI AOP Green light ON and Red light OFF, flow lowering on Performance Feedback HPCI-FIC-108, HPCI Turbine Speed lowering on HPCI-SI-2792, and reactor water level stop rising on various control room indicators Applicability Low power conditions, where HPCI rated flow 4250 gpm is higher than reactor steam flow, resulting in reactor water level rising.

CNS Procedure 2.4CSCS immediate operator action requires securing HPCI upon a spurious initiation. Procedure 2.4RXLVL Justification for the immediate operator action requires a manual scram if reactor water chosen performance limit level cannot be maintained below +50 inches on narrow range instruments. RFPTs trip on high reactor water level, +52.5 inches.

BWR Owners Group N/A Appendix Power level must be low enough for HPCI at rated flow to cause reactor water level to rise above 53.5 inches with feedwater flow reduced to zero. To reach the RFPT trip setpoint, wide range level instrument NBI-LIS-101B should be set slightly below the HPCI high Scenario Guide water level trip setpoint using malfunction rr28b, to the defeat the Requirements HPCI trip, which occurs at a lower actual water level than the narrow range RFPT high water level trip. The scenario should be designed to provide at least ~1 minute before level reaches +53.5 inches.

Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 8 of 37 When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating values are exceeded in two areas for the same parameter and prior to exceeding maximum safe operating Critical Task #2 value in a third area for that parameter. (For this scenario, HPCI-TE-105B Torus 888 WSW and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 SE would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

Should secondary containment parameters exceed their maximum safe operating values in more than one area, the RPV must be depressurized to preclude further degradation. RPV depressurization places the primary system in its lowest possible energy state, rejects heat to the suppression pool in preference to outside the containment, and reduces the driving head and flow of primary systems that are unisolated and discharging into the Safety Significance secondary containment.

The criteria of "two or more areas" specified identifies the rise in secondary containment parameters as a wide-spread problem which may pose a direct and immediate threat to secondary containment integrity, equipment located in the secondary containment, and continued safe operation of the plant.

Cues SPDS indication for secondary containment parameters indicate area radiation, area temperature, or area water level has exceeded its maximum safe operating value in two areas.

Manipulation of SRV controls on panel 9-3:

SRV-71A SRV-71B SRV-71E Measurable Performance SRV-71G Indicators SRV-71H SRV-71C SRV-71D SRV-71F Crew will observe SRV light indication go from green to red, amber pressure switch lights illuminate, reactor pressure lowering on Performance Feedback SPDS and panel 9-3 and 9-5 meters and recorders, and SRV tailpipe temperatures rise on recorder MS-TR-166.

Applicability EOP-5A conditions, RCS leaks into secondary containment with the RPV pressurized.

Emergency Depressurization is required due to effects of a break spreading into and potentially affecting safety equipment and operations in more than one area; however, emergency depressurization is not allowed until the second area exceeds its Justification for the Max Safe limit. Before the Max Safe limit is exceeded in a third chosen performance limit area gives reasonable time for the crew to perform emergency depressurization before the leak hampers equipment or operations in an even more widespread area.

Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 9 of 37 BWR Owners Group App. B, steps SC/T-4.2, SC/r-2.2, SC/L-2.2.

Appendix The scenario must be able to drive the selected parameter to its Max Safe value in three plant areas. If temperature is chosen, a failure to scram event, where RPV pressure is not allowed to be lowered, is well suited. Also, ensure the leak severity itself, or subsequent cold water injection, does not deplete RPV pressure Scenario Guide (driving head) so low that Max Safe in a third area cannot be Requirements reached. The crew should be driven to ED, versus just reducing pressure, to provide a consistent, measurable performance indicator. The CT listed in the scenario should list which instruments/areas will exceed their MSO limit first, second, and third.

Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 10 of 37 Related Operating Experience (CNS) CR 2006-06868 RMCS timer failure Entered Abnormal Procedure 2.4 CRD due to control rod 18-43 will not notch out from position 46 to 48. When attempting to withdraw control rod by continuous or notch withdrawal the settle light illuminates immediately and no drive water flow is observed, the drive in and drive out lights do not illuminate. Performed Attachment 6 for stuck control rod, all attempts to move control rod are unsuccessful. Based on indications, fault appears to with the timer. Method of discovery: SP 6.CRD.301. Requirement not met: RMCS should operate HCUs to position control rods as required.

(CNS) CR 2011-01763 RMCS timer test failed during surveillance test During performance of the Withdraw Timer Malfunction Test at step 5.2.2 of 6.CRD.301 the Timer Test failed to function at all to block rod withdrawal. White light did not turn on, Red light did not turn on and the selected Control Rod remained selected on the Full Core Display.

INPO ICES 306797 Control Rod double notching (CNS) On June 8, 2013, Control Rod 18-35 double notched during notch withdrawal from position 02 to 06. The control rod was being withdrawn from position 00 to 18 using notch withdrawal. All other notches were as expected. CRD Drive Water differential pressure was verified to be at 265 psig. The control rod withdrawal did not appear to be too fast. Control rod should not double notch during notch withdrawal.

After double notch occurrence, stop rod withdrawal, notify Reactivity Manager, Control Room Supervisor, and Shift Manager. Continued rod withdrawal after being evaluated by Reactor Engineering and Operation (CNS) CR 2014-01430 Control rod 18-35 has exhibited multiple double notches SEN 136 Mispositioned control rod recovery without management approval (CNS) On January 7, 1996, during a load line reduction following a reactor recirculation pump trip, the wrong control rod group was inserted when both the reactor operator and second verifier selected the wrong page of the rod movement sheet. After insertion of the first group of rods, and noting the error, the operator and verifier decided to begin recovery from the error without notifying management of the mispositioning or the plan to recover.

Rev 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 NRC CNS 4/2020 Scenario 2 Page 11 of 37 OE26672 Mispositioned control rods during reactor startup (River Bend) On March 8, 2008, during plant startup at approximately 25 percent the rod line was being adjusted in accordance with the Reactivity Control Plan (RCP) in preparation for reactor recirculation pump up-shift. During manipulations, 6 control rods were withdrawn from position 16 to 24 instead of 16 to 20 as indicated on the control rod pull sheet. The root cause evaluation determined that the primary factor in the event was failure to appropriately utilize human performance tools and inadequate oversight.

SER 40-84 Inadvertent initiation of ESF systems due to spurious operation of trip units Various design inadequacies, component failures, and personnel errors associated with dc buses caused voltage variations resulting in tripping of inverters. Following the dc voltage transients, the inverters automatically reset. This caused analog trip units, which are powered by the inverters, to produce short duration actuation signals. The signals were caused by the trip unit's load relay becoming energized before the loop current reestablished itself above the trip setpoint. These momentary signals have inadvertently initiated emergency diesel generators, emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) and other safety- related systems.

INPO ICES 466852 Unusual Event due to failure of Reactor Mode Switch to fully actuate (Peach Bottom) During GP-3 shutdown of Unit 3 on 10/21/19, when the Reactor Operator moved the Unit 3 Reactor Mode Switch to shutdown, it failed to generate a full reactor scram.

Rev 1

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 SIMULATOR SET-UP A. Materials Required - none B. Initialize the simulator in IC10 or password protected IC, 5% (BOC)

1. Ensure this schedule file is in the schedule file directory:

Schedule File Name - 2020-4sc2.sch

2. Click on Open in the Schedule window and Open Schedule File 2020-4sc2.sch (in the Schedule Directory)

3. In Schedule window, click on the Stopped red block. The red block will change to a green arrow and indicate the schedule file is active (Running).

4. Take the simulator out of freeze.

5. Click the Summary tab in the Director window. Verify the schedule files are loaded and opened per Section C below. (Note: Any actions in the schedule file without a value in the @Time column will not load into the director until the event trigger goes active.)

Page 12 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 C. File loaded verification:

(Continued on next page.)

Page 13 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 (Continued on next page.)

Page 14 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Page 15 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 D. Panel Setup

1. Ensure PMIS IDTs are blank.

2. Ensure RR Controllers are selected to P.

3. Power approximately 5%.

4. Mark up 31-SU-BOL rod package to sequence step 18, Rod 26-03 at Position 0 to provide for crew turnover.

5. Ensure GARDEL initializes properly.

6. Ensure RWM initialized.

7. Ensure RCIC flow controller is set to 400 gpm.

8. Ensure HPCI flow controller is set to 4250 gpm.

9. Ensure CRD flow controller is set properly(50 gpm and drive d/p at 265).

10. Ensure IRM/APRM recorders in second speed.

11. Reset APRM back panel alarm lights.

12. Provide markup of procedure 2.1.1(Rev197) with step 4.24 marked complete through step 4.24.6 and section 5 complete up to 5.42 for crew turnover.

13. Provide copy of Procedure 2.1.10 for crew turnover.

14. Provide copy of Procedure 10.13 for crew turnover.

15. At Panel 9-4, set SSST Y Voltage Adjust to Tap 2.

16. At Panel C, set SSST X Voltage Adjust to Tap 3, min 4221, max 4333.

17. On STARTUP TRANSFORMER BACKUP VOLTAGE BUS, placard:

TAP POSITION: 3 MAX 4333 MIN 4221 Page 16 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: The beginning of shift brief and reactivity brief will have been conducted during turnover outside of the simulator.

Directs ATC to place the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN IAW Procedure 2.1.1 CRS

[Startup Procedure], step 4.24.7 Performs procedure 2.1.1 step 4.24 to place the Reactor Mode Switch in RUN 4.24 PERFORM following to place REACTOR MODE switch in RUN:

4.24.7 PLACE REACTOR MODE switch in RUN.

4.25 PLACE all IRM/APRM recorder select switches to APRM.

4.26 PLACE all IRM/RBM recorder select switches to RBM.

4.27 MARK all APRM and RBM recorders with time and date.

4.28 PLACE all IRM recorders to normal speed.

ATC 4.29 COMPLETE LCO Tracking Log entry to establish Drywell oxygen content below Tech Spec limit within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of exceeding 15% RTP.

(Step is N/A at 5% power) 4.30 PERFORM one of following for all IRM detectors:

4.30.1 WITHDRAW IRM detector fully per Procedure 4.1.2.

4.30.2 IF any IRM detector cannot be withdrawn, THEN REFER to Procedure 4.1.2.

Withdraws IRMs IAW procedure 4.1.2 [Intermediate Range Monitoring System]

5. WITHDRAWING IRM DETECTORS 5.1 IF DETECTOR POSITION light off, THEN PERFORM following: (Step is N/A) 5.2 Momentarily DEPRESS applicable SELECT switch(s).

ATC 5.3 VERIFY applicable SELECT switch(s) lights lit.

5.4 IF at any time following conditions exist,

MODE switch in RUN.

Associated APRM channels indicate above their downscale trip points. THEN fully WITHDRAW IRM(s).

5.5 DEPRESS and HOLD DRIVE OUT switch.

Page 17 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Event

Description:

Transfer Reactor Mode Switch to RUN Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 5.6 WHEN IRM detectors at desired position, THEN RELEASE DRIVE OUT switch.

5.7 WHEN detector(s) fully withdrawn, THEN VERIFY applicable OUT light lit.

5.8 WHEN IRM detector operation complete, THEN PERFORM following:

5.8.1 PLACE all IRM range switches to 2.

5.8.2 Momentarily DEPRESS all lit SELECT buttons.

5.8.3 VERIFY all SELECT buttons off.

5.8.4 Momentarily DEPRESS SRM/IRM DETECTOR POS display (POWER ON) button.

5.8.5 VERIFY DETECTOR POSITION light off.

Continues procedure 2.1.1:

4.31 (Informs CRS to) ENTER potential LCOs for all SRM, IRM, and APRM high flux (startup) channels.

ATC 4.32 VERIFY following conditions established per Procedures 2.1.10 and 10.13:

Pressure setpoint 926 psig.

Bypass valves ~ 10% open, or as directed by other procedural conditions.

Performs concurrent verification for procedure 2.1.1 step 4.24.7 and peer BOP checks for other procedure steps.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to next event when directed by Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 18 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 20-25% Bypass Valve position, RMCS timer malfunction, control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Trigger 3 goes true and RD19, RMCS Timer Malfunction, goes active when rod 02-27 is withdrawn to position 06. The malfunction takes effect when rod Booth 02-27 is withdrawn from position 06 to 08.

Operator Trigger 4 goes true and RD235027, Fast Rod Speed, when rod 50-27 is withdrawn to position 10. The malfunction takes effect when rod 50-27 is withdrawn from position 10 and it will double notch to position 14.

NOTE to Examiners: Example of Non-EOP Control Rod Movement Protocol per 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations, is attached for reference.

Event 3, RMCS timer malfunction will occur when control rod 02-27 is being withdrawn from position 06 to 08. Refer to page 21 for Event 3 actions.

Event 4, control rod 50-27 double notch will occur when it is withdrawn from position 10 to 12. Refer to page 23 for Event 4 actions.

Directs ATC to withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 20-25%

Bypass Valve position IAW sequence 31-SU-BOL, Procedure 2.1.10 [Station CRS Power Changes] step 8.1, and Procedure 10.13 [Control Rod Sequence and Movement Control] section 4.

Withdraws control rods IAW sequence 31-SU-BOL using notch withdrawal:

(For control rods 26-03, 26-51, 02-27, and 50-27 to position 12)

Selects in-sequence control rod by depressing respective Rod Select push button on panel 9-5 Rod Select matrix.

Observes OUT PERMIT light ON on panel 9-5.

Withdraws control rod one notch at a time by placing rod movement control switch on panel 9-5 to OUT NOTCH, then releasing.

ATC

Observes ROD IN, ROD OUT, and ROD SETTLE lights illuminate in sequence and selected rod position indicates control rod withdrew one notch on panel 9-5.

Observes IRM recorder indication on panel 9-5 is consistent with control rod withdrawal.

Repeats notch withdrawal until control rod is at target position specified in sequence 31-SU-BOL, then initials step in 31-SU-BOL.

Repeats process for each successive control rod until bypass valve position on DEH HMI indicates 20-25%.

If directed, provides peer check for control rod selection, movement direction, BOP and step completion and initials as verifier in 31-SU-BOL.

Page 19 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Event

Description:

Withdraw control rods to raise power to establish 20-25% Bypass Valve position, RMCS timer malfunction, control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Monitors bypass valve position on HMI, panel B.

END OF EVENT Notes Proceed to Event 3(page 21) when RMCS timer malfunction occurs.

Booth Proceed to Event 4(page 23) when control rod 50-27 double notch to position Operator 14 occurs.

Proceed to Event 5 when directed by Lead Examiner.

Page 20 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RMCS timer malfunction Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior During withdrawal of control rod 02-27 from position 06 to position 08, ATC recognizes and reports reception of RMCS Timer Malfunction Select Block.

Announces entry condition for procedure 2.4CRD.

Enters 2.4CRD [CRD Trouble].

CRS Directs ATC to perform 2.4CRD Att. 8.

Performs 2.4CRD Att. 8 to reset RMCS timer malfunction ATC Notifies CRS RMCS timer is reset.

Exits 2.4CRD.

CRS Directs ATC to continue control rod withdrawal IAW the startup rod sequence.

ATC Continues control rod withdrawal, as directed.

BOP If directed, provides peer check for ATC.

Page 21 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Event

Description:

RMCS timer malfunction Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to Event 4 when control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Operator occurs.

Page 22 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior During withdrawal of control rod 50-27 from position 10 to position 12, recognizes and reports rod 50-27 double notches and settles at position 14.

ATC Responds to annunciator:

9-5-1/A-5, RWM ROD BLOCK Determines alarm due to rod 50-27 out of required banked position.

Booth Role Play: When requested to develop a revised pull sheet to recover rod 50-27 to its intended position (12), state that will you will need to run a Gardel Operator case and provide will provide 10.13 Pull sheet when complete.

Directs suspending control rod withdrawal.

CRS Contacts Reactor Engineering and requests revised control rod movement step IAW procedure 10.13 step 4.2.8 to recover rod 50-27 to its intended position of 12.

Note to Examiners: Due to scenario timing and required CRS oversight for reactivity control, the CRS may not address TS 3.1.6 during the timeframe of the scenario. This may require grading TS by use of follow-up questioning.

CRS Determines entry into TS 3.1.6 Condition A is required.

TS 3.1.6 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.1 -----------------NOTE--------------

A. One or more OPERABLE control Rod worth minimizer (RWM) rods not in may be bypassed as compliance with allowed by LCO 3.3.2.1, BPWS.

Control Rod Block Instrumentation.

Move associated control rod(s) 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months to correct position.

OR A.2 Declare associated control rod(s) inoperable. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Page 23 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Event

Description:

Control rod 50-27 double notch to position 14 Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to Event 5 when directed by the Lead Examiner.

Operator Page 24 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Spurious HPCI initiation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 5, HP05 HPCI inadvertent initiation.

Operator NOTE to Examiners: It takes ~80 seconds from the time HPCI initiates until RPV level reaches 50. IAW procedure 2.4RXLVL immediate operator actions, the ATC will insert a manual scram if reactor water level cannot be maintained below +50. If a manual scram is inserted, Event 6, HPCI Steam Line Break will automatically become active upon the scram. RFPTs trip on high reactor water level, +54 narrow range, which is reached in ~2 minutes if HPCI is not tripped.

Responds to annunciator:

BOP

9-3-2/A-1, HPCI Logic Actuated Recognizes and reports HPCI starting, 2.4CSCS entry condition.

CRS Directs BOP to secure HPCI IAW 2.4CSCS [Inadvertent CSCS Initiation].

CRITICAL TASK #1: When HPCI spuriously initiates at low reactor power, stop and prevent HPCI injection before RFPT high water level trip.

Stops HPCI IAW 2.4CSCS immediate operator actions:

3.1 IF HPCI initiated, THEN perform following:

3.1.1 Ensure AUXILIARY OIL PUMP control switch in START.

3.1.2 Press and hold TURBINE TRIP button.

BOP 3.1.3 AFTER turbine stops, THEN place AUXILIARY OIL PUMP in PULL-TO-LOCK.

3.1.4 Release TURBINE TRIP button.

Per subsequent action 4.7, informs CRS HPCI is inoperable due to Aux Oil Pump is in PTL Reports reactor power and reactor water level.

ATC If RPV level cannot be maintained below +50 on narrow range instruments, announces entry condition to procedure 2.4RXLVL and intention to insert a manual scram.

NOTE to Examiners: If a manual scram is inserted due to RPV water level, refer to Event 6 for operator actions related to scram (page 30).

CRS If required, enters 2.4RXLVL and directs ATC to scram.

Page 25 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Event

Description:

Spurious HPCI initiation Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CRS Determines entry into TS 3.5.1 Condition C is required.

TS 3.5.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. HPCI System C.1 Verify by administrative means 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months inoperable. RCIC System is OPERABLE.

AND A.2 Restore HPCI System to 14 days OPERABLE status.

END OF EVENT Notes Booth Proceed to Event 6 when directed by the Lead Examiner or if the ATC Operator manually scrams.

Page 26 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building, Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close, Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position, Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature, Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior When directed by the Lead Examiner, insert TRIGGER 6, HP06 HPCI Steam Line Break.

HP06 is initially inserted at severity 4 on Trigger 6. Later, when Reactor Booth pressure falls below 650 psig, auto Trigger 16 raises the severity to 9 to Operator drive the crew to emergency depressurization. Later, auto Trigger 26 raises the severity to 13 when reactor pressure falls below 500 psig to ensure a third area will reach Max Safe temperature if the crew does NOT depressurize.

NOTE to Examiners: The CRS may not wait for EOP-5A entry condition to be met before directing isolation of the HPCI steam supply. The following operator actions are written from the standpoint that EOP-5A has been entered. If the crew attempts to isolate HPCI before the SW Quad reaches the HPCI isolation setpoint of 195°F, the failure of HPCI automatic isolation will not be observable.

Responds to annunciator:

BOP

9-3-1/A-9, REACTOR BLDG HIGH RAD Recognize Secondary Containment annunciator window on SPDS turns CREW yellow, and recognize radiation and temperature rising in SW and NW Quads using area temperature and radiation displays on SPDS.

Booth Role Play: As building operator sent to Reactor Bldg to investigate rising area temperatures, wait 3 minutes, then report you can hear a steam leak Operator and see steam in the vicinity of the HPCI room.

CRS Assigns BOP critical parameter of Secondary Containment temperatures.

Monitors and reports Secondary Containment temperatures using PMIS or BOP panel 9-21.

NOTE to Examiners: EOP-5A Table 9, Maximum Normal/Safe Operating Temperatures is attached for reference.

Responds to alarm:

BOP

9-3-1/E-10 Area High Temp Reports EOP-5A entry condition met due to Torus Area SW Quad reaching Max Normal Operating value (160°F).

Page 27 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building, Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close, Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position, Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature, Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-5A [Secondary Containment Control] on Secondary Containment temperature above Max Normal Operating value.

CRS Directs BOP to isolate HPCI steam supply.

NOTE to Examiners: When the operator attempts to close them from panel 9-3, HPCI-MO-15 will not move and HPCI-MO-16 will de-energize.

Role Play: If sent as building operator to check breaker for HPCI-MO-16, wait 3 minutes, then report no indication at the disconnect If sent to close either valve from their LASP panels, IRF HP17A for HPCI-Booth MO-15 and IRF HP1A for HPCI-MO-16 then report MO-16 indicates no power and MO-15 will not close.

Operator If sent to ASD Panel to close HPCI isolation valves, wait 2 minutes, then report transfer switches are not functioning.

If sent to manually close HPCI-MO-16, wait 10 minutes and report the gearbox is bound and the handwheel will not turn. (This requires an RP.)

Page 28 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building, Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close, Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position, Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature, Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior If SW Quad temperature reaches the HPCI isolation setpoint, recognizes and reports HPCI failure to automatically isolate.

Attempts to isolate HPCI steam supply by placing HPCI control switches INBD STM SUPP ISOL VLV MO 15 and OTBD STM SUPP ISOL VLV MO 16 to CLOSE on panel 9-3.

BOP Recognizes and reports loss of power to MO-16 and failure of MO-15 to close.

Sends building operator to check power supply to MO-16:

HPCI-MO-16 Breaker EE-STR-125HPCI (MO16) on 125 VDC STARTER RACK B (EOP-5A steps SC-4&5) Determines a primary system is discharging into secondary containment and areas cannot be maintained below the Max Safe Temperature value, 195°F.

CRS Page 29 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building, Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close, Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position, Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature, Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-1A [RPV Control] and directs ATC to insert a manual scram IAW EOP-1A step RC-2.

CRS Performs 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram] Attachment 1 Mitigating Task Scram Actions 1.1 Press both RX SCRAM buttons.

1.2 Place REACTOR MODE switch to REFUEL.

Performs Attachment 2 Reactor Power Control of 2.1.5 as follows:

1 REACTOR POWER CONTROL 1.1 Ensure REACTOR MODE switch is in SHUTDOWN.

1.2 Verify all SDV vent and drain valves are closed.

Recognizes and reports failure of SDV vent and drain valves to close. Places ISOL TEST VLVL 29 control switch on Panel 9-5 to ISOL and verifies SDV vent and drain valves close.

ATC 1.3 Ensure operating RR pumps have run back to 22% speed 1.4 Verify all control rods are fully inserted.

Reports manual scram successful, all rods in.

1.5 Observe nuclear instrumentation and perform following:

1.5.1 Insert SRM detectors.

1.5.2 Insert IRM detectors.

1.5.3 Change APRM recorders to IRMs.

1.5.4 Range IRMs on scale.

1.5.5 Check reactor power is lowering.

Page 30 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building, Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close, Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position, Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature, Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Verifies actions for Turbine Trip IAW 2.1.5 Att. 5:

1.3 WHEN main turbine trips, THEN observe following valves close:

1.3.1 Both stop valves.

1.3.2 All governor valves.

1.3.3 All reheat stop valves.

BOP 1.3.4 All interceptor valves.

1.4 Verify station service is transferred to Startup Transformer.

1.5 Ensure PCB-3310 open (Panel C).

1.6 Ensure PCB-3312 open (Panel C).

1.7 Ensure GEN EXCITER FIELD BKR is open (Panel C).

Directs ATC to control RPV level +3 to +54 IAW EOP-1A step RC/L-3.

CRS When RPV pressure lowers below 835 psig, recognize and report MSIVs CREW close (due to Reactor Mode Switch failure).

May direct building operator to enter steam tunnel to manually close HPCI-CRS MO-16.

NOTE to Examiners: Assuming the crew does not lower RPV pressure and scrams when the first area reaches 195°F, SW Quad temperature will reach 195°F approximately 3.5 minutes after the leak begins and NW Quad temperature will reach 195°F approximately 12.5 minutes after the leak begins. If the crew does not depressurize, SE Quad, the third area, will exceed 195°F approximately 18.5 minutes after the steam leak begins.

Page 31 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building, Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close, Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position, Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature, Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Auto Trigger 29 sends a trip signal to all three CBPs when Rx Pressure falls below 600 psig. This is to prevent cold water injection that would reduce the driving head of the HPCI steam leak. (Only CBP C is initially in service in Booth this IC.)

Operator Role Play: If sent to investigate trip of CBP C, wait 10 minutes, then report you can NOT see anything that would have caused it to trip.

Reports when SW Quad temperature rises to 195°F (Max Safe).

BOP Reports when NW Quad temperature rises to 195°F (Max Safe).

(EOP-5A steps SC-6 & 7):

Recognizes emergency depressurization is required when two areas exceed Max Safe Operating Temperature with a primary system (RCIC) discharging into secondary containment.

CRS Page 32 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building, Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close, Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position, Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature, Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Enters EOP-2A [Emergency Depressurization]:

CRS Requests mark PC water level >6ft for EOP-2A step RC/P-12.

Directs WCO/BOP to open 6 SRVs.

Directs RO to control level 0 inches to -110 inches CFZ.

CRITICAL TASK #2: When a primary system is discharging into the secondary containment through an unisolable break, the crew Emergency Depressurizes by opening 6 SRVs when maximum safe operating values are exceeded in two areas for the same parameter and prior to exceeding maximum safe operating value in a third area for that parameter. (For this scenario, HPCI-TE-105B Torus 888 WSW and RHR-TE-99C Torus 885 NNW are the two areas that will exceed MSO first. RWCU-TE-117F Torus 896 SE would be the third area to exceed MSO.)

Reports PC water level.

Opens 6 SRVs at panel 9-4 by placing control switches to OPEN.

BOP Monitors reactor pressure and when RPV pressure reaches 50 psig, reports emergency depressurization is complete.

Monitors Condensate injection for level control.

ATC Reports all three Condensate Booster Pumps tripped Reports status when level band is exited and restored.

Page 33 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Event

Description:

HPCI steam line break in the Reactor Building, Failure of Scram Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to automatically close, Reactor Mode Switch fails in RUN position, Failure of HPCI to automatically isolate on high area temperature, Failure of HPCI steam supply isolation valves to fully close Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior NOTE to Examiners: Scenario objectives have been met when reactor pressure has lowered to <50 psig and level is being controlled +3 inches to +54 inches, OR at Lead Examiners discretion.

END OF SCENARIO Notes Booth When directed by the Lead Examiner, place the simulator in freeze and Operator tell the crew to stop operating.

Page 34 of 37 Rev 0

Op-Test No.: CNS 2020-4 Scenario No.: 2 From Procedure 2.0.3, Conduct of Operations 9.6.3 EXAMPLE OF NON-EMERGENCY CONTROL ROD MOVEMENT STANDARD PROTOCOL 9.6.3.1 Control Rod 06-43 is to be withdrawn from Position 00 to Position 12 by notch rod withdrawal.