ML20241A243

3-CN-2020-04-Draft Written Exam

ML20241A243
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	08/04/2020
From:	Greg Werner Operations Branch IV
To:	Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD)
References
Download: ML20241A243 (761)

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ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 300000 (SF8 IA) Instrument Air Tier# 2 Knowledge of (INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM) design Group# 1 feature(s) and or interlocks which provide for the K/A # 300000 K4.02 following: Rating 3.0 K4.02 Cross-over to other air systems Revision Revision Statement:

Question 1 Instrument Air header pressure is 55 psig, rising slowly.

Which one of the following is the LOWEST Instrument Air header pressure at which SA-PCV-609 [Service Air System Isolation] can be opened by depressing CONTROL VALVE PCV-609 RESET button on Panel A?

A. 75 psig B. 79 psig C. 83 psig D. 87 psig Answer: B Explanation:

The three Plant Air compressors take suction from the surrounding Control Building atmosphere and discharge, to a pair of cross- connected air receivers. Service Air distribution headers are supplied from the air receivers through a pressure control valve (SA-PCV-609). The pressure control valve will automatically isolate the non-essential Service Air system on low air pressure at 77 psig decreasing. SA-PCV-609 isolates the Service Air distribution header from the air compressors and receivers on low system pressure. Automatic isolation of the Service Air header, along with the storage capacity of the air receivers, ensures that the Instrument Air header will be available for a safe shutdown and cool down of the reactor. PCV-609 is an air-to-open and spring-to-close isolation valve. When air pressure on the discharge header of the air receivers drops to below 77 psig, the solenoid pilot valve de-energizes.

When de-energized, the pilot valve isolates the air supply to PCV-609 and vents off its operator, thus allowing spring pressure to close PCV-609. The pilot valve will remain in the tripped position until air pressure goes above 77 psig and it is manually reset by SA-PCV-609, Control Valve PCV-609 Reset pushbutton on Panel A in the Control

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Room. The pressure switch which de-energizes the solenoid also actuates a Control Room alarm. A control room annunciator is also generated when this setpoint is exceeded.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because the signal that closes SA-PCV-609 also generates a control room annunciator, and another control room annunciator, A-4/G-4 [Intake Bldg Control Air Low Pressure] alarms at 60 psig when IA pressure is lowering. The examinee who confuses the alarm setpoints and their relation to SA-PCV-609 may choose this answer. It is wrong because SA-PCV-609 cannot be opened until IA pressure is above 77 psig.

Answer C is plausible because the signal that closes SA-PCV-609 also generates a control room annunciator, and another control room annunciator, A-4/A-4 [Air Receiver A or B Low Pressure] alarms at 80 psig when IA pressure is lowering. The examinee who confuses the alarm setpoints and their relation to SA-PCV-609 may choose this answer. It is wrong because SA-PCV-609 could have already been opened at a lower pressure listed, 79 psig.

Answer D is plausible because the signal that closes SA-PCV-609 also generates a control room annunciator, and another control room annunciator, A-4/B-5 [Service Air Low Pressure] alarms at 85 psig when IA pressure is lowering. The examinee who confuses the alarm setpoints and their relation to SA-PCV-609 may choose this answer. It is wrong because SA-PCV-609 could have already been opened at a lower pressure listed, 79 psig.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR001-17-01 [Ops Plant Air](Rev 34), alarm card A-4/B-4 [Service Air Isolation PCV-609](Rev 44), alarm card A-4/G-4 [Intake Bldg Control Air Low Pressure](Rev 44), alarm card A-4/A-4 [Air Receiver A or B Low Pressure](Rev 44), alarm card A-4/B-5 [Service Air Low Pressure](Rev 44)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-17-01 Obj LO-6c, Describe the operation of the interlocks associated with the following components in the Plant Air system: Plant Air Pressure Control Valve (PCV-609)

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 218000 (SF3 ADS) Automatic Depressurization Tier# 2 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Group# 1 cause-effect relationships between AUTOMATIC K/A # 218000 K1.02 DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM and the following: Rating 4.0 K1.02 Low pressure core spray: Plant-Specific Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 2 An ATWS is in progress with the following conditions:

Reactor water level -120 inches, Wide Range Reactor pressure 800 psig The ONLY ECCS pump running is Core Spray Pump A All ADS valves just automatically opened Which one of the following lists EVERY operator action that will cause ADS valves to automatically close?

A. Place both ADS Inhibit Switches to INHIBIT, ONLY B. Momentarily depress both ADS Logic Timer Reset buttons simultaneously or place CS Pump A control switch to STOP, ONLY C. Place both ADS Inhibit Switches to INHIBIT or momentarily depress both ADS Logic Timer Reset buttons simultaneously, ONLY D. Place both ADS Inhibit Switches to INHIBIT or momentarily depress both ADS Logic Timer Reset buttons simultaneously or place CS Pump A control switch to STOP Answer: D Explanation:

This question requires understanding of signals that input into ADS initiation logic and the arrangement of those signals, ADS Logic Timer Reset switches, and ADS inhibit switches within ADS logic. Automatic ADS initiation logic requires reactor water level low +3, plus reactor water level low-low-low -113, plus 109 second time delay, plus any low pressure ECCS pump discharge pressure 108 psig. For the conditions

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 given, placing both ADS Inhibit Switches to INHIBIT or simultaneously depressing both ADS Logic Timer Reset buttons or placing CS Pump A control switch to STOP will cause ADS logic relays to de-energize. The contacts from those relays are normally open, so ADS valves lose their open signal when ADS logic relays de-energize, and ADS valves close.

This question is listed as higher cognitive because Examinees who do not understand the ADS logic arrangement have historically exhibited confusion for this topic, because depending on the situation and the question, the answer can be different.

For example, if ADS had not yet initiated and the question was what would prevent ADS initiation, momentarily depressing the Timer Logic Reset would not be correct.

The examinee usually has to picture the logic and then apply the given conditions.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible to the examinee who does not know the ADS logic arrangement but who remembers from simulator training that ADS Inhibit Switches are always placed in INHIBIT during ATWS conditions to prevent ADS valves from opening. It is wrong because depressing both ADS Logic Timer Reset buttons or placing CS Pump A control switch to STOP will also cause ADS logic relays to de-energize and ADS valves to close.

Answer B is plausible for the same reason given for distractor A and for the examinee who remembers a low pressure ECCS pump must be operating for ADS to initiate but does not know the arrangement of ADS Logic Timer Relay/Reset contacts in ADS logic. This answer is wrong because depressing both ADS Logic Timer Reset buttons causes ADS initiation relays and the 109 second time delay to pick up relay to drop out, resulting in ADS valves closing.

Answer C is plausible to the examinee who does not know the arrangement of low pressure ECCS pump discharge pressure inputs into ADS logic. Low reactor water level signals can clear after ADS logic has initiated, and ADS valves will remain open because when the 109 second timer elapses, ADS logic seals in around the low water level contacts. If low pressure ECCS pump discharge pressure signals were similarly arranged, the ECCS pumps could be stopped but ADS logic would remain sealed in.

This answer is wrong because low pressure ECCS pump discharge pressure contacts are arranged in ADS logic such that the ADS initiation relays are de-energized if no low pressure ECCS pump is running.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-16-02 [Ops Nuclear Pressure Relief](Rev 21)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-16-02 Obj LO-5a, Describe the Nuclear Pressure Relief system design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Allows prevention of inadvertent initiation of ADS blowdown.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - ADS/SRV

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 211000 (SF1 SLCS) Standby Liquid Control Tier# 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on Group# 1 the STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM; and (b) K/A # 211000 A2.03 based on those predictions, use procedures to Rating 3.2 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Revision 1 those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.03 A.C. power failures Revision Statement: Based on validator and reviewer comments, removed Boron injection is required, SLC squib valve A status, and removed numbering associated with squib valve B from stem due to unnecessary clutter.

Question 3 An ATWS is in progress with the following condition:

MCC-K has lost power One minute later, the operator places SLC Pump A and B control switches to START.

White SQUIB VALVE B READY light is ON Which one of the following describes the status of SLC injection AND which action is required to be performed?

A. SLC Pump A and B are injecting through SLC squib valve V-14A. Inform the CRS when Hot Shutdown boron weight has been injected IAW EOP-6A.

B. Only SLC Pump B is injecting through SLC squib valve V-14A. Inform the CRS when Hot Shutdown boron weight has been injected IAW EOP-6A.

C. SLC is NOT being injected. Inject boron using HPCI IAW Procedure 5.8.8

[Alternate Boron Injection and Preparation].

D. SLC is NOT being injected. Inject boron using RCIC IAW Procedure 5.8.8

[Alternate Boron Injection and Preparation].

Answer: D Explanation:

MCC-K supplies power to SLC Pump A. SLC squib valve V14A is powered by 120 VAC. This power is derived via a 480V/120V transformer from SLC A pump breaker,

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 breaker 6B on MCC-K. V-14A is normally closed and is opened when the squib is fired by supplying 120 VAC to the squib charge. With MCC-K de-energized, SLC V-14A will not fire when SLC Pump A control switch is placed to START, therefore, it remains closed.

White SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3B (1106B) light is ON, indicating SLC B squib valve V-14B has failed to actuate. Therefore, with both SLC squib valves closed, boron is not being injected with SLC.

With SLC system unavailable, EOP-6A directs boron injection by an alternate method.

Procedure 5.5.8 provides two options for alternate boron injection. One option is to use the RWCU system, and the other is to use RCIC with SLC storage tank connected by hose to RCIC pump suction line. MCC-K does not power any valves needed for the lineup involving RCIC. (MCC-K supplies power to MCC-R, which powers RWCU valves required to be operated for alternate boron injection using RWCU; therefore, RCIC must be used.) The CRS directs entry into procedure 5.8.8; however, this question is at the RO level because it only tests knowledge of the overall mitigative strategy of the procedure.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because SLC piping is arranged such that either pump will inject via either or both squib valves and because White SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3B (1106B) light is ON, which means SLC is not injecting through that squib valve.

An examinee who does not know MCC-K supplies power to SLC Pump A and squib valve A may choose this answer. It is wrong because SLC Pump A is powered from MCC-K and V-14A derives power directly from SLC Pump A breaker 6B on MCC-K, which is de-energized. So, neither SLC Pump A nor B are injecting.

Answer B is plausible because SLC piping is arranged such that either pump will inject via either or both squib valves and because White SQUIB VALVE READY DS-3B (1106B) light is ON, which means SLC is not injecting through that squib valve.

SLC Pump B started when its control switch was placed to START. It is plausible that squib valve V-14A could have actuated to the examinee who does not know the squib valve derives power from its associated pump control power. This is plausible because V-14A is powered by 120 VAC, and many other 120 VAC powered valves, such as Rx Bldg to Torus Vacuum Relief valves, derive power directly from 120V power panels. The examinee who knows MCC-K supplies SLC pump A but does not know squib valve V-14A derives power from the pump circuit may choose this answer.

It is wrong because V-14A derives power directly from SLC Pump A breaker 6B on MCC-K, which is de-energized; therefore, it will not fire and open. Neither squib valve has opened, so boron is not being injected by SLC Pump B.

Answer C is plausible because alternate boron injection is required and HPCI is a steam driven system, like RCIC, and in its standby alignment does not rely on power from MCC-K. It is wrong because procedure 5.8.8 does not contain provisions for alternate boron injection using HPCI.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Technical

References:

EOP-6A [RPV Pressure/Reactor Power(Failure-to-Scram)](Rev 19), Procedure 2.2A_480.RX [480 VAC Reactor Building Breaker Checklist](Rev 22), GE dwg 791E262 sh 1, Procedure 5.8.8 [Alternate Boron Injection and Preparation](Rev 17), Procedure 2.2A_120CRIT.DIV1 [120/240 VAC Critical Instrument Power Checklist (Div 1)](Rev 10), Procedure 2.2.74 [Standby Liquid Control System](Rev 56), procedure 5.3AC480 [480 VAC Bus Failure](Rev 55),

procedure 2.2.66A [Reactor Water Cleanup Component Checklist](Rev 21)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-29-02 Obj LO-10c, Predict the consequences a malfunction of the following would have on the SLC system: AC power Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency AC Power

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E262 sh 1

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-6A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 239002 (SF3 SRV) Safety Relief Valves Tier# 2 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Group# 1 parameters associated with operating the K/A # 239002 A1.06 RELIEF/SAFETY VALVES controls including: Rating 3.7 A1.06 Reactor power Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 4 The plant is at 100% power when SRV 71D fails open.

Which one of the following describes how reactor power responds to this event?

A. Drops lower, then rises to greater than 100%

B. Rises higher, then rises to greater than 102%

C. Rises higher, then lowers and stabilizes at less than 100%

D. Drops lower, then lowers and stabilizes at less than 98%

Answer: A Explanation:

When the SRV opens, MSL pressure lowers slightly, resulting in reactor pressure lowering slightly, which increases voids, causing power to promptly fall several percent. The initial transient low is short lived due to response of the DEH system.

Equalizing header pressure will fall, causing turbine governor valves to close to restore pressure to the DEH setpoint, which results in reactor pressure rising, void collapse, and power to return to near 100%. Steam flow through the open SRV results in reduced turbine steam flow and reduced extraction steam. This results in reduced feedwater heating. As feedwater temperature lowers, core inlet subcooling is reduced, resulting in a slight upward shift of the core boiling boundary. Power slowly rises until feedwater temperature stabilizes. Although reactor pressure stabilizes a lower value than it was initially, which would otherwise result in a lower final power level, the effects of reduced feedwater temperature outweigh the pressure effect, so final power level is higher than the initial power level.

Distracters:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer B is plausible to the examinee who considers the effect of reduced feedwater temperature but fails to consider the initial effect of void production. It is wrong because the prompt reduction in reactor pressure is the first effect on power, causing it to initially lower.

Answer C is plausible because one of the first operator actions required by Procedure 2.4SRV is to lower power to <90%, which is mainly to accommodate the effect of the reactor pressure rise when subsequent actions are taken to close the SRV, but also provides margin to the licensed thermal power limit due to the reduction in feedwater temperature. The examinee who remembers this action but not its reason, or who confuses the effects of SRV operation on core voids, power, and/or feedwater temperature and reverses the overall effects of the transient may choose this answer.

It is wrong because power initially lowers due the pressure reduction and resulting core voiding, then it slowly rises as feedwater temperature lowers due to reduction of extraction steam caused by reduced turbine steam flow.

Answer D is plausible to the examinee who understands the initial effect of the SRV opening on reactor pressure and voiding but who does not understand the net effects on feedwater temperature. An examinee may believe the final power will be lower because the final reactor pressure is lower. This answer is wrong because the power increase caused by reduced feedwater temperature results in a net increase in reactor power.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.4SRV [Stuck Open Relief Valve](Rev 15)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-16-02 Obj LO-4f, Given a Nuclear Pressure Relief system component manipulation, predict the changes in the following parameters:

Reactor power Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - ADS/SRV

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 262002 (SF6 UPS) Uninterruptable Power Supply Tier# 2 (AC/DC) Group# 1 Knowledge of UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER K/A # 262002 K4.01 SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.) design feature(s) and/or Rating 3.1 interlocks which provide for the following: Revision 0 K4.01 Transfer from preferred power to alternate power supplies Revision Statement:

Question 5 Plant is at 100% power.

Regarding the No-Break Power System (1) Which signal sensed on the output of the NBPP Inverter will cause it to automatically transfer to the alternate supply?

AND (2) What is the alternate power supply to NBPP?

A. (1) Overvoltage (2) MCC-R B. (1) Overvoltage (2) MCC-S C. (1) Overcurrent (2) MCC-R D. (1) Overcurrent (2) MCC-S Answer: A Explanation:

The No-Break Power system provides power at 115VAC/230 VAC for equipment and instrumentation which must have an uninterruptible power supply. An emergency (alternate) AC power source for the NBPP #1 is provided from MCC-R through a step-down transformer in the event that inverter 1A fails.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 A static switch inside the inverter transfers to the alternate power source when inverter output voltage or frequency is not within limits specified for safe system operations. An automatic transfer from the inverter to the AC supply will occur on any of the following:

an overvoltage or undervoltage of +/- 10%

an overfrequency or underfrequency of +/- 2 cycles Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because MCC-R is fed through an ESF bus that can be supplied by a DG, and MCC-S is also fed through an ESF bus that can be supplied by a DG. It is wrong because MCC-R is the alternate supply to the NBPP, not MCC-S.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because inverter failure will cause the NBPP to transfer to its alternate supply, and inverter failure would be caused by low battery DC input voltage to the inverter, which would correspond to high DC input current to the inverter. It is wrong because overcurrent is not sensed on the inverter output. Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reasons given for distractor C. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reasons given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.2.22 [Vital Instrument Power System](Rev 80),

Lesson plan COR001-01-01 [Ops AC Electrical Distribution](Rev 50), Procedure 5.3AC480 [480 VAC Bus Failure](Rev 55)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-01-01 Obj LO-6c, Describe the interrelationship between the AC Electrical Distribution System and the following: No Break Power Supply; 10e, Briefly describe the following concepts as they apply to AC Electrical Distribution System: Static Switch operation; 17e, Describe the effect of the following on No Break Power Supply operation: High No Break Power Supply voltage Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 223002 (SF5 PCIS) Primary Containment Tier# 2 Isolation/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Group# 1 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the K/A # 223002 A3.02 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Rating 3.5 SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF Revision 0 including:

A3.02 Valve closures Revision Statement:

Question 6 RCIC is injecting at rated flow following a scram from 100% power.

The following annunciator is received due to a pipe break:

RCIC PANEL/WINDOW:

STEAM LINE HIGH D/P 9-4-1/A-2 Which of the RCIC valves listed below CLOSE as a result of this condition?

RCIC-MO-15 [Inbd Stm Supp Isol Vlv]

RCIC- MO-16 [Outbd Stm Supp Isol Vlv]

RCIC-MO-21 [Pump Disch to Rx Vlv]

RCIC Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve A. RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16, ONLY B. Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve and RCIC-MO-21, ONLY C. RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 and RCIC-MO-21, ONLY D. RCIC-MO-15 and RCIC-MO-16 and Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve, ONLY Answer: D Explanation:

RCIC steam line high flow, 288%, is a Group 5 isolation signal. High RCIC steam line flow is sensed by D/P instrumentation and also actuates the subject annunciator at

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 the isolation setpoint. A pipe break would result in both channels of Group 5 logic tripping. Group 5 Channel A closes RCIC-MO-16. Channel B closes RCIC-MO-15.

An automatic isolation signal from Channel A while RCIC is operating results in a RCIC Turbine Trip, which closes the Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because both channels of Group 5 logic tripping closes RCIC-MO-15 and MO-16. It is wrong because an isolation of Group 5 Channel A also causes the Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve to close.

Answer B is plausible because actuation of Group 5 logic closes the Turbine Trip &

Throttle Valve, which shuts off the steam supply to RCIC turbine. An examinee believe the Trip & Throttle Valve will isolate the steam leak. An examinee may also believe injection valve MO-21 closes on a Group 5 signal or when RCIC turbine trips, since minimum flow valve MO-27 automatically closes on a RCIC turbine trip. This answer is wrong because MO-15 and MO-16 isolate on a Group 5 signal and because MO-21 does not automatically close.

Answer C is plausible because MO-15 and MO-16 close upon a Group 5 signal and because an examinee may believe injection valve MO-21 also automatically closes on a Group 5 signal or when RCIC turbine trips. It is wrong because MO-21 does not automatically close and because the Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve does automatically close for this event.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-18-02 [Ops Reactor Core Isolation Cooling](Rev 32), procedure 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation](Rev 63),

Alarm Card 9-4-1/A-2 [RCIC Steam Line High D/P](Rev 59)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-18-02 Obj. LO-10r, Predict the consequences of the following on the RCIC System: PCIS isolation signal Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - PCIS, RCIC

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 261000 (SF9 SGTS) Standby Gas Treatment Tier# 2 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or Group# 1 cause-effect relationships between STANDBY GAS K/A # 261000 K1.02 TREATMENT SYSTEM and the following: Rating 3.2 K1.02 Drywell Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 7 A steam leak at 60% power is causing Drywell pressure to rise.

SGT B is aligned to vent the Drywell IAW Procedure 2.2.60 [Primary Containment Ventilation and Nitrogen Inerting System].

(1) According to the caution in Procedure 2.2.60 for this alignment, why is the Drywell pressure reduction required to be limited by the operator?

AND (2) If Drywell pressure rises to 3 psig, which one of the following valves CLOSE to isolate the connection between SGT and the Drywell?

A. (1) Minimize the release of radioactivity outside PC (2) PC-MO-306, VALVE MO 231 BYPASS VLV B. (1) Minimize the release of radioactivity outside PC (2) PC-AD-R-1B, CONTAINMENT EXH. TO STBY GAS TREATMENT C. (1) Prevent Torus to Drywell vacuum breakers from opening (2) PC-MO-306, VALVE MO 231 BYPASS VLV D. (1) Prevent Torus to Drywell vacuum breakers from opening (2) (2) PC-AD-R-1B, CONTAINMENT EXH. TO STBY GAS TREATMENT Answer: C Explanation:

SGT is connected to the DW via the DW vent line. Flow from the DW can pass through 24 inboard isolation valve PC-MO-231 or through a smaller 2 bypass line around MO-231 via PC-MO-306. Flow then passes through outboard isolation valve PC-AO-246 and then through inlet to SGT suction plenum from drywell damper PC-AD-R-1B.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Procedure 2.2.60 contains the steps for DW venting during non-EOP conditions. A caution at step 4.7 states Torus to DW vacuum breakers may open if Torus pressure is as low as 0.1 psig above DW pressure. Step 4.7.2 directs the operator to open PC-MO-306 while ensuring Torus pressure does not exceed DW pressure by > 0.1 psig, which is in order to maintain Torus to DW vacuum breakers closed.

PC-MO-231 automatically isolates on a Group 6 isolation signal. PC-AD-R-1B does not.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because the DW atmosphere during a steam leak would contain radioactivity, and an examinee may believe minimizing pressure reduction is to minimize the overall volume of DW atmosphere containing radioactivity released outside PC. It is also plausible because procedure 2.2.60 contains cautions related to radioactivity release when ventilating the DW to the Reactor Building exhaust plenum.

It is wrong because the caution in procedure 2.2.60 related to DW venting is specific to preventing Torus to DW vacuum breakers from opening. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reasons given for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because PC-AD-R-1B is in the flow path from the drywell and because it has interlocks associated with a Group 6 isolation/initiation. An associated damper PC-AD-R-1A, which connects the DW to the Rx Bldg Vent Exh Plenum and is operated by the control switch common to PC-AD-R1B, automatically closes on a Group 6 isolation/initiation. It is wrong because PC-AD-R-1B automatically opens on a Group 6 isolation/initiation.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reasons given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

lesson plan COR002-28-02 [Ops Standby Gas Treatment System](Rev 26), Procedure 2.2.60 [Primary Containment Ventilation and Nitrogen Inerting System](Rev 101), Procedure 2.2.73 [Standby Gas Treatment System](Rev 60)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-28-02 LO-05b, Describe the interrelationships between SGT and the following: Primary Containment Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7),(10)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Primary Containment

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 262001 (SF6 AC) AC Electrical Distribution Tier# 2 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the Group# 1 following: K/A # 262001 K2.01 K2.01 Off-site sources of power Rating 3.3 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 8 What is the normal power source to the Emergency Service Station Transformer?

A. OPPD line via the T6 transformer B. Auburn line via the T7 transformer C. 161 KV substation via the T7 transformer D. 161 KV substation via the T6 transformer Answer: D Explanation:

During normal station operation, the Emergency Service Station Transformer (ESST) is energized by the 69 kV transmission line from the 69 kV Bay of the 161 kV Substation via Transformer T6 through Air Break Switch 5298. The Emergency Transformer supply can be aligned to either the Cooper 161 kV System via Transformer T6 or to the OPPD 69 kV line.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because the 69 KV OPPD line can feed the ESST. It is incorrect because the OPPD line does not connect with the ESST via the T6 transformer.

Answer B is plausible because the 161KV Auburn line does supply the ESST, just not directly. It is wrong because the Auburn line connects with the 161 kV Substation.

From the 161 kV Substation the power must go through the 69 kV Bay and the T6 transformer to connect with the ESST. The Auburn line does not connect to the ESST via the T7 transformer.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer C is plausible because the 161KV substation supplies the ESST via a step down transformer. It is wrong because the ESST is supplied via step down transformer T6, not T7.

Technical

References:

procedure 2.2.17 [Emergency Station Service Transformer](Rev 73), TS 3.8.1 Bases References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-01-01 Obj LO-7a, State the electrical power supplies to the following: Off-Site Sources of Power Question Source: Bank # 4/2015 ILT NRC Q#44 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency AC Power

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 4/2015 ILT NRC Q#44

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 400000 (SF8 CCS) Component Cooling Water Tier# 2 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the Group# 1 following: K/A # 400000 K2.02 K2.02 CCW valves Rating 2.9 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 9 What is the normal power supply to REC-MO-713 [REC HX B Outlet Valve]?

A. MCC-C B. MCC-M C. MCC-R D. MCC-RB Answer: D Explanation:

Modified question by changing the subject valve in the stem, making the correct answer different than in the original question.

Procedure 2.2A.REC.DIV3 lists MCC-RB breaker 4B as the power supply to MO-713.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because other MOVs, such as MC-MO-1 [SJAE Cond A Inlet],

are powered from MCC-C. It is wrong because MO-713 is powered from MCC-RB.

Answer B is plausible because MCC-M is also powered from 480B Bus 1F and other loads in the Reactor Building are powered from MCC-M, including REC-TIC-451A. It is wrong because MO-713 is powered from MCC-RB.

Answer C is plausible because MCC-R powers REC-MO-700 [Non-Critical Header Supply]. It is wrong because MO-713 is powered from MCC-RB.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Technical

References:

procedure 2.2A.REC.DIV3 [Reactor Equipment Cooling Water System Common Divisional Component Checklist](Rev 3), Procedure 5.3AC480 [480 VAC Bus Failure](Rev 55), procedure 2.2A_480.RX [480 VAC Reactor Building Breaker Checklist](Rev 22)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-19-02 Obj LO-2a, State the electrical power supplies to the following REC components: Valve Motors Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#53 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability N/A 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#53

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 206000 (SF2, SF4 HPCIS) High-Pressure Coolant Tier# 2 Injection Group# 1 2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, K/A # 206000 G2.4.31 indications, or response procedures. Rating 4.2 Revision Revision Statement:

Question 10 HPCI is in standby when the following annunciators are received:

HPCI TURBINE PANEL/WINDOW:

TRIP 9-3-2/B-1 HPCI-MO-15/16 PANEL/WINDOW:

NOT FULL OPEN 9-3-2/B-2 HPCI Inboard and Outboard Isolation Valves MO-15 AND MO-16 go closed.

The amber AUTO ISOL SIG light on Panel 9-3 is NOT lit.

What caused these indications?

A. HPCI Low Steam Line Pressure isolation has occurred B. HPCI Steam Line High Steam Flow isolation has occurred C. HPCI MANUAL ISOLATION push button was depressed D. HPCI Steam Line Space High Temperature isolation has occurred Answer: A Explanation:

Conditions given in the stem indicated a HPCI isolation has occurred. The HPCI amber AUTO ISOL SIG light indicates the isolation logic has sealed in, requiring the reset push button to be depressed after the isolation condition has cleared in order to reset the logic and allow the isolation valves to be recovered. Only the low steam

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 supply pressure isolation signal does not cause HPCI isolation logic to seal in and will auto reset when the condition clears. For this reason, a Low Steam Line Pressure condition will not illuminate the Amber AUTO ISOL SIG light and will not actuate the HPCI Isolation annunciator 9-3-2/A-2, but it causes all other isolation functions to occur.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because HPCI steam line high steam flow (high D/P) is a HPCI isolation signal. It is wrong because the Amber AUTO ISOL SIG light and annunciator 9-3-2/A-2 [HPCI Isol Sig A/B Initiated] would also be on.

Answer C is plausible because an isolation is present but the AUTO ISOL SIG amber light is off. It is wrong because the HPCI MANUAL ISOLATION push button only causes an isolation when a HPCI initiation signal is present.

Answer D is plausible because HPCI Steam Line Space High Temperature is an isolation signal. It is wrong for the same reason stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

procedure 2.2.33 [High Pressure Coolant Injection System](Rev 84), Alarm Card 9-3-2/B-1 [HPCI TURBINE TRIP](Rev 34), Alarm Card 9-3-2/A-2 [HPCI ISOL SIG A/B INITIATED](Rev 34)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-11-02 Obj LO-8b, Describe the HPCI design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: System isolation Question Source: Bank # 5136 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability; Top 10 Risk Significant System - HPCI

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 215004 (SF7 SRMS) Source-Range Monitor Tier# 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of Group# 1 the SOURCE RANGE MONITOR (SRM) SYSTEM K/A # 215004 K3.04 will have on following: Rating 3.7 K3.04 Reactor power and indication Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 11 IRMs are on Range 7 during startup.

SRM SHORTING LINK SWITCHES are in their normal positions for startup.

The following alarm is received relative to SRM C:

SRM PANEL/WINDOW:

UPSCALE/INOP 9-5-1/F-7 SRM C back panel indication is:

(1) What is the cause of the above alarm? (Assume MAXIMUM allowed TRM setpoint.)

AND (2) What is the status of the reactor?

A. (1) SRM Inop (2) Operating B. (1) SRM Inop

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 (2) Scrammed C. (1) SRM Upscale (2) Operating D. (1) SRM Upscale (2) Scrammed Answer: A Explanation:

The SRM Upscale/Inop alarm combined with the given SRM C reading of 5E4 cps indicates a SRM Inop condition caused the alarm, not upscale since count rate is below 1E5. With IRMs on range 7, an SRM inop produces a control rod block, not automatically bypassed until IRMs are on range 8 or the Reactor Mode Switch is in RUN during a plant start up.

The normal position of SRM SHORTING LINK SWITCHES is CLOSE. With SRM shorting link switches in CLOSE, SRM trip signals are bypassed within RPS, so only a rod block occurs with SRM C Inop.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because a SRM hi-hi flux trip on any channel would result in a full scram if shorting link switches were in OPEN. When shorting links are open, SRM hi-hi flux trip signals result in non-coincident RPS trip signals. It is wrong because SRM shorting link switches are normally in CLOSE, so SRM trip signals are bypassed within RPS, so only a rod block occurs.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because the alarm is common to a SRM Upscale condition. It is wrong because the maximum allowed value for SRM upscale is 1E5 cps, but SRM C is below the setpoint at 5E4 cps. Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor C. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

TRM 3.3.1 [Control Rod Block Instrumentation], Alarm Card 9-5-1/F-7 [SRM Upscale/Inop](Rev 36), procedure 4.1.4 [Source Range Monitor Instrumentation](Rev 24)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-30-02 Obj LO 7d, Given a specific SRM system malfunction, determine the effect on the following: Reactor power indication Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 262002 (SF6 UPS) Uninterruptable Power Supply Tier# 2 (AC/DC) Group# 1 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of K/A # 262002 K6.03 the following will have on the UNINTERRUPTABLE Rating 2.7 POWER SUPPLY (A.C./D.C.): Revision K6.03 Static inverter Revision Statement:

Question 12 The plant is at 100% power.

PMIS UPS inverter fails due to overcurrent.

The PMIS UPS Main Panel is now .

A. de-energized B. energized via MDP-1 C. energized via MDP-2 D. energized via MCC-L Answer: B Explanation:

The PMIS-UPS provides an uninterruptible source of 208 VAC power to the Plant Management Information System (plant computer). PMIS-UPS consists of a battery charger, battery, inverter, and the PMIS UPS Main panel. Power to PMIS UPS Main panel is normally supplied from the 12.5 kV distribution system at the multi-purpose facility (MPF) panel MDP-2 through an automatic transfer switch to a battery charger.

The battery charger's DC output is sent to a 75 kVA inverter and supplies a trickle charge to the battery. The inverter converts the DC voltage to AC and supplies PMIS UPS main panel. An alternate source of power from MCC-L is also provided. If the normal supply is lost, the transfer switch will shift to MCC-L. The 75 kVA static switch will transfer to MDP-1 on inverter failure, which could be caused by low battery/DC supply voltage, or an overcurrent condition on the inverter. MDP-1 may also be put on line manually with a manual bypass switch. This allows PMIS UPS Main panel to remain energized while de-energizing the PMIS-UPS inverter cabinet for maintenance.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because MDP-1 also has a bypass switch that must be operated manually. The examinee may believe the transfer to MDP-1 must be performed manually if the inverter fails. It is wrong because the 75 kVA static switch will automatically transfer to MDP-1 on inverter failure.

Answer C is plausible because MDP-2 can ultimately supply power to the PMIS UPS main panel. It is wrong because MDP-2 can only supply power to the PMIS UPS Main Panel via the inverter, but the inverter has failed.

Answer D is plausible because MCC-L can ultimately supply power to the PMIS UPS main panel, and there is an automatic transfer to the MCC-L supply if the normal supply, MDP-2 is lost. It is wrong because MCC-L can only supply power to the PMIS UPS Main Panel via the inverter, but the inverter has failed.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR001-01-01 [Ops AC Electrical Distribution](Rev 50)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-01-01 Obj LO-6d, Describe the interrelationship between the AC Electrical Distribution System and the following: PMIS UPS; 8e, Predict the consequences of the following on plant operation: PMIS/UPS Inverter Failure Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 215003 (SF7 IRM) Intermediate-Range Monitor Tier# 2 Knowledge of the operational implications of the Group# 1 following concepts as they apply to INTERMEDIATE K/A # 215003 K5.03 RANGE MONITOR (IRM) SYSTEM: Rating 3.0 K5.03 Changing detector position Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 13 The plant is in Mode 2.

All IRMs are fully inserted AND are reading 65 on range 4.

Which one of the following describes the FIRST effect that would occur if IRM C were to be withdrawn under these conditions?

A. ONLY a Rod Withdrawal Block when IRM C detector reaches NOT fully inserted position B. ONLY a Rod Withdrawal Block when IRM C detector reaches fully withdrawn position C. Rod Withdrawal Block AND RPS Div 1 half scram when IRM C detector reaches NOT fully inserted position D. Rod Withdrawal Block AND RPS Div 1 half scram when IRM C detector reaches rate reaches fully withdrawn position Answer: A Explanation:

With the plant in Mode 2, the Reactor Mode Switch is in STARTUP. With the Reactor Mode Switch not in RUN, a control withdrawal rod block is generated when an IRM is not fully inserted, unless it is bypassed.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because IRM downscale generates a rod withdrawal block with the Reactor Mode Switch in STARTUP and because IRM fully withdrawn position actuates a status light on panel 9-5 just as does fully inserted position. SRMs can be withdrawn without generating a detector not fully inserted rod withdrawal block when

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 IRMs are on range 3 or above. The examinee who confuses IRM interlocks with SRM interlocks or IRM fully withdrawn position with fully inserted position may choose this answer. It is wrong because IRMs generate a rod withdrawal block in Mode 2 if any detector is not fully inserted, regardless of selected range.

Answer C is plausible because a rod withdrawal block would be generated due to IRM C detector not fully inserted. It is also plausible because some IRM C signals, INOP and Upscale Hi-Hi, would cause a half scram. The examinee who believes a half scram would be generated would choose this answer. It is wrong because IRM downscale is only a rod withdrawal block signal.

Answer D is plausible for the same reason stated for distractor A and because some IRM C signals, INOP and Upscale Hi-Hi, would cause a Div 1 RPS half scram. The examinee who confuses IRM interlocks with RMCS with those for RPS, believing an IRM downscale generates a half scram, may choose this answer. It is wrong because IRM downscale is only a rod withdrawal block signal.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-12-02 [Intermediate Range Monitoring System ](Rev 16), Procedure 4.1.2 [Intermediate Range Monitoring System](Rev 24),

procedure 4.1.1 [Source Range Monitoring System](Rev 24), TS 3.3.1.1 [RPS Instrumentation, TRM 3.3.1 [Control Rod Block Instrumentation]

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-12-02 Obj LO-5a, Describe the IRM system design features and/or interlocks that provide the following: Rod withdrawal blocks; 5e, Changing detector position Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 223002 (SF5 PCIS) Primary Containment Tier# 2 Isolation/Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff Group# 1 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on K/A # 223002 A2.02 the PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION Rating 2.9 SYSTEM/NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUT-OFF; Revision 0 and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.02 D.C. electrical distribution failures Revision Statement:

Question 14 The reactor is in Mode 2 at 500 psig.

The power panel supplying Group 4 Channel B isolation logic power was lost one minute ago.

With respect to Group 4 Channel B isolation logic ONLY (1) Is the logic tripped or NOT tripped?

AND (2) Which one of the following procedures is required to be entered to mitigate this condition?

A. (1) Tripped (2) 5.3DC125 [Loss of 125 VDC]

B. (1) Tripped (2) Alarm Card C-1/F-2 [RPS Pwr Panel 1B Voltage Failure]

C. (1) NOT tripped (2) 5.3DC125 [Loss of 125 VDC]

D. (1) NOT tripped (2) Alarm Card C-1/F-2 [RPS Pwr Panel 1B Voltage Failure]

Answer: C

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Explanation:

Portions of Group 4 (HPCI) isolation logic is powered from both 125 VDC Distribution Panel B via Panel BB2 and from 125 VDC Distribution Panel A via Panel AA2. Group 4 logic is energize to isolate. Redundancy is provided for PCIS such that no single failure will prevent isolation.

Loss of 125 VDC Panel B results in loss of logic power to Group 4 channel B. Since Group 4 isolation logic is energize to trip, no isolation signal is generated.

Loss of 125 VDC Distribution Panel B requires entry into procedure 5.3DC125 and does not directly result in a reactor scram or Group isolation. Only procedure 5.3DC125 is required to be entered, since no isolation occurred.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because some Group isolation logic is de-energize to trip, such as for Groups 1, 3, and 6. It is wrong because Group 4 logic is energize to trip, so no isolation signal is generated. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Part 2 is plausible because RPS supplies logic power for some isolation Groups, such as Groups 1, 3, and 6. The first step to mitigate loss of RPS B power is to transfer RPS B to its alternate power supply IAW Alarm Card C-1/F-2. It is wrong because 125 VDC supplies power to Group 4 isolation logic, so procedure 5.3DC125 is required to be entered. RPS B remains energized, so Alarm Card C-1/F-2 entry is not required.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

GE dwg 791E271 sheets 2, 3, 4; Procedure 5.3DC125 [Loss of 125 VDC](Rev 44), Lesson Plan COR002-03-02 [Ops Containment](Rev 35), Alarm Card C-1/F-2 [RPS Pwr Panel 1B Voltage Failure](Rev 33)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-07-02 Obj LO-3f, (for HPCI) Given a specific loss or malfunction of the DC Distribution system, indicate the effect the loss or malfunction would have on the following systems, include in this discussion:

The systems ability to automatically initiate and perform its intended function.

The systems ability to be manually initiated and perform its intended function.

The actions necessary outside of the control room to be performed to mitigate the loss or the failure of this system to operate as intended (if any).

COR002-03-02 Obj. LO-6n, Describe the interrelationship between PCIS and the following: DC Distribution; 6d, HPCI Question Source: Bank #

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - Emergency DC Power, PCIS, HPCI

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E271 sh 2

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E271 sh 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E271 sh 4

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E271 sh 4

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 259002 (SF2 RWLCS) Reactor Water Level Control Tier# 2 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Group# 1 control room: K/A # 259002 A4.11 A4.11 High level lockout reset controls: Plant- Rating 3.5 Specific Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 15 The plant is at 100% power when RPV water level rises due to a Master Level Controller failure, resulting in the following indications on Panel 9-5:

(1) What is the status of RFPT B?

AND (2) Which one of the following values is the HIGHEST Narrow Range reactor water level that depressing the above RESET button(s) will cause the tripped logic channel(s) to reset?

A. (1) Tripped (2) 52 inches B. (1) Tripped (2) 56 inches C. (1) Running (2) 52 inches D. (1) Running (2) 56 inches

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer: A Explanation:

There are three reactor water level high channels in RVLCS. The trip logic is derived from narrow range water level instrumentation and is arranged in a 2-out-of-3 taken once scheme, with a trip setpoint of 54 (TS). When any two channels trip, a trip signal is sent to both RFPTs and the Main Turbine. The amber lights pictured in the stem indicate channels A and C are tripped, since the associated lights are illuminated. With channels A and C tripped, both RFPTs are tripped and cannot be reset until reactor water level is below 54.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because HPCI also trips on reactor water level high, 54. However, its instrumentation is derived from wide range water level instrumentation. (One wide range level instrumentation is an input to RVLCS, but it does not input into the high water level trip logic.) Wide range level indicates approximately 5 lower than narrow range level instrumentation at 100% power due to differing calibration conditions (WR is calibrated to no Jet Pump Flow). Therefore, the HPCI high reactor water level trip does not occur until ~ 59 indicated on narrow range. This answer would be correct if the question concerned HPCI or if RFPT trip was derived from wide range level instrumentation. It is wrong because the RFPT trip is derived from narrow range instrumentation, thus narrow range must be below 54.

Answer C part 1 is plausible for two reasons. First, an examinee may believe an extinguished light indicates the channel is tripped, since PCIS isolation status logic lights on Panel 9-5 extinguish to indicate isolation logic is tripped. Thus the examinee may believe only one channel is tripped and both RFPTs are still operating. Second, an examinee who realizes channels A and C are tripped may believe all three channels must be tripped to result in RFPT trips. This answer is wrong because two of the channels are tripped, indicated by the illuminated logic channel lights.

Therefore the necessary logic requirements are satisfied to cause both RFPTs to trip.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor C.

Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-32-02 [Ops Reactor Vessel Level Control](Rev 24), Lesson plan COR002-15-02 [Ops Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation](Rev 28), procedure 4.4.1 [Reactor Vessel Level Control System](Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-32-02 Obj LO 3j, Describe the RVLC system design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Reactor Vessel Overfill Protection

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)((7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 239002 (SF3 SRV) Safety Relief Valves Tier# 2 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system limits and Group# 2 precautions. K/A # 239002 G2.1.32 Rating 3.8 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 16 Procedure 2.2.1 [Nuclear Pressure Relief System] states:

SRV operation is prohibited when Main Steam System pressure is below (1) psig.

AND The basis for this limitation is (2) .

A. (1) 50 (2) SRV tailpipe damage may occur.

B. (1) 50 (2) The SRV can NOT be relied upon to open.

C. (1) 70 (2) SRV tailpipe damage may occur.

D. (1) 70 (2) The SRV can NOT be relied upon to open.

Answer: B Explanation:

Procedure 2.2.1 P&L 2.2 states Safety/relief valve operation prohibited with Main Steam System less than 50 psig. This is because the valve springs will cause the SRVs to close when RPV pressure lowers to ~50 psig; therefore, an SRV cannot be relied upon to open if RPV pressure is <50 psig.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because a caution preceding procedure 2.2.1 step 5.1 relates to an opening restriction for SRVs to prevent SRV tailpipe damage. Also, the SRV tailpipe level limit in EOPs is associated with SRV operation and SRV tailpipe damage. The examinee who confuses these restrictions on opening

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRVs may choose this answer. It is wrong because the caution at step 5.1 requires waiting a minimum of 3 minutes before reopening a SRV, due to water being drawn into the SRV tailpipe from the SP due to the vacuum created as steam in the tailpipe cools and is not based directly on RPV pressure. Also, SRV tailpipe damage associated with the SRV tailpipe level limit is based on SP level, not RPV pressure.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because it is just below a recognizable value associated with RPV cooldown using SRVs. 72 psig is the RPV low pressure permissive for placing Shutdown Cooling in service. It is wrong because Procedure 2.2.1 P&L 2.2 states SRV operation is prohibited with MS pressure below 50 psig. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor C. Part 2 is correct.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.2.1 [Nuclear Pressure Relief System](Rev 39),

Lesson plan COR002-16-02 [Ops Nuclear Pressure Relief](Rev 21), PSTG [AMP-TBD00 EOP Technical Basis](Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-16-02 Obj LO-6b, Briefly describe the following concepts as they apply to NPR: Relief function of SRV operation Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - ADS/SRV

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 211000 (SF1 SLCS) Standby Liquid Control Tier# 2 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the Group# 1 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM including: K/A # 211000 A3.06 A3.06 RWCU system isolation: Plant-Specific Rating 4.0 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 17 Both SLC pumps A and B control switches are placed in START on panel 9-5.

SLC Pump B breaker immediately trips when SLC Pump B switch is placed in START Which one of the following completes the statement below regarding how RWCU is affected in this situation?

RWCU valve(s) (1) receive(s) an isolation signal, then the in-service RWCU pump trips due to (2) .

A. (1) MO-15, Inboard Isolation Valve, ONLY (2) MO-15 reaching not fully open B. (1) MO-15, Inboard Isolation Valve, ONLY (2) RWCU flow dropping below 50 gpm C. (1) MO-15, Inboard Isolation Valve and MO-18, Outboard Isolation Valve (2) RWCU flow dropping below 50 gpm D. (1) MO-15, Inboard Isolation Valve and MO-18, Outboard Isolation Valve (2) MO-15 or MO-18 reaching not fully open Answer: D Explanation:

SLC A panel 9-5 control switch in START de-energizes isolation logic for RWCU suction valve MO-15 and SLC B panel 9-5 control switch in START de-energizes isolation logic for RWCU suction valve MO-18. PCIS Group 3 logic for RWCU-MO-15 and 18 is de-energize to isolate. The SLC pump start contacts are located in RWCU logic and these circuits do not rely on AC power from SLC system. Therefore, close

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 signals are completed for both MO-15 and MO-18 when SLC control switches are placed to START, and MO-15 and MO-18 close.

When the not fully open limit switch contact picks upon either MO-15 or MO-18, a trip signal to RWCU pumps is generated. This will occur at approximately 95% open position, essentially before MO-15 or MO-18 begin to throttle flow, thus before RWCU flow drops to 50 gpm.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because SLC Pump control circuits are powered via a 480V/120V transformer via the respective SLC pump breaker, and the stem implies SLC Pump B and its control circuit are de-energized 2 seconds after its control switch is taken to START. If the circuit for RWCU-MO-18 isolation was powered from this circuit, MO-18 would not reach not fully open position (~95% open). It is wrong because the SLC control switch contact is in the RWCU MO-18 control circuit, and receives power via MO-18 power, so MO-18 closes when the SLC B control switch contact closes. Part 2 is correct in that RWCU pumps trip before RWCU flow lowers to 50 gpm based on a suction valve, MO-15 or MO-18, reaching not fully open, ~95%,

position.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because RWCU flow < 50 gpm is also a pump trip, and isolation valves closing would eventually throttle RWCU flow below 50 gpm. It is wrong because MO-15 and MO-18 will reach not fully open position and trip the RWCU pump before flow lowers to 50 gpm.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.2.66 [Reactor Water Cleanup](Rev 118), GE dwgs 791E262 sh 1, 791E263 sh 1, References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-29-02 Obj LO-5f, Describe the SLC design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: RWCU isolation Question Source: Bank # LOR Biennial Bank Q#49-4 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - PCIS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E262 sh 1

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E263 sh 1

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 264000 (SF6 EGE) Emergency Generators Tier# 2 (Diesel/Jet) EDG Group# 1 2.4.46 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent K/A # 264000 G2.4.46 with the plant conditions. Rating 4.2 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 18 DG1 was manually started for a monthly surveillance.

The following annunciator was received 20 seconds ago and DG1 is still running:

DIESEL GEN 1 PANEL/WINDOW:

EXCESSIVE VIBRATION C-1/F-3 (1) Is DG1 required to be tripped by the operator?

AND (2) If this had been a valid automatic DG1 start, is DG1 required to be tripped?

A. (1) No (2) No B. (1) No (2) Yes C. (1) Yes (2) No D. (1) Yes (2) Yes Answer: C Explanation:

Upon a normal (manual) start, the high vibration trip is bypassed for 30 seconds to allow the DG to come to rated speed and to stabilize. If high vibration remains after 30 seconds, the excessive vibration alarm will be received and, 5 seconds later, the DG will trip. Since the vibration alarm has been in for more than 5 seconds, an

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 automatic trip should have occurred, and the operator is required to trip the DG IAW Alarm Card C-1/F-3 step 2.1 to protect important plant equipment.

The high vibration trip is automatically bypassed on an emergency start of the DG, so the operator would not be required to trip the DG during an emergency start if the high vibration alarm remained in for >30 seconds.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because high vibration trip is bypassed sometimes and because the alarm does not come in until excessive vibration exists and a 30 second time delay expires. An examinee may believe another 5 seconds must pass before a trip signal is generated. It is wrong because the vibration trip is not bypassed during a monthly surveillance, and the alarm has been in for 20 seconds, so the DG should have tripped 15 seconds ago. Manually tripping the DG is required. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Part 2 is plausible because high vibration is an automatic trip during a normal DG start if it remains in for >30 seconds, and operators are required to effect failed automatic actions. It is wrong because by design the high vibration trip is automatically bypassed during emergency DG starts, so the operator is not required to trip the DG.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-08-02 [Ops Diesel Generators](Rev 37), Alarm Card C-1/F-3 [Diesel Gen 1 Excessive Vibration](Rev 33), Procedure 14.17.7 [DG-1 Vibration Switch Testing and Maintenance](Rev 8)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-08-02 Obj. LO-9a, Describe the Diesel Generator design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) that provide for the following: Diesel Generator Trips (Normal); 9b, Diesel Generator Trips (Emergency/LOCA)

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency DGs

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 205000 (SF4 SCS) Shutdown Cooling Tier# 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of Group# 1 the SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR K/A # 205000 K3.05 SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) will have on Rating 2.6 following: Revision 0 K3.05 Fuel pool cooling assist: Plant-Specific Revision Statement:

Question 19 The plant is in Mode 5 with the following conditions:

RHR System B is intertied with Fuel Pool Cooling (FPC) to provide additional cooling to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP).

FPC Pump A is in service.

RHR Pump B is in service.

SFP temperature is 120°F.

A spurious Group 2 isolation is received.

(1) Which pump(s) trip(s) as a result of this condition?

AND (2) Which procedure is required to be entered?

A. (1) FPC Pump A and RHR Pump B (2) 2.4SDC [Shutdown cooling Abnormal]

B. (1) FPC Pump A and RHR Pump B (2) 2.4FPC [Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble]

C. (1) RHR Pump B (2) 2.4SDC [Shutdown cooling Abnormal]

D. (1) RHR Pump B (2) 2.4FPC [Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble]

Answer: C Explanation:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Connections to the RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) system are provided which allow the RHR heat exchangers to be used to aid in cooling the fuel storage pool should supplementary cooling be necessary. The RHR system can be intertied with the Fuel Pool Cooling system when the Fuel Pool gates and slot plugs have been removed. With RHR Pump B operating in SDC, manual valve RHR-82 [RHR System Return to FPC System] is opened to supply a portion of RHR flow to the FPC distribution header. This capability increases the spent fuel pool cooling capacity in the event that additional capacity is necessary to maintain fuel pool temperature below 150°F. The RHR system - Fuel Pool Cooling system intertie is sized to assist with removing the decay heat of a full core off-load plus the spent fuel discharged from previous refuelings.

In the event that that RHR Assist mode of cooling is being utilized, weirs are adjusted to make reactor cavity water flow into skimmer surge tanks and prevent fuel pool water from flowing into skimmer surge tanks. Configuring weirs in this fashion allows skimmer tanks to only be taking suction off of the Reactor well. This alignment will force more circulation from the fuel pool into the reactor well. RHR Pump B is providing both shutdown cooling and fuel pool cooling assist in this alignment.

A Group 2 isolation causes RHR SDC suction valves RHR-MO17 & 18 to close. This results in automatic trip of RHR Pump B due to loss of suction path. FPC Pump A will remain in operation, with the return path to the FPC skimmer surge tank via the reactor cavity weirs.

Trip of the operating RHR pump in SDC is an entry condition to procedure 2.4SDC.

Since FPC Pump A remains in operation and SFP temperature is <125°F, no entry condition to procedure 2.4FPC exists.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible to the examinee who knows RHR Pump B will trip when SDC suction valves close and believes that would result in loss of return flow to the FPC skimmer surge tank and a low skimmer surge tank level trip of FPC Pump A.

The examinee who only considers loss of RHR flow to the SFP and does not consider RHR SDC suction flow from the RPV is also terminated may choose this answer. It is wrong because FPC flow continues from the skimmer surge tanks to FPC Pump A, into the SFP and reactor cavity, and return to the skimmer surge tanks; therefore, FPC Pump A remains running. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason as given for distractor A.

Part 2 is plausible because RHR is in fuel pool cooling assist when it is lost, and that will cause SFP temp to eventually rise. It is wrong because entry conditions for 2.4SPC are trip of all FPC pumps, SFP temperature >125°F, or loss of cooling to FP heat exchangers, none of which exist.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason as given for distractor B.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Technical

References:

Procedure 2.2.69.2 [RHR System Shutdown Operations](Rev 106), Lesson plan COR001-06-01 [Fuel Pool Cooling](Rev 31),

procedure 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation](Rev 63), procedure 2.4SDC

[Shutdown Cooling Abnormal](Rev 17), procedure 2.4FPC [Fuel Pool Cooling Trouble](Rev 37)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-23-02 Obj LO 7g, Given a specific RHR system malfunction, determine the effect on any of the following: Fuel Pool Cooling assist Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4),(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - RHR

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 212000 (SF7 RPS) Reactor Protection Tier# 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on Group# 1 the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM; and (b) K/A # 212000 A2.11 based on those predictions, use procedures to Rating 4.0 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Revision 0 those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.11 Main steamline isolation valve closure Revision Statement:

Question 20 With the plant at 15% power, MSIVs 80C AND 86D simultaneously FAST close.

Which one of the following describes the effect of this condition on RPS AND which procedure(s) is/are required to be entered?

A. Full reactor scram; enter 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram] AND EOP-1A B. RPS half scram; enter 2.4MSIV [Inadvertent MSIV Closure], ONLY C. Contacts open in RPS but logic for half scram on MSIV position is NOT satisfied, so NO trip is initiated; enter 2.4MSIV [Inadvertent MSIV Closure], ONLY D. Contacts open in RPS and logic for RPS half scram on MSIV position is satisfied but is bypassed in RPS for current plant Mode; enter 2.4MSIV [Inadvertent MSIV Closure], ONLY Answer: B Explanation:

At 15% power, the Reactor Mode Switch is in RUN. MSIV closure RPS trip is only active (not bypassed) when the Reactor Mode Switch is in RUN. This question represents isolation of two of the four MSLs. If two steam lines are isolated a RPS protective action may or may not occur, depending on the MSIV's that are closed. If the isolation valves for Main Steam Lines "A" and "D", or, "B" and "C" are closed 10%,

the RPS recognizes this condition but no actions are initiated until a third line isolates causing a full reactor scram to take place. If the isolation valves are closed on two Main Steam Lines using any other combination, a half scram will occur. Isolation of MSL (A and B) OR (C and D) trip RPS A. Isolation of MSL (A and C) OR (B and D) trip RPS B. In this case, isolation of MSLs C and D causes a RPS A half scram.

Also, isolation of two MSLs at 15% power does not cause RPV pressure to rise to the

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 scram setpoint or steam flow in the two MSLs that remain open to rise to the high flow isolation setpoint, since the two MSLs that remain open can easily accommodate 15%

steam flow. Therefore, a full scram is not generated, and neither procedure 2.1.5 nor EOP-1A will be entered.

Only Procedure 2.4MSIV is required to be entered, since it is intended to mitigate a MSIV closure event that does not directly result in a scram.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because some combinations of closed MSIVs result in a reactor scram and because it would be correct at high power levels. When an MSIV closes, steam flow in the open steam lines increases to accommodate the steam flow lost from the line that closed. The Group 1 isolation setpoint for MSL Flow High is 142.7%

of rated steam flow. At power levels above 75%, when two MSIVs close and all flow from those steam lines must redirect through the two lines that remain open, the steam flow in each of the open steam lines approaches 200% of their normal rated flow. Therefore, a Group 1 isolation occurs, resulting in closure of all eight MSIVs.

Closure of MSIVs in more than one MSL results in a direct full scram signal to RPS when the MSIVs reach not fully open position. Isolation of two MSLs at 100% power also results in RPS trip signals on high reactor pressure and high APRM flux. The RPS setpoint for low reactor water level, +3 inches, is also exceeded due to shrink during the scram. Procedure 2.1.5 entry would be required and contains mitigating actions required to be performed. EOP-1A entry would be required due to high reactor pressure and low reactor water level and contains required actions for level and pressure control with MSIVs closed. This answer is wrong because isolation of the subject MSIVs does not directly result in a trip of both RPS A and B and because at 15% power, the two MSLs that remain open can easily accommodate the required steam flow, so a scram signal is not generated. The examinee who believes a scram will occur and knows 2.4MSIV is not intended for MSIV closures that directly result in an RPS actuation will choose this answer. This answer is wrong because isolation of the subject MSIVs does not directly result in a trip of RPS A and B, so neither procedure 2.1.5 nor EOP-1A entry is required.

Answer C is plausible other combinations of two MSIVs closing would result in only contacts in RPS logic opening, but no half scram. Isolation of MSL (A and D) OR (B and C) would not result in a half scram. It is wrong for the same reason given for distractor C.

Answer D is plausible because MSIV closure RPS trip is bypassed when the Reactor Mode Switch is not in RUN. It is wrong because the Reactor Mode Switch wouold be in RUN at 15% power, and closure of the subject MSIVs would result in an RPS A half scram.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.4MSIV [Inadvertent MSIV Closure](Rev 10),

procedure 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram](Rev 77), EOP-1A [RPV Control](Rev 22), Lesson plan COR002-21-02 [Ops Reactor Protection System](Rev 25)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-21-02 Obj LO-12a, Given plant conditions determine if: A Full Scram should have occurred Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - RPS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 217000 (SF2, SF4 RCIC) Reactor Core Isolation Tier# 2 Cooling Group# 1 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of K/A # 217000 K6.01 the following will have on the REACTOR CORE Rating 3.4 ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM (RCIC): Revision 0 K6.01 Electrical power Revision Statement:

Question 21 The plant is at 100% power.

125 VDC Panel AA2 power is lost.

Then, a condition requiring automatic RCIC initiation occurs.

Which one of the following describes the effect of the loss of 125 VDC Panel AA2 on:

RCIC-MO-131 [Steam Supply to Turbine Valve] and RCIC flow controller RCIC-FIC-91?

A. RCIC-MO-131 automatically opens.

RCIC flow controller will NOT control in AUTO or in MANUAL.

B. RCIC-MO-131 automatically opens.

RCIC flow controller will NOT control in AUTO but will control in MANUAL.

C. RCIC-MO-131 remains closed but can be opened using its control switch.

RCIC flow controller will NOT control in AUTO or in MANUAL.

D. RCIC-MO-131 remains closed but can be opened using its control switch.

RCIC flow controller will NOT control in AUTO but will control in MANUAL.

Answer: C Explanation:

125 VDC Panel AA2 supplies power to RCIC initiation logic and to the RCIC flow control circuit. RCIC initiation logic is energize to trip. With 125 VDC Panel AA2 de-energized, RCIC initiation will not occur; therefore, RCIC-MO-131 will remain closed, its standby position. The RCIC flow control circuit responds to RCIC flow feedback to position the RCIC governor valve. When RCIC is idle, flow feed back is zero, and RCIC governor valve is open. Upon a normal RCIC start, the ramp generator in the flow control circuit applies a closed signal to RCIC governor valve to prevent RCIC

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 overspeed by allowing the flow control circuit and control oil pressure to develop in response to rising flow feedback. This signal is ramped up to a high end stop, and RCIC flow controller assumes control as its output lowers in response to rising flow feedback. With the RCIC flow control circuit de-energized, no flow control signal is developed to close the governor valve. RCIC governor valve is fully open and the ramp generator function does not limit the RCIC control signal. RCIC flow controller RCIC-FIC-91 will not function in AUTO and cannot be placed into MANUAL, since it has no power. If RCIC-MO-131 is opened using its control switch, RCIC will overspeed, since the governor valve is fully open and there is no control signal to cause it to throttle closed.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because another 125 VDC panel, BB2, supplies some sensors and relays that input into RCIC isolation logic. An examinee may confuse isolation logic with initiation logic believe initiation will still occur from Div 2 powered sensors/logic. It is also plausible because flow controllers have some failure modes that prevent automatic operation but do not inhibit manual operation. It is wrong because Panel AA2 supplies the main circuit power to the RCIC initiation logic, which is energize to initiate, so RCIC-MO-131 will not receive an automatic open signal. It is also wrong because Panel AA2 supplies power to the RCIC flow controller, so it cannot be placed into MANUAL.

Answer B is plausible because RCIC-MO-131 will not automatically open and because power from Panel BB2 supplies a portion of RCIC logic. It is also plausible because flow controllers have some failure modes that prevent automatic operation but do not inhibit manual operation. If Panel AA2 only supplied the flow feedback portion of the flow control circuit, the controller would not function in AUTO but could be operated to control RCIC speed/flow in MANUAL. An examinee who does not know the power supply arrangement for RCIC may choose this answer. It is wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Answer D is correct with respect to RCIC-MO-131. It is plausible and wrong for the reasons given for distractor B with respect to RCIC flow controller.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-18-02 [Ops Reactor Core Isolation Cooling](Rev 31), GE dwgs. 791E264 sheets 02, 03, 04 References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-18-02 Obj LO-10b, Predict the consequences of the following on the RCIC System: AC and/or DC Electrical power failure Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk significant System - RCIC

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg. 791E264 sh 2

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg. 791E264 sh 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg. 791E264 sh 2 and 4

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 264000 (SF6 EGE) Emergency Generators Tier# 2 (Diesel/Jet) EDG Group# 1 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the K/A # 264000 A3.06 EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) Rating 3.1 including: Revision 0 A3.06 Cooling water system operation Revision Statement:

Question 22 The plant is at 100% power.

Service Water pumps A and B Mode Selector switches are in AUTO.

Service Water pumps C and D Mode Selector switches are in STDBY.

A design basis LOCA with Loss of Offsite Power occurs.

Assuming the design criteria MAXIMUM times listed in the USAR, which one of the following completes the statement below regarding DG load sequencing?

Service Water pumps (1) start (2) seconds following bus re-energization?

A. (1) A and B (2) 5 B. (1) A and B (2) 13 C. (1) C and D (2) 5 D. (1) C and D (2) 13 Answer: D Explanation:

This question is a modified version of 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#50. It was modified by adding part 1, to test knowledge of the SW pump standby start logic, and by changing

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 part to to SW Pump sequence time from bus re-energization versus from LOOP/LOCA signal.

Service Water pumps cool DG1 and DG2. The DGs are designed to re-energize their respective buses within 14 seconds of a LOOP/LOCA signal. DGs are cooled by SW Pumps. At 100% power, normally two SW pumps are selected to STANDBY. Service Water Pumps that are in STANDBY will automatically sequence 13 seconds following DG output breaker closure during a LOOP/LOCA.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because SW pumps A and B switch positions are AUTO.

Pumps in AUTO start on low SW discharge header pressure. An examinee who does not know SW pump logic may believe AUTO means the SW pumps would automatically start on a LOOP/LOCA signal. This is plausible because SGT fans in AUTO start on an initiation signal, and SGT fans in STDBY will not automatically start on an initiation signal. It is wrong because only SW pumps in STDBY sequence on during a LOOP/LOCA. The low SW header pressure start signal is removed during load sequencing. Part 2 is plausible because the sequence time for RHR Pumps B and D sequence on after 5 seconds. It is wrong because SW Pumps selected to Standby sequence on after 13 seconds.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor A.

Technical

References:

lesson plans COR001-01-01 [Ops AC Electrical Distribution](Rev 50), procedure 2.2.20 [Standby AC Power System (Diesel Generator)](Rev 105), TS 3.8.1 [AC Sources - Operating], procedure 2.2.18.1 [4160V Auxiliary Power Distribution System](Rev 2)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-01-01 Obj LO-13b,c - Predict the consequences of the following events on the AC Electrical Distribution System: Loss of Coolant Accident ,

Loss of Off-site Power Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#50 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - Emergency AC Power/DGs, Service Water 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#50

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 263000 (SF6 DC) DC Electrical Distribution Tier# 2 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Group# 1 control room: K/A # 263000 A4.01 A4.01 Major breakers and control power fuses: Rating 3.3 Plant-Specific Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 23 The plant is at 50% power.

The following alarm is received:

250V DC SWGR PANEL/WINDOW:

BUS 1A BLOWN FUSE C-1/A-1 One hour later, 250 VDC Bus 1A voltage has lowered from 265 VDC to 249 VDC.

(1) Which one of the following caused these indications?

AND (2) What is the status of the associated red fuse status light on the front of 250 VDC Switchgear 1A?

A. (1) 250 VDC BATTERY 1A BLOWN FUSE (2) On B. (1) 250 VDC BATTERY 1A BLOWN FUSE (2) Off C. (1) 250 VDC FEEDER FROM BATT CHARGER 1A BLOWN FUSE (2) On D. (1) 250 VDC FEEDER FROM BATT CHARGER 1A BLOWN FUSE (2) Off Answer: C Explanation:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 The 250 VDC system uses fused disconnects versus breakers for power distribution.

Indication of fused disconnect status is provided by annunciators on Panel C.

Operation of the fused disconnects are local, only.

250 VDC Battery Charger 1A supplies 250 VDC Bus 1A via a fused disconnect. 250 VDC Battery 1A is also connected to 250 VDC Bus 1A via a fused disconnect. 250 VDC Charger 1A maintains 250 VDC Bus 1A at ~ 265 VDC to supply the various DC loads and to maintain 250 VDC Battery 1A charged. 250 VDC Bus 1A supplies the following loads via fused disconnects:

250 VDC Rx Bldg Div 1 Starter Rack 250 VDC RCIC Starter Rack Normal Feeder 250 VDC Turbine Bldg Starter Rack Emerg Feeder 250 VDC Static Inverter 1A for NBPP The following are inputs to annunciator C-1/A-2:

250 VDC BATTERY 1A BLOWN FUSE 250 VDC FEEDER FROM BATT CHARGER 1A BLOWN FUSE 250 VDC RX BLDG DIV 1 SR BLOWN FUSE 250 VDC RCIC SR NORMAL FEEDER BLOWN FUSE 250 VDC TURB SR EMERG FEEDER BLOWN FUSE 250 VDC STATIC INV 1A FEEDER BLOWN FUSE Since the subject alarm was the only alarm received, only failure of the charger fuse or battery fuse could have caused the alarm with the absence of any other alarm.

Since 250 VDC Bus 1A voltage is lowering, the charger must not be supplying the bus, since its output is higher than battery output alone and because it is a full capacity charger. Bus voltage is lowering because the battery is discharging as it alone supplies the bus.

The red fuse status light for the Battery Charger fused disconnect on the front of 250 VDC Switchgear 1A illuminates when the fuse blows.

Distracter:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because it represents an input to the subject alarm. It would be correct if 250 VDC bus voltage remained stable. It is wrong because with the charger not connected to the bus, 250 VDC Battery 1A is supplying the load, and its voltage lowers as the battery discharges. Part 2 is correct Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because some status indicating lights, such as RPS bus power available lights on Panel 9-16, are illuminated when conditions are normal and power is available, and they extinguish when something has resulted in a loss of power. It is wrong because the red fuse status light for the Battery Charger fused disconnect on the front of 250 VDC Switchgear 1A illuminates when the fuse blows.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reasons stated for distractor B.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Technical

References:

Alarm card C-1/A-1 [250V DC Swgr Bus 1A Blown Fuse](Rev 33), procedure (2) 2.2.24.1 [250 VDC Electrical System (Div 1)](Rev 17)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-07-02 Obj LO-6c, Describe the interrelationship between the DC Electrical Distribution System and the following: Battery charger and battery; 8e, Given a specific DC Electrical Distribution system malfunction, determine the effect on any of the following: Batteries Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency DC Power

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 215005 (SF7 PRMS) Average Power Range Tier# 2 Monitor/Local Power Range Monitor Group# 1 Knowledge of AVERAGE POWER RANGE K/A # 215005 K4.07 MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR Rating 3.7 SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which Revision 0 provide for the following:

K4.07 Flow biased trip setpoints Revision Statement:

Question 24 The plant is at 100% power.

What is the nominal APRM neutron flux high (flow biased) trip setpoint for RPS?

A. 0.75W + 62% -0.75 W RTP B. 0.62W + 75% -0.62 W RTP C. 0.75W + 51% -0.75 W RTP D. 0.62W + 51% -0.62 W RTP Answer: A Explanation:

At 100% power, two Reactor Recirc loops are in operation. The APRM neutron flux high (flow biased) trip setpoint for RPS during two Recirc loop operation is 0.75W +

62% -0.75 W RTP. TS Table 3.3.1.1-1 [RPS Instrumentation] lists it as 0.75W +

62% RTP, since W in 2-loop operation is zero.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because it contains the same numbers as the correct answer, just rearranged. It is wrong because the APRM neutron flux high (flow biased) trip setpoint for RPS listed in TS Table 3.3.1.1-1 [RPS Instrumentation] is 0.75W + 62%

RTP.

Answer C is plausible because it reflects the APRM flow biased upscale control rod withdrawal block setpoint from TRM Table T3.3.1-1 [Control Rod Block Instrumentation]. It is wrong for the same reason stated for distractor B.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer D is plausible because it contains a combination of numbers from the APRM flow biased RPS and Control Rod Block equations. It is wrong for the same reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

TS Table 3.3.1.1-1 [RPS Instrumentation], TRM Table T3.3.1-1 [Control Rod Block Instrumentation], Procedure 4.1.3 [Average Power Range Monitoring System](Rev 26)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-01-02 Obj LO-8e, Describe the APRM design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) that provide for the following: Flow biased trip setpoints Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - RPS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 209001 (SF2, SF4 LPCS) Low-Pressure Core Spray Tier# 2 Knowledge of the operational implications of the Group# 1 following concepts as they apply to LOW K/A # 209001 K5.04 PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM: Rating 2.8 K5.04 Heat removal (transfer) mechanisms Revision Revision Statement:

Question 25 Regarding decay heat removal by Core Spray, (1) What is the predominant heat removal mechanism produced by Core Spray for uncovered portions of the reactor fuel?

AND (2) Which one of the following is the LOWEST reactor water level at which Core Spray at rated flow provides adequate core cooling?

A. (1) Conductive heat transfer (2) -195 inches B. (1) Conductive heat transfer (2) -209 inches C. (1) Convective heat transfer (2) -195 inches D. (1) Convective heat transfer (2) -209 inches Answer: D Explanation:

Core Spray injects through four spargers located inside the core shroud above the core. CS A injects via the two lower spargers, and CS B injects via the two upper spargers. CS can provide either conductive or convective heat transfer to assure adequate core cooling. When the Core Spray system is used to provide core submergence, cooling is by conductive heat transfer. Core submergence exists when level is at or above TAF, -158 inches. The heat transfer mechanism transitions from conduction to convection when level falls below TAF. A Core Spray subsystem provides the required conductive heat transfer when flow rate is at least 4750 gpm at the established spray pattern. Core Spray produces a low pressure area above the core that promotes convective cooling by increasing steam flow up through the core.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Convective cooling absorbs the sensible heat from the surrounding atmosphere. Core Spray can provide sufficient spray flow to assure adequate core cooling until reactor water level falls below -209 inches, the elevation of the jet pump suction.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because CS provides core cooling predominantly by conduction when level is above TAF. It is wrong because for uncovered portions of the fuel, the predominant heat transfer mechanism is convective heat transfer by steam flow. Part 2 is plausible because -195 is the Minimum Zero Injection RPV Water Level (MZIRWL). As long as there is no injection from any system, when level falls below -183 (MSCRWL), there is sufficient steam flow produced by the core to assure adequate core cooling through convective heat transfer until level falls below -

195. The examinee who confuses this limit with the limit for spray cooling will choose this answer. It is wrong because CS at rated flow ensures adequate core cooling as long as level is not below the elevation of the jet pump inlet nozzles, -209.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Technical

References:

Lesson Plan COR002-06-02 [Ops Core Spray System],

AMP-TBD00 [PSTGs](Rev 10), EOP-1A [RPV Control](Rev 22)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-06-02 Obj LO-6c, Briefly describe the following concepts as they apply to the Core Spray system: Heat removal (transfer) mechanisms Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-1A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 203000 (SF2, SF4 RHR/LPCI) RHR/LPCI: Injection Tier# 2 Mode Group# 1 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in K/A # 203000 A1.01 parameters associated with operating the Rating 4.2 RHR/LPCI: INJECTION MODE (PLANT SPECIFIC) Revision 0 controls including:

A1.01 Reactor water level Revision Statement:

Question 26 A LOCA is in progress following a scram with the following conditions:

EOP PTMs 97 through 100 are installed RHR Pump A is operating on minimum flow after being secured from Drywell Spray RHR-MO-27A [Outboard Injection Valve] is CLOSED Reactor pressure is 500 psig, slowly lowering Reactor water level is at -113 inches, lowering 0.5 inch/minute (1) Which one of the following describes operation of RHR-MO-27A under these conditions in order to raise reactor water level as reactor pressure continues to lower?

AND (2) According to Operations Instruction #8 [Guideline for Successful Transient Mitigation],

which level instrumentation is required to be used to monitor and control reactor water level under these conditions?

A. (1) RHR-MO-27A control switch must be held in OPEN to open fully (2) Fuel Zone B. (1) RHR-MO-27A control switch must be held in OPEN to open fully (2) Wide Range C. (1) RHR-MO-27A will open automatically (2) Fuel Zone D. (1) RHR-MO-27A will open automatically (2) Wide Range Answer: A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Explanation:

Conditions in the stem reflect a LPCI initiation signal is present and RHR-MO-27A is closed. RHR-MO-27A is normally open and is designed to automatically and fully open when an ECCS ignition signal is present (low reactor water level -113 (Level

1) or high DW pressure 1.84 psig) and reactor pressure lowers below the injection RPV pressure permissive (436 psig). EOP Plant Temporary Modifications (PTMs)97-100 are installed, normally performed for containment spray operation. These jumpers defeat the automatic open signal to RHR-MO-27A and 27B and cause the valves to behave as throttle valves. Therefore, the control switch for RHR-MO-27A must be held in OPEN to cause the valve to fully open.

Operations Instruction #8 provides directions for which level bands and which level instrumentation ranges to use for various transient condition. In non-ATWS conditions, such as this case, OI#8 directs use of Fuel Zone for monitoring and controlling reactor water level.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because Level 1 (-113) is above -130, and OI#8 directs using Wide Range level instrumentation until level drops below -130 during ATWS conditions. It is wrong because ATWS conditions do not exist, so Fuel Zone is required to be used.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because Reactor water level is at Level 1, so LPCI initiation signal is present, and RHR-MO-27A is designed to automatically open when RPV pressure falls below 436 psig. It is wrong because EOP PTMs97-100 are installed, which defeat the automatic open signal to RHR-MO-27A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor C. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedure 5.8.20 [EOP Plant Temporary Modifications](Rev 21), Operations Instruction #8 [Guideline for Successful Transient Mitigation](Rev 19),

Lesson Plan COR002-23-02 [Ops Residual Heat Removal System](Rev 36)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-05-01 EO-1, Given a simulator scenario, determine which support procedures and Plant Temporary Modifications (PTMs) should be used based on plant conditions and EOP strategy being utilized; EO-5 State the reasons why all PTM's are installed versus select PTM's for priority equipment such as HPCI and RCIC.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - RHR

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 288000 (SF9 PVS) Plant Ventilation Tier# 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of Group# 2 the PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS will have on K/A # 288000 K3.01 following: Rating 2.8 K3.01 Secondary containment temperature: Plant- Revision 0 Specific Revision Statement:

Question 27 Reactor water level is -120 (Wide Range) during a LOCA.

MCC-K loses power.

Which one of the following secondary containment areas will experience a temperature rise FIRST due to loss of HVAC stemming from this power failure?

A. MSL Tunnel B. RCIC Pump area C. HPCI Pump area D. Core Spray B Pump area Answer: B Explanation:

MCC-K supplies power to NE Quad Core Spray A Room FCU. The FCU auto starts when CS Pump A breaker closes or when RCIC steam admission valve MO-131 opens. RCIC turbine/pump is located in the same room as CS Pump A. Both RCIC and CS Pump A have an initiation signal with WR level at -120, adding heat to that area. Therefore, RCIC Pump area temperature will rise first as a result of loss of the NE Quad FCU.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because Steam Tunnel FCUs are supplied by MCCs and the steam tunnel has a high heat load. It is wrong because Steam Tunnel FCUs are supplied by MCC-N and MCC-V.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer C is plausible because the HPCI room FCU is supplied by a MCC and HPCI would be running with reactor water level -120, adding a high heat load to the area. It is wrong because HPCI room FCU is supplied by MCC-S.

Answer D is plausible because the SE Quad CS-B Room FCU is supplied by a MCC and CS Pump B would be running with reactor water level -120, adding a high heat load to the area. It is wrong because SE Quad CS-B Room FCU is supplied by MCC-S.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR001-08-01 [OPS Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning](Rev 30)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-08-01 Obj LO- 9b, Given a specific HVAC malfunction, determine the effect on any of the following: Reactor Building temperature Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(8)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency AC Power

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295003 (APE 3) Partial or Complete Loss of AC Tier# 1 Power / 6 Group# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as K/A # 295003 AA2.05 they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF Rating 3.9 A.C. POWER: Revision 0 AA2.05 Whether a partial or complete loss of A.C.

power has occurred Revision Statement:

Question 28 A leak in the drywell occurred at 100% power.

Drywell pressure rises to 5 psig over 3 minutes AND ALL systems function as designed.

5 minutes later, Drywell pressure has risen above 5.5 psig AND indication at RHR Pump A control switch is:

Which one of the following caused this indication for RHR Pump A?

A. Loss of DC power to RHR Pump A breaker B. RPV pressure is above the LPCI injection permissive C. Loss of AC power to the bus supplying RHR Pump A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 D. RHR Pump A control switch has been placed in Pull-To-Lock Answer: C Explanation:

RHR Pump A is supplied by 4160 VAC Bus 1F. RHR pumps automatically start on high DW pressure, 1.84 psig. RHR pump control power, which powers control switch light indication, is supplied by 125 VDC and is unaffected by loss of AC power.

Indication for a running RHR pump is Red light ON, Green light OFF, Amber light OFF. Loss of power to 4160 VAC Bus 1F causes RHR Pump A breaker to shed (trip open) on Low voltage on critical bus (2300V), resulting in Red light OFF, Green light ON, Amber light OFF. (The amber light illuminates only when the control switch is placed to STOP or PTL. It will then remain lit if there is an auto start signal present. It does not illuminate if the breaker opened due to load shedding.)

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because loss of 125 VDC breaker control power would prevent RHR Pump A breaker from closing. It is wrong because 125 VDC control power supplies red and green lights at the breaker control switch, so the green light would be extinguished if control power had been lost. Also, the stem states ALL systems function as designed, so RHR Pump A would have already started when DW pressure exceeded 1.84 psig.

Answer B is plausible because not all RHR A components required for LPCI injection completely align for injection until RPV pressure falls below the injection permissive, 436 psig (e.g inboard injection valve RHR-MO-25A does not open until pressure is below the permissive). This answer is wrong because RHR A pump starts as soon as DW pressure rises to 1.84 psig.

Answer D is plausible because placing RHR Pump A control switch in PTL would cause the breaker to open, even with an initiation signal present. Placing RHR pumps in PTL is sometimes performed during LOCA conditions IAW Procedure 5.8 if systems are not needed for injection. It is wrong because placing the switch in PTL would also cause the amber light to illuminate, since the amber light illuminates when certain stop signals are present while an initiation signal is in.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR001-01-01 [Ops AC Electrical Distribution](Rev 50), Lesson plan COR002-23-02 [Residual Heat Removal System](Rev 36), procedure 2.2A_125DC.DIV1 [125 VDC POWER CHECKLIST (DIV 1)](Rev 7), procedure 5.8 [Emergency Operating Procedures(EOPs)](Rev 45)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-01-01 Obj LO-8b, Predict the consequences of the following on plant operation: 4160V Critical Bus Undervoltage; COR002-23-02 Obj

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 LO-8a, Predict the consequences a malfunction of the following will have on the RHR system: A.C. electrical power (including RPS)

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295021 (APE 21) Loss of Shutdown Cooling / 4 Tier# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as Group# 1 they apply to LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING: K/A # 295021 AA2.06 AA2.06 Reactor pressure Rating 3.2 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 29 The plant is in Mode 3.

RHR Pump A was operating in Shutdown Cooling when it tripped due to a motor fault.

Reactor pressure rose to 80 psig, then pressure was lowered to 40 psig by the operator.

(1) Which one of the following valves automatically closed as a result of this transient?

AND (2) To satisfy system logic ONLY, what is the MINIMUM action necessary to reopen that valve?

A. (1) RHR-MO-25A [Inbd Injection Vlv]

(2) Place RHR-MO-25A control switch to OPEN B. (1) RHR-MO-25A [Inbd Injection Vlv]

(2) Place GROUP ISOL RESET CHANNEL A and B switches to GR 2, 3, 6, 7 RESET, then place RHR-MO-25A control switch to OPEN C. (1) RHR-MO-18 [Shutdown Cooling RHR Supply Inbd Vlv]

(2) Place RHR-MO-18 control switch to OPEN D. (1) RHR-MO-18 [Shutdown Cooling RHR Supply Inbd Vlv]

(2) Place GROUP ISOL RESET CHANNEL A and B switches to GR 2, 3, 6, 7 RESET, then place RHR-MO-18 control switch to OPEN Answer: D Explanation:

RHR-MO-18 and RHR-MO-25A are both open when RHR Pump A is operating in SDC mode. RHR-MO-18 automatically closes on high reactor pressure, 72 psig, or a Group 2 isolation signal, low RPV level +3 or high DW pressure, 1.84 psig. RHR-

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 MO-25A only closes on a Group 2 isolation signal. No Group 2 isolation signal exists, so MO-25A is still open. Reactor pressure is above 72 psig, so MO-18 is closed.

The Reactor Pressure-High Function is provided to isolate the shutdown cooling portion of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. This function is provided only for equipment protection to prevent an intersystem LOCA scenario. The Reactor Pressure High isolation is not considered part of PCIS Group 2, but PCIS Group 2 reset switches must be operated to reset this logic. Reactor Pressure below the high setpoint, 72 psig, is a permissive for opening SDC suction isolation valves MO-17 and MO-18.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because MO-25A is open for a return flow path when RHR Pump A is in SDC mode, and MO-25A automatically isolates on a Group 2 signal. Two Group 2 valves, MO-17 and MO-18 close on both a Group 2 signal and high reactor pressure. It is wrong because high reactor pressure, 72 psig does not close MO-25A. Part 2 is plausible because high reactor pressure is not a Group 2 signal and because some RHR logic, such as RHR injection valve reactor pressure low permissives do not seal-in but automatically reset when the condition clears. It is wrong because MO-25A does not close on high reactor pressure, 72 psig, in shutdown cooling mode.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor A.

Technical

References:

Procedures 2.4SDC [Shutdown Cooling Abnormal](Rev 17),

2.2.69.2 [RHR System Shutdown Operations](Rev 105)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-26 EO-M: Given plant condition(s), determine from memory any automatic actions listed in the applicable Abnormal/Emergency Procedure(s) which will occur due to the event(s);

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - RHR, PCIS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 290003 (SF9 CRV) Control Room Ventilation Tier# 2 Ability to monitor automatic operations of the Group# 2 CONTROL ROOM HVAC including: K/A # 290003 A3.01 A3.01 Initiation/reconfiguration Rating 3.3 Revision Revision Statement:

Question 30 The plant is in Mode 5.

A Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) initiation signal is received.

One minute later, the operator observes the following status of Control Room ventilation components:

HV-270AV, CONTROL ROOM HVAC INLET VALVE is open HV-271AV, CONTROL ROOM HVAC EMER BYPASS VLV is open HV-272AV, CONTROL ROOM PANTRY EXH FAN ISOL SYSTEM is open Which of the above listed components is/are in the required position?

A. HV-270AV, only B. HV-271AV, only C. HV-270AV and HV-272AV, only D. HV-271AV and HV-272AV, only Answer: B Explanation:

This question is a modified version of 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#65. The stem was modified to ask which components are in the required position (Answer B). The 2018 question asked which components are NOT in the required position (answer C).

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system initiates automatically from a Group 6 isolation. When CREF initiates, control room ventilation reconfigures as follows:

BF-C-1A, EMER BSTR FAN starts EF-C-1B, TOILET EXHAUST FAN, trips HV-270AV, CONTROL ROOM HVAC INLET VALVE, closes HV-271AV, CONTROL ROOM HVAC EMERGENCY BYPASS SYSTEM INLET VALVE, opens HV-272AV, CONTROL ROOM PANTRY EXHAUST FAN ISOLATION VALVE, closes Therefore, only HV-271AV should be open.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible to the examinee who does not know the arrangement of control HVAC components or system response to CREF initiation. The examinee may believe HV-270AV is necessarily open to provide an inlet for the AC unit. This answer is wrong because HV-270AV should be closed.

Answer C is plausible to the examinee who does not know the arrangement of control HVAC components or system response to CREF initiation and believes HV-270AV is necessarily open to provide an inlet for the AC unit, and HV-272AV should be open to create a negative pressure atmosphere, similar to SGT, not knowing the system is designed to create a positive pressure atmosphere to prevent inleakage of radioactive gases. This answer is wrong because HV-270AV and 272AV should be closed.

Answer D is plausible to the examinee who does not know the arrangement of control HVAC components or system response to CREF initiation and believes HV-272AV should be open to create a negative pressure atmosphere, similar to SGT, not knowing the system is designed to create a positive pressure atmosphere to prevent inleakage of radioactive gases. This answer is wrong because HV-272AV should be closed.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation](Rev 62), lesson plan COR001-08-01 [OPS Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning](Rev 28)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-08-01 Obj LO-12a, Describe the Control Room HVAC design features and interlocks that provide for the following: Control Room HVAC reconfigurations Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#65 New

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability N/A 9/2019 NRC Q#65

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 256000 (SF2 CDS) Condensate Tier# 2 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in Group# 2 parameters associated with operating the K/A # 256000 A1.07 REACTOR CONDENSATE SYSTEM controls Rating 3.1 including: Revision 0 A1.07 System lineup Revision Statement:

Question 31 Plant is in Mode 1 with the following conditions:

Condensate Pumps B and C are running.

Condensate Booster Pumps B and C are running.

Condensate Booster Pump suction header pressure is 65 psig.

The Condensate Booster Pump A control switch is placed in START.

Which one of the following completes the statement below?

When Condensate Booster Pump A control switch is placed in START, the pump will.....

A. NOT start because less than three condensate pumps are running.

B. NOT start because the low suction pressure interlock has not been met.

C. start, but then, if suction pressure falls below 25 psig, it will trip 9 seconds later.

D. start, but then, if suction pressure falls below 25 psig, it will trip 12 seconds later.

Answer: C Explanation:

Starting interlocks for CBPs require suction pressure > 50 psig and pump lube oil pressure > 5psig. In the stem, suction pressure is >50 psig, so CBP A will start.

CBPs trip if suction pressure falls to < 25 psig after a time delay of 9 seconds for Pump A, 12 seconds for Pump B, and 15 seconds for Pump C.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because previously, the number of running CPs were inputs to starting interlocks for CBPs. Until recently (10-25-18), for 1st CBP being started at least one CP had to be running, and for 2nd and 3rd CBPs being started required at least two CPs operating for the CBP to start. Now, 1st, 2nd and 3rd CBPs being placed into operation will start irrespective of the number of CPs running. The examinee who believes a CBP starting is contingent upon the number of CPs running may choose this answer. It is wrong because CBP starting interlocks are not dependent on the number of CPs running.

Answer C is plausible because CBPs will not start if suction pressure is below the starting interlock setpoint. It is wrong because suction pressure is above the starting interlock setpoint, 50 psig.

Answer D is plausible because CBPs sequentially trip on low suction pressure <25 psig based on assigned time delays of 9, 12, or 15 seconds. CBP C trips after a 12 second time delay. It is wrong because CBP A trips after a 9 second time delay when pressure is suction pressure falls below 25 psig.

Technical

References:

procedure 2.2.6 [Condensate System](Rev 98),

CED 6024460 References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR0020202001060A Describe the Condensate and Feedwater design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Condensate and Booster Pump interlocks Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 12/2015 ILT NRC Q#62 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 12/2015 ILT NRC Q#62

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295024 High Drywell Pressure / 5 Tier# 1 Knowledge of the reasons for the following Group# 1 responses as they apply to HIGH DRYWELL K/A # 295024 EK3.06 PRESSURE: Rating 4.0 EK3.06 Reactor SCRAM Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 32 Regarding the reasons for a manual scram due to high drywell pressure during a LOCA (1) Procedure 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control] states:

If drywell pressure cannot be maintained psig, THEN SCRAM and enter Procedure 2.1.5.

AND (2) What is the reason stated in Procedure 2.4PC for this scram action?

A. (1) 0.75 (2) It is preferable to insert a manual scram rather than to allow an automatic scram to occur B. (1) 0.75 (2) To avoid initiation of safety systems by reducing the amount of energy that must be absorbed by primary containment C. (1) 1.5 (2) It is preferable to insert a manual scram rather than to allow an automatic scram to occur D. (1) 1.5 (2) To avoid initiation of safety systems by reducing the amount of energy that must be absorbed by primary containment Answer: C Explanation:

Procedure 2.4PC step 4.2 requires the operator to insert a manual scram if DW pressure cannot be maintained 1.5 psig. 2.4PC Attachment 2 step 1.3 states scram

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 action: "If drywell pressure cannot be maintained 1.5 psig" is based on actual trip setpoints, setpoint tolerances, and to allow a reasonable pressure range for recovery.

Per Operations policy, it is preferable to initiate a Manual Scram rather than allow an Automatic Scram to occur.

USAR Section VII-2.3.6.8 states a high pressure inside the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary. It is prudent to scram the reactor in such a situation to minimize the possibility of fuel damage and to reduce the addition of energy from the core to the coolant. USAR Section XIV-6.3.7.1 states the reactor is assumed to be scrammed at the time of accident initiation in less than one second from receipt of the high drywell pressure signal. Part 2 is design bases question.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because 0.75 psig is the TS 3.6.1.4 limit for DW pressure and because procedure 2.4PC requires a rapid power reduction if DW pressure cannot be maintained below that value. It is wrong because 1.5 psig is the scram criteria per procedure 2.4PC. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A. Part 2 plausible because 2.4PC contains actions to attempt to avert reaching the ESF initiation setpoint (i.e. venting containment). Also, the high DW pressure automatic scram is assumed in the USAR accident analysis to trip the reactor and functions to minimize the energy absorbed by the coolant and transmitted to the containment during large break LOCAs. It is wrong because scramming alone does not reduce reactor pressure; therefore, it does not reduce the driving head of a LOCA, so the ESF initiation setpoint may still be exceeded. It is not the reason for the criteria in the stated scram action listed in procedure 2.4PC.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan INT006-01-18 [Ops Accident Analysis](Rev 11),

CNS USAR XIV Section 6.3, Procedure 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control](Rev 21)

References to be provided to applicants during exam:

Learning Objective: INT007-05-04 EO-2, Discuss the applicable Safety Analysis in the Bases associated with each Section 3.3 Specification ; COR002-21-02 Obj LO-1d, State the purpose of the following items related to RPS: RPS logic channels; 10k, Describe the interrelationship between the RPS and the following: Primary Containment; INT006-01-18 EO-2, Given an accident and a set of conditions, select those conditions that would tend to make the consequences of the given accident more severe.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5),(6),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - RPS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295007 (APE 7) High Reactor Pressure / 3 Tier# 1 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as Group# 2 they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: K/A # 295007 AA1.05 AA1.05 Reactor/turbine pressure regulating system Rating 3.7 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 33 The plant is at 100% power when MSIV 86C fails closed.

Which one of the following describes the response of DEH control?

A. Turbine control valves throttle closed, then throttle open based on reactor pressure.

B. Turbine control valves throttle closed, then throttle open based on equalizing header pressure.

C. Turbine control valves throttle open, then throttle closed based on reactor pressure.

D. Turbine control valves throttle open, then throttle closed based on equalizing header pressure.

Answer: B Explanation:

DEH is in Mode 4, Turbine Follow Reactor mode, at 100% power. Single MSIV closure at 70% power causes reactor pressure to rise ~15 psig, due to increased differential pressure across the remaining three open steam lines. In this transient reactor pressure remains below the scram setpoint, 1030 psig. Pressure downstream of the MSIVs lowers due to increased flow resistance caused by loss of 25% of the total cross-sectional area of the steam lines. Pressure in main steam equalizing header, therefore, lowers. DEH senses pressure in the equalizing header to control turbine governor valves and bypass valves. In DEH Mode 4, DEH responds by throttling turbine control valves closed to maintain pressure in the equalizing header at the DEH pressure setpoint. As reactor pressure rises due to closed MSIV, and flow increases in the other three MSLs, causing pressure in the equalizing header to rise, turbine control valves then throttle open to control equalizing header pressure.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because it reflects the actual response of TCVs. The examinee who believes DEH senses reactor pressure and remembers TCVs response from simulator training but who does not understand DEH operation may choose this answer. This answer is wrong because DEH control is based on feedback from pressure sensed from the equalizing header.

Answer C is plausible for the examinee who believes DEH senses reactor pressure. If DEH sensed reactor pressure, TCVs would throttle open, then closed. It is wrong because in DEH senses equalizing header pressure, and TCVs throttle closed, then open.

Answer D is plausible for the examinee who remembers DEH senses equalizing header pressure and does not understand how MSIV closure affects equalizing header pressure and reactor pressure or does not understand DEH control. It is wrong because TCVs first throttle closed due to lowering equalizing header pressure, then as reactor pressure rises and steam flow increases through the open steam lines, TCVs open in response to rising equalizing header pressure.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-09-02 [Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control](Rev 20), procedure 2.2.77.1 [Digital Electro-Hydraulic (DEH) Control System](Rev 42), procedure 2.4MSIV [Inadvertent MSIV Closure](Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-09-02 Obj LO-4d, Describe how the DEH Control system operates to control the following: Pressure setpoint/pressure demand Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295038 (EPE 15) High Offsite Radioactivity Release Tier# 1 Rate / 9 Group# 1 Knowledge of the reasons for the following K/A # 295038 EK3.03 responses as they apply to HIGH OFF-SITE Rating 3.7 RELEASE RATE: Revision 0 EK3.03 Control room ventilation isolation: Plant-Specific Revision Statement:

Question 34 Which one of the following completes the statements below regarding Control Room ventilation isolation during a Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) causing high Off Site release rates?

Control Room ventilation automatically isolates due to ____(1)____ to protect Control Room operators by maintaining the Control Room Envelope (CRE) at a ____(2)____

pressure.

A. (1) Control Room High Radiation (2) positive B. (1) Control Room High Radiation (2) negative C. (1) Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum High-High Radiation (2) positive D. (1) Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum High-High Radiation (2) negative Answer: C Explanation:

Control Room ventilation automatically isolates due to a Group 6 isolation signal to maintain the CRE pressure positive to support Control Room operator habitability.

Group 6 isolation occurs if Reactor Building Exhaust Plenum High-High Radiation setpoint (10mr/hr) is reached.

The design basis Fuel Handling accident results in a Group 6 isolation due to Reactor Bldg Vent Exhaust Plenum High Radiation. Upon a Group 6 isolation, CREFS initiates. The following actions occur:

BF-C-1A, EMER BSTR FAN, starts

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 HV-270AV, CONTROL ROOM HVAC INLET VALVE, closes HV-271AV, CONTROL ROOM HVAC EMER BYPASS VLV, opens EF-C-1B, TOILET EXH FAN, stops HV-272AV, CONTROL ROOM PANTRY EXH FAN ISOL SYSTEM, closes Distracters:

Answer A part 1 choice is plausible due to Control Room Hi Rad requiring entry into procedure 5.1RAD which provides guidance to manually align Control Room ventilation and CR Hi Rad providing isolation signals at other BWRs. The examinee that confuses CR HVAC auto isolation signals and recognizes the CR pressure is maintained positive would choose this answer. It is incorrect due Control Room ventilation isolates due to RB Exh H-Hi Rad. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because Standby Gas Treatment system also initiates on a Group 6 isolation, and it is designed to maintain the Reactor Building at a negative pressure to mitigate radiation exposure. It is wrong because CREFS maintains the CRE at a positive pressure to mitigate radiation exposure to control room personnel.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.3_9-3-1 (Panel 9 Annunciator 9-3-1), Rev. 39 Procedure 2.3_9-4-1 (Panel 9 Annunciator 9-4-1), Rev. 59 Procedure 2.1.22 (Recovering from A Group Isolation), Rev. 62 Procedure 2.2.84 (HVAC Main Control Room And Cable Spreading Room), Rev. 59 References to be provided to applicants during exam: NONE Learning Objective: COR0010802001140A Briefly describe the following concepts as they apply to Control Room HVAC: Airborne contamination (e.g., radiological,toxic gas, smoke) control COR001-08-01 Obj 10b, Given plant and/or HVAC system conditions, apply the below listed concepts as they are associated with the HVAC system and predict the resultant condition of the system (including components): Differential pressure control Question Source: Bank # 12/2015 ILT NRC Q#18 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295017 (APE 17) Abnormal Offsite Release Rate / 9 Tier# 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH OFF- Group# 2 SITE RELEASE RATE and the following: K/A # 295017 AK2.10 AK2.10 Process radiation monitoring system Rating 3.3 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 35 The plant is at 100% power when a steam leak in the Reactor Building results in a rising offsite release rate through Reactor Building Ventilation system.

(1) What is the LOWEST radiation level sensed at the Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitors at which this release through Reactor Building Ventilation will be automatically isolated?

(Assume ACTUAL setpoints.)

AND (2) Which one of the following combinations of Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitors indicating above the isolation setpoint will cause automatic isolation of Reactor Building Vent system?

A. (1) 5 mR/hr (2) RMP-RM-452B and RMP-RM-452D B. (1) 5 mR/hr (2) RMP-RM-452C and RMP-RM-452D C. (1) 10 mR/hr (2) RMP-RM-452B and RMP-RM-452D D. (1) 10 mR/hr (2) RMP-RM-452C and RMP-RM-452D Answer: D Explanation:

This is a modified version of 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#28. It was modified by changing the channel combinations in part 2 of all of the answers.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Reactor Building Vent Exhaust Plenum Radiation Monitors RMP-RM-452A,B,C,D initiate a Group 6 isolation, including isolation of Reactor Building Vent, at a setpoint of 10 mR/hr. The logic arrangement for a high-high trip is (A or C) AND (B or D).

Therefore, channels C and D high-high will cause a full Group 6 isolation Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because it reflects the setpoint of annunciator 9-4-1/E-5

[Rx Bldg Vent High Rad]. It is wrong because the high-high trip setpoint for RMP-RM-452A,B,C,D is 10 mR/hr (49 mR/hr TS). Part 2 is plausible because Group 6 logic for RB Vent Exhaust Plenum Rad is one-out-of-two taken twice, so two channels must trip to cause a Group 6 isolation/initiation. It is wrong because the logic arrangement is (A or C) AND (B or D). Therefore, channels B and D high-high will NOT cause a Group 6 isolation, since neither channel A nor C is tripped.

Answer B part is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Technical

References:

Alarm card 9-4-1/E-4 [Rx Bldg Vent Hi-Hi Rad](Rev 59),

alarm card 9-4-1/E-5 [Rx Bldg Vent High Rad](Rev 59), Procedure 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation](Rev 62)

References to be provided to applicants during exam:

Learning Objective: COR002-03-02 OPS Containment, Obj LO-2, Given plant conditions, determine if the following should have occurred:

a. Secondary Containment isolation, b. Any of the PCIS group isolations Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#28 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Top 10 Risk Significant System - PCIS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295037 (EPE 14) Scram Condition Present and Tier# 1 Reactor Power Above APRM Downscale or Group# 1 Unknown / 1 K/A # 295037 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as Rating 3.9 they apply to SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND Revision 0 REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN:

EA1.07 RMCS: Plant-Specific Revision Statement:

Question 36 A hydraulic block ATWS has occurred with approximately two thirds of the control rods failing to fully insert.

Reactor power is 8%.

CRD pump 1A is operating.

Action is being taken to manually insert control rods.

Which mode of control rod operation is used and why?

A. Continuous In mode in order to bypass the Rod Sequence Timer B. Emergency In mode in order to bypass the Rod Sequence Timer C. Continuous In mode in order to bypass Rod Worth Minimizer Insert rod blocks D. Emergency In mode in order to bypass Rod Worth Minimizer Insert rod blocks Answer: B Explanation:

EOP-6A is entered from EOP-1A due to failure to scram and power above 3%. EOP-6A step FS/Q-17 directs rod insertion per procedure 5.8.3. Procedure 5.8.3 Att. 1 flowchart step ARI-20 (3) directs the operator to use the Emergency Override switch (on panel 9-5) to insert control rods. This switch is labeled Emergency Notch Override and has three positions: Emer Rod In, Off, and Override. Position Emer Rod In is used for control rod insertion and is commonly referred to as Emergency In mode.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 The Emergency Rod In mode is used because it bypasses the Rod Sequence Timer and allows more rapid insertion of the control rods. Bypassing the Rod Sequence Timer eliminates the timed settle function that occurs when a rod motion signal is removed in both the Normal and Continuous In modes of operation and takes several seconds to complete. Selection of another control rod is prevented until the settle function times out. Bypassing this function allows another control rod to be selected and begin inserting immediately.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because control switch on panel 9-5 labeled Movement Control Control is used for normal rod movement and, if held in the IN position, will cause the selected control rod to continuously insert to full in. It is wrong because when this switch is released for IN position, the rod sequence timer initiates a settle function that takes a few seconds, which would delay selection and insertion of another control rod.

Procedure 5.8.3 Att. 1 requires use of Emergency In mode to bypass the Rod Sequence Timer in order to avert that delay.

Answer C is plausible with respect to use of Continuous In as described for distractor A. It is plausible with respect to bypassing RWM rod blocks because at the given power level, RWM enforces rod pattern constraints by both withdrawal and insertion rod blocks, thus inhibiting control rod insertion for skewed rod patterns expected for a hydraulic block ATWS. This answer is wrong because use of Emergency In only bypasses the Rod Sequence Timer, not the RWM. RWM rod blocks are instead bypassed using the keylocked RWM Bypass switch on panel 9-5.

Answer D is plausible and wrong for reasons stated for distractor C.

Technical

References:

EOP-6A [Reactor Pressure/Power (Failure-to-Scram)](Rev 19), Procedure 5.8.3 [Alternate Rod Insertion Methods](Rev 17),

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-06-06 EO-12, Given plant conditions and ESP 5.8.3, ALTERNATE ROD INSERTION METHODS, determine which methods would successfully insert control rods.

Question Source: Bank # 8-2014 ILT NRC Q#17 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6),(10)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A From 8-2014 ILT NRC exam (five ILT NRC exams ago)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-6A From procedure 5.8.3, Attachment 1 [Alternate Rod Insertion Methods]

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 204000 (SF2 RWCU) Reactor Water Cleanup Tier# 2 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for Group# 2 system operating parameters that are entry-level K/A # 204000 G2.4.4 conditions for emergency and abnormal operating Rating 4.5 procedures. Revision Revision Statement:

Question 37 The plant is at 100% power when the following two annunciators are received separately over the course of five minutes due to RWCU Pump A seal failure:

RWCU PANEL/WINDOW:

HI SPACE TEMP 9-4-2/A-5 AREA PANEL/WINDOW:

HIGH TEMP 9-3-1/E-10 (1) Is entry into EOP-5A required for this condition?

AND (2) Is entry into Procedure 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation] required for this condition?

A. (1) No (2) No B. (1) No (2) Yes C. (1) Yes (2) No D. (1) Yes (2) Yes Answer: D

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Explanation:

There are multiple temperature switches that monitor the RWCU areas to provide high area temperature annunciation in the control room. RWCU-TS-117A monitors RWCU Pump A and B rooms. It inputs into annunciator 9-3-1/E-10 and has a setpoint of 140°F. For RWCU Pump A seal failure, which would cause RWCU pump room temperature to rise, it would be the first temperature switch to alarm. RWCU-TS-117A is listed in EOP-5A Table 9. An EOP-5A entry condition is any area temperature above Maximum Normal Operating temperature, which is indicated by any temperature switch listed in Table 9 alarmed.

Procedure 2.1.22 is the procedure that addresses response to abnormal conditions involving containment isolation signals. PCIS Group 3 involves RWCU isolation valves. One Group 3 isolation signal is RWCU System High Space Temperature.

This signal is designed to detect high energy leakage from RWCU as sensed by various temperature switches in associated areas housing RWCU components.

RWCU-TS-81A through H and RWCU-TS-150 through RWCU-TS-159A-D monitor various RWCU areas including RWCU pump rooms and input into annunciator 9 2/A-5 and Group 3 isolation logic. The setpoint for these switches is 195°F (TS),

185°F (actual). Since a Group 3 isolation is consistent with the subject annunciator, entry into procedure 2.1.22 is required. Alarm Card 9-4-2/A-5 states to enter procedure 2.1.22.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because temperature switches associated with one of the listed alarms, 9-4-2/E-5, are not listed in EOP-5A Table 9 as entry conditions for EOP-5A. An examinee who does know the relationship between RWCU area temperature switches, alarm 9-3-1/E-10, and EOP-5A Table 9 may choose this answer. It is wrong because in addition to RWCU temperature switches associated with alarm 9-4-2/A-5 and Group 3 isolation, different RWCU temperature switches exist that input into alarm 9-3-1/E-10, and those are listed as an EOP-5A entry condition. Part 2 is plausible because one of the listed alarms, 9-3-1/E-10, can be in without a Group 3 isolation, since the setpoints associated with RWCU area temperatures is below the isolation setpoint. For annunciator 9-3-1/E-10, the associated temperature switches related to RWCU have setpoints of 140°F and 150°F, which are below the Group 3 isolation signal setpoint of 195°F. An examinee who does not know alarm 9-4-2/A-5 is consistent with RWCU area temperature above the isolation setpoint and the relationship of the associated temperature instrumentation with Group 3 isolation logic may choose this answer. This answer is wrong because the temperature switches that cause annunciator 9-4-2/A-5 [RWCU High Space Temperature] to alarm also input into Group 3 isolation logic and result in Group 3 isolation at the same setpoint as the annunciator, 195°F (TS).

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Technical

References:

Alarm Cards 9-4-2/A-5 [RWCU High Space Temp](Rev 22),

9-3-1/E-10 [Area High Temp](Rev 39), Procedure 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation](Rev 62)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-20-01 Obj LO-9f, Describe the RWCU design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: System isolation Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - PCIS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-5A:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295001 (APE 1) Partial or Complete Loss of Forced Tier# 1 Core Flow Circulation / 1 & 4 Group# 1 Knowledge of the reasons for the following K/A # 295001 AK3.03 responses as they apply to PARTIAL OR Rating 2.8 COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW Revision 0 CIRCULATION:

AK3.03 Idle loop flow Revision Statement:

Question 38 The plant was at 85% power during plant startup when the following annunciator was received:

RECIRC LOOP A PANEL/WINDOW:

OUT OF SERVICE 9-4-3/E-3 Two minutes later, the following stable indications exist:

JP LOOP FLOW [NBI-FI-92A] 5 Mlbm/hr JP LOOP FLOW [NBI-FI-92B] 37 Mlbm/hr TOTAL CORE FLOW [NBI-FRDPR-95] 32 Mlbm/hr (1) What is producing the flow indicated on NBI-FI-92A?

AND (2) Is flow indicated on TOTAL CORE FLOW [NBI-FRDPR-95] reflective of actual total core flow?

A. (1) RR Pump B driving head (2) Yes B. (1) RR Pump B driving head (2) No C. (1) Natural circulation driving head (2) Yes D. (1) Natural circulation driving head (2) No

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer: A Explanation:

Conditions given represent a trip of RR Pump A at reduced power. It takes ~ 1 minute from time a pump has tripped for indicated core flow to stabilize. Procedure 2.4RR Att. 1 Note 3 states above ~29.5 Mlbm/hr indicated total core flow, driving head from the active RR loop is greater than driving head from natural circulation in the idle RR loop. The flow summer is designed to subtract jet pump flow in the RR loop with the idle pump from the jet pump flow in the RR loop with the running pump. In this case, the flow summer is subtracting 5 mlbm/hr (reverse flow) from 37 mlbm/hr (forward flow) in the operating RR loop, resulting in 32 mlbm/hr total core flow, which is accurate for the given conditions.

When flow is low in the active RR loop, (i.e when Indicated core flow < 24 Mlbm/hr) indicated core flow will read inaccurately on Power-to-Flow map, possibly resulting in indicated core flow indication to the left of the natural circulation line. This is because the driving head from natural circulation in the idle loop overcomes the effect of driving head from the operating RR pump when active loop flow is low. Since indicated total core flow is below 24 Mlbm/hr, the 3 Mlbm/hr indicated for the idle jet pump loop is actually forward flow produced by natural circulation driving head. Procedure 2.4RR states only maintaining core flow > 29.5 Mlbm/hr ensures backflow (reverse flow) through inactive loop.

Procedure 2.4RR Att. 1 Note 1 at step 1.1 states core flow may indicate higher than actual if a RR pump is tripped and reverse core flow summer is not operating; following indicate summer is operating:

Annunciator 9-4-3/E-3 (9-4-3/E-7), RECIRC LOOP A (B) OUT OF SERVICE, alarming.

Indicated core flow approximately equal to difference between NBI-FI-92A and NBI-FI-92B, JP LOOP FLOW.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Answer B part 2 is plausible because for low core flow conditions below ~29.5 mlbm/hr, the core flow summer is inaccurate because it always subtracts idle loop jet pump flow from operating loop jet pump flow during single loop operation. Below 29.5 mlbm/hr, jet pump flow in both RR loops would be forward, so the core flow summer would errantly indicate lower than actual core flow.

This answer is wrong because flow in idle RR loop A is reversed for the given conditions, and the core flow summer is subtracting RR loop A flow from RR loop B flow, resulting in accurate core flow indication.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because at reduced core flow natural circulation in an idle RR loop can overcome the effects of driving head from the operating RR loop, causing forward flow in the idle loop. This answer is wrong because indicated core flow given in the stem is above 29.5 mlbm/hr, so idle loop flow is reversed because

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 the driving head from RR loop B exceeds the driving head from natural circulation in RR loop A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor C.

Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.4RR [Reactor Recirculation Abnormal](Rev 45)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-22-02 Obj. LO-4u, Describe the interrelationships between the Reactor Recirculation system or the Recirculation Flow Control system and the following: Core flow; 5h, Describe the following concepts as they apply to the Reactor Recirculation system, or to the Recirculation Flow Control system: Natural circulation Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 700000 (APE 25) Generator Voltage and Electric Tier# 1 Grid Disturbances / 6 Group# 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between K/A # 700000 AK2.02 GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID Rating 3.1 DISTURBANCES and the following: Revision 0 AK2.02 Breakers, relays Revision Statement:

Question 39 The plant is operating at rated power.

ALL off-site power voltages simultaneously lower causing ALL 4160 VAC bus voltages to stabilize at 3800 VAC.

Which one of the following completes the statements below regarding the status of Diesel Generators (DGs) and 480 VAC Load Shedding if Grid voltage remains at this value for 2 minutes?

Both DG(s) ____(1)____ be running.

480 VAC Load-Shedding ____(2)____ occur.

A. (1) will (2) will B. (1) will (2) will NOT C. (1) will NOT (2) will D. (1) will NOT (2) will NOT Answer: A Explanation:

With the NSST supplying 1A/1F & 1B/1G and bus voltage lowering to 3800 volts, breakers 1FA and 1GB will trip 12.5 seconds after voltage has lowered below 3880

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 VAC. The "loss of voltage" signal will start the Diesel generators and apply a close permissive to 1FS & 1GS. As the Emergency Transformer voltage is also degraded, 1FS/1GS will not automatically close and the EDGs will close onto the bus when they have reached rated voltage and speed (at least 10 seconds after the bus was de-energized). As the "loss of voltage" signal exists for > 5.5 seconds, 480 volt load-shedding will be initiated and 12 breakers will receive a trip signal.

Distracters:

B. This answer is incorrect due to 480 VAC load shed occurs. This choice is plausible if the time from reaching the first level undervoltage were reduced to less than 5.5 seconds. The examinee that correctly identifies the degraded voltage starting both DGs and confuses first & second level undervoltage logic would select this answer.

C. This answer is incorrect due to both DGs automatically starting. This choice is plausible if the undervoltage setpoints and time delays are not known or confused.

The examinee that confuses degraded voltage DG starts and remember 480 VAC load shed logic would select this answer.

D. This answer is incorrect due to both DGs automatically starting and 480 VAC load shed occurring. This choice is plausible if the undervoltage setpoints and time delays are not known or confused and the time from reaching the first level undervoltage were reduced to less than 5.5 seconds. The examinee that confuses degraded voltage DG starts and first & second level undervoltage logic would select this answer.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.2.18.1 [4160V Auxiliary Power Distribution System](Rev 2), procedure 5.3GRID [Degraded Grid Voltage](Rev 53)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR0010102001080B Predict the consequences of the following on plant operation: 4160V Critical bus undervoltage Question Source: Bank # 12-2015 ILT NRC Q#45 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - Emergency AC Power, DGs From 12-2015 ILT NRC exam

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295012 (APE 12) High Drywell Temperature / 5 Tier# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as Group# 2 they apply to HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE: K/A # 295012 AA2.03 AA2.03 Drywell humidity: Plant-Specific Rating 2.8 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 40 Reference Provided The plant is at 100% power.

Procedure 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control] has been entered due to changes in the following drywell parameters over the last 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s:

Drywell pressure has risen 0.3 psig Inlet/Outlet Temp Unit B, PC-TR-500B (inlet) has risen from 118°F to 126°F Inlet Moisture Unit B, PC-MR-500B has risen from 94°F to 96°F Which one of the following describes the effect of this condition on drywell relative humidity and what would have caused these indications?

DW relative humidity has A. risen due to a steam leak.

B. risen due to a DW FCU tube leak.

C. lowered due to a DW FCU shaft shear.

D. lowered due to drywell nitrogen supply PCV-513 leak-by.

Answer: C Explanation:

Procedure 2.4PC Attachment 1 is used to determine DW relative humidity by plotting DW FCU inlet wet bulb temperature PC-MR-500 (A-D) versus DW FCU inlet dry bulb temperature PC-TR-500 (A-D). For the conditions given, plotting the initial values of wet bulb and dry bulb temperature yield a relative humidity of ~50%. Plotting the final values yields ~40% relative humidity. Therefore, relative humidity has lowered. This

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 is expected because DW atmosphere water vapor content will not change significantly, and if the water vapor content stays the same and the temperature rises, the relative humidity decreases. This is because warmer air requires more moisture to become saturated than does colder air. Of the answers given, the only failure that would cause DW temperature to rise, reflected by the inlet to DW FCU B inlet temperature rising, and relative humidity to lower is loss of heat removal by another DW FCU due to shaft shear.

Shaft cracking on DW FCUs was documented in 2018 by CR-CNS-2018-02868 and 03180.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because DW pressure and temperature have risen. The examinee who misreads 2.4PC Att. 1 graph and believes relative humidity increased because the final operating point is higher than the initial operating point on the graph will choose this answer. It is wrong because 2.4PC states a short-term rise in DW relative humidity would accompany a rise in DW pressure and temperature if due to a steam leak; however, DW relative humidity has lowered.

Answer B is plausible for the examinee who misreads 2.4PC Att. 1 graph, as discussed for distractor A, and because the answer reflects water leakage into the DW, which would eventually raise DW atmosphere moisture content. Also, a tube leak could result in decreased effectiveness of the affected DW FCU, which would result in elevated DW temperature and pressure. It is wrong because DW relative humidity has actually lowered.

Answer D is plausible because leak-by of DW nitrogen supply PCV-510 would cause DW pressure to rise and relative humidity to lower. It is wrong because it would have negligible effect on DW temperature and not cause DW temperature to rise significantly.

Technical

References:

CR-CNS-2018-02868, CR-CNS-2018-03180, Procedure 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control](Rev 21)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control] Attachment 1 [Primary Containment Relative Humidity](rev 20)

Learning Objective: INT032-01-28 EO-J, Given plant condition(s) and the applicable Abnormal/Emergency Procedure, discuss the correct subsequent actions required to mitigate the event(s).

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4),(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295028 (EPE 5) High Drywell Temperature (Mark I Tier# 1 and Mark II only) / 5 Group# 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH K/A # 295028 EK2.04 DRYWELL TEMPERATURE and the following: Rating 3.6 EK2.04 Drywell ventilation Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 41 The plant is at 100% power when the following annunciator is received:

DRYWELL FCU A PANEL/WINDOW:

HI DISCH TEMP H-1/A-1 Drywell temperature is 130°F, rising slowly.

Drywell pressure is 0.5 psig, rising slowly (1) EOP-3A entry will be required as soon as average drywell temperature exceeds °F.

AND (2) Which action is required NOW with respect to DW FCUs?

A. (1) 135°F (2) Ensure all DW FCU control switches in RUN B. (1) 135°F (2) Place all DW FCU control switches in OVERRIDE C. (1) 150°F (2) Ensure all DW FCU control switches in RUN D. (1) 150°F (2) Place all DW FCU control switches in OVERRIDE Answer: C

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Explanation:

The stem reflects a condition where a problem with one DW FCU is causing DW temperature to rise. EOP-3A entry is required when primary containment temperature exceeds 150°F.

An entry condition for Procedure 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control] is DW temperature rising, so 2.4PC entry is required. 2.4PC step 4.6 requires placing all available DW FCUs in RUN.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because the DW ventilation system is designed to maintain average DW temperature below 135°F. It is wrong because EOP-3A entry is required only when DW average temperature exceeds 150°F. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Part 2 is plausible because if DW pressure was above 1.84 psig, DW FCUs would automatically trip and EOP-3A entry would be required due to high DW pressure.

EOP-3A step DW/T-3 would require placing DW FCU switches in OVERRIDE to defeat the high DW pressure trip interlock and return DW FCUs to operation. It is wrong because EOP-3A has not yet been entered, so placing DW FCU switches to OVERRIDE is not allowed.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

EOP-3A [Primary Containment Control](Rev 18), Procedure 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control](Rev 20), PSTG [AMP-TBD00 EOP Technical Basis](Rev 10), lesson plan COR001-08-01 [Ops HVAC](Rev 30)

References to be provided to applicants during exam:

Learning Objective: COR001-08-01 Obj LO-11c, Describe the HVAC design features and interlocks that provide for the following: Automatic starting and stopping of fans; Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 PSA Applicability:

N/A From EOP-3A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-3A:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295023 (APE 23) Refueling Accidents / 8 Tier# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as Group# 1 they apply to REFUELING ACCIDENTS: K/A # 295023 AA2.01 AA2.01 Area radiation levels Rating 3.6 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 42 Core offload is in progress during Mode 5 when a fuel bundle drops into the Spent Fuel Pool due a fuel grapple malfunction, resulting in damage to the fuel bundle.

The following annunciator is received due to Fuel Pool Area RMA-RA-1 and Fuel Pool Area RMA-RA-2 in alarm:

REFUEL AREA PANEL/WINDOW:

HIGH RAD 9-3-1/A-10 Which of the following lists EVERY procedure REQUIRED to be entered for this condition?

A. 5.1RAD [Building Radiation Trouble], ONLY B. 5.1RAD [Building Radiation Trouble] AND EOP-5A, ONLY C. 5.1RAD [Building Radiation Trouble] AND 5.2FUEL [Fuel Failure], ONLY D. 5.1RAD [Building Radiation Trouble] AND 5.2FUEL [Fuel Failure] AND EOP-5A Answer: D Explanation:

This question requires determining which area radiation monitors are in alarm and interpreting the alarm level in order to identify which procedures are required to be entered. Area radiation monitors RMA-RA-1 and RMA-RA-2 monitor the fuel pool area in the reactor building and input into the subject alarm. Alarm Card 9-3-1/A-10 directs entry into procedure 5.1RAD. An entry condition to procedure 5.1RAD is high or unusual readings on any ARM or ARM recorder; therefore, 5.1RAD entry is required. Alarm Card 9-3-1/A-10 does not direct entry into procedure 5.2FUEL; however, an entry condition to 5.2FUEL is Irradiated fuel damage with release of radioactivity to secondary containment as indicated by HIGH alarm on refueling floor

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ARM #2, CAM, or Reactor Building ventilation monitor. Therefore, 5.2FUEL entry is required. An entry condition to EOP-5A is any area radiation level above Maximum Normal Operating value of Table 10. Table 10 lists various area radiation monitors, including RMA-RA-1 and RMA-RA-2, Fuel Pool Area (high and low range). Therefore, EOP-5A entry is required.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible with respect to absence 5.2FUEL because Alarm Card 9-3-1/A-10 does not direct entry into procedure 5.2FUEL, and 5.2FUEL mainly addresses fuel failure during plant operation. It is plausible with respect to absence of EOP-5A because the majority of areas associated with EOP-5A table 10 are inputs to annunciator 9-3-1/A-9 [Reactor Bldg High Rad], not 9-3-1/A-10. Operators are more familiar with EOP-5A entry due to receipt of 9-3-1/A-9 from simulator training involving steam leaks. An examinee who does not know the area radiation monitors that inputs to 9-3-1/A-10 are also EOP-5A entry conditions will chose this answer. This answer is wrong because an entry condition to 5.2FUEL is Irradiated fuel damage with release of radioactivity to secondary containment as indicated by HIGH alarm on refueling floor ARM #2, so 5.2FUEL entry is required. It also is wrong because RMA-RA-1 or RMA-RA-2, which input to annunciator 9-3-1/A-10, are listed in EOP-5A Table 10, and conditions given represent a secondary containment area above MNO value, so EOP-5A entry is required.

Answer B is plausible and wrong for the same reasons given for distractor A with respect to 5.2FUEL.

Answer C is plausible and wrong for the same reasons given for distractor A with respect to EOP-5A.

Technical

References:

Alarm card 9-3-1/A-10 [Refuel Area High Rad](Rev 39),

Procedure 5.1RAD [Building Radiation Trouble](Rev18), Procedure 5.2FUEL [Fuel Failure](Rev 22), EOP-5A [Secondary Containment Control and Radioactivity Release Control](Rev 19)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-18-01 Obj LO-11d, Predict the consequences of the following items on the Radiation Monitoring system: Refuel floor handling accidents/operations Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-5A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 219000 (SF5 RHR SPC) RHR/LPCI: Tier# 2 Torus/Suppression Pool Cooling Mode Group# 2 Knowledge of the operational implications of the K/A # 219000 K5.04 following concepts as they apply to RHR/LPCI: Rating 2.9 TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MODE: Revision 0 K5.04 Heat exchanger operation Revision Statement:

Question 43 From previous 2 NRC Exams 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#57 RHR pump A is operating in Suppression Pool Cooling mode.

RHR A flow rate is 8400 gpm.

NO other RHR pumps are available.

IAW Procedure 2.2.69.3 [RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray], which one of the following actions is required to RAISE the cooldown rate?

A. Throttle closed MO-66A [HX BYPASS VLV]

B. Throttle open MO-12A [HX-A OUTLET VLV]

C. Throttle closed MO-38A [TORUS SPRAY INBD THROTTLE VLV]

D. Throttle open MO-34A [SUPPR POOL COOLING INBD THROTTLE VLV]

Answer: A Explanation:

RHR A flow is at the maximum flow limit to prevent pump runout per procedure 2.2.69.3 step 2.7. Throttling closed MO-66A will force more flow through the RHR HX, resulting in greater heat removal and cooldown rate.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because opening MO-12A is an option in SDC mode per procedure 2.2.69.2 and would result in more flow through the HX, thus more cooling.

The examinee who confuses SDC mode with SPC mode may choose this answer. It is wrong because MO-12A is fully open in SPC mode and because opening MO-12A, if possible, would result in RHR flow rising above 8400 gpm, which is the upper flow limit to prevent pump runout.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer C is plausible because the examinee might not know the RHR piping arrangement or lineup for SPC. It is wrong because MO-38A is already closed for SPC mode, so this action will not raise cool down rate.

Answer D is plausible because if additional cooling is required, procedure 2.2.69.3 states pump C in the same RHR loop may be started and MO-34A throttled further open to achieve more flow. It is wrong because only one RHR pump is operating, and raising flow will cause pump runout.

Technical

References:

procedure 2.2.69.3 [RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray](Rev 51), procedure 2.2.69.2 [RHR System Shutdown Operations](rev 106)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-23-02 Obj LO-5d, Briefly describe the following concepts as they apply to the RHR system: Heat exchanger operation Question Source: Bank # From previous 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#57 2 NRC Exams (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - RHR SPC

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 9-2018 ILT NRC Q#57

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295030 (EPE 7) Low Suppression Pool Water Level Tier# 1

/5 Group# 1 2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a K/A # 295030 G2.2.40 system. Rating 3.4 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 44 The plant is in Mode 3.

Which one of the following is the LOWEST value indicated on PC-LI-12 [TORUS LEVEL]

that satisfies (does NOT require entry into Conditions of) TS LCO 3.6.2.2 [Suppression Pool Water Level]?

A. +0.1 inches B. -1.4 inches C. -1.9 inches D. -4.0 inches Answer: C Explanation:

TS 3.6.2.2 requires SP water level to be 12 ft 7 inches and 12 ft 11 inches. This is equivalent to -2.0 inches and +2.0 inches on PC-LI-12 [TORUS LEVEL]. The lowest answer that is -2.0 inches is C, -1.9 inches.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because, of the answers given, it is the lowest positive value.

An examinee may believe a negative value constitutes being below the TS minimum and choose this answer. It is wrong because it is not the lowest value given that satisfies TS 3.6.2.2.

Answer B is plausible because it is the lowest value that is above the setpoint for SP Level Low annunciator 9-3-2/G-5. The examinee who knows the alarm setpoint and believes it represents the TS 3.6.2.2 minimum water level. It is wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer D is plausible for the same reason given for distractor B and because the low SP level alarm corresponds to -5 inches on wide range SP level indicator PC-LI-10. It is wrong because -4.0 inches on PC-LI-12 is below the TS 3.6.2.2 minimum required SP level.

Technical

References:

TS 3.6.2.2 [Suppression Pool Water Level], Alarm card 9 2/G-5 [Suppr Pool NR/WR Low Level](Rev 34), Procedure 6.LOG.601 [Daily Surveillance Log - Modes 1, 2, and 3](Rev 139)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT007-05-07 EO-1, Given a set of plant conditions, recognize non-compliance with a Chapter 3.6 LCO.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Primary Containment

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295016 (APE 16) Control Room Abandonment / 7 Tier# 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between CONTROL Group# 1 ROOM ABANDONMENT and the following: K/A # 295016 AK2.01 AK2.01 Remote shutdown panel: Plant-Specific Rating 4.4 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 45 Which one of the following actions can be performed ENTIRELY by the ASD Operator from the Alternate Shutdown panel in the event the Control Room becomes uninhabitable due to toxic fumes during Mode 1?

A. Prevent RCIC injection B. Operate all Low-Low Set valves C. Place HPCI in pressure control mode D. Place RHR Suppression Pool Cooling in service Answer: C Explanation:

Of the actions listed, only HPCI has all controls necessary for pressure control mode located on ASD panels. Other listed actions are either fully or in part only performed from locations other than the ASD panel room.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because this action is performed from outside of the control room for control room abandonment. Like ASD panel actions, this action is also performed from a location in the control building. It is wrong because it is accomplished by the control building operator placing the RCIC ISOLATION switch to ISOLATE in the Auxiliary Relay Room.

Answer B is plausible because there are two LLS SRVs and there are controls for three SRVs on the ASD panel. It is wrong because only one LLS SRV (71F) can be controlled from the ASD panel.

Answer D is plausible because controls for all RHR loop B valves necessary to establish the SPC lineup are located on the ASD panel. It is wrong because RHR

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Pump D used for SPC is not controlled from the ASD panel but must be started locally at the pump breaker in the critical switchgear room, and RHRSW to RHR B heat exchanger is aligned from locations other than the ASD room.

Technical

References:

Procedure 5.1ASD [Alternate Shutdown](Rev 19), Lesson plan COR002-16-02 [Ops Nuclear Pressure Relief](Rev 21)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-34-02 Obj LO-9, List the components that can be operated from the ASD room.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - HPCI, RHR, ADS/SRV

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295018 (APE 18) Partial or Complete Loss of CCW / 8 Tier# 1 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses Group# 1 as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF K/A # 295018 AK3.06 COMPONENT COOLING WATER: Rating 3.3 AK3.06 Increasing cooling water flow to heat Revision 0 exchangers Revision Statement:

Question 46 Procedures 2.2.71 [Service Water System] and 2.2.65.1 [REC Operations] require raising Service Water flow through the in-service REC heat exchanger for a specific condition.

(1) Which one of the following is the specific condition for which Service Water flow through the in-service REC heat exchanger is required to be raised?

AND (2) According to procedure 2.2.65.1 [REC Operations], what operating restriction applies with respect to SW to prevent exceeding REC heat exchanger design limits?

A. (1) Low REC system flow (2) Do NOT exceed 6000 gpm B. (1) Low REC system flow (2) Do NOT exceed 17 psid across the heat exchanger divider plate C. (1) Elevated river temperature (2) Do NOT exceed 6000 gpm D. (1) Elevated river temperature (2) Do NOT exceed 17 psid across the heat exchanger divider plate Answer: C Explanation:

There are two REC heat exchangers. Normally, one HX is in service at 100% power.

REC heat exchangers are cooled by Service Water via a motor operated SW valve on the outlet of each HX in series with an automatically or manually controlled temperature control valve. REC supply temperature is normally maintained ~75°F.

Procedure 2.2.71 Precaution and Limitation 2.2 states at river temperatures approaching 95°F, maintain REC HX outlet temperature below 98°F per Procedure

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 2.2.65.1. Procedure 2.2.65.1 section 6 directs raising service water flow through the REC HX when river temperature is above 65°F, and section 17 directs raising service water flow through the REC HX.

REC heat exchanger is a shell and tube type HX. Procedure 2.2.65.1 Cautions at steps 17.1.1 and 19.3 state SW flow through REC HXs > 6000 gpm may result in exceeding HX design limitations.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because a reduction in REC flow will result in decreased cooling to REC loads. Raising SW flow to the in-service HX would mitigate that condition. It is wrong because the mitigation strategy for low REC flow is starting additional REC pumps or throttling open the associated REC HX REC outlet valve, not raising SW flow. A reduction in REC flow would actually result in SW flow being reduced automatically by its temperature control valve due to a reduction in REC HX outlet temperature. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because it represents a limit related to RHRSW flow rate through an RHR heat exchanger IAW procedure 2.2.70 [RHR Service Water Booster Pump System].

RHR heat exchanger is also a shell and tube type HX. It is wrong because it is the limit for RHR HX SW divider plate differential pressure, not REC heat exchanger.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedures 5.2REC [Loss of REC](Rev 18), 2.2.65.1 [REC Operations](Rev 78), 2.2.70 [RHR Service Water Booster Pump System](Rev 90)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-19-02 Obj LO-5d, Briefly describe the following concepts as they apply to REC: Heat Exchanger Operation during normal, accident and transient operation Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Service Water

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 286000 (SF8 FPS) Fire Protection Tier# 2 Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the Group# 2 following: K/A # 286000 K2.02 K2.02 Pumps Rating 2.9 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 47 What is the power supply to Fire Pump C?

480V Bus A. 1B B. 1E C. 1F D. 1G Answer: B Explanation:

Electric Fire pump (1C) located in the Service Water Pump Room, in the intake structure, can supply the fire protection water system. The pump takes suction from the Missouri River and delivers this water, via a double basket strainer, to the fire system main piping loop. This pump starts automatically at 68 psig and is rated at 2000 gpm. It is powered from 480V AC Bus 1E. This is the last fire pump to start on lowering pressure as river water is not as desirable as clean water.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because it reflects another 480V bus that supplies other pumps, such as TEC Pump 1C. It is wrong because 480V Bus 1E supplies Fire Pump C.

Answer C is plausible because it reflects another 480V bus that supplies other pumps, such as CRD Pump 1A. Also, 480V Bus 1F is safety-related, and an examinee may believe Fire Pump C is supplied by a safety-related bus, since it is required by Appendix R. It is wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Answer D is plausible because it reflects another 480V bus that supplies other pumps, such as CRD Pump 1B. Also, 480V Bus 1G is safety-related, and an examinee may

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 believe Fire Pump C is supplied by a safety-related bus, since it is required by Appendix R. It is wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Technical

References:

Lesson Plan COR001-05-01 [Fire Protection System](Rev 36), procedure 2.2A_480.IS [480 VAC Intake Structure Building Breaker Checklist](Rev 17)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-05-01 LO Obj 6b, State the electrical power supplies to the following: Electric Fire Pumps "C" & "E" Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295006 (APE 6) Scram / 1 Tier# 1 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as Group# 1 they apply to SCRAM: K/A # 295006 AA1.03 AA1.03 Reactor/turbine pressure regulating system Rating 3.7 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 48 A MANUAL scram is inserted with the plant at 25% power.

Which one of the following completes the statements below for this event?

When the anti-motoring turbine trip is received, (1) DEH shifts to Mode .

AND (2) Bypass valves respond by .

A. (1) 3 (2) throttling open to maintain the DEH pressure setpoint B. (1) 3 (2) rapidly opening fully for 5 seconds, then throttle to maintain the DEH setpoint C. (1) 1 (2) throttling open to maintain the DEH pressure setpoint D. (1) 1 (2) rapidly opening fully for 5 seconds, then throttle to maintain the DEH setpoint Answer: C Explanation:

Upon a scram when the generator is on line, turbine governor valves throttle closed to maintain the DEH pressure setpoint as reactor power and steam production lower. As steam flow lowers, a turbine generator anti-motoring trip occurs when HP turbine dp goes below 30 psid after a 25 second time delay. At this point, turbine generator load is nearing zero, below 106 MWe. Upon a turbine trip below 106 MWe, bypass valves throttle open to maintain the DEH setpoint,

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Distracters:

Answer A part 1 plausible because DEH is in Mode 4 at 25% power. DEH transitions from Mode 3 to Mode 4 when the generator is placed on line. An examinee may believe that DEH shifts to the previous mode, Mode 3, when the generator trips. Also, the reactor mode shifts to Mode 3 upon a scram. It is wrong because when the turbine trips due to low HP turbine dp, DEH shifts to Mode 1 (turbine not latched).

Part 2 is correct Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason as given for distractor A.

Part 2 is plausible because generator load is initially above 106 MWe at 25% power, and for a turbine trip above 106 MWe, the bypass valve actuator dump valves open, causing the bypass valves to fully open rapidly for 5 seconds. It is wrong because the anti-motoring trip setpoint corresponds to a generator load below 106 MWe, so bypass valves throttle open only so far as required to maintain the DEH pressure setpoint.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-09-02 [Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control](Rev 20)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-09-02 Obj LO-8o, Predict the consequences a malfunction of the following would have on DEH Control system: Reactor Scram Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295026 (EPE 3) Suppression Pool High Water Tier# 1 Temperature / 5 Group# 1 Knowledge of the operational implications of the K/A # 295026 EK1.02 following concepts as they apply to SUPPRESSION Rating 3.5 POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: Revision 1 EK1.02 Steam condensation Revision Statement: Rev 1 - Replaced part 1 distractor per NRC comment that part 1 distractor was borderline LOD=1 during free review using distractor from 12/2015 ILT NRC Q#13. Also replaced containment failure with containment over-pressurization in part 1 correct answer to make more distinctive from revised part 1 distractor.

Question 49 An ATWS is in progress.

HPCI is in service for level control.

Suppression Pool temperature is rising.

(1) What is the principal operational concern if Suppression Pool temperature approaches the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL)?

AND (2) IAW EOP-3A, Emergency Depressurization is required when Suppression Pool temperature cannot be within HCTL.

A. (1) Exceeding the Torus design temperature (2) maintained B. (1) Exceeding the Torus design temperature (2) restored and maintained C. (1) Containment over-pressurization due to inability of the Suppression Pool to absorb all energy from a blowdown (2) maintained D. (1) Containment over-pressurization due to inability of the Suppression Pool to absorb all energy from a blowdown (2) restored and maintained

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer: C Explanation:

Operation in the safe region of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) graph ensures there is sufficient heat capacity in the suppression pool to absorb energy and condense steam from SRV discharge and steam discharged through the drywell downcomers.

HCTL is the highest suppression pool temperature from which emergency RPV depressurization will not raise:

Suppression chamber temperature above the maximum temperature capability of the suppression chamber, or Suppression chamber pressure above Primary Containment Pressure Limit, while the rate of energy transfer from the RPV to the containment is greater than the capacity of the containment vent.

Exceeding HCTL could result in exceeding design limits during a blowdown, which could result in containment failure.

IAW EOP-3A step SP/T-5, emergency depressurization is required before HCTL is exceeded in order to reduce the energy within the RPV before reaching plant conditions for which the pressure suppression system may not be able to safely accommodate an SRV opening or condense steam discharged through the downcomer vents. Cannot be maintained requires the action to be taken as soon as it is determined HCTL will be exceeded or as soon as it exceeded. This is in contrast to restored and maintained, which allows a limit to be exceeded without having to take the associated action, if there is reason to believe the parameter can otherwise be restored to within the limit.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because the torus design temperature is sometimes confused with the temperature capability of the torus, which is variable based upon RPV pressure, Torus level, and initial Torus temperature. This answer is wrong because HCTL is concerned with ensuring the heat absorption capability of the SP from SRV and DW downcomer vent discharges is sufficient for adequate steam condensation to prevent overpressurizing containment above PCPL. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reasons stated for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because other EOP steps, such as EOP-3A step DW/T-5, require emergency depressurization when a parameter cannot be restored and maintained within the limit, allowing attempts to restore the parameter without inducing the serious transient of a blowdown. It is wrong because EOP-3A step SP/T-5 requires emergency depressurization when operation cannot be maintained within the limit (HCTL), and no allowance for restoration within limits is provided.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reasons stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

EOP-3A [Primary Containment Control](Rev 18), AMP-TBD00 [PSTGs](Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-06-13 EO-4c, State the basis for primary containment control actions as they apply to the following: Graphs referenced on Flowchart 3A; INT008-08-16 EO-2, For each graph used in the flowcharts, identify the action(s) required if the parameters associated indicate operation in the restricted or prohibited area.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-3A:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-3A:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 230000 (SF5 RHR SPS) RHR/LPCI: Tier# 2 Torus/Suppression Pool Spray Mode Group# 2 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or K/A # 230000 K1.06 cause-effect relationships between RHR/LPCI: Rating 3.0 TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY MODE and Revision 0 the following:

K1.06 Keep fill system Revision Statement:

Question 50 The reactor scrammed 10 minutes ago from 100% power due to a steam leak in the drywell.

Containment Spray is required.

(1) What is the normal supply for Pressure Maintenance to RHR Loop B?

AND (2) During operation of containment spray IAW Procedure 2.2.69.3 Section 12, why is the operator cautioned to maintain RHR pressure above Condensate Transfer System pressure?

A. (1) Condensate Pumps (2) Prevent depleting CST B. (1) Condensate Pumps (2) Prevent raising Suppression Pool level C. (1) Reactor Building Auxiliary Condensate Pump (2) Prevent depleting CST D. (1) Reactor Building Auxiliary Condensate Pump (2) Prevent raising Suppression Pool level Answer: B Explanation:

The Pressure Maintenance system prevents water hammer on pump starts and the possible pipe and valve damage that may result, and it prevents a pump runout condition from occurring while discharging to an empty pipe on a start.up. The

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Condensate system supplies the Pressure Maintenance system during normal plant operations from the inlet to the Condensate Demineralizers. When the Condensate pumps are not operating, the Reactor Building auxiliary condensate pump (power supply MCC-N) will supply the Pressure Maintenance system. The Reactor Building auxiliary condensate pump takes a suction from the CST through a line which is also used for the Core Spray pumps' and RHR pumps' 1A and 1D alternate suction. With its control switch in AUTO (Panel 9-3 in the Control Room), PS-685 starts the Reactor Building aux. condensate pump when the pressure decreases to 50 psig. A scram on high DW pressure would not result in trip of CPs, so no low pressure condition occurs, and the RB Aux. Condensate Pump does not start. Therefore, CPs continue to supply Pressure Maintenance.

Procedure 2.2.69.3 caution at step 12.16.2 for placing Containment Spray in operation states Suppression Pool filling may occur if RHR Subsystem pressure less than Condensate Transfer System pressure.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because CPs take suction from the hotwell, and the CST makes up to the hotwell. So, Pressure Maintenance flow would eventually deplete the CST. It is wrong because the concern for the Caution in procedure 2.2.69.3 is raising SP level if Pressure Maintenance pressure is higher than RHR pressure with Containment Spray valves open.

Answer C is plausible because the RB Aux. Condensate Pump will start and supply Pressure Maintenance to RHR if a low Pressure Maintenance supply pressure condition occurs. It is wrong because nothing in the stem would cause a loss of Pressure Maintenance system pressure, so CPs are still the supply. Part 2 is plausible because RB Aux. Condensate Pumps take a suction from the CST. It is wrong because the concern for the Caution in procedure 2.2.69.3 is raising SP level if Pressure Maintenance pressure is higher than RHR pressure with Containment Spray valves open.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor C. Part 2 is correct.

Technical

References:

Lesson Plan COR002-02-02 [Condensate and Feedwater](Rev 39), Lesson Plan COR002-23-02 [Ops Residual Heat Removal System](Rev 36), Procedure 2.2.69.3 [RHR Suppression Pool Cooling and Containment Spray](Rev 51)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-23-02 Obj LO- 4c, Describe the interrelationship between the RHR system and the following: Pressure Maintenance system Question Source: Bank #

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4),(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - RHR

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295025 (EPE 2) High Reactor Pressure / 3 Tier# 1 Knowledge of the interrelations between HIGH Group# 1 REACTOR PRESSURE and the following: K/A # 295025 EK2.09 EK2.09 Reactor power Rating 3.9 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 51 Startup is in progress following a 1-day shutdown near the end of the current operating cycle.

Reactor power is 20%

Main generator is on line DEH Pump B trips, and DEH Pump A will NOT start, resulting in a plant transient.

Which one of the following completes the statements below regarding effects of this transient?

Reactor power will initially (1) .

EOP-1A entry (2) be required.

A. (1) rise (2) will B. (1) rise (2) will NOT C. (1) lower (2) will D. (1) lower (2) will NOT Answer: A Explanation:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Loss of DEH pumps results in Turbine Control Valves closing, which causes reactor pressure to rise. Reactor power rises due to void collapse caused by the pressure rise.

When TCVs close, a scram signal is generated on TCV Fast Closure. This scram signal is bypassed when reactor power is below 29.5% power. Since DEH pumps are lost, Bypass valves are unable to control reactor pressure. Since the TCV Fast Closure scram is bypassed and Bypass valves are unavailable, reactor pressure rises to the scram setpoint, 1050 psig. Reactor pressure above 1050 psig is an entry condition to EOP-1A; therefore, EOP-1A entry will be required.

At 20% power, the APRM flow biased scram setpoint is ~95%. Reactor pressure will reach the scram setpoint well before APRMs reach their scram setpoint.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because reactor power rises due to high pressure and because TCV Fast Closure signal occurs. A reactor scram on high APRM flux or TCV Fast Closure does not alone require entry into EOP-1A. An examinee may believe the pressure rise would be terminated by a high flux scram or TCV Fast Closure scram, so only entry into procedure 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram] would be required. It is wrong because reactor pressure rises to the scram setpoint and EOP-1A entry condition before APRM scram setpoint is reached and because TCV Fast Closure scram is bypassed, so EOP-1A entry will be required on reactor pressure

>1050 psig.

Answer C part 1 is plausible to the examinee who confuses the effect of rising pressure on voids and boiling boundary and the resulting effect on reactor power.

The examinee may believe rising pressure pushes the boiling boundary downward, lowering power. It is wrong because rising pressure causes voids in the core to collapse, thus raising the boiling boundary and reactor power. Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor C. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

TS 3.3.1.1 [RPS Instrumentation], Lesson plan COR002 02 [Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control](Rev 20), Alarm Card 9-5-2/C-4 [TSV & TCV Closure Trip Byp Chan A/B](Rev 49)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-09-02 Obj LO-8b, Predict the consequences a malfunction of the following would have on DEH Control system: Failed open/closed bypass valve(s); Obj LO-7a, Given a specific DEH Control system malfunction, determine the effect on any of the following: Reactor power Obj LO-7b, Given a specific DEH Control system malfunction, determine the effect on any of the following:

Reactor pressure; INT008-06-05 EO-1, List the entry conditions of Flowchart 1A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - RPS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295004 (APE 4) Partial or Total Loss of DC Power/6 Tier# 1 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for Group# 1 operations and safety limits. K/A # 295004 G2.2.22 Rating 4.0 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 52 The plant is at 2% power during startup.

250 VDC Bus 1B loses power.

IAW TS 3.8.7 [Distributions Systems - Operating],

(1) Which one of the following systems must be declared inoperable as a result of this failure?

AND (2) What is the Completion Time specified by TS 3.8.7 for declaring the supported system inoperable?

A. (1) LPCI Loop B (2) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> B. (1) LPCI Loop B (2) Immediately C. (1) Core Spray B (2) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> D. (1) Core Spray B (2) Immediately Answer: B Explanation:

This is RO level, since it involves a 1 hr TS action statement. For the conditions given, the plant is in Mode 2, so TS 3.8.7 is applicable.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 250 VDC Bus 1B provides power to various required Division 2 DC loads. 250 VDC Bus 1B supplies power to the 250 VDC Div 2 Starter rack, which supplies power to RHR Loop B Inboard Injection Valve RHR-MO-25B. This valve is closed in standby and automatically opens on an ECCS initiation signal. Since the valve is supported by 250 VDC Bus 1B and will not perform its safety function with 250 VDC Bus 1 B de-energized it must be declared inoperable IAW TS 3.8.7 Action D.1. The completion time for TS 3.8.7 Action D.1 is IMMEDIATELY.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because a one hour completion time is sometimes given for other very limiting actions. For example, one action associated with DC power, TS 3.8.6 Action A.1, has a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> completion time. It is wrong because TS 3.8.7 action D.1 completion time is IMMEDIATELY.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because Core Spray B has inboard and outboard injection valves as does RHR Loop B. It is wrong because Core Spray B injection valves are both AC powered. 250 VDC does not support Core Spray B system. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor C.

Part 2 is correct.

Technical

References:

TS 3.8.7 [Distribution Systems - Operating], Procedure 2.2A_250DC.DIV2 [250 VDC Power Checklist (Div 2)] (Rev 2), TS 3.8.6 [Battery Cell Parameters]

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT007-05-09 EO-9, From memory, in MODES 1, 2, and 3 state the actions required in one hour if one 250 V DC electrical power distribution subsystem inoperable (LCO 3.8.7).

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(8)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Emergency DC Power

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295032 (EPE 9) High Secondary Containment Area Tier# 1 Temperature / 5 Group# 2 Knowledge of the reasons for the following K/A # 295032 EK3.03 responses as they apply to HIGH SECONDARY Rating 3.8 CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE: Revision 0 EK3.03 Isolating affected systems Revision Statement:

Question 53 MSL tunnel area temperatures are rising due to a steam leak from MSL B while operating at 100% power.

IAW EOP-5A, closing MSIVs is REQUIRED ____(1)____ a Secondary Containment area temperature exceeds Maximum Normal Operating (MNO) value in order to ____(2)____.

A. (1) before (2) prevent uncontrolled depressurization of the RPV B. (1) before (2) reduce the energy input into secondary containment C. (1) ONLY after (2) prevent uncontrolled depressurization of the RPV D. (1) ONLY after (2) reduce the energy input into secondary containment Answer: D Explanation:

The MSL tunnel is in Secondary Containment. With a primary system discharging into secondary containment, EOP-5A steps SC/T-3 and SC-3 require isolating the system WHEN any area exceeds its MNO temperature. IAW PSTGs, system isolation is required when any area temperature exceeds its MNO value in order to terminate the heat addition from a primary system that is discharging into the secondary containment to prevent reaching Maximum Safe Operating temperature.

Distracters:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer A part 1 is plausible because IAW EOP-5A steps SC-4 and SC-5, a scram is required before any area temperature reaches its Max Safe Operating (MSO) limit. It is wrong because EOP-5A steps SC/T-3 requires step SC-3, isolating the system, to be performed when any area temperature exceeds its MNO limit, not before. Part 2 is plausible because a MSL leak could result in uncontrolled RPV depressurization if large enough. A reactor scram is inevitable with MSL tunnel temperature continuing to rise, and once the Reactor Mode Switch is placed to Shutdown, automatic MSIV closure on RPV low pressure is bypassed. Operator action would be necessary to close MSIVs to prevent uncontrolled depressurization. It is wrong because the EOP-5A basis for isolating the system is to terminate the heat addition into secondary containment from a high energy leak. EOP-1A contains actions for controlling RPV pressure.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Technical

References:

EOP-5A [Secondary Containment Control/Radioactivity Release Control](Rev 19), PSTG [AMP-TBD00 EOP Technical Basis](Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: : INT008-06-17 EOP Flowchart 5A Secondary Containment and Radioactivity Release Control, EO-7. Given plant conditions and EOP flowchart 5A, SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL and RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL, state the reasons for the actions contained in the steps.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 12/2015 ILT NRC Q#25 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-5A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 201003 (SF1 CRDM) Control Rod and Drive Tier# 2 Mechanism Group# 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of K/A # 201003 K6.02 the following will have on the CONTROL ROD AND Rating 3.0 DRIVE MECHANISM: Revision 1 K6.02 Reactor pressure Revision Statement: Rev 1 - Made answer C=900, A=960, and B=940 IAW NRC comment from free review Question 54 The plant is at 80% power when the following conditions occur:

HCU accumulator for withdrawn control rod 18-23 is declared inoperable due to low pressure Running CRD pump trips DEH malfunction causes reactor pressure to slowly lower Which one of the following is the LOWEST reactor pressure which will fully insert control rod 18-23 within the TS Allowable Control Rod Scram Time under these conditions?

A. 960 psig B. 940 psig C. 900 psig D. 835 psig Answer: C Explanation:

Per Procedure 2.2.8, below ~ 900 psig reactor pressure, hydraulic accumulators are required to ensure any withdrawn control rods are fully scrammed within required time. Answer C is the lowest answer given that is 900 psig.

Distracters:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer A is plausible because 960 psig is the setpoint for CRD HCU accumulator low pressure alarm. It is wrong because it is not the lowest pressure given that is above 900 psig.

Answer B is plausible because 940 psig is just above the action point criteria IAW alarm card 9-5-2/G-6. Immediate action is required IAW alarm card 9-5-2/G-6 states if CRD charging water pressure indicated on CRD-PI-302 is <940 psig, along with reactor pressure <900 psig and a CRD HCU accumulator for a withdrawn control rod inoperable. It is wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Answer D is plausible because it reflects a familiar number associated with reactor pressure. 835 psig reactor pressure is the TS setpoint for Group 1 isolation on low reactor pressure. It is wrong because it is below the ~900 psig reactor pressure necessary to ensure scram times are met with inoperable CRD HCU accumulators and low charging water header pressure.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.2.8 [Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System](Rev 106], Alarm Card 9-5-2/G-6 [CRD Accum Low Press or High Level](Rev 49), Lesson Plan COR002-04-02 [OPS Control Rod Drive Hydraulics](Rev 30), TS Table 3.3.6.1-1

[Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation]

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-04-02 Obj LO 13g. Describe the interrelationships between the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic system (CRDH) and the following: Control Rod Drive Mechanisms; COR002-04-02 Obj LO-11i, Predict the consequences a malfunction of the following would have on the CRDH system: CRDH pump trip Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295013 (APE 13) High Suppression Pool Tier# 1 Temperature. / 5 Group# 2 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. K/A # 295013 G2.4.18 Rating 3.3 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 55 The EOP-3A entry condition for high Suppression Pool temperature is the TS 3.6.2.1

[Suppression Pool Average Temperature] limit .

A. when power is 1%.

B. at which plant shutdown is required.

C. during testing that adds heat to the Suppression Pool when power is >1%.

D. with NO testing in progress that adds heat to the Suppression Pool with power above 1%.

Answer: D Explanation:

The EOP-3A entry condition for high SP temperature is 95°F. The basis is this represents the most limiting (lowest) value allowed for SP temperature listed in LCO 3.6.2.1 [Suppression Pool Average Temperature] during Modes 1, 2, and 3.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because it reflects a limit listed in LCO 3.6.2.1. It is the LCO limit when power is 1% and is 110°F. It is wrong because it is not the EOP-3A entry condition for high SP temperature, because it is not the most limiting LCO value.

Answer B is plausible because TS 3.6.2.1 Action D.1 requires immediately placing the Reactor Mode Switch to shutdown if SP temperature is >110°F when power is >1%. It is wrong because 110°F is not the most limiting LCO value. (This distractor is RO knowledge, since it involves a 1hr TS action.)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer C is plausible because it reflects a limit listed in LCO 3.6.2.1. It is the LCO limit when power is >1% and testing is adding heat to SP and is 105°F. It is wrong because 105°F is not the most limiting LCO value.

Technical

References:

PSTG [AMP-TBD00 EOP Technical Basis](Rev 9), TS 3.6.2.1 [Suppression Pool Average Temperature], Lesson plan INT008-06-13 [OPS EOP Flowchart 3A - Primary Containment Control](Rev 22)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-06-13 EO-1, List the entry conditions for Flowchart 3A and briefly describe the importance of each.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295035 (EPE 12) Secondary Containment High Tier# 1 Differential Pressure / 5 Group# 2 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as K/A # 295035 EA1.02 they apply to SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH Rating 3.8 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE: Revision 0 EA1.02 SBGT/FRVS Revision Statement:

Question 56 Reactor Building H & V exhaust fans tripped with the plant at 100% power.

SGT A was placed in service by the operator IAW Procedure 2.2.73 [Standby Gas Treatment System] due to secondary containment high differential pressure.

According to Procedure 2.2.73, SGT-DPIC-546 [RX BLDG/SGT DP] setpoint is required to be adjusted to maintain:

Reactor Building differential pressure less than or equal to (1) AND SGT discharge header flow greater than or equal to (2) .

A. (1) -0.25 wg (2) 800 scfm B. (1) -0.25 wg (2) 1780 scfm C. (1) -0.50 wg (2) 800 scfm D. (1) -0.50 wg (2) 1780 scfm Answer: A Explanation:

SGT system prevents out-leakage from secondary containment during periods of primary and/or secondary containment isolation by holding it at a sub atmospheric pressure of -0.25" wg. Procedure 2.2.73 section 6 is for manual operation to maintain RB differential pressure. Step 6.2 requires adjusting SGT-DPIC-546 setpoint to less than or equal to -0.25" wg. Step 6.6 further requires adjusting SGT-DPIC-546, as necessary to obtain greater than or equal to 800 scfm on SGT-FI-545 [SGT

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Discharge Header Flow] to maintain the SGT filter train electric heaters energized.

Heaters are necessary to maintain low moisture in the charcoal filters by reducing the relative humidity of the air stream and trip if flow falls below 800 scfm.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because the design flow rate for a single SGT subsystem is 1780 scfm. It is wrong because actual flow rate to maintain -

0.25 wg differential pressure varies with plant conditions, so Procedure 2.2.73 specifies 800 scfm as the minimum flow rate in order to maintain heaters energized, and that also prevents auto start of a SGT subsystem that has been placed in STANDBY.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because it reflects the differential pressure listed in Procedure 2.2.73 at which step 6.7.1.2 requires placing one SGT subsystem in STANDBY. It is wrong because this is the low limit of the desired differential control band, and Procedure 2.2.73 specifies setting the DP controller to -0.25" wg Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor C.

Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.2.73 [Standby Gas Treatment System](Rev 58)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-28-02 Obj LO-8c, Describe the Standby Gas Treatment System design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following:

Moisture removal; 3, State the design bases for the SGT System as described in the associated Student Text.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295031 (EPE 8) Reactor Low Water Level / 2 Tier# 1 2.4.2 Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks and Group# 1 automatic actions associated with EOP entry K/A # 295031 G2.4.2 conditions. Rating 4.5 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 57 (1) The EOP entry condition for low reactor water level is listed on EOP-1A as:

RPV water level below inches.

(2) Which one of the following valves receive an isolation signal at that setpoint for RPV water level?

A. (1) +3 inches (2) RR-AO-741, INBD ISOL VLV B. (1) +3 inches (2) RHR-SSV-95, RHR SAMPLE VALVE C. (1) +7 inches (2) RR-AO-741, INBD ISOL VLV D. (1) +7 inches (2) RHR-SSV-95, RHR SAMPLE VALVE Answer: B Explanation:

The EOP-1A entry condition for low RPV level is level below +3. The setpoint for Group 2 isolation on low RPV level is level below +3. RHR-SSV-95, RHR SAMPLE VALVE is a Group 2 valve and receives an isolation signal when RPV level falls below

+3.

Distracters:

Answers A part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because it is also a sample valve that isolates on low reactor watetr level. It is wrong because RR-AO-741, INBD ISOL VLV is a Group 7 valve and isolates only when level falls below -113.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer C part 1 is plausible because the TS setpoint for the low water level scram is

+ 3, but the actual setpoint is +7.81. The examinee who believes the EOP-1A entry condition is synonymous with the actual low water level scram setpoint would choose this answer. It is wrong because the EOP-1A entry condition is +3. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason given for distractor C.

Part 2 is correct.

Technical

References:

EOP-1A [RPV Control](Rev 22), procedure 2.1.22

[Recovering from a Group Isolation](Rev 63), Alarm Card 9-5-2/D-1 [Reactor Low Level Trip](Rev 49)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-06-05 EO-1, List the entry conditions of Flowchart 1A Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - PCIS From EOP-1A:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295005 (APE 5) Main Turbine Generator Trip / 3 Tier# 1 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as Group# 1 they apply to MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP: K/A # 295005 AA1.01 AA1.01 Recirculation system: Plant-Specific Rating 3.1 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 58 The plant is at 60% power.

Reactor Recirc pump drive motor breakers 1CN and 1DS are closed with each pump at 57% speed.

A main generator load reject occurs.

Reactor pressure peaks at 1050 psig.

What is the status of RR Pumps A and B two minutes later?

A. A is OFF B is running at ~57% speed B. A is OFF B is running at ~22% speed C. A is running at ~57% speed B is OFF D. A is running at ~22% speed B is OFF Answer: B Explanation:

Breaker 1CN powers RR Pump A MG and is supplied by NSST, which is supplied by the main generator. 1CN trips when the generator trips on load reject. 1DS powers RR Pump B MG and is supplied by SSST, which is not affected by the load reject.

The load reject results in a turbine trip, which causes a scram on TSV closure/ TCV fast closure above ~28% power. RVLCS initiates setpoint setdown due to the scram and reduces FW demand to <20%. When FW flow goes <20%, the operating RR Pump (B) runs back to minimum speed, ~22%, which takes ~1 minute.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because RR Pump B is initially at 57% speed, and at higher power levels, a load reject may cause ATWS RPT to initiate (1060 psig reactor pressure), which would trip RR MG field breakers and prevent a RR runback. It is wrong because ATWS RPT does not initiate, since peak pressure is given as 1050 psig, below the RPT setpoint. FW flow reduces below 20% following a scram. That causes RR Pump B to runback to ~22%.

Answer C is plausible because one RR pump is powered from the NSST and one is powered from the SSST, and because of the same reason stated for distractor A. It is wrong because RR Pump B MG is supplied from SSST, so it remains running, and RR Pump A MG is supplied from the NSST, which loses power when the generator trips. It is also wrong for the reason stated for distractor A.

Answer D is plausible because one RR pump is powered from the NSST and one is powered from the SSST. It is wrong because RR Pump B MG is supplied from SSST, so it remains running, and RR Pump A MG is supplied from the NSST, which loses power when the generator trips.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR002-22-02 [Reactor Recirculation System](Rev 35)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-22-02 OBJ LO-4e: Describe the interrelationships between the Reactor Recirculation system or the Recirculation Flow Control system and the following: Main Turbine Generator trip Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 239001 (SF3, SF4 MRSS) Main and Reheat Steam Tier# 2 Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of Group# 2 the MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM will have K/A # 239001 on following: Rating 2.8 K3.05 Condenser air removal Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 59 A spurious Group 1 isolation occurs at 100% power.

Which stage(s) of air ejectors lose(s) driving steam as a direct result of the Group 1 isolation?

A. 1st stage, ONLY B. 3rd stage, ONLY C. 1st AND 2nd stages D. 2nd AND 3rd stages Answer: C Explanation:

This question tests knowledge of the direct effect of loss of main steam to the condenser air removal system. Each SJAE train contains two first stages and two second stages. One first stage and one second stage in an SJAE is capable of evacuating one shell of the Main Condenser. The suction piping to the SJAEs is arranged so either SJAE could evacuate either or both shells of the Main Condenser.

Normally one first stage and both second stages from each SJAE is in service. 1st and 2nd stage SJAEs are supplied steam from the main steam equalizing header.

Only a Group 1 isolation (MSIVs and MSL Drains) isolates the equalizing header, and thus 1st and 2nd stage air ejectors, from the RPV.

The first two processes of the AOG system, compression and dilution of the stream, are accomplished through the addition of Main Steam from the third stage ejectors and sonic nozzles in both AOG trains. This compression and dilution raises the total stream pressure and lowers the hydrogen concentration below its flammability limit of 4% by volume. The 3rd Stage Air Ejectors are supplied Main Steam from the C Main Steam Line upstream of the inboard isolation valve (MS-AO-80C) via the HPCI steam supply line and two RHR motor operated valves (RHR-MO-920 and

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 RHR-MO-921). A Group 2 isolation closes RHR-MO-920 and RHR-MO-921, which would isolate main steam to AOG 3rd stage air ejectors. A Group 4 isolation would close HPCI-MO-15 and HPCI-MO-16, which would indirectly isolate main steam to AOG 3rd stage air ejectors.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because one stage of air ejectors is supplied through a different path than the other two stages. The examinee who does not know the main steam piping arrangement or the air ejector arrangement may choose this answer. It is wrong because 2ndt stage air ejectors are also supplied by main steam from the equalizing header, which would be lost if Group 1 valves isolated.

Answer B is plausible because the 3rd stage air ejectors are supplied through a different path than the 1st and 2nd stages. An examinee who confuses the steam supply for the 3rd stage air ejectors with that of the 1st and 2nd stages may choose this answer. It is wrong because 3rd stage air ejectors are supplied Main Steam from the C Main Steam Line upstream of the inboard isolation valve (MS-AO-80C) via the HPCI steam supply line, not from the equalizing header.

Answer D is plausible because two stages of air ejectors are supplied by a common path, the equalizing header. An examinee who confuses the pairing of air ejectors may chose this answer. It is wrong because 1st and 2nd stage air ejectors lose their steam supply following a Group 1 isolation, but the 3rd stage air ejectors do not.

Technical

References:

lesson plan COR002-14-02 [Ops Main Steam](Rev 30),

lesson plan COR001-16-01 [Ops Off Gas](Rev 35), lesson plan COR002-11-02 [Ops High Pressure Coolant Injection](Rev 38)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-14-02 Obj LO-3d, Describe the interrelationships between the Main Steam system and the following: Off Gas and Condenser Air Removal system Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4),(7)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295019 (APE 19) Partial or Complete Loss of Tier# 1 Instrument Air / 8 Group# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as K/A # 295019 AA2.01 they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF Rating 3.5 INSTRUMENT AIR: Revision 0 AA2.01 Instrument air system pressure Revision Statement:

Question 60 Station Air Compressors (SAC) are aligned as follows:

SAC 1A 1st Backup SAC 1B Lead SAC 1C 2nd Backup A leak has occurred on the instrument air supply header.

Instrument Air supply header pressure has fallen to 92 psig and has stabilized.

480V Bus 1G is de-energized.

Which Station Air Compressor(s) is/are running loaded NOW?

A. 1A, only B. 1B, only C. 1A and 1B D. 1A and 1C Answer: A Explanation:

This is a modified version of 3-2017 ILT NRC Q#52. It was modified by replacing high lube oil temperature with loss of 4160V Bus 1G as an intitial condition.

An entry condition for procedure 5.2AIR is IA header pressure below the green band on IA-PI-66 on panel A. The bottom of the green band is 95 psig, so 5.2AIR entry is

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 required. The operator must interpret IA pressure to verify automatic actions occur.

The lead SAC, 1B, is set to load between 100 to 110 psig. The 1st Backup SAC, 1A, is set to auto start at 93 psig and load between 93 to 99 psig. The 2nd Backup SAC, 1C, is set to auto start at 90 psig and load between 90 to 97 psig. Therefore, for IA pressure of 92 psig, only SAC 1A and 1B have a demand to be running loaded, since 92 psig is above the auto start and loading range of the 2nd backup compressor, SAC C.

480V bus 1G supplies SAC B and is de-energized, so, SAC B is not running. 480V bus 1F supplies SAC A and is not affected, so SAC A is running.

Therefore, only SAC 1A is running loaded.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because SAC A is also supplied by a 480V AC bus. It is wrong because 480V bus 1F supplies SAC A and is not affected, so SAC A is running, and 480V bus 1G supplies SAC B and is de-energized, so, SAC B is not running.

Answer C is plausible because IA pressure is below the setpoint for the 1st backup, SAC A, to be running. It is wrong because SAC B is not running due to 480V bus 1G being de-energized.

Answer D is plausible because each SAC will operate loaded for different IA pressure ranges. The examinee who believes all SACs have a demand to operate loaded at 92 psig IA pressure but recognizes 480V bus 1G supplies SAC B will choose this answer.

It is wrong because SAC 1C would not be running loaded, since IA pressure, 92 psig, has not yet lowered to its auto start setting of 90 psig.

Technical

References:

Procedures 5.2AIR [Loss of Instrument Air](Rev 22), 2.2.59

[Plant Air System](Rev 76), lesson plan COR001-17-01 [Ops Plant Air](Rev 33)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-36 EO-M: Given plant condition(s), determine from memory any automatic actions listed in the applicable Abnormal/Emergency Procedure(s) which will occur due to the event(s); COR0011701 Obj. LO-05b, Describe the Plant Air system design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Air compressor sequence control; 04a, State the electrical power supplies to the following: Air Compressors Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 3-2017 ILT NRC Q#52 New

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 216000 (SF7 NBI) Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation Tier# 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on Group# 2 the NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATION ; and K/A # 216000 A2.09 (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to Rating 3.1 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Revision 0 those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.09 Jet pump flow: Design-Specific Revision Statement:

Question 61 Which one of the following completes the statements below regarding the effect of jet pump flow on Fuel Zone level indication?

Jet pump flow causes Fuel Zone level to indicate (1) than actual.

Operations Instruction #8 [Guidelines for Successful Transient Mitigation] requires the operator to evaluate changes in (2) injection flow because making sudden changes in flow rate will cause a large change in Fuel Zone level indication due to effects on jet pump flow.

A. (1) Higher (2) LPCI B. (1) Higher (2) Core Spray C. (1) Lower (2) LPCI D. (1) Lower (2) Core Spray Answer: A Explanation:

This question tests application of Operations Instruction #8 direction regarding the effects of the design of Fuel Zone level instrumentation, specifically variable leg arrangement, with respect to internal RR Jet Pumps. Fuel zone instruments tap off jet pump #6 and 16 lower taps. They are only accurate with no jet pump flow. The positive dynamic head at the variable tap resulting from the jet pump flow causes the Fuel Zone differential pressure transmitter to indicate a high indicated fuel zone level

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 relative to actual level, since it senses higher than actual pressure at the instrument variable leg tap. RHR (LPCI) injects into Reactor Recirc discharge piping and into jet pump drive flow nozzles, resulting in flow through the jet pumps and a higher indicated level than actual level. If RHR flow is abruptly stopped, indicated Fuel Zone level will take a step change downward. OI#8 directs the operator to take this into consideration when adjusting LPCI injection to maintain the prescribed level band.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because Core Spray reduces the core exit pressure. An Examinee may believe this affects Fuel Zone indication due to a manometer affect. It is wrong because OI#8 states when using Core Spray or condensate for injection, fuel zone indication is not affected by injection rate, and the subject phenomenon and direction in OI#8 relates to LPCI.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because Wide Range level instruments are also affected by Jet Pump flow, but in the opposite way, Entrained flow into the jet pumps in the annulus region outside the core shroud passes the lower tap of the Wide Range instruments and has a significant velocity head and some friction loss which reduces the pressure on the Wide Range variable leg to the differential pressure (level) instrument, resulting in an indicated level lower than actual. It is wrong because Fuel Zone variable tap is in the jet pump nozzle and senses higher pressure when jet pump flow exists, so indicated level lowers when jet pump flow is reduced. Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor C. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor B Technical

References:

Operations Instruction #8 [Guidelines for Successful Transient Mitigation](Rev 19), Lesson Plan COR002-15-02 [Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation](Rev 28)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-15-02 Obj. 04h, Describe the following concepts as they apply to NBI: Recirculation flow effects on level indicators Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - NBI

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 295022 (APE 22) Loss of Control Rod Drive Pumps Tier# 1

/1 Group# 2 Knowledge of the operational implications of the K/A # 295022 AK1.02 following concepts as they apply to LOSS OF CRD Rating 3.6 PUMPS: Revision 0 AK1.02 Reactivity control Revision Statement:

Question 62 The first RFP is being placed into service during startup from a refueling outage.

The following annunciator is received for the In-service CRD Pump:

CRD PUMP A PANEL/WINDOW:

BREAKER TRIP 9-5-2/A-6 The operator attempts to start CRD Pumps B and A, but NEITHER will start.

What action is required NEXT by Alarm Card 9-5-2/A-6?

A. Immediately insert a scram.

B. Perform a rapid power reduction and insert a scram within 20 minutes.

C. When one CRD HCU Accumulator is declared inoperable, immediately insert a scram.

D. After a second CRD HCU Accumulator is declared inoperable, insert a scram within 20 minutes.

Answer: A Explanation:

This question tests the operational implications of the challenge to reactivity control resulting from loss of both CRD pumps. The first RFP is placed into service between 350-500 psig reactor pressure. Alarm card 9-5-2/A-6 step 1.2 for both CRD pumps off is required when reactor pressure is <900 psig after attempting to start the standby CRD pump. Step 1.2.1.1 directs attempting to restart CRD Pump A. If CRD Pump A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 does not restart, step 1.2.1.2 is required, which states IF neither CRD pump can be immediately restarted, THEN SCRAM and enter Procedure 2.1.5. This requirement is irrespective of CRD HCU Accumulator status due to the imminent challenge to reactivity control and in anticipation of HCU Accumulator low pressures, which would impede or prevent a scram if one was required.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible for the following reasons. Perform a rapid power reduction is plausible because procedure 2.1.5 is referenced in the associated alarm card actions, and procedure 2.1.5 directs lowering power before scramming to reduce the severity of the scram transient. Also, HCU accumulator pressures will lower due to loss of CRD charging water pressure with no CRD pump running. Inserting a scram within 20 minutes is plausible because it reflects action required per alarm card 9-5-2/G-6

[CRD Accum Low Press or High Level] which require application of TS 3.1.5. TS 3.1.5 Conditions C and D are reflected in this answer. The examinee who confuses the requirements of alarm cards 9-5-2/A-6 and 9-5-2/G-6 and applies TS 3.1.5 for reactor pressure 900 psig may choose this answer. It is wrong because alarm card 9-5-2/A-6 requires an immediate scram if neither CRD pump can be restarted, irrespective of CRD HCU Accumulator status. This distractor is RO level because it involves only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action statements.

Answer C is plausible because It reflects action required per alarm card 9-5-2/G-6

[CRD Accum Low Press or High Level] which require application of TS 3.1.5. TS 3.1.5 Condition C is reflected in this answer, which requires immediately inserting a scram when a HCU Accumulator for a withdrawn control rod is declared inoperable.

The examinee who confuses the requirements of alarm cards 9-5-2/A-6 and 9-5-2/G-6 and applies TS 3.1.5 for reactor pressure 900 psig may choose this answer. It is wrong because alarm card 9-5-2/A-6 requires an immediate scram if neither CRD pump can be restarted, irrespective of CRD HCU Accumulator status. This distractor is RO level because it involves only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action statements.

Answer D is plausible for the same reason given for distractor C. It reflects action required per alarm card 9-5-2/G-6 [CRD Accum Low Press or High Level] which require application of TS 3.1.5. TS 3.1.5 Condition B is reflected in this answer, which requires inserting a scram after a second HCU Accumulator associated with a withdrawn control rod is declared inoperable. The examinee who confuses the requirements of alarm cards 9-5-2/A-6 and 9-5-2/G-6 and applies TS 3.1.5 for reactor pressure 900 psig may choose this answer. It is wrong because alarm card 9-5-2/A-6 requires an immediate scram if neither CRD pump can be restarted, irrespective of CRD HCU Accumulator status. This distractor is RO level because it involves only 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action statements.

Technical

References:

TS 3.1.5 [Control Rod Scram Accumulators], Alarm Card 9-5-2/A-6 [CRD Pump A Breaker Trip](Rev 49), Alarm Card 9-5-2/G-6 [CRD Accum Low Press or High Level](Rev 49), Procedure 2.1.1 [Startup Procedure](Rev 197)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-04-02 Obj LO 11i, Predict the consequences a malfunction of the following would have on the CRDH system: CRDH pump trip INT007-05-02 EO-6b, From memory, for MODES 1 and 2, state the actions required in one hour for: one or more control rod scram accumulators inoperable with reactor steam dome pressure < 900 psig. (LCO 3.1.5 C.1, C.2)

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 271000 (SF9 OG) Offgas Tier# 2 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Group# 2 control room: K/A # 271000 A4.02 A4.02 System flows Rating 2.9 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 63 The plant is at 70% power.

A sustained hydrogen combustion is occurring in the Off-gas system.

According to Procedure 2.4OG [Off-Gas Abnormal]

(1) Where does the operator monitor Off-gas flow during this transient?

AND (2) How does the operator temporarily reduce Off-gas flow to zero to extinguish the hydrogen combustion for this condition?

A. (1) VBD-K (2) Fully isolate AOG B. (1) VBD-K (2) Close SJAE suction valves C. (1) Panel B (2) Fully isolate AOG D. (1) Panel B (2) Close SJAE suction valves Answer: D Explanation:

This question requires knowledge of how Offgas flow is monitored in the control room and overall mitigative strategy of the AOP for extinguishing a hydrogen combustion in the Offgas system by interrupting Offgas flow. According to Procedure 2.4OG, Ignitions in the Off-Gas System usually start in the AOG System and propagate upstream until they reach the air ejector after-condenser where the sustained

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 combustion occurs. A sustained combustion at the air ejector is indicated by air ejector flow dropping to a low value along with a rising air ejector drain temperature and subsequent conductivity rise in the hotwell. In order to extinguish the combustion, it is necessary to interrupt the off-gas flow through the air ejector long enough to put out the hydrogen flame and permit cooling of the hot spots to preclude re-ignition.

Offgas flow is interrupted by closing SJAE suction valves, venting the suction lines via test connections for 5 minutes, then reopening SJAE suction valves. SJAE A and B flow indicated on Panel B recorder AR-FR-47 is what is referenced in procedure 2.4OG as off-gas flow.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because VBD-K contains Offgas valves and dilution fan controls and indication related to Offgas and because the indicators used to monitor Offgas flow are actually labeled SJAE flow, not Offgas flow. It is wrong because Offgas flow is not indicated on VBD-K. Part 2 is plausible because isolating AOG (Augmented Offgas system) would eventually stall flow through the SJAEs, and procedure 2.4OG directs isolation of AOG for certain conditions (i.e. hydrogen explosion, high radiation). It is wrong because for a hydrogen combustion, 2.4OG directs stopping offgas flow through the SJAEs by temporarily closing their suction valves.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor A.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.4OG [Off-Gas Abnormal](Rev 27)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-32 EO-L, Given plant condition(s) and the applicable Abnormal/Emergency Procedure, discuss the correct subsequent actions required to mitigate the event(s).

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4),(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From Panel B:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From VBD-K:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 600000 (APE 24) Plant Fire On Site / 8 Tier# 1 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as Group# 1 they apply to PLANT FIRE ON SITE: K/A # 600000 AA1.08 AA1.08 Fire fighting equipment used on each class Rating 2.6 of fire Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 64 The control room annunciator related to DG1 room fire suppression has just been received due to a fire in an electrical cabinet inside DG1 room.

No personnel are in the area.

(1) When does DG1 room fire extinguishing agent dispense relative to the time the associated fire detection instrumentation trips?

AND (2) For the fire brigade making entry into DG1 room, what is the primary hazard related to the extinguishing agent dispensed with this class of fire?

A. (1) Immediately (2) Suffocation B. (1) Immediately (2) Electrocution C. (1) After a 50 second delay (2) Suffocation D. (1) After a 50 second delay (2) Electrocution Answer: C Explanation:

Each Diesel Generator room has its own total flooding, high pressure CO2 system, which consists of 38, high pressure (750 psig), cylinders interconnected to a discharge manifold, and a discharge piping system which floods the entire volume of the Diesel Generator room and its associated fuel oil day tank room. The system is

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 automatically actuated by any two smoke detectors in the DG room, and/or by a thermal detector, set at 190ºF, in the associated diesel fuel oil day tank room.

Automatic actuation from detection sensors is delayed for 50 seconds to allow for system abort or personnel evacuation. Manual actuation, regardless of where initiated, will immediately actuate CO2 into the selected DG and Day Tank rooms.

CO2 is a Class 3 fire extinguishing agent suitable for use on fires where live electrical equipment is located and is designed to suppress electrical equipment fires and, to an extent, flammable liquids. CO2 is non-conductive and suppresses a fire by oxygen displacement. The DG1 room CO2 system is designed to yield a 35% concentration with a 20 minute hold time. CO2 discharge results in an atmosphere that is immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) due to oxygen displacement which requires use of a Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) to prevent suffocation of personnel entering the affected area.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because a manual discharge of the DG 1 high pressure CO2 system results in immediate discharge. However, automatic initiation is delayed for 50 seconds to allow personnel egress or system abort. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reasons stated for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because water sprinkler systems are used in some areas where energized electrical equipment predominates, such as the Electrical Cable Spreading Room.

Water is conductive, so in the presence of energized electrical equipment it can present an electrocution hazard to personnel. It is wrong because DG1 room is protected by high pressure CO2, only, which is non-conductive and does not present an electrocution hazard.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reasons stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Lesson plan COR001-05-01 [Fire Protection System](Rev 36), Alarm Card FP-3/E-4 [Diesel Gen 1 CO2 System Activated](Rev 16), procedure 2.2.2 [Carbon Dioxide Systems](Rev 42)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR001-05-01 Obj LO-8l, Describe the Fire Protection system design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Automatic system initiation Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(4)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 201001 (SF1 CRDH) CRD Hydraulic Tier# 2 Knowledge of CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC Group# 2 SYSTEM design feature(s) and/or interlocks which K/A # 201001 K4.12 provide for the following: Rating 2.9 K4.12 Controlling CRD system flow Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 65 The plant was manually scrammed one minute ago from rated power; the scram has NOT been reset.

What is the effect of the scram on CRD total system flow AND in-service CRD Flow Control Valve CRD-AO-19A now relative to their status before the scram?

A. CRD System Total Flow lower CRD FCV AO-19A position more closed B. CRD System Total Flow lower CRD FCV AO-19A position more open C. CRD System Total Flow higher CRD FCV AO-19A position more closed D. CRD System Total Flow higher CRD FCV AO-19A position more open Answer: C Explanation:

This is a modified version of 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#54. It was modified by replacing charging water pressure with CRD FCV position in part 2.

A scram causes CRD HCU accumulators to discharge through the scram inlet valves.

CRD charging water header pressure rapidly lowers. CRD system flow, labeled Actual on panel 9-5, which senses nearly all system flow except ~20 gpm minimum flow to CST and ~2 gpm to Recirc and RWCU Pump seals, rises above 100 gpm, with one CRD pump operating, as flow directs toward the charging header. High system flow sensed on the CRD supply header upstream of the charging water branch signals the in-service CRD FCV to close to its minimum setting. Flows downstream of the FCV drop to near 0 gpm as downstream pressure falls to near RPV pressure. One minute after a scram, conditions have essentially stabilized, with nearly all CRD system flow directed to the charging header and routing into the RPV bottom head

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 region through seals of all of the CRDMs, since scram inlet valves are open. CRD Flow Control (Actual) remains higher (~100 gpm with one CRD pump running) than the normal 45 gpm since it reflects the high charging water flow. Charging header pressure has stabilized at a lower value since high charging flow exists.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because CRD Flow Control (Actual) indication is sensed downstream of some flow branches (e.g. CR minimum flow to CST, Recirc pump seal purge, etc.). The examinee who remembers the FCV closes but believes CRD Flow Control (Actual) indication is sensed downstream of the charging water branch would choose this answer. It is wrong because CRD Flow Control (Actual) is sensed upstream of the charging header and would, therefore, reflect the high charging water flow following a scram.

Answer B first part is plausible and wrong for the same reasons as given for distractor A. The second part is plausible to the examinee who believes the FCV is upstream of the charging water header branch and must open to route more flow to the CRD HCUs. It is wrong because the FCV is downstream of the charging water header and closes to minimum position when high flow is sensed on the CRD supply header upstream of the charging water branch when the CRD HCUs discharge during a scram.

Answer D first part is correct. The second part is plausible and wrong for the same reasons as given for distractor B relative to the FCV.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.2.8 [Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System](Rev 106), B&R Drawing 2039 [CRD Hydraulic System], Lesson Plan COR002-04-02 [CRD System](Rev 30)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-04-02 Obj 04m, 05b, 05c, 05f, 11f, 15b Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#54 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(6)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 PSA applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.4.47 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in Tier# 3 an accurate and timely manner utilizing the Group#

appropriate control room reference material. K/A # G2.4.47 Rating 4.2 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 66 Reference Provided LOCA conditions exist with the following conditions after a scram from 100% power:

PMIS is UNAVAILABLE Drywell temperature 190°F, steady 10 minutes ago, RPV parameters were:

Reactor pressure 1000 psig, slowly lowering Reactor water level -182 Fuel Zone on NBI-LR-1A NOW, RPV parameters are:

Reactor pressure 600 psig, slowly lowering Reactor water level -180 Fuel Zone on NBI-LR-1A Which one of the following completes the statement below regarding the RPV level trend over the past 10 minutes and where actual level is with respect to Top of Active Fuel?

True water level inside the shroud has (1) (risen/lowered),

AND reactor water level is (2) (above/below) Top of Active Fuel NOW.

A. (1) risen (2) above B. (1) risen (2) below C. (1) lowered (2) above

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 D. (1) lowered (2) below Answer: C Explanation:

This question is generic because it involves use of a graph used to determine actual reactor water in any plant condition. This question requires the examinee to determine the trend in RPV water level using EOP/SAG Graph 14, Fuel Zone Range Correction and diagnose current conditions as they pertain to RPV level with respect to TAF, adequate core cooling by submergence. PMIS is designed to provide Corrected Fuel Zone level, which is compensated for the effects of varying reactor pressure, and is the normal method of determining actual Fuel Zone water level. But in this case, PMIS is unavailable.

The Fuel Zone instruments are calibrated to be accurate at 0 psig RPV pressure, 212°F in both the RPV and drywell with no jet pump flow. At higher pressure, water density in the variable leg is lower, so the dP as sensed by the differential pressure instrument is lower, resulting in an indicated level that is lower than actual level. At higher reactor pressures, as pressure lowers, indicated level and actual level converge.

For the first set of conditions given, 1000 psig and -182 indicated Fuel Zone level, actual level is ~ -140.

For the current conditions, 600 psig and -180 indicated Fuel Zone level, actual Fuel Zone level is ~-150. Although indicated water level has risen, actual water level has lowered. TAF is -158, so actual level -150 is above TAF.

Drywell temperature is given as <200°F to ensure RPVSAT is in the safe zone, so Fuel Zone level indication is usable.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because indicated level has risen. It is also plausible because if the Y-axis (indicated level) is confused with the X-axis (actual level). This would result in movement upward on Graph 14, and rising level along the Y-axis. It is wrong because actual level has lowered as RPV pressure has lowered. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Part 2 is plausible to the examinee who has reversed axis believes actual level has risen because they would plot current level at ~-205, which is below TAF, -158. It is wrong because current actual level is ~ -150, above TAF.

Answer D Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor B.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Technical

References:

EOP/SAG Graph 14 [Fuel Zone Range Correction](Rev 17),

Lesson plan COR002-15-02 [Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation](Rev 28), EOP/SAG Graph 1 [RPV Saturation Temperature](Rev 17), AMP-TBD00 [PSTGs](Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: EOP/SAG Graph 14 [Fuel Zone Range Correction]

Learning Objective: INT008-06-18 EO-3, Given plant conditions and the EOP and SAG Graphs Flowchart, determine if operation is within the allowed region of a graph.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.1.37 Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or Tier# 3 limitations associated with reactivity management. Group#

K/A # G2.1.37 Rating 4.3 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 67 From previous 2 NRC Exams 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#67 Power is being reduced from 100% to 60% on your shift to perform a planned control rod sequence exchange.

IAW Procedure 2.0.3 [Conduct of Operations], what is the staffing requirement to fill the position of Reactivity Manager for this power change?

A. Additional SRO on shift with no concurrent duties B. On shift SRO qualified WCO with concurrent duties C. CRS with the Shift Manager present in the control room D. CRS with a Reactor Engineer present in the control room Answer: A Explanation:

Procedure 2.0.3 [Conduct of Operations] section 2.5.1 lists the staffing requirements for Reactivity Manager. It states an additional SRO with no concurrent duties must be present in the control room and act as Reactivity Manager during significant power changes. It defines significant power changes as startups, shutdowns, and 25%

power changes using control rods. It gives specific examples of power changes that are not considered significant power changes where the on shift CRS may act a Reactivity Manager. The specific exemptions include routine power changes via Recirc flow for surveillances or load adjustments, rapid power reductions IAW procedure 2.1.10 [Station Power Changes], and <25% power change in one shift using control rods. For the case given, power reduction from 100% to 60% would be a 40% change. In this case, the power change does not fall into the category of any of the exemptions allowing the CRS to serve as Reactivity Manager; Therefore, an additional SRO with no concurrent duties is required.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because an SRO qualified WCO is an extra SRO, since minimum staffing only requires two SROs, the CRS and the SM. It is wrong because the WCO position is required for minimum control room operator staffing, along with RO and BOP licensed operators. The Reactivity Manager can have no concurrent duties, so he cannot also serve as WCO.

Answer C is plausible because the SM does not normally have to be present in the control room. The unprepared applicant might select this answer because he may know the CRS can, at times, fill the position of Reactivity Manager but not remember the conditions when an additional, dedicated SRO is required to be Reactivity Manager, or he might interpret the presence of the SM in the control room as an additional SRO, This answer is wrong because the case stated is for a planned, non-transient power reduction and involves a 40% power change on one shift. It is, therefore, a significant reactivity manipulation for which the CRS may not serve as Reactivity Manager.

Answer D is plausible because normally a Reactor Engineer would be present in the control room to provide guidance and oversight during significant power changes using control rods. The unprepared applicant might interpret the expertise available from reactor engineering sufficient to allow the CRS to concurrently fill the position of Reactivity Manager. This answer is wrong for the same reasons as stated for distractor C.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.0.3 [Conduct of Operations](Rev 104)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-03 EO-C1a7 Question Source: Bank # From previous 3/2017 ILT NRC 2 NRC Exams Q#67 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#67

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.4.49 Ability to perform without reference to procedures Tier# 3 those actions that require immediate operation of system Group#

components and controls. K/A # G2.4.49 Rating 4.6 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 68 There are operational circumstances when operators must perform Immediate Operator Actions, as defined per Procedure 2.0.1.2 [Operations Procedure Policy], without reference to procedures or directions from the CRS.

Which statement represents one of those circumstances?

A. When an EOP directs performing the action.

B. When Technical Specifications direct a scram.

C. When an Alarm procedure directs performing the action.

D. When an Abnormal procedure directs performing the action.

Answer: D Explanation:

Abnormal and Emergency (Non-EOP) procedures contain Immediate Operator Actions which the control room operator has committed to memory. Should a condition exist that requires Immediate Operator Actions, Procedure 2.0.1.2 directs performing the action without use of procedures. Procedure 2.0.1.2 Attachment 1 lists all of the approved Immediate Operator Actions, and they are only contained in Abnormal/Emergency Procedures.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because actions are directed to be taken without use of the procedure but they are not immediately performed from memory. The examinee who recalls immediately performing actions directed from EOPs would select this answer.

This answer is incorrect because EOPs do not contain immediate operator actions.

Actions are taken per the EOPs without the control room operator having the procedure in hand, but the actions are directed by the CRS.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer B is plausible because Technical Specifications have completion times to be taken immediately, but per TS immediate means to pursue without delay and in a controlled manner. This answer is incorrect because no actions are taken immediately from Technical Specifications.

Answer C is plausible because actions can be performed immediately after entering the procedure. The examinee who recalls scram actions contained in alarm procedures may believe the action can be taken prior to entering the alarm procedure would select this answer. This answer is incorrect because alarm procedures do not contain immediate operator actions.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.0.1.2 [Operations Procedure Policy](Rev 47)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-03 EO- G1f, Discuss the following as described in Procedure 2.0.1.2, Operations Procedure Policy: Attachment 1, Immediate Operator Actions Question Source: Bank # 4/2015 ILT NRC Q#75 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 4/2015 ILT NRC Q#75

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under Tier# 3 normal or emergency conditions. Group#

K/A # G2.3.4 Rating 3.2 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 69 IAW Procedure 9.ALARA.1 [Personnel Dosimetry and Occupational Radiation Exposure Program]

What is the highest dose that can be received on-site under normal plant conditions by an individual in a calendar-year without having to acquire written authorization for a dose extension?

A. 1000 mrem B. 2000 mrem C. 3000 mrem D. 4000 mrem Answer: B Explanation:

This is a modified version of 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#72 that has a different correct answer due to a procedure change. The annual limit that requires written authorization to exceed has since been changed from 1000 mrem to 2000 mrem.

IAW procedure 9.ALARA.1 section 5, written approval to exceed 2000 mrem in a calendar year must be obtained from an individuals supervisor and the RP Technical Supervisor. Therefore, 2000 mrem is the highest dose that can be received annually without written authorization.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because it was the previous limit listed in procedure 9.ALARA.1 that required a level of written authorization to exceed. It is wrong because written

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 authorization from the individuals supervisor and the RP Technical Supervisor is only required to exceed 2000 mrem.

Answer C is plausible because it is a value listed in procedure 9.ALARA.1 step 5.5 that requires a level of written authorization to exceed. It is wrong because one level of written authorization would have already been required to reach 3000 mrem, since it is greater than 2000 mrem.

Answer D is plausible because it is the overall administrative annual dose limit listed in procedure 9.ALARA.1 section 5. It is wrong because two levels of written authorization would have already been required to reach 4000 mrem, and 4000 mrem is not to be exceeded.

Technical

References:

procedure 9.ALARA.1 section 5 (Rev 48)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-15 EO-D1h Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#72 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(12)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#72

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.4.3 Ability to identify post-accident Tier# 3 instrumentation. Group#

K/A # G2.4.3 Rating 3.7 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 70 From previous 2 NRC Exams 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#74 Which symbol is used on control room panels to identify Post-Accident Monitoring instrumentation required by Reg. Guide 1.97 and governed by TS 3.3.3.1 [PAM Instrumentation]?

A.

B.

C.

D.

Answer: A Explanation:

Black diamonds on meter/recorder labels and near isolation valve indicating lights are used to identify the indication as Reg Guide 1.97/Post-Accident Monitoring instrumentation.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because it reflects a simple symbol, like the correct answer. It is wrong because it is a triangle, not a diamond.

Answer C is plausible because it reflects a simple symbol, like the correct answer. It is wrong because it is a square, not a diamond.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer D is plausible because it reflects a simple symbol, like the correct answer. It is wrong because it is a circle, not a diamond.

Technical

References:

Procedure 3.18 [Regulatory Guide 1.97 Instrumentation](Rev 11), procedure 2.0.1 [Plant Operations Policy](Rev 65)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT0320103 EO-3, State how Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation is identified in the Control Room.

Question Source: Bank # From previous 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#74 2 NRC Exams (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(7),(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From 9/2018 NRC Exam

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.3.5 Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as Tier# 3 fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey Group#

instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc. K/A # G2.3.5 Rating 2.9 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 71 What is/are the MINIMUM personnel monitoring requirement(s) for exiting a contaminated area in the Reactor Building and dressing in street clothing IAW 9.EN-RP-100 (Radiation Worker Expectations)?

A. Perform a whole body frisk with a frisker ONLY.

B. Perform a hand and foot frisk with a frisker ONLY.

C. Perform a whole body frisk with a frisker then a whole body contamination monitor scan using a PCM.

D. Perform a hand and foot frisk with a frisker then a whole body contamination monitor scan using a PCM.

Answer: D Explanation:

When exiting a contaminated area within the Reactor Building, personnel are required as a minimum to perform a hand and foot frisk (with a frisker) as soon as practical upon exiting the CA (RB airlock has friskers to support as soon as practical) and then proceed to a PCM for whole body contamination monitoring. Clothing can then be changed within the RCA. If Exiting the RCA personnel are required monitor themselves for contamination with a whole body contamination monitor and a gamma portal monitor. The examinee should recognize that contamination control requires a minimum of a hand and foot frisk to reduce the potential for spread of contamination.

The requirement to exit the RCA via a whole body monitor is always a requirement.

Distracters:

Answer A is incorrect because it does not include hand and foot frisk or PCM. An examinee could choose this distractor if they do not equate Minimum as hand and foot frisk with contamination control. This answer is plausible because performing a whole body frisk would meet the hand and foot requirement.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer B is incorrect because it does not include the whole body monitor. An examinee could choose this distractor if they do not equate the whole body monitor with contamination control. This answer is plausible because performing hand and foot frisk is required.

Answer C is incorrect because it does not properly show the allowance for a hand and foot frisk. An examinee could choose this distractor if they did not remember the minimum requirement of the procedure. This answer is plausible because using the whole body monitor is required.

Technical

References:

Procedure 9.EN-RP-100 [Radiation Worker Expectations](Rev 15)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: N/A Question Source: Bank # 4/2015 ILT NRC Q#72 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(11)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.2.14 Knowledge of the process for controlling Tier# 3 equipment configuration or status. Group#

K/A # G2.2.14 Rating 3.9 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 72 From previous 2 NRC Exams 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#70 A pipe cap painted yellow is installed directly downstream of a manual valve that has a single strand of wire with a lead seal attached.

What does this configuration represent?

A. Contaminated system B. ECCS system high point vent C. Operations test gauge connection D. Primary Containment isolation boundary Answer: D Explanation:

Procedure 2.0.1 section 14 contains the requirements for PC manual isolation valve and cap administrative control. It states numerous primary containment manual isolation valves and associated caps throughout plant are administratively controlled for strict control over their manipulation. Valves are identified by a tag labeled PRIMARY CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY and caps are identified by being painted yellow. A single strand of wire with a single lead seal is used for certain sealed closed primary containment manual isolation valves. These are installed in such a manner as to prevent valve operation without destroying seal.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because yellow material is used to identify catch containments for radioactively contaminated water from system leaks. It is wrong because the configuration described in the stem is unique to control of PC manual isolation valves and pipe caps.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer B is plausible because some PC manual isolation valves are ECCS system vent valves. It is wrong because not all ECCS system manual valves are PC manual isolation valves, and the configuration described in the stem is specifically established to control of PC manual isolation valves and pipe caps.

Answer C is plausible because some PC manual isolation valves are system test gauge connection points. It is wrong because not all system test connection points are PC manual isolation valves, and the configuration described in the stem is specifically established to control of PC manual isolation valves and pipe caps.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.0.1 [Plant Operations Policy] section 14 (Rev.

66), Procedure 2.0.2 [Operations Logs and Reports] (Rev. 118), Procedure 9.EN-RP-108 [Radiation Protection Posting] (Rev. 16)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-03 EO-A1p, Discuss the following as described in Conduct of Operations Procedure 2.0.1, Plant Operations Policy: PC manual isolation valve and cap administrative control Question Source: Bank # From previous 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#70 2 NRC Exams (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - Primary Containment (Isolation)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 3/2017 ILT NRC exam Q#70

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.2.43 Knowledge of the process used to track Tier# 3 inoperable alarms. Group#

K/A # G2.2.43 Rating 3.0 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 73 A Disabled Annunciator Record has been approved for disabling a Control Room alarm point.

(1) Who is responsible for performing the physical actions necessary to disable the alarm point?

AND (2) What color self-adhesive flag placed on the affected annunciator window is used by the RO to track that the affected annunciator is disabled?

A. (1) SRO (2) Pink B. (1) SRO (2) Green C. (1) RO (2) Pink D. (1) RO (2) Green Answer: B Explanation:

Procedure 2.3.1 governs the tracking process for disabled alarms. With respect to the process for tracking disabled Control Room annunciators, SROs are responsible for physically disabling and restoring the annunciator alarm point from the CRS display VID IAW procedure 2.2.64. After the point is disabled, ROs are responsible for placing green tape on the affected annunciator window and for removing the tape when the annunciator is returned to service.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Distracters:

Answer A part 1 correct. Part 2 is plausible because pink (color used in practice) self-adhesive flags are placed on annunciator windows to track the alarm is expected to be received as part of a pre-planned evolution. It is wrong because green flags are reserved for use to track disabled alarms.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because ROs do have responsibilities with respect to disabling and restoring inoperable annunciators and operators disable annunciators on local panels. It is wrong because the CRS performs the steps to disable the alarm points in RTP. Part 2 is plausible for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Answer C part 1 is plausible for the same reason stated for distractor A. Part 2 is correct.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.3.1 [General Alarm Procedure](Rev 69),

Procedure 2.2.64 [Annunciator System](Rev 20), Operator Desk Guide #3 [LCO Action Tracking System - NOMS](Rev 11)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-03 EO-E1d, Discuss the following as described in Alarm Procedure 2.3.1, General Alarm Procedure: Annunciator disabling Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure Tier# 3 steps. Group#

K/A # G2.1.20 Rating 4.6 Revision 1 Revision Statement: Rev 1 - Ops Rep review identified per 2.0.1.2 note before step 2.1 states 0-EN-HU-106 is NOT applicable to AOPs. Revised stem to remove reference to 0-EN-HU-106 and revised answer B to now be the correct answer. Based on validators comments, condensed stem by removing reference to manual scram and added unconditional step to make more generic.

Question 74 IAW Procedure 2.0.1.2 [Operations Procedure Policy],

Which one of the following listed actions meets the MINIMUM requirements for marking an unconditional step as N/A in an abnormal or emergency procedure?

Mark the step N/A AND A. annotate a reason for not performing the step AND initial and date the step, ONLY.

B. obtain concurrence from the CRS that procedure intent is NOT altered by skipping the step, ONLY.

C. obtain concurrence from the SM that procedure intent is NOT altered by skipping the step, AND document the reason for not performing the step, AND both initial and date the step.

D. obtain concurrence from the AOM Shift that procedure intent is NOT altered by skipping the step, AND document the reason for not performing the step, AND both initial and date the step.

Answer: B Explanation:

This questions tests knowledge of the note before step 2.1 of procedure 2.0.1.2 that exempts Abnormal Procedures from the requirements of procedure 0-EN-HU-106 and tests ability to interpret Procedure 2.0.1.2 step 6.1.7, exceptions to continuous use procedures.

For procedures other than AOPs, EPs, EOPs, and Alarm Cards, procedure 0-EN-HU-106 requirements would apply. 0-EN-HU-106 step 5.2.3[1] states what constitutes a

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 conditional step when executing abnormal procedure actions. Per Procedure 2.0.1.2, AP and EP steps should be performed in sequence unless mitigating circumstances warrant altering the sequence. To support priorities during event mitigation, it's acceptable to perform steps out of sequence. The procedures are typically written given the plant is at 100% power. Therefore, some actions in the procedure that are performed at power may not be applicable in other modes of operation (e.g., tripping the main turbine and scramming the reactor). The procedures may not address all possible plant conditions and therefore, some steps may not apply. If steps are performed out of sequence or not performed, the user and CRS or SM shall ensure all applicable steps are performed and procedure intent is not altered. If steps are not performed, justification for non-performance shall be documented/logged.

Procedure 0-EN-HU-106 states:

IF conditions are discovered where Procedure or Work Instruction steps cannot or should not be performed, THEN the step may be marked N/A if ALL of the following criteria are satisfied:

The step is not needed or cannot be performed due to the current mode, condition, or configuration of the plant.

Marking the step N/A Does Not violate the Limits or Precautions or initial conditions described in the Procedure or Work Instruction.

Marking the step N/A Does Not create an unsafe condition in the Procedure or Work Instruction.

Marking the step N/A Does Not change the intent (method of operation or the results) of the steps or sections.

IF all conditions listed in step [4] are met, THEN a justification for marking the step or section N/A shall be approved and annotated on the document as follows:

Two knowledgeable individuals shall agree with the steps or sections to be marked N/A of which one shall be a supervisor or above. Both individuals who agreed shall initial the steps marked N/A before the document is considered complete.

As described in the stem, the subject step to insert a manual scram is not a conditional step, and per the note at procedure 2.0.1.2, the requirements of procedure 0-EN-HU-106 do not apply. Therefore, the only action necessary to N/A the subject step is to obtain concurrence from the CRS or SM that procedure intent is not altered.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because 0-EN-HU-106 step 5.2.3[1] allows steps that contain conditional statements to be marked N/A without supervisory approval. The examinee who confuses the requirements for conditional steps with steps that are not conditional may choose this answer. It is wrong because IAW procedure 2.0.1.2, although most APs are written from the perspective of the plant being at 100% power, step 6.1.7 still requires concurrence from the CRS or SM in order to not perform a

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 step. Also, since 0-EN-HU-106 is not applicable to AOPs, initialing and dating is not specifically required.

Answer C is plausible because it contains the requirement to have the CRS or SM concur intent is not altered, which is correct, and because this answer would be correct if 0-EN-HU-106 requirements applied. An examinee who does not know AOPs are exempted from 0-EN-HU-106 requirements may choose this answer. It is wrong because it goes above the minimum requirements as requested in the stem.

Answer D is plausible because it contains the to have the CRS or SM concur intent is not altered, and the 0-EN-HU-106 requirement to document the reason for marking the step N/A. It is also plausible because the AOM-Shift is responsible for the final Operations review of all completed AOPs, including review of steps not performed. It is wrong because procedure 2.0.1.2 states either the on shift CRS or SM must provide concurrence to not perform a step and because it goes above the minimum requirements as requested in the stem.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.0.1.2 [Operations Procedure Policy](Rev 47),

Procedure 0-EN-HU-106 [Procedure and Work Instruction Use and Adherence](Rev 3C2)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-01 EO-R1a, Discuss the following as described in 2.0.1.2, Operations Procedure Policy: Operations Procedure Use; R1e, Abnormal and Emergency Procedures Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level RO 2.2.40 Ability to apply technical specifications for a Tier# 3 system. Group#

K/A # G2.2.40 Rating 3.4 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 75 With the plant at power, a manual valve is closed in order to maintain Primary Containment OPERABLE IAW TS LCO 3.6.1.3 (PCIVs).

The valve is required to be opened per CRS direction with a NLO stationed at the valve.

Which of the following completes the statements below regarding the actions required to maintain Administrative Control of this PCIV while open IAW Procedure 2.0.1 [Plant Operations Policy]?

Direct the NLO to establish ____(1)____ communication with the Control Room and to close the valve in event of an accident condition.

The instructions provided to the NLO ____(2)____ required to be documented in the Control Room log.

A. (1) continuous (2) are B. (1) continuous (2) are NOT C. (1) intermittent (2) are D. (1) intermittent (2) are NOT Answer: A Explanation:

This question requires the Reactor Operator to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room (Plant Operator local valve operations under TS Administrative Controls).

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Procedure 2.0.1 (Plant Operations Policy) provides the following guidance:

Isolation valves closed to satisfy LCO 3.6.1.3 may be re-opened on an intermittent basis following administrative controls:

A person shall be stationed at valve controls while valve is open.

If valve is being controlled outside of Control Room, person at valve controls shall be in continuous communication with Control Room.

Person at valve controls shall be instructed to close valve in event of an accident condition. These instructions shall be documented (the Control Room log satisfies this requirement).

This question is generic (Tier 3) in nature because administrative controls for PCIVs applies to components in a broad range of plant systems.

Distracters:

Answer B is incorrect due to NLO instructions being required to be logged. This choice is plausible due to logging the NLO instructions not being required if performed by a controlling document vs. CRS direction. The examinee that correctly identifies continuous communication and does not identify the CRS direction vs. controlling document would chose this answer.

Answer C is incorrect due to continuous communications being required. This choice is plausible because the word intermittent has familiar association with the subject requirement (i.e. valve may be opened on an intermittent basis) and because most communications between NLOs in the field and the Control Room being intermittent (head tank level, system parameters) during system operations and monitoring. The examinee that incorrectly identifies intermittent communication and correctly identifies the logging requirement would chose this answer.

Answer D is incorrect due to continuous communications being required and the NLO instructions being required to be logged. This choice is plausible due to most communications between NLOs in the field and the Control Room being intermittent during system operations and monitoring and logging the NLO instructions not being required if performed by a controlling document vs. CRS direction. The examinee that incorrectly identifies intermittent communication and does not identify the CRS direction vs. controlling document would chose this answer.

Technical

References:

TS Procedure 2.0.1 [Plant Operations Policy](Rev. 66)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: SKL008-01-02 EO-4, Describe the administrative controls for primary or secondary containment manual valve opening or associated cap removal when primary or secondary containment is required.

Question Source: Bank # 4/2015 ILT NRC Q#66 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification: N/A PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Primary Containment

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 259002 (SF2 RWLCS) Reactor Water Level Control Tier# 2 2.4.30 Knowledge of events related to system Group# 1 operation/status that must be reported to internal K/A # 295002 G2.4.30 organizations or external agencies, such as the Rating 4.1 State, the NRC, or the transmission system Revision 0 operator.

Revision Statement:

Question 76 The plant is at 100%.

The following events have occurred:

Time Event 1800 NOUE declared due to loss of annunciators per EAL SU4.1 1810 Reactor scram due to Master Level Controller failure (EAL SA4.1 met) 1815 FIRST communication made to NRC for above events 1820 ALERT declaration made for EAL SA4.1 by the On-Shift Emergency Director 1925 SECOND communication made to NRC for above events (1) Which procedure(s) related to NRC reporting requirements is/are required to be entered for this event?

AND (2) Was the NRC informed for ALL events within the time requirements of plant procedures?

A. (1) 5.7.6 [Notification] AND 2.0.5 [Reports to the NRC Operations Center]

(2) Yes B. (1) 5.7.6 [Notification] AND 2.0.5 [Reports to the NRC Operations Center]

(2) No C. (1) 5.7.6 [Notification], ONLY (2) Yes D. (1) 5.7.6 [Notification], ONLY (2) No

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer: B Explanation:

The event describes involves a significant plant transient due to failure of the reactor water level control system that requires upgrade to the emergency classification.

Reports associated with E-Plan entry are categorized as emergency events.

Procedure 5.7.6 governs reporting to outside agencies (state, local, NRC) for emergency events. Procedure 2.0.5 governs non-emergency reports to the NRC.

Failure of the Master Level Controller resulted in a scram. Combined with loss of annunciators, this required a new emergency classification, upgrade to Alert. The NRC is required to be informed using the ENS as soon as possible after notification of state and local agencies but in all cases within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of event declaration.

Notification of the upgrade to Alert was due within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of 1820, by 1920.

Notification to the NRC was at 1925, so it did not meet procedural requirements.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because the first report to the NRC for the NOUE was within the time limit of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.. The examinee who does not know the NRC must be informed of the upgrade to Alert may choose this answer. It is wrong because notification to the NRC for the Alert was due no later than 1920.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because is plausible because the specific directions for emergency reports are contained in procedure 5.7.6. It is wrong because procedure 2.0.5 states plant conditions which require declaration of an emergency classification and notification per Procedure 5.7.6 also require performance of this procedure to ensure non-emergency reports continue to be made as required. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason as given for distractor A.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reasons stated for distractor C.

Part 2 is correct.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.0.5 [Reports to the NRC Operations Center](Rev 50), Procedure 5.7.6 [Notification](Rev 75), Procedure 5.7.1 [Emergency Classification] Att. 4 [EPIPEALHOT](Rev 18)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-03 EO-F1a, Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center: Discuss the following as described in Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center: Purpose of procedure along with the differences between Immediate Emergency and Non-Emergency notifications Question Source: Bank #

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires assessment of plant conditions, selection of the appropriate administrative procedure governing reporting requirements, and knowledge of information contained within attachments in the applicable administrative procedure.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From procedure 2.0.5

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295025 (EPE 2) High Reactor Pressure / 3 Tier# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as Group# 1 they apply to HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: K/A # 295025 EA2.06 EA2.06 Reactor water level Rating 3.8 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 77 An Extended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) has just been declared.

EOP-1A is in use with the following conditions:

Reactor Level -100 inches CFZ, lowering 1 inch/minute Reactor Pressure 1060 psig, slowly lowering Drywell Pressure 4 psig, slowly rising Only RCIC is available for injection and is injecting at maximum flow rate Which one of the following mitigation strategies is appropriate for these conditions?

A. Immediately transition to EOP-1B and reduce RPV pressure to 200 psig.

B. Immediately transition to EOP-1B and reduce RPV pressure to 400 psig.

C. Stabilize RPV pressure when it falls below 1050 psig AND remain in EOP-1A to align FLEX injection systems.

D. Stabilize RPV pressure when it falls below 1050 psig, remain in EOP-1A until level goes below TAF, then transition to EOP-2A and Emergency Depressurize.

Answer: A Explanation:

Reactor pressure is above the EOP-1A entry condition, 1050 psig. This question requires interpreting a lowering reactor water level with respect to a high reactor pressure condition in order to determine the appropriate EOP action.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 RPV water level is below the normal EOP-1A control band, +3 to +54, and lowering with the only available injection system at maximum flow rate. EOP-1A step RC/L-2 2nd override states if anticipated that available injection cannot assure adequate core cooling, transition to EOP-1B. With level above -158, EOP-1B step RC/P-3 requires reducing pressure per note 31, which requires a pressure control band of 150-300 psig for RCIC injection.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because transition to EOP-1B is required per EOP-2A step RC/L-2 2nd override, and if HPCI was being used, the appropriate pressure band would be 150-450 psig. It is wrong because for RCIC, EOP-1B requires reducing pressure to 150-300 psig. 400 psig given in this distractor is above the pressure band for RCIC, which is the only injection system available.

Answer C is plausible because EOP-1A step RC/P-5 requires stabilizing pressure below 1050 psig and ELAP conditions warrant alignment of FLEX systems for required safety functions. It is wrong because level is lowering with the only injection source injecting at maximum rate, and EOP-1A step RC/L-2 2nd override states if anticipated that available injection cannot assure adequate core cooling, transition to EOP-1B.

Answer D is plausible because EOP-1A step RC/P-5 requires stabilizing pressure below 1050 psig and ED is required when level goes below -158 per EOP-1A step RC/L-10. It is wrong because EOP-1A step RC/L-2 2nd override states if anticipated that available injection cannot assure adequate core cooling, transition to EOP-1B.

Technical

References:

EOP-1A [RPV Control](Rev 22), EOP-1B [Alternate Level/Pressure Control](Rev 2)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-06-93 EO-14, Given plant conditions and EOP flowchart 1B, Alternate Level/Pressure Control, determine required actions.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRO Only Justification:

Requires assessment of plant conditions and selection of a procedure with which to proceed.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-1A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-1A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-1B

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 215005 (SF7 PRMS) Average Power Range Tier# 2 Monitor/Local Power Range Monitor Group# 1 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the K/A # 215005 G2.2.38 facility license. Rating 4.5 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 78 The plant is at 100% power.

It is discovered that due to an administrative error, quarterly (92 days) surveillance 6.1APRM.303 [APRM Channel Functional Test Mode Switch in RUN (DIV 1)] has exceeded its drop dead date.

With respect to TS 3.3.1.1 [RPS Instrumentation], ONLY Which of the following statements identifies the MINIMUM TS requirements regarding RPS operability pending satisfactory performance of the surveillance?

A. Immediately enter appropriate Condition(s) of TS 3.3.1.1 for channel(s) inoperable with trip capability maintained.

B. Immediately enter appropriate Condition(s) of TS 3.3.1.1 for channel(s) inoperable with trip capability NOT maintained.

C. APRMs may be considered operable for up to 92 days from discovery only if an acceptable risk evaluation is performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk managed.

D. APRMs may be considered operable for up to 115 days from discovery only if an acceptable risk evaluation is performed within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the risk managed.

Answer: C Explanation:

This question requires a determination of operability given a missed RPS surveillance.

An exception to SR 3.0.1, SR 3.0.3 states when failure to comply with a surveillance frequency is discovered, declaring the LCO not met may be delayed for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the surveillance frequency, whichever is greater, to allow time to perform the surveillance. If delayed greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, a risk evaluation must be performed

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 and the risk managed. The surveillance in question has a 92 day frequency.

Therefore, the minimum requirement is to perform a risk evaluation within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to allow delaying entry into TS 3.3.1.1 action for up to 92 days, and answer C is correct.

Drop dead date, as reflected in the stem, is used in procedure 2.0.4 and refers to the date a surveillance exceeds its required test frequency, including any allowable frequency extension.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible since an examinee may assume failure to comply with the specified surveillance frequency is the same as failing a surveillance requirement and requires immediately declaring the equipment inoperable per SR 3.0.1. Answer A reflects TS 3.3.1.1 Condition A. Only Division 1 APRMs are tested by the subject surveillance, so this answer will be plausible to the examinee who does not know the provisions of SR 3.0.3 and does not understand the TS Bases definition of trip capability. Answer A is wrong because the stem asks for the minimum requirement, which would be to delay entry into TS 3.3.1.1 actions as allowed by SR 3.0.3 and SR 3.0.1.

Answer B is plausible to the examinee who assumes failure to comply with the specified surveillance frequency is the same as failing a surveillance requirement and requires immediately declaring the equipment inoperable per SR 3.0.1. Answer B is also plausible because trip capability would be lost if all Division 1 APRMs were inoperable and untripped, which would require entry into both Conditions A and C of TS 3.3.1.1. Answer B is wrong for the same reason given for distractor A Answer D is plausible because the examinee may attempt to apply surveillance frequency extension per SR 3.0.2, 1.25 times the specified frequency, which is inappropriate in this situation. The 115 days in answer D is derived by multiplying 92 times 1.25. The surveillance frequency extension of SR 3.0.2 does not apply to SR 3.0.3 requirements.

Technical

References:

TS 3.3.1.1 [RPS Instrumentation, SR 3.0.1, SR 3.0.3, SR 3.3.1.1.9; TRM Appendix B [Surveillance Frequency Control Program]

Procedure 6.1APRM.303 [APRM Channel Functional Test Mode Switch in RUN (DIV 1)](Rev 20)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective:

INT00705010010200 Given plant conditions and a Specification, apply the rules of Section 3.0 to determine appropriate actions.

COR002-21-02 Obj. LO-2, Given conditions and/or parameters associated with the RPS, determine if related Technical Specification and Technical Requirements Manual Limiting Condition for Operations are met.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 12/2015 NRC Q#77 New

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This requires application of Tech Spec generic LCO SR 3.0.3.

PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - RPS 12/2015 NRC ILT Q#77

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 215002 (SF7 RBMS) Rod Block Monitor Tier# 2 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for Group# 2 operations and safety limits. K/A # 215002 G2.2.22 Rating 4.7 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 79 Reference Provided The plant is at 60% power with Rod 26-27 selected.

MCPR is 1.69 with NO peripheral control rod selected.

A Condition Report identifies actual upscale trip setpoints installed for the Rod Block Monitor are:

Low Intermediate High Channel A 118/125 113/125 109/125 Channel B 122/125 116/125 108/125 (1) What is the MAXIMUM time allowed by TS 3.3.2.1 [Control Rod Block Instrumentation]

to place one RBM channel in trip?

AND (2) Assume LCO 3.0.3 is entered because completion times are NOT met for TS 3.3.2.1 required action for RBM. Which one of the following is the FIRST point reached during the power reduction required by LCO 3.0.3 that allows exiting TS 3.0.3?

A. (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (2) ONLY when Mode 2 is entered B. (1) 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (2) When power is reduced below 27.5%

C. (1) 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> (2) ONLY when Mode 2 is entered D. (1) 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> (2) When power is reduced below 27.5%

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer: D Explanation:

TS 3.3.2.1 requires two RBM channels operable when 27.5% power. TS Allowable values for RBM upscale trip setpoints are stated in the COLR and are:

< 120/125 between Low Power Setpoint (> 27.5%) and Intermediate Power Setpoint (< 62.5%).

< 115/125 between IPSP (> 62.5%) and High Power Setpoint (< 82.5%).

< 110.5/125 above HPSP (> 82.5%).

For the setpoints given in the stem, RBM channel B low range and intermediate range setpoints are above the allowable values. Therefore, channel B is inoperable. With one RBM channel inoperable, TS 3.3.2.1 Action A.1 applies, which requires restoring the channel operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Then, Action B.1 applies, which requires placing one RBM channel in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. 24 hrs + 1 hr = 25 hrs.

There are no conditions specified in TS 3.3.2.1 if the completion time of TS 3.3.2.1 required actions A.1 and B.1 cannot be met, so LCO 3.0.3 would apply. LCO 3.0.3 states:

When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS, the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;

b. MODE 3 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and

c. MODE 4 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

RBM is only required to be operable when power is 27.5%. Reducing power to

<27.5% would place the unit in a specified condition in which LCO 3.3.2.1 is not applicable for RBM. At that point, TS 3.0.3 is exited. Entering Mode 2 is not required.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because a variety of setpoints for the various ranges for RBM A and B are presented in the stem. The examinee who does not know the setpoints may choose this answer. This answer reflects TS 3.3.2.1 Action B.1 (both channels inoperable) to place one channel in trip within 1 hr. It is wrong because only channel B is inoperable. Therefore, the maximum time to place one RBM channel in trip is 25 hrs. Part 2 is plausible because LCO 3.0.3 states action shall be taken to place the unit in MODE 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. It is wrong because LCO 3.0.3 is exited when power is lowered below the specified condition related to the applicability of TS 3.3.2.1 for RBM, 27.5%. Since RBM is not required operable below 27.5% power, further power reduction is not required.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A.

Technical

References:

TS 3.3.2.1 [Control Rod Block Instrumentation], TS 3.0.3, lesson plan COR002-24-02 [Ops Rod Block Monitor](Rev 22)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: TS 3.3.2.1 LCO and Actions (pages 3.3-14 thru 3.3-16), only Learning Objective: COR002-24-02 Obj LO-4a, Describe the RBM design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Prevent control rod withdrawal; INT007-05-04 EO-3, Given a set of plant conditions that constitutes non-compliance with a Section 3.3 LCO, discuss the ACTIONS that are required; INT007-05-01 EO-2, Given plant conditions and a Specification, apply the rules of Section 3.0 to determine appropriate actions.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This requires application of TS 3.3.2.1 required actions and TS 3.0.4.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 215001 (SF7 TIP) Traversing In-Core Probe Tier# 2 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for Group# 2 system operating parameters that are entry-level K/A # 215001 G2.4.4 conditions for emergency and abnormal operating Rating 4.7 procedures. Revision 1 Revision Statement: Modified question to ensure it cannot be answered solely using fundamental knowledge, knowledge of AOP entry conditions, or knowledge of overall mitigative strategy of a procedure to elevate to SRO-level IAW NRC CE comments during free review.

Question 80 The plant was operating at 100% power with a TIP run (OD-1) in progress when a TIP isolation signal was received.

TIP C ball valve did not close.

(1) Which procedure contains steps to fire the TIP SQUIB VALVE for TIP C?

AND (2) Under which condition is firing the TIP SQUIB VALVE for TIP C required?

A. (1) 4.1.4 [Traversing In-Core Probe System]

(2) Drywell pressure 2 psig due to a steam leak B. (1) 4.1.4 [Traversing In-Core Probe System]

(2) Reactor water level -100 inches due to loss of high pressure systems C. (1) 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation], Att. 1 [Group Isolation Hard Card]

(2) Drywell pressure 2 psig due to a steam leak D. (1) 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation], Att. 1 [Group Isolation Hard Card]

(2) Reactor water level -100 inches due to loss of high pressure systems Answer: A Explanation:

Procedure 4.1.4 contains actions necessary to effect TIP isolation in the abnormal event automatic isolation on a Group 2 isolation signal fails. The operator is instructed to first attempt to retract the TIP and close the isolation ball valve. If that is not successful, step 6.3 directs actuating the affected TIP squib (shear) valve as a contingency. This contingency, operating the TIP squib valve, is conditional and is

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 directed only if an attempt to isolate the TIP ball valve fails AND if there are indications of a reactor coolant leak in the drywell. Drywell pressure 2 psig due to a steam leak represents a reactor coolant leak in the Drywell, so actuating the TIP squib valve is required.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because reactor water level below +3 is a Group 2 isolation signal. TIP isolation is included in Group 2. A Group 2 isolation signal could be indicative of a reactor coolant leak in the DW, since the setpoints for Group 2 are DW pressure 1.84 psig and reactor water level +3. An examinee who confuses the relationship between Group 2 isolation signals an the cause of the isolation signal may choose this answer. It is wrong because Procedure 4.1.4 states there must be indications of a reactor coolant leak in the DW to actuate the TIP squib valve, but level is low only due to loss of high pressure feed in this answer.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because Procedure 2.1.22 Att. 1 Group Isolation Hard Card is the tool operators are required to use to verify required isolations have occurred and gone to completion. Section 5.2 is performed to verify a Group 2 isolation and instructs the operator to ensure all associated automatic actions have occurred. The word Ensure at CNS instructs the operator to verify automatic action has occurred, or if not, to manually effect the isolation. This answer is wrong because procedure 2.1.22 only instructs the operator to ensure TIP ball valves have closed. It does not inform the operator how to attempt to close TIP ball valves if a TIP is inserted, and it does not provide any instructions related to the TIP squib valve. It also does not refer the operator to procedure 4.1.4 if TIP isolation has not occurred.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor C. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.1.22 [Recovering from a Group Isolation](Rev 62), 4.1.4 [Traversing In-Core Probe System](Rev 37),

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: COR002-31-02 EO-11, Describe the TIP system design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: Primary containment isolation Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

Part 1 requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of a procedure with which to proceed. Procedure selection involves SRO-level knowledge because it requires knowledge of procedure content versus knowledge of the procedures overall mitigative strategy or purpose. Part 2 requires detailed knowledge of procedure content related to assessment of plant conditions.

PSA Applicability Top 10 Risk Significant System - PCIS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295024 High Drywell Pressure / 5 Tier# 1 2.4.4 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for Group# 1 system operating parameters that are entry-level K/A # 295024 G2.4.4 conditions for emergency and abnormal operating Rating 4.7 procedures. Revision Revision Statement:

Question 81 EOP-3A has been entered due to high Suppression Pool temperature from a failed open SRV.

All legs of EOP-3A have been addressed by the CRS except for PC Pressure.

Drywell pressure is now 1.9 psig, rising slowly.

Which one of the following completes the statement below regarding the required CRS actions?

The CRS is required to ____(1)____ EOP-3A and address ____(2)____.

A. (1) re-enter (2) the PC Pressure leg ONLY B. (1) re-enter (2) ALL legs C. (1) continue in (2) the PC Pressure leg ONLY D. (1) continue in (2) ALL legs Answer: B Explanation:

Guidance for EOP execution given in the PSTG (ref. B-4-4) states anytime an EOP entry condition is exceeded, any associated EOP is required to be re-entered at the beginning, even if it had been entered previously due to another parameter. Another parameter exceeding its EOP entry condition may be indicative of degrading

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 conditions where specific EOP action may not have been required earlier but is now.

Changes in one parameter may also be indicative that degradation is occurring in the another parameter/function that needs to be re-addressed. Therefore, Answer B is correct.

Distracters:

Answer A is incorrect due to all legs of EOP 3A being required to be addressed. This choice is plausible due to EOP entry condition being the primary focus for execution. The examinee that focuses on the re-entry condition or does not recognize the entry condition would select this answer.

Answer C is incorrect due to all legs of EOP 3A being required to be addressed following re-entry. This choice is plausible due to not recognizing the EOP entry condition making this a correct answer by only requiring continuing and addressing the leg that has not been addressed. The examinee that focuses on the re-entry condition OR does not recognize the EOP entry would select this answer.

Answer D is incorrect due to EOP 3A re-entry being required. This choice is plausible due to not recognizing the EOP entry condition making this a partially correct answer. The examinee that does not recognize EOP re-entry requirement and confuses whether all vs. the applicable leg is required to be addressed would select this answer.

Technical

References:

EOP-3A [Primary Containment Control](Rev 17), PSTG (AMP-TBD00 Technical Basis)(Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective:

INT00806040010200 Discuss the method used to track progress in the flowcharts (place keeping).

INT00806130011100 Given plant conditions and EOP Flowchart 3A, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, determine required actions.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 12/2015 ILT NRC Q#99 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 This requires knowledge of administrative procedures that specify implementation of EOPs. It relates to proper EOP execution, which is an SRO function.

PSA Applicability:

N/A 12/2015 ILT NRC Q#99

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295001 (APE 1) Partial or Complete Loss of Forced Tier# 1 Core Flow Circulation / 1 & 4 Group# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as K/A # 295001 AA2.04 they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF Rating 3.1 FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION: Revision AA2.04 Individual jet pump flows: Not-BWR-1&2 Revision Statement:

Question 82 Reference Provided The plant was at 100% power on the 100% rod line when a transient resulted in the following indications:

Reactor power 89%

Total Core Flow [NBI-FRDPR-95] 76 Mlbm/hr Core Plate Pressure Drop [NBI-FRDPR-95] 13 psid Recirc Pump A Flow [RR-FR-163, Ch 1] 46 Kgpm Recirc Pump B Flow [RR-FR-163, Ch 2] 55 Kgpm JP #11 Flow [NBI-FI-87A] 4.3 Mlbm/hr JP #1 Flow [NBI-FI-87B] 2.9 Mlbm/hr JP #16 Flow [NBI-FI-87C] 4.3 Mlbm/hr JP #6 Flow [NBI-FI-87D] 3.7 Mlbm/hr (1) Which one of the following failures caused these indications?

AND (2) IAW Procedure 2.4RXPWR, if it is determined the plant cannot reach Mode 3 within the time required for this condition per Procedure 2.1.4 [Normal Shutdown], which procedure is required to be entered?

A. (1) RPV shroud cracking (2) Shut down IAW Procedure 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram]

B. (1) RPV shroud cracking (2) Shut down IAW Procedure 2.1.4.1 [Rapid Shutdown]

C. (1) Displaced Jet Pump mixer (2) Shut down IAW Procedure 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram]

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 D. (1) Displaced Jet Pump mixer (2) Shut down IAW Procedure 2.1.4.1 [Rapid Shutdown]

Answer: D Explanation:

The case presented represents diffuser displacement for jet pumps 5/6 due to hold down beam failure. Operation at 100% power on the 100% rod line results in rated core flow, 73.5 Mlbm/hr. Following the transient, indicated core flow has risen, but power has lowered significantly. An unexplained drop in reactor power is an entry condition to 2.4RXPWR. Step 4.3 requires entering Attachment 2 for an unexplained drop in power. Att. 2 addresses two potential failures, shroud cracking/separation and jet pump diffuser displacement. Attachment 3 is used to diagnose shroud cracking and Attachment 4 is used to diagnose jet pump diffuser displacement. There are some common indications used for these attachments, such as reactor power, indicated core flow, and core plate DP. Each of these indications behave similarly for either shroud cracking or jet pump diffuser displacement. Reactor power lowers, indicated core flow rises, and core plate DP lowers. Individual jet pump flows are used to discern between shroud cracking and jet pump diffuser displacement. For shroud cracking/separation, individual jet pump flows would be expected to change uniformly. In the data given, RR loop A jet pump flows have risen and RR loop B jet pump flows have lowered, indicating the failure is not common to both loops as would be expected for shroud cracking. Attachment 4 states jet pump loop flow in the intact loop will rise and in the affected loop may rise or slightly lower. RR Pump B drive flow has risen significantly, while loop B jet pump flows have lowered.

If displacement of a jet pump diffuser is confirmed, Att. 2 step 1.2.1.4 requires entry into procedure 2.1.4.1 [Rapid Shutdown] or 2.1.4 [Normal Shutdown]. Since the stem states shut down per procedure 2.1.4 would take 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, procedure 2.1.4.1 is required to be used for shut down. This is because TS 3.4.2 [Jet Pumps] requires entry into Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for an inoperable jet pump as noted in 2.4RXPWR Att. 2.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because 2.4RXPWR Att. 2 addresses shroud cracking/separation, and effect of shroud cracking/separation on reactor power, core flow, and core plate DP is similar to the effect of jet pump diffuser displacement. This answer is wrong because shroud cracking would affect individual jet pump flows and Recirc Pump drive flows uniformly, but in the case presented, jet pump flows in RR loop A rise, whereas flows in RR loop B lower, indicating a jet pump pair in loop B has failed. Part 2 is plausible because some conditions require entry into procedure 2.1.5 to rapidly shutdown the plant. It is wrong because procedure 2.4RXPWR Att. 2 step 1.2.1.4 states IF confirmed displaced jet pump/mixer, THEN shut down per Procedure 2.1.4 or 2.1.4.1, and the states purpose of procedure 2.1.4.1 is that it will be used to meet LCO Required Action Completion Times when shutdown completion

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 time cannot be met using Procedure 2.1.4. 2.4RXPWR does not require entry into procedure 2.1.5 for this situation.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reasons stated for distractor A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reasons stated for distractor A.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.4RXPWR [Reactor Power Anomalies](Rev 10),

procedure 2.1.4 [Normal Shutdown](Rev 169), procedure 2.1.4.1 [Rapid Shutdown](Rev 42)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: Procedure 2.4RXPWR

[Reactor Power Anomalies] pages 7 and 10, ONLY (first page of Att. 3 and first page of Att. 4)

Learning Objective: INT032-01-23 EO-J, Given plant condition(s) and the applicable Abnormal/Emergency Procedure, discuss the correct subsequent actions required to mitigate the event(s)

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of a procedure/attachment with which to proceed. It also involves knowledge of the content of a procedure attachment versus knowledge of overall mitigative strategy or purpose.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295028 (EPE 5) High Drywell Temperature (Mark I Tier# 1 and Mark II only) / 5 Group# 1 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures. K/A # 295028 G2.2.12 Rating 4.1 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 83 The plant is at 100% power with the following conditions:

Drywell temperature is 140°F, rising slowly due to leak Four DW FCUs are operating 2.4PC has been entered Drywell venting is in progress AND drywell pressure is 0.3 psig, steady SR 3.6.1.5.1 to verify drywell average air temperature within limits has a specified frequency interval of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> AND was last performed 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> ago.

(1) IAW TS SR rules of application, what is the MAXIMUM time remaining until SR 3.6.1.5.1 must be completed again to maintain the surveillance current?

AND (2) If drywell temperature rises above the EOP-3A entry condition, which is the preferred source for determining average drywell temperature?

A. (1) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (2) PMIS Point SPDS0202 [AVE DW TEMP (DYNAMIC CALC)]

B. (1) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> (2) Procedure 5.8.10 [Average Drywell Temperature Calculation]

C. (1) 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (2) PMIS Point SPDS0202 [AVE DW TEMP (DYNAMIC CALC)]

D. (1) 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> (2) Procedure 5.8.10 [Average Drywell Temperature Calculation]

Answer: C

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Explanation:

In Mode 1, drywell average temperature is required to be verified 150°F IAW SR 3.6.1.5.1 IAW the Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The frequency interval specified by the SFCP for SR 3.6.1.5.1 is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances. SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency. 25% of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Therefore, one surveillance interval must not exceed 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Since it has been 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> since SR 3.6.1.5.1 was last completed, it must be completed again within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> to maintain the surveillance current.

If a leak in the drywell is indicated and four DW FCUs are operating, Procedure 2.4PC step 4.10.8.1 requires using PMIS Point SPDS0202. If PMIS Point SPDS0202 is other than healthy or if less than four DW FCUs are operating, 2.4PC requires use of alternate methods to determine drywell average air temperature.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because the stated surveillance frequency interval is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and in some cases, SR 2.0.2 does not allow an extension to a specified interval. For example, if the specified interval was once per basis the 25% extension does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per ... " basis. The extension also does not apply for some requirements where an exclusion is explicitly stated, such as for the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program. This answer is wrong because the 25% extension does apply in this case, so the maximum frequency interval is 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> remain until the current interval expires. Part 2 is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible for the same reasons stated for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because various methods for determining drywell average air temperature exist based on plant conditions. Also, EOP-3A step DW/T-1 states Monitor average drywell temperature, EOP 5.8.10, and control below 150°F using available drywell cooling. The examinee that believes the reference to procedure 5.8.10 is an unqualified direction to use that method and who does not have knowledge of the prerequisite or methodology for that procedure may choose this answer. It is wrong because use of 5.8.10 is predicated on unavailability of SPDS. In this case, SPDS is available and use of PMIS Point SPDS0202 is much less cumbersome than manual calculation per 5.8.10 and yields a more accurate result; therefore, use of PMIS Point SPDS0202 is preferred and is specified by 2.4PC.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reasons given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.4PC [Primary Containment Control](Rev 20),

Procedure 5.8.10 [Average Drywell Temperature Calculation](Rev 8), Procedure 6.PC.604 [Average Drywell Temperature Manual Determination](Rev 6), EOP-3A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401

[Primary Containment Control](Rev 17), TS 3.6.1.5 [Drywell Air Temperature], TS SR 3.0.2 [SR Applicability] Bases References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT007-05-01 EO-10, Apply the rules for Frequency to determine when a periodic action must be performed.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(2)(10)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

Part 1 requires application of generic LCO requirement SR 2.0.2. Part 2 requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of a procedure with which to proceed.

PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - Primary Containment

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-3A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 209001 (SF2, SF4 LPCS) Low-Pressure Core Spray Tier# 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on Group# 1 the LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM; and K/A # 209001 A2.01 (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to Rating 3.4 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Revision 0 those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.01 Pump trips Revision Statement:

Question 84 The following conditions exist during a LOCA: EOP-1A is being executed Reactor water level -200 inches CFZ, steady Reactor pressure 47 psig, slowly lowering Drywell pressure 23 psig, slowly lowering Core Spray A flow 4800 gpm Core Spray B flow 2500 gpm The only available injection systems are Core Spray A and B Then, Core Spray Pump A trips on overcurrent.

Which action is required NEXT?

Transition to A. SAG 1 B. SAG 2 C. EOP-1B D. EOP-2A Answer: A Explanation:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 For the initial conditions, operation is holding at EOP-1A step RC/L-15. With reactor level below -183 inches and CS systems injecting, adequate core cooling is being provided by CS Pump A, since its flow is above 4750 gpm. When CS Pump A trips, reactor level, which was only stable with both CS pumps injecting, will lower. CS Pump B flow is below 4750 gpm, so it will not alone provide sufficient heat removal for adequate core cooling. EOP-1A step RC/L-15, 16, 17, and18 are now required to be executed, since injection is already maximized and level is below -183 inches and now will be lowering. Step RC/L-18 requires exiting all EOP flowcharts and entering SAG 1.

Alternate level control strategy was revised in 2019. EOP-1A and EOP-2A were significantly revised due to the addition of new EOP-1B.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because entry into SAGs is required. Adequate injection has been lost, and SAG 2 contains instructions for use of injection systems for RPV and Containment flooding. The examinee who does not recall how SAGs are constructed and which SAG is specified by EOP-1A step RC/L-18 may choose this answer. It is wrong because SAG 1 must be entered directly from EOPs, because it contains the logic for entry into the appropriate flowchart of SAG 2, based on conditions such as whether the core has breached the RPV and whether the containment is in jeopardy.

Answer C is plausible because EOP-1A step RC/L-2 2nd override directs entering EOP-1B if it is anticipated that available injection systems alone cannot assure adequate core cooling. This answer is wrong because step RC/L-2 2nd override is intended to be an anticipatory step where adequate core cooling exists but is expected to be lost in the future. EOP-1B coordinates RPV water level and RPV pressure control actions to prolong availability of steam-driven injection systems and optimize the transfer to motor-driven systems. In this case, steam driven systems are not available and control has already been transferred to motor driven systems.

Adequate core cooling has already been lost due to level <-183 inches with injection flow from CS B. EOP-1B directs stem cooling down to -195 inches. Level is already below -195 inches and cannot be restored >-183 inches, so entry into SAG 1 is required now.

Answer D is plausible because Emergency Depressurization IAW EOP-2A is directed by EOP-1A step RC/L-10 due to reactor water level below -158 inches, and an examinee may reason that further depressurization may not recognize the reactor is already depressurized, since reactor pressure is <50psig above DW pressure, and may believe ED will result in adequate injection flow rate from CS B. The examinee who does not recall the layout and strategy of EOP-1A may choose this answer. It is wrong because for the initial conditions given, specifically reactor level <-183 inches and level not rising, Emergency depressurization would have already been required.

Reactor pressure <73 psig indicates depressurization is complete.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Technical

References:

EOP-1A [RPV Control](Rev 22), EOP-1B [Alternate Level/Pressure Control](Rev 2), EOP-2A [Emergency RPV Depressurization](Rev 20),

SAG 1 [RPV, Containment and Radioactivity Release Control](Rev 11), PSTG (AMP-TBD00 Technical Basis)(Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-06-05 EO-10, Given plant conditions and EOP flowchart 1A, RPV CONTROL, determine required actions.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of a procedure with which to proceed.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-1A [RPV Control]

From EOP-1A [RPV Control]

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295015 (APE 15) Incomplete Scram / 1 Tier# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as Group# 2 they apply to INCOMPLETE SCRAM: K/A # 295015 AA2.02 Control rod position Rating 4.2 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 85 The plant is at 50% power late in the operating cycle when loss of both RPS buses occurs.

The following control rod positions result:

24 control rods are at position 00 One rod remains at position 48 All other control rods are at position 02 According to EOP Technical Bases (PSTG)

(1) Is Maximum Subcritical Banked Rod Withdrawal Position (MSBWP) met for shutdown margin?

AND (2) Is transition to EOP-6A required?

A. (1) no (2) no B. (1) no (2) yes C. (1) yes (2) no D. (1) yes (2) yes Answer: B Explanation:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 The Maximum Subcritical Banked Withdrawal Position (MSBWP) is the greatest banked rod position at which the reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions. At CNS, the MSBWP is determined in NEDC 97-089 and is assigned the value of position 02. Since all control rods are not at or beyond position 02, MSBWP is not met for shutdown margin.

EOP-1A step RC-3 asks Has it been determined that reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions without boron. If answered NO, transition to EOP-6A and 7A is required.

Criteria used to demonstrate that the reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions without boron include determining:

Control rod position is within the Maximum Subcritical Banked Withdrawal Position (MSBWP). The MSBWP is the greatest banked rod position at which the reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions.

The existence of the core design basis shutdown margin with the single strongest control rod full-out and all other control rods full-in Compliance with Technical Specification requirements governing control rod position and the allowable number of inoperable control rods.

In some cases, the control room operating crew may be able to make the determination that the reactor will remain shutdown without boron themselves. In most cases, however, it is expected that the determination will be made by a reactor engineer or other member of the technical support staff. Therefore, transition to EOP-6A is required.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because all control rods except for one are at or beyond position 02, and shutdown margin accommodates the highest worth control rod being at position 48. An examinee may believe the requirement assumes both MSBWP and highest worth rod at position 48 may coexist and by definition, the reactor will remain shutdown without boron, or an examinee may not know MSBWP or how it relates to this decision block.. It is wrong because MSBWP and shutdown margin for the highest worth rod are separate considerations. The SRO can decide the reactor will remain shutdown without boron only if all rods are inserted to or beyond position 02 OR if all rods but one are fully inserted, with one one out past position 02 (i.e 04 - 48).

Answer C part 1 is plausible to the examinee who believes 24 rods inserted to 00, each one notch beyond 02, negate the one rod at 48, since one rod at 48 constitutes 24 notches. It is wrong because MSBWP is defined as all rods inserted to position 02.

MSBWP is only met if all rods are inserted to 02 or 00. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated in distractor A.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated in distractor C.

Part 2 is correct.

Technical

References:

EOP-1A [RPV Control](Rev 22), PSTG (AMP-TBD00 Technical Basis)(Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-06-05 EO 4, State the criteria used to determine that the reactor will remain shutdown under all conditions without boron injection.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires assessment of plant conditions and knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to emergency contingency procedure EOP-6A.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 300000 (SF8 IA) Instrument Air Tier# 2 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and Group# 1 make operational judgments based on operating K/A # 300000 G2.1.7 characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument Rating 4.7 interpretation. Revision 1 Revision Statement: Replaced K/A 2.2.40 with K/A 2.1.7 per NRC CE comments on free review and replaced question.

Question 86 The plant is operating at rated power when a leak on the Instrument Air (IA) header occurs in the Reactor Building.

Which one of the following completes the statement below regarding the HIGHEST Instrument Air pressure that requires performing Procedure 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram] and when Attachment 2 [IA Pressure Loss] is required to be performed IAW Procedure 5.2AIR

[Loss of Instrument Air]?

Entry into Procedure 2.1.5 is required if IA pressure lowers below ____(1)___.

Attachment 2 (IA Pressure Loss) is required to be performed ____(2)____.

A. (1) 77 psig (2) anytime Procedure 5.2AIR is entered B. (1) 77 psig (2) ONLY when system pressure is considered to be too low to support continued operation C. (1) 85 psig (2) anytime Procedure 5.2AIR is entered D. (1) 85 psig (2) ONLY when system pressure is considered to be too low to support continued operation Answer: B Explanation:

This question requires knowledge of AOP subsequent actions and when to implement abnormal procedure attachments.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Procedure 5.2AIR requires the CRS to enter Procedure 2.1.5, Reactor Scram, which implements reactor shutdown, when air header pressure is < 77 psig based on the operating characteristics of systems supplied by instrument air. (Service Air automatically isolates <77 psig). Attachment 2 is also required to be implemented concurrently with the 5.2AIR body when IA pressure lowers below 77 psig which is the pressure considered too low to support continued operation.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect due to Attachment 2 only being required to be implemented when IA pressure is considered too low to support continued operation. This choice is plausible due to confusing Attachment 2 title (IA Pressure Loss) with when to implement the attachment. The candidate that correctly recalls the IA lowering pressure milestones and confuses when to implement Attachment 2 would select this answer.

Answer C part 1 is incorrect due to IA pressure being < 77 psig requires entry into procedure 2.1.5 and Attachment 2 only being required to be implemented when IA pressure is considered too low to support continued operation. This choice is plausible due to < 85 psig being one of the lowering IA pressure milestones in the supplemental actions. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reasons given for distractor A. The candidate that confuses IA lowering pressure milestones and confuses when to implement Attachment 2 would select this answer.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reasons given for distractor C. Part 2 is correct.

Technical

References:

5.2AIR {Loss of Instrument Air](Rev 23)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective:

COR0011702001070A Given a specific Plant Air system malfunction, determine the effect on any of the following: a. Plant operation Question Source: Bank # 12/2015 ILT NRC Q#79 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

Knowledge of when to implement attachments and appendices, including how to

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 coordinate these items with procedure steps.

PSA Applicability:

N/A from 12/2015 ILT NRC exam

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295002 (APE 2) Loss of Main Condenser Vacuum / Tier# 1 3 Group# 2 2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that K/A # 295002 G2.2.42 are entry-level conditions for Technical Rating 4.6 Specifications. Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 87 The plant was at 100% power when loss of condenser vacuum due to boot seal failure.

Mitigating Task Scram actions are complete.

Turbine trip actions are complete.

Condenser vacuum is 5 Hg, slowly lowering.

The following indications on Panel 9-3 for MSIVs exist:

For MSIV 86D:

o At control switch - Red light is ON and Green light is OFF.

o On Isolation Valve Positions mimic - Red light is ON and Green light is OFF.

For ALL other MSIVs indications - Red lights are OFF and Green lights are ON.

The DC ammeter for MSIV 86D at Panel 9-42 indicates 85 milliamps.

Which one of the following actions is required for these conditions?

A. Initiate an ACTIVE LCO for TS 3.6.1.3 [Primary Containment Isolation Valves], for MSIV 86D B. Initiate a POTENTIAL LCO for TS 3.6.1.3 [Primary Containment Isolation Valves],

for MSIV 86D C. Enter an ACTIVE LCO for TS 3.3.3.1 [Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation],

PCIV Position for MSIV 86D D. Enter a POTENTIAL LCO for TS 3.3.3.1 [Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation],

PCIV Position for MSIV 86D

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer: A Explanation:

MSIV (Group 1) isolates on condenser vacuum low, 10Hg (TS 8Hg). With the given annunciators in and seven of eight MSIVs closed, isolation instrumentation has performed its function. MSIV 86D should have closed on the isolation signal or when its control switch was placed to CLOSE.

MSIV 86D position is indicated by red and green lights above the control switch on Panel 9-3 and on the Isolation Valve Status mimic on the vertical section of Panel 9-3.

Both red lights are actuated by one limit switch when the valve is not fully closed, and both green lights are actuated by another limit switch when the valve is not fully open.

Position indication is required to be operable IAW TS 3.3.3.1 during Modes 1 and 2.

MSIVs have two solenoid valves, one AC powered and one DC powered, that must de-energize to cause the MSIV to close. In the stem, the DC ammeter indicates current to the DC solenoid. This represents the DC solenoid valve for MSIV 86D is energized, a condition that causes MSIV 86D to remain open. This is consistent with the position indication showing the valve is fully open. Therefore, three separate components, the ammeter and both open and closed limit switches, indicate MSIV 86D is open. Since all other MSIVs indicate closed, there is no other indication, such as steam flow or equalizing header pressure, that could be used to indicate the inboard MSIV is open.

Since it is fully open, MSIV 86D is inoperable. MSIV 86D is required to be operable IAW the applicability of TS 3.6.1.3. The applicability for TS 3.6.1.3 states PCIVs are required operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3, when the associated isolation instrumentation is required operable IAW TS 3.3.6.1. Condenser vacuum low, function 1d of TS Table 3.3.6.1-1, is required operable at all times during Mode 1, and when any turbine stop valve is not closed in Modes 2 and 3. Conditions given in the stem represent the plant in Mode 3, since Mitigating Task Scram Actions are complete, which place the Reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown. And turbine stop valves are closed, since turbine trip actions are completed. Therefore, MSIV 86D is not required to be operable with respect to condenser vacuum low trip function. However, it is required to be operable at all times during Mode 3 with respect to TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 functions 1a (RPV water level low), 1c (MSL flow high), and 1e (MS tunnel temperature high). With MSIV 86D fully open with automatic isolation signals in, it is inoperable for required automatic functions. Therefore, an ACTIVE LCO must be entered for MSIV 86D per TS 3.6.1.3.

Procedure 2.0.11 requires that an ACTIVE LCO be entered for those conditions where the SSC design function is required to be operable in the current mode as defined by Technical Specifications. Whereas a POTENTIAL LCO would be required for a condition where a SSC is inoperable, but is not required to be operable, in the current mode.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 It is important to enter the TS that governs the actuated device versus the TS that governs the actuation instrumentation for the given conditions. For an inoperable MSIV, TS 3.6.1.3 Action A.1 requires isolating the affected penetration within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

If only the isolation instrumentation was inoperable and untrippable, TS 3.3.6.1 Action B.1 and D.1 would provide up to 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> to isolate the penetration.

Distracters:

Answer B is plausible because condenser vacuum has exceeded the trip setpoint, and MSIV 86B has not closed, and because the condenser vacuum low trip function is not required to be operable under given plant conditions.. It is also wrong because MSIVs are required to be operable at all times during Mode 3 for TS Table 3.3.6.1-1 functions 1a (RPV water level low), 1c MSL flow high), and 1e (MS tunnel temperature high);

therefore, an ACTIVE LCO is required.

Answer C is plausible because MSIV 86D should be closed, but the position indication is not consistent with a closed valve. The examinee who assumes MSIV 86D is closed, since all other MSIVs indicate closed, and who does not know TS 3.3.3.1 only applies in Modes 1 and 2 or does not recognize the plant is in Mode 3, may chose this answer. If the plant was in Mode 1 or 2 and the position indication was inoperable, an active LCO for TS 3.3.3.1 would be required. This answer is wrong because the ammeter indicates the DC solenoid valve for MSIV 86D is energized, which would cause the valve to remain open. The position indication governed by TS 3.3.3.1 is operable.

Answer D is plausible because MSIV 86D should be closed, but the position indication is not consistent with a closed valve. An examinee may incorrectly assume MSIV 86D is closed but the position indication is errant. If that was the case, this answer would be correct, because TS 3.3.3.1 would apply to the position indication, which is not required operable in Mode 3, so only a potential LCO would be required.

Technical

References:

TS 3.3.6.1 [Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation],

TS 3.6.1.3 [PCIVs], Alarm Card 9-5-1/A-1 [Group 1 Isol Channel A](Rev 36), Alarm Card 9-5-1/A-2 [Group 1 Isol Channel B](Rev 36), GE dwg 791E266 sheet 11 References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT007-05-07 EO-1, Given a set of plant conditions, recognize non-compliance with a Chapter 3.6 LCO.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires determining operability of required components in order to properly apply TS action statements. It also requires knowledge of the administrative procedure governing entering LCOs for application of TS required actions PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - PCIVs, PCIS

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E266 sheet 11

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From GE dwg 791E266 sheet 11

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 700000 (APE 25) Generator Voltage and Electric Tier# 1 Grid Disturbances / 6 Group# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as l K/A # 700000 AA2.07 they apply to GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND Rating 4.0 ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES: Revision 0 AA2.07 Operational status of engineered safety features Revision Statement:

Question 88 Reference Provided The plant is at 10% power.

ESST is NOT loaded.

DG2 has been tagged out of service for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to repair a lube oil leak.

Doniphan Control (DCC) has called the control room and stated that thunderstorms and tornados are causing grid disturbances and Contingency Analysis is NOT solving.

SSST LTC-X tap has been raised and voltages being maintained as follows:

4160V Bus 1F - 3900 V 4160V Bus 1G - 3900 V ESST - 64 kV (via OPPD line)

What is the MAXIMUM time before Mode 3 is required to be entered?

A. 7 days, 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> B. 7 days, 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> C. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> D. 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> Answer: D Explanation:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 This is a modified version of 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#82. There are two onsite emergency AC power sources governed by TS 3.8.1, DG1 and DG2. There are two offsite emergency AC power sources governed by TS 3.8.1, the SSST and the ESST. One onsite source, DG2 is given as being tagged out of service, so it is inoperable. At 10% power, the SSST is supplying 4160V ESF Buses 1F and 1G. The NSST, which supplies 4160V ESF Buses 1F and 1G via 4160V Buses 1A and 1B when the generator is on line, is not in service because the generator is off line at 10% power.

With SSST supplying 4160V ESF Buses 1F and 1G and either of their voltages below 3950 V, the SSST is required to be declared inoperable per procedure 5.3GRID.

Therefore, with 4160V ESF Bus 1F and 1G voltage below 3950 V, the SSST, one offsite AC source, is inoperable. ESST operability is based on the primary side voltage being 70 kV under no-load conditions. For the situation given, the ESST is not loaded. ESST no-load voltage is below 70 kV; therefore, the ESST, another offsite AC source, is inoperable per 5.3GRID.

With one onsite AC source inoperable and both offsite AC sources inoperable, TS 3.8.1 Condition G is required to be entered, which requires immediate entry into TS 3.0.3. LCO 3.0.3 requires entry into Mode 3 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible to the examinee who does not know some operability requirements listed in procedure 5.3GRID, believes only one offsite AC source is inoperable, does not consider DG2 inoperability and applies only TS 3.8.1 Condition A. Adding to plausibility that only one offsite source is inoperable is that one bus, Bus 1G, is above the low voltage limit, so an examinee may believe the SSST remains operable. It is plausible to the examinee who does not recognize there are TS 3.8.1 Conditions that address inoperability of combinations of offsite and onsite AC sources.

This is plausible because TS 3.8.1 Conditions A, B, C, and E address inoperability of only offsite AC sources or inoperability of onsite AC sources, but not both. Also, a common error is to not look further once an applicable TS Condition is identified. For the examinee who believes only Condition A applies, this answer is plausible because it reflects the completion time of Condition A (Action A.3) which has a completion time of 7 days before Condition F (Action F.1) would be entered, which requires being in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. It is wrong because both SSST and ESST, two offsite circuits, are inoperable, and DG2, one onsite AC source, is inoperable; therefore, Condition G applies, so Mode 3 must be entered within a maximum of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

Answer B is plausible to the examinee who does not know some operability requirements listed in procedure 5.3GRID, believes only one offsite AC source is inoperable, also recognizes DG2 is inoperable and poses a separate concern, and applies only TS 3.8.1 Conditions A and B. It is plausible to the examinee who does not recognize there are TS 3.8.1 Conditions that address inoperability of combinations of offsite and onsite AC sources. This is plausible because TS 3.8.1 Conditions A, B, C, and E address inoperability of only offsite AC sources or inoperability of onsite AC sources, but not both. Also, a common error is to not look further once an applicable TS Condition is identified. For the examinee who believes only Conditions A and B apply, this answer is plausible because it reflects the most limiting completion time of

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 the two. Both Condition A (Action A.3) and B (Action B.4) have completion times of 7 days before Condition F (Action F.1) would be entered, which requires being in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. But DG2 has already been out of service for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The remaining time for Condition B plus the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> completion time of Condition F equals 7 days, 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. Condition A with Condition F would provide 7 days 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for reaching Mode 3. It is wrong because both SSST and ESST, two offsite circuits, are inoperable, and DG2, one onsite AC source, is inoperable; therefore, Condition G applies, so Mode 3 must be entered within a maximum of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

Answer C is plausible to the examinee who does not know some operability requirements listed in procedure 5.3GRID and believes only one offsite AC source is inoperable and applies TS 3.8.1 Condition D, for one offsite source and one onsite source inoperable. It is also plausible to the examinee who recognizes both offsite sources are inoperable but who does not recognize there are TS 3.8.1 Conditions that address inoperability of combinations of offsite and onsite AC sources and selects TS 3.8.1 Condition C. Both Conditions C (Action C.2) and D (Actions D.1 and D.2). have 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> completion times. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> combined with the 12 our completion time of Condition F (Action F.1) yields in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> to be in Mode 3. It is wrong for the same reason given for distractor A.

Technical

References:

TS 3.8.1 [AC Sources - Operating], Procedure 5.3GRID

[Degraded Grid Voltage](Rev 53)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: TS 3.8.1 [AC Sources -

Operating] LCO and Actions, only.(pages 3.8-1 thru 3.8-4)

Learning Objective: INT007-05-09 EO 3, Given a set of plant conditions that constitutes non-compliance with a Section 3.8 LCO, determine the ACTIONS that are required.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank # 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#82 New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires knowledge of details within subsequent actions and an attachment of an AOP, application of TS required actions, and application of generic TS 3.0.3.

PSA Applicability:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - Emergency AC Power 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#82

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295010 (APE 10) High Drywell Pressure / 5 Tier# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as Group# 2 they apply to HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE: K/A # 295010 AA2.02 AA2.02 Drywell pressure Rating 3.9 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 89 A LOCA is in progress with the following conditions:

Drywell pressure 63 psig, rising slowly Torus water level 29 feet, rising slowly (1) What procedure is required to be used to vent primary containment under these conditions?

AND (2) What vent path is required to be used under these conditions?

A. (1) 5.8.17 [Primary Containment Venting]

(2) Torus vent path B. (1) 5.8.17 [Primary Containment Venting]

(2) Drywell vent path C. (1) 5.8.18 [Primary Containment Venting for PCPL, PSP, Primary Containment Flooding, or Early Containment Venting]

(2) Torus vent path D. (1) 5.8.18 [Primary Containment Venting for PCPL, PSP, Primary Containment Flooding, or Early Containment Venting]

(2) Drywell vent path Answer: D Explanation:

Conditions given represent drywell pressure slightly above the Primary Containment Pressure Limit (PCPL-A), which is the lesser of:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 The pressure capability of the primary containment.

The maximum primary containment pressure at which vent valves sized to reject all decay heat from the containment can be opened and closed.

The maximum primary containment pressure at which SRVs can be opened and will remain open.

The PCPL is a function of primary containment water level and primary containment temperature. At CNS, RPV vent valve operability is not a concern in derivation of the PCPL because RPV venting can be accomplished using the motor operated main steam line drain valves. Operability of these valves are not affected by containment atmospheric pressure.

EOP-3A step PC/P-6 requires emergency venting the containment IAW EP 5.8.18 when drywell pressure cannot be maintained below PCPL-A. Per PSTGs cannot be maintained means The value of an identified parameter is/is not able to be held within the specified limit. Once the parameter does exceed the limit, the action must be performed.

EP 5.8.18 contains various methods/vent paths to vent primary containment. Venting from the Torus is employed first because the drywell atmosphere is first scrubbed by the suppression pool before being released through the vent. However, once Suppression Pool level reaches 28.5 feet, the Torus vent path is isolated and venting through a drywell vent path is performed.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because EOP-3A step PC/P-1 requires venting primary containment using EP 5.8.17 to control PC pressure below 1.84 psig. This answer is wrong because EP 5.8.17 is intended to maintain drywell pressure below 1.84 psig and does not permit overriding interlocks to vent at drywell pressures >1.84 psig. With drywell pressure >1.84 psig, the associated vent paths are unavailable unless isolation interlocks are first defeated. Part 2 is plausible because venting from the Torus is preferred over the drywell vent path because the suppression pool provides scrubbing of fission products from the drywell atmosphere before it is released. This answer is wrong because EP 5.8.18 requires using the drywell vent path when Suppression Pool level is 28.5 feet, because the Torus vent path becomes submerged, so Suppression Pool water containing fission products may be discharged from the Torus vent path at this level.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A. Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason stated for distractor A.

Technical

References:

EOP-3A [Primary Containment Control](Rev 18), Procedure 5.8.17 [Primary Containment Venting](Rev 12), Procedure 5.8.18 [Primary

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Containment Venting for PCPL, PSP, Primary Containment Flooding, or Early Containment Venting](Rev 21), PSTG (AMP-TBD00 Technical Basis)(Rev 10)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT008-06-13 EO-11, Given plant conditions and EOP Flowchart 3A, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, discuss required actions; EO-12, Given plant conditions and EOP flowchart 3A, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL, discuss the reasons for the actions contained in the steps Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of a procedure with which to proceed. It also involves knowledge of the content of the procedure versus knowledge of overall mitigative strategy or purpose.

PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant Systems - Primary Containment

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From EOP-3A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295018 (APE 18) Partial or Complete Loss of CCW / Tier# 1 8 Group# 1 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks K/A # 295018 G2.4.35 during an emergency and the resultant operational Rating 4.0 effects. Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 90 The plant has scrammed from 100% power due to a steam leak in the drywell.

Only REC Pump D is available AND it is running.

A leak that can NOT be isolated has been reported on REC north critical loop.

The following annunciators are ON:

REC SYSTEM PANEL/WINDOW:

LOW PRESSURE M-1/A-1 REC SURGE PANEL/WINDOW:

TANK LOW LEVEL M-1/A-3 Procedure 5.2REC [Loss of REC] has been entered.

Which one of the following actions performed by the NLO and related 5.2REC Attachment is required for this situation AND why?

A. Close valve DW-468, REC SURGE TANK LCV-488 ISOLATION to reduce system pressure until the leak can be isolated IAW 5.2REC Attachment 2 [REC Pipe Break].

B. Close REC-18, REC HX B INLET FROM PUMPS C & D and REC-20, REC HX A INLET FROM PUMPS A & B to begin splitting REC critical loops isolated IAW 5.2REC Attachment 5 [Splitting Critical Subsystems].

C. Lift leads in Isolation Relay Cabinets in the Cable Spreading Room to allow opening REC-MO-709, DRYWELL RETURN ISOLATION for restoring DW cooling isolated IAW 5.2REC Attachment 4 [REC Restoration following Isolation].

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 D. Lift leads in Isolation Relay Cabinets in the Cable Spreading Room to allow closing REC HX Service Water Outlet valves from VBD-M for aligning SW backup to REC IAW 5.2REC Attachment 6 [SW Backup for Critical Subsystem Cooling].

Answer: B Explanation:

The SRO is responsible for selecting and assigning the appropriate Attachment(s) of procedure 5.2REC to mitigate the described condition. REC critical loop cooling is required for CSCS Quad cooling during Modes 1, 2, and 3. For a REC leak, procedure 5.2REC step 4.6 requires performin Attachment 2 [REC Pipe Break]. If the break is on a critical loop (i.e. only one critical loop intact), Att. 2 step 1.6 requires performing Attachment 5 to split REC critical loops. Att. 5 steps 1.5 and 1.6 require locally closing manual valves REC-19 and REC 21 to isolate REC Pumps A and B from REC HX A and to isolate REC Pumps C and D from REC HX B.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because a sizable REC leak has been reported and 5.2REC Att. 2 requires reducing system pressure to limit leakage until the leak can be isolated.

5,2REC contains local operator actions associated with REC surge tank makeup when annunciator M-1/A-1 [REC System Low Pressure] is on. An examinee may believe automatic makeup to the surge tank should be defeated until the leak is isolated. It is wrong because 5.2REC step 4.7.1 requires additional makeup to the surge tank to be established by opening makeup bypass valve DW-470. System pressure is reduced by stopping all pumps IAW Att. 2 step 1.1 until critical loops are split.

Answer C is plausible because there is a steam leak in the drywell, which would cause elevated drywell temperature, and REC Drywell Supply Isolation valves automatically close on low system pressure (<61 psig), after a 40 second time delay.

Att. 4 contains steps for restoring REC to DW FCUs. It is wrong because 5.2REC Att.

2 directs closing REC-MO-709, DRYWELL RETURN ISOLATION.

Answer D is plausible because it reflects a local operator task listed in 5.2REC. When REC is unable to supply critical loop cooling, procedure 5.2REC subsequent action step 4.8 requires initiating SW backup to REC IAW Attachment 6. SW cools the REC heat exchangers. Establishing SW backup cooling requires isolating the normal SW return path by closing the REC HX outlet valves, SW-MO-650 and SW-MO-651.

These valves are interlocked to automatically throttle open upon low system pressure for 40 seconds and will not fully close. 5.2REC Att. 6 step 1.3.2 requires the building operator to lift leads in in Isolation Relay Cabinets A and B in the Cable Spreading Room to allow closing REC HX Service Water Outlet valves using their control switches on VBD-M in the control room. This answer is wrong because this is not required by 5.2REC for the stated conditions. Per TS 3.7.3 bases, one REC pump

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 provides enough flow to transfer the design heat load during transient or accident conditions.

Technical

References:

Procedure 5.2REC [Loss of REC](Rev 19), B&R Drawing 2021 Sheet 2 [ Reactor Building - Closed Cooling Water System], Alarm Card M-1/A-1 [REC System Low Pressure](Rev 21), Alarm Card M-1/A-3 [REC Surge Tank Low Level](Rev 21)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-12-06 EO-Q, Given plant condition(s) and the applicable Abnormal/Emergency Procedure, discuss the correct subsequent actions required to mitigate the event(s).

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires assessment of plant conditions and selection of an AOP attachment to mitigate the event. Detailed knowledge of the content of Attachments of procedure 5.2REC is required to make the proper Attachment selection, making this SRO-level.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From B&R Dwg 2021 Sh 2

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 295019 (APE 19) Partial or Complete Loss of Tier# 1 Instrument Air / 8 Group# 1 Ability to determine and/or interpret the following as K/A # 295019 AA2.02 they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF Rating 3.7 INSTRUMENT AIR: Revision AA2.02 Status of safety-related instrument air system loads (see AK2.1 - AK2.19)

Revision Statement:

Question 91 Reference Provided The plant is at 10% power.

Instrument Air pressure is completely lost to Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers.

What TS 3.6.1.7 [Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers] ACTION statement is required to be entered?

A. A.1 Close the open Vacuum breaker within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

B. B.1 Close one open Vacuum breaker within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

C. C.1 Restore the vacuum breaker(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

D. D.1 Restore all vacuum breakers in one line to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Answer: A Explanation:

This question relates to loss of IA as it relates to the Containment function (ref 295019 AK2.09).

The Reactor Building to torus vacuum breaker system relieves pressure from the Reactor Building to the torus if torus pressure were to drop to 0.5 psi below Reactor Building pressure. Operation of either vacuum breaker will maintain a pressure differential of less than 2 psid, the external design pressure of containment. The system consists of two separate lines which are open to the Reactor Building atmosphere. They then combine into a common line before going to the torus. Both lines contain a spring-tensioned check valve PC-13CV (PC-14CV), and a 100%

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 capacity air operated butterfly valve in series PC-AO-243 (PC-AO-244). Each butterfly valve is controlled by a three way switch which is located on Control Room Panel H. When the control switch is in either the OPEN or AUTO position (with a 0.5 psid between Rx Bldg. & Torus), air is vented off the air operator and the valve opens.

If the control switch is positioned to CLOSE, air is supplied to the air operator and the valve is held closed. PC-AO-243 and PC-AO-244 are normally closed since RB to Torus dp is normally below 0.5 psid.

On a loss of air pressure or power, PC-AO-243 and PC-AO-244 fail open. This represents one or more lines with one RB to Torus vacuum breaker not closed.

Therefore, only TS 3.6.1.7 Action A.1 applies.

Distracters:

Answer B reflects a condition where two vacuum breakers in one line are each open, such that the line is open from Primary Containment to the Reactor Bldg. It is plausible because the system is arranged with parallel piping containing series valves and PC-AO-243 and 244 fail open on a loss of IA. Also, the wording of TS 3.6.1.7 Condition B is complex. It states One or more lines with two reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers not closed. The examinee who misunderstands the wording of TS 3.6.1.7 Condition B or who believes PC-AO-243 and 244 are in series on the same line may choose this answer. It is wrong because PC-AO-243 and 244 are on separate lines and are each in series with a spring closed check valve that maintains the respective vacuum breaker lines closed, even with PC-AO-243 and 244 failed open..

Answer C is plausible because the system is arranged with parallel piping containing series valves and PC-AO-243 and 244 are air operated, and they are closed during normal, steady-state operation. The examinee who does not remember how PC-AO-243 and 244 fail on a loss of IA and believes they are on the same vacuum breaker line will choose this answer. It is wrong because PC-AO-243 and 244 fail open on loss of IA, and spring check valves PC-13CV and 14 CV will open at the setpoint to provide the required vacuum relief for each vacuum breaker line.

Answer D is plausible because the system is arranged with parallel piping containing series valves and PC-AO-243 and 244 are air operated, and they are closed during normal, steady-state operation. The examinee who does not remember how PC-AO-243 and 244 fail on a loss of IA knows they are on different vacuum breaker lines will choose this answer. It is wrong for the same reason given for distractor C.

Technical

References:

B&R Dwg 2022 [Primary Containment Cooling & Nitrogen Inerting System] sh 1, TS 3.6.1.7 [Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers] and bases, lesson plan COR002-03-02 [Ops Containment](Rev 35)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: TS 3.6.1.7 [Reactor Building-to-Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers] LCO and ACTIONS, only

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Learning Objective: INT007-05-07 EO-3, Given a set of plant conditions that constitutes non-compliance with a Chapter 3.6 LCO, discuss the ACTIONS that are required.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires application of TS required actions for LCO 3.6.1.7.

PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - Primary Containment

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From B&R Dwg 2022 sh 1

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 400000 (SF8 CCS) Component Cooling Water Tier# 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on Group# 1 the CCWS and (b) based on those predictions, use K/A # 400000 A2.01 procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the Rating 3.4 consequences of those abnormal operation: Revision 0 A2.01 Loss of CCW pump Revision Statement:

Question 92 Reference Provided The plant is at 100% power.

At 0000 on 7/1, DG1 is declared inoperable due to a failed surveillance.

At 0100 on 7/1, REC Pump D trips due to a fault in its motor windings.

What is the EARLIEST time Mode 3 is REQUIRED to be entered IAW TS?

A. 1300 on 7/1 B. 1700 on 7/1 C. 1200 on 7/8 D. 1300 on 7/31 Answer: B Explanation:

Procedure actions to mitigate the subject condition are the correct implementation of the TS requirements. Per TS bases, two REC pumps per loop are required operable for a REC subsystem to be considered operable IAW TS 3.7.3. REC Pumps C and D, associated with subsystem B, are redundant to REC Pumps A and B, associated with subsystem A. For the situation given, REC Pump D must be declared inoperable at 0100. For an unplanned LCO entry, procedure 2.0.11 requires the SRO to verify operability of redundant equipment.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 DG1 is a required support system for REC Pumps A and B, which are powered from MCC-K. REC Pump D is powered from MCC-S, which is supported by DG2. With DG1 inoperable, TS 3.8.1 Action B.2 requires declaring required features, supported by the inoperable DG, inoperable when the redundant required features are inoperable and has a completion time of four hours from discovery. For this case, REC Pumps A and B must be declared inoperable 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after REC Pump D is discovered to be inoperable, which was at 0100. Therefore, REC Pumps A and B must be declared operable no later than 0500. With REC Pumps A, B and D inoperable. TS 3.7.3 Condition C must be entered due to both REC subsystems inoperable for reasons other than REC leakage above the limit with no SW backup available. TS 3.7.3 Action C.1 requires being in Mode 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. 0500 + 12 hrs = 1700 on 7/1.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible for the examinee who does not consider the completion time of four hours for TS 3.8.1 Action B.2 and enters TS 3.7.3 Condition C at the time of REC Pump D trip. It is wrong because entry into TS 3.7.3 Condition C is not required until the completion time for TS 3.8.1 Action B.2 has elapsed. That completion time of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> only begins upon discovery of REC Pump D inoperable at 0100 and expires at 0500. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> from 0500 is 1700 on 7/1.

Answer C is plausible to the examinee who does not realize the support function of DG1 with respect to REC and does not apply TS 3.8.1 Action B.2. This answer is reflective of the 7 day completion time for one DG inoperable in Mode 1, plus the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> completion time of TS 3.8.1 Action F.1 to get to Mode 3. It is wrong because Mode 3 is required to be entered earlier IAW TS 3.7.3 due to both REC subsystems inoperable.

Answer D is plausible for the same reason given for distractor C. It reflects the 30 day completion time for TS 3.7.3, plus the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> completion time of TS 3.7.3 Action C.1 to get to Mode 3. It is wrong for the same reason stated for distractor C.

Technical

References:

TS 3.7.3 [REC System] and bases, TS 3.8.1 [AC Sources -

Operating] and bases, Procedure 2.0.11 [Entering and Exiting Technical Specification/TRM/ODAM LCO Condition(s)](Rev 44), Lesson Plan COR002-19-03

[OPS Reactor Equipment Cooling](Rev 31), Procedure 5.3AC480 [480 VAC Bus Failure](Rev 52)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: TS 3.7.3 [REC System]

LCO and Actions, only (TS page 3.7-6)

Learning Objective: INT007-05-08 EO-2, Discuss the applicable Safety Analysis in the Bases associated with each Chapter 3.7 Specification; EO-3, Given a set of plant conditions that constitutes non-compliance with a Chapter 3.7 LCO, determine the ACTIONS that are required

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires knowledge of TS bases required to access REC subsystem operability and it involves application of TS 3.8.1 and TS 3.7.3 required actions.

PSA Applicability:

Top 10 Risk Significant System - DGs

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 259001 (SF2 FWS) Feedwater Tier# 2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on Group# 2 the REACTOR FEEDWATER SYSTEM; and (b) K/A # 259001 A2.02 based on those predictions, use procedures to Rating 3.3 correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of Revision 0 those abnormal conditions or operations:

A2.02 Feedwater heater isolation Revision Statement:

Question 93 The plant is at 90% power with 55 Mlbm/hr core flow.

At 1300, alarm point 3233 Feedwater Heater 5A High Level alarms and the following annunciator is received:

HEATER HIGH PANEL/WINDOW:

LEVEL TRIP A-2/C-6 Procedure 2.4EX-STM [Extraction Steam Abnormal] is entered.

At 1305:

The following annunciator is received:

MOISTURE PANEL/WINDOW:

SEPARATOR A HIGH LEVEL A-2/A-4 AND the following conditions exist:

Feedwater temperature has lowered 13°F, slowly lowering Rod line is 107%, slowly rising What action is required at 1306?

A. Scram and transition to Procedure 2.1.5 [Reactor Scram].

B. Trip turbine and transition to Procedure 2.2.77 [Turbine Generator].

C. Transition to 2.1.10 [Station Power Changes] and perform rapid power reduction using RR.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 D. Transition to 2.1.10 [Station Power Changes] and insert emergency power reduction rods.

Answer: C Explanation:

The conditions given represent a rising level in high pressure FWH 5A, which has resulted in automatic isolation of the FWH and is backing up into Moisture Separator A, resulting in high level. Procedure 2.4EXT-STM subsequent action step 4.1 requires transition to Attachment 1 if Moisture Separator level is high. Attachment 1 step 1.4.1 requires performing a rapid power reduction IAW procedure 2.1.10 if Moisture Separator high level alarm is in with the associated FWH 5 high level trip annunciator in. For a rapid power reduction, Procedure 2.1.10 first requires lowering core flow to 40 Mlbm/hr, if rod line is below 118%. That would lower power to ~60-70%. 2.4EX-STM Attachment 1 step Step 1.3 states if the Moisture Separator high level alarm is in continuously for >4 minutes with the associated FWH 5 high level trip annunciator, to remove the unit from service IAW Att. 1 step 1.5. Since the condition of both annunciators simultaneously in has only existed for 1 minute, the appropriate action is to perform a rapid power reduction by lowering Reactor Recirc flow to attempt to reduce level in Moisture Separator A.

Step 1.5.1 requires the operator to first scram, if annunciator 9-5-2/C-4 [TSV & TCV Closure Trip Byp Chan A/B] is clear, indicating that a turbine trip would cause an automatic scram. That alarm is clear when power is 29.5% RTP, so the next action is to insert a manual scram.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because 2.4EX-STM Attachment 1 step Step 1.3 states if the Moisture Separator high level alarm is in continuously for >4 minutes with the associated FWH 5 high level trip annunciator, to remove the unit from service IAW Att.

1 step 1.5. Step 1.5.1 requires the operator to first scram, if annunciator 9-5-2/C-4

[TSV & TCV Closure Trip Byp Chan A/B] is clear, indicating that a turbine trip would cause an automatic scram. That alarm is clear when power is 29.5% RTP, so the next action would be to insert a manual scram, if high level in FWH 5A and in Moisture Separator A had existed for >4minutes. This answer is wrong because the high levels have only existed for 1 minute, and 2.4EX-STM requires a rapid power reduction to attempt to reduce the high level in Moisture Separator A and avert a reactor scram and turbine trip.

Answer B is plausible for the same reason stated for distractor A and because if annunciator 9-5-2/C-4 was in alarm, 2.4EX-STM Att. 1 step 1.5.1 would be N/A, and step 1.5.2 would be the next action, which requires tripping the turbine and performing procedure 2.2.77 to shut down the main turbine. It is wrong because for the reason stated for distractor A, plus power is >29.5%, which implies 9-5-2/C-4 is clear.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer D is plausible because with FW temperature lowering, 2.4EX-STM steps 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 require control rod insertion to maintain rod line <118% or to avoid the Stability Exclusion Region of the Power-To-Flow Map. If core flow was 40 Mlbm/hr, insertion of Emergency Power Reduction Rods would be the next step of a Rapid Power Reduction or, in some situations, to exit the Buffer Region of the Power-To-Flow Map. It is wrong because core flow is 55 Mlbm/hr, so the first step of rapid power reduction is to lower core flow by 15 Mlbm/hr. Also, load line is below 118%.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.4EX-STM [Extraction Steam Abnormal](Rev 20), Procedure 2.1.10 [Station Power Changes](Rev 116), Alarm Card 9-5-2/C-4 [TSV

& TCV Closure Trip Byp Chan A/B](Rev 49), Alarm Card A-2/C-6 [Heater High Level Trip](Rev 41), Alarm Card A-2/A-4 [Moisture Separator A High Level](Rev 41)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-23 EO-H, Given plant condition(s), state from memory if a manual reactor scram or an emergency shutdown from power is required due to the event(s).

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This requires evaluation of plant conditions and selection of a procedure/attachment with which to proceed. It also involves knowledge of the content of a procedure attachment versus knowledge of overall mitigative strategy or purpose.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 2.4.42 Ability to recognize system parameters that Tier# 3 are entry-level conditions for Technical Group#

Specifications. K/A # G2.4.42 Rating 4.6 Revision Revision Statement:

Question 94 At 0800, an I&C surveillance for a pressure switch associated with one channel in a one-out-of-two-taken twice logic system is started.

The surveillance has a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Delayed Entry Time (DET).

The TS allowable value for the function is 10 psig.

At 1000, the channel tripped per the surveillance (as-found setpoint) at 9 psig.

At 1200, I&C reports having trouble getting the cover off of the pressure switch by hand and exit the RCA to obtain a special tool from the warehouse.

IAW procedure 0.26 [Surveillance Program],

What is the EARLIEST time the CONDITIONS and REQUIRED ACTIONS of Technical Specifications are REQUIRED to be entered?

A. 0800 B. 1000 C. 1200 D. 1400 Answer: D Explanation:

The channel under test is considered inoperable when the surveillance is started.

However, per TS notes before SRs regarding Delayed Entry Time, when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to the DET, in

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 this case 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. If one channel of a one-out-of-two-taken twice logic system is removed from service, the remaining channels provide trip capability, so DET is allowed. This allows delaying entry into associated TS Conditions and Required Actions for a maximum of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> from the surveillance start time, 0800. 6 hrs from 0800 is 1400.

None of the other information provided in the stem requires declaring the channel under test inoperable for a reason other than the surveillance.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because it is the surveillance start time, which would be correct if a DET was not provided by TS or if trip capability was not maintained by remaining OPERABLE channels. It is wrong because it is not the LATEST time listed, and a DET of 6 hrs applies, since a DET is specified, and other channels are providing the trip function.

Answer B is plausible because it is the time the instrument is tripped. The allowable value given in the stem is common to a high setpoint, where the trip function occurs as the parameter rises. Examinees sometimes confuse use of the qualifying signs (i.e or ) stated for TS allowable values with the purpose of the functions themselves.

For instance, if asked to list the allowable value for RPS high reactor pressure trip, they sometimes list it as 1050 psig, since the trip occurs as pressure rises. For the situation given in the stem, an examinee may believe the channel tripped outside of the TS allowable value. If that were true, the channel would be considered inoperable for reasons other than the required surveillance, and associated CONDITIONS and Required Actions would be required to be entered at 1000. It is wrong because the trip setpoint is within the as-found allowable value of the surveillance, and for the reasons stated for distractor A.

Answer C is plausible because it is the time the physical problem with the transmitter is reported. It is wrong because the problem described does not render the channel inoperable for a reason other than the required surveillance and because of the reasons given for distractor A.

Technical

References:

Procedure 0.26 [Surveillance Program](Rev 71), TS 3.3.1.1

[RPS Instrumentation] (as an example for DET allowances)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: SKL008-01-02 EO-9, Briefly describe the administrative process for the application of DETs during surveillance testing.

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(2)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This requires application of rules for administration of TS surveillance requirements and action statements.

PSA Applicability N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in Tier# 3 the facility license. Group#

K/A # G2.2.38 Rating 4.5 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 95 The plant is at 100% power.

At 1200, the shift complement of NLOs becomes one less than required by TS 5.5.2.a due to an NLO leaving the site due to illness.

(1) Which one of the following is the LATEST time that maintains compliance with the Operating License for the required NLO position to be filled?

AND (2) If 10 CFR 50.54(x) is invoked due to a condition which prevents filling the NLO position within the required time, which one of the following persons must approve the deviation? (Assume only persons listed are available, and plant conditions are normal.)

A. (1) 1255 (2) Shift Manager B. (1) 1255 (2) AOM-Operating Shift C. (1) 1355 (2) Shift Manager D. (1) 1355 (2) AOM-Operating Shift Answer: D Explanation:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 The NLO staffing requirements are delineated in TS 5.5.2.a. TS 5.5.2.c allows shift crew composition to be less than the minimum requirement of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(i) and Specification 5.2.2.a for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements The condition presented represents a deviation from TS. Procedure 2.0.1 lists the chain-of-command for an on-shift SRO for non-emergency situations as AOM-Operating Shift, Operations Manager, and GMPO (GMPO is the highest in the chain-of-command). 2.0.1 also states prior to taking action, the action shall be approved by highest person in the appropriate chain-of-command (declared event or non-event situation) that is available. Since the stem states Assume only persons listed are available, the AOM-Operating Shift must approve the deviation.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because many TS required actions have a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> completion time and because the reporting requirement for part 2 of the question has a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time limit. It is wrong because it does not reflect the latest time allowed by TS 5.5.2.c (within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />). Part 2 is plausible because the Shift Manager initially acts as Emergency Director during a declared emergency, and procedure 2.0.1 lists the Emergency Director as the highest in the chain-of-command during emergencies. It also states in an emergency, an on-shift SRO may authorize deviation from a license condition (e.g., approved procedures) or Technical Specifications as allowed by 10CFR50.54(x) and (y) or 10CFR72.32(d). It is also plausible because procedure 2.0.1 states that at a minimum, an on-shift SRO must approve the deviation. This answer is wrong because the situation presented is non-emergency with one person higher in the chain-of-command than the SM, the AOM-Operating Shift, available; therefore, the AOM-Operating Shift must approve the deviation.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Part 2 is correct.

Answer C part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reason stated for distractor A.

Technical

References:

TS 5.5.2 Organization, Unit Staff; Procedure 2.0.1 [Plant Operations Policy](Rev 66]

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-03 EO F.1.d, Discuss the following as described in Procedure 2.0.5, Reports to NRC Operations Center: Instructions section of procedure

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(1)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question tests knowledge of administrative requirements in the Operating License and reporting requirements for deviations from the Operating License.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating Tier# 3 procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs. Group#

K/A # G2.4.8 Rating 4.5 Revision 1 Revision Statement: Replaced question with a new one based on NRC CE comment during free review that original question did not meet generic requirements for Tier 3.

Question 96 An event has occurred requiring entry into EOP flowcharts, 2.4 series procedures, 5.1 series procedures, and 5.8 series procedures.

According to Procedure 2.0.1.2 [Operations Procedure Policy]

(1) Which one of the following describes the requirements for use of EOP flowcharts and 2.4 series procedures?

AND (2) If an explicit operation is required by EOPs and is addressed in both a 5.1 series procedure and a 5.8 series procedure, which action is required?

A. (1) EOP flowcharts and 2.4 series procedures may be performed concurrently.

(2) Transition out of the 5.1 series procedure to the 5.8 series procedure.

B. (1) EOP flowcharts and 2.4 series procedures may be performed concurrently.

(2) Transition out of the 5.8 series procedure to the 5.1 series procedure.

C. (1) EOP flowchart actions MUST be completed first, THEN 2.4 series procedure actions may be taken.

(2) Transition out of the 5.1 series procedure to the 5.8 series procedure.

D. (1) EOP flowchart actions MUST be completed first, THEN 2.4 series procedure actions may be taken.

(2) Transition out of the 5.8 series procedure to the 5.1 series procedure.

Answer: A Explanation:

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 To support distractor plausibility for part 2, Procedure series numbers were used so the title EOP Support Procedure for series 5.8 procedures would not have to be given.

APs (AOPs) are series 2.4 procedures.

EPs (Emergency Procedures) are similar to APs but address more severe conditions than APs and should not be confused with EOPs. Procedure 2.0.1.2 states APs may be used concurrently with EOPs, unless EOP actions conflict with AP actions, in which case EOP actions take precedence. It also states if an explicit operation is directed by EOPs per a 5.8 EOP Support Procedure, then transition shall be made from the Alarm/Abnormal/Emergency/System Operating/Instrument Operating Procedures (including hard cards) to the 5.8 Procedure to perform or continue performing that operation.

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because both procedures are intended for emergency conditions. It is wrong because procedure 2.0.1.2 states if an explicit operation is directed by EOPs per a 5.8 EOP Support Procedure, then transition shall be made from the Alarm/Abnormal/Emergency/System Operating/Instrument Operating Procedures (including hard cards) to the 5.8 Procedure to perform or continue performing that operation.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because EOPs/SAMGs are the highest level Operations procedure. An examinee may believe this requires all EOP actions to be prioritized to be performed before actions of other procedures It is wrong because procedure 2.0.1.2 states AP and EOP actions may be performed concurrently as long as they do not conflict, in which case EOPs take precedence. Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor C. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractorB.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.0.1.2 [Operations Procedure Policy](Rev 47)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-01 EO-R2, Describe the hierarchy between the Emergency Operating Procedures, Abnormal Procedures, and Emergency Procedures, including which guidance takes precedence Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires assessment of plant conditions and selection of steps within an emergency (abnormal) procedure attachment with which to proceed. It also requires administrative knowledge of implementation hierarchy between EOPs and APs/EPs.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. Tier# 3 Group#

K/A # 2.3.11 Rating 4.3 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 97 From previous 2 NRC Exams 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#98 The plant is operating at low power with:

Two Circulating Water pumps running De-icing in progress The Floor Drain Sample Tank requires discharging.

1) Whose authorization(s)/approval(s) is/are required in order to accomplish this discharge?

AND

2) What action is required if one of the two operating circulating water pumps trip during the discharge?

A. (1) Shift Manager authorizes and approves the release.

(2) Terminate the discharge B. (1) Shift Manager authorizes and approves the release.

(2) Reduce the discharge flow rate by 50%.

C. (1) Chemistry department authorizes the release, Shift Manager approves it.

(2) Terminate the discharge D. (1) Chemistry department authorizes the release, Shift Manager approves it.

(2) Reduce the discharge flow rate by 50%.

Answer: C

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Explanation:

This question tests knowledge of SRO responsibilities for controlled release of radioactive material. Chemistry Procedure 8.8.11, Attachment 1 requires that chemistry authorizes the release and the duty Shift Manager approves the release.

The loss of one CW pump would reduce flow to less than the minimum required 159,000 gpm and the discharge should be terminated. Part of the CW discharge is routed back to the intake structure for de-icing and does not flow to the discharge canal so the credited dilution flow is lowered. When de-icing is in operation, two CW pumps can be credited for 193,200 gpm and one CW pump can be credited with a dilution flow of 118, 800 gpm.

Distracters:

Answer A part 1 is plausible because the SM is the final approval and his authorization is required for rad discharges. It is wrong because Chemistry authorization is first required per procedure 8.8.11 [Liquid Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization]. Part 2 is is correct.

Answer B part 1 is plausible and wrong for the same reasons as stated for distractor A. Part 2 is plausible because loss of one CW pump would result in about 50%

reduction in total CW flow. It is wrong because part of total CW flow is diverted to de-icing, so the resultant dilution flow is less than the minimum required for radioactive discharges.

Answer D part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the same reasons as stated for distractor B.

Technical

References:

procedure 8.8.11 [Liquid Radioactive Waste Discharge Authorization](Rev 34)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT0320115 EO-B1, State who, by title, authorizes releases of radioactive liquid effluents from CNS; EO-B3, State the number of Circulating Water Pumps required to be in service during liquid radioactive discharges.

Question Source: Bank # From previous 9/2018 ILT NRC 2 NRC Exams Q#98 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(4)

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Level of Difficulty: 2 SRO Only Justification:

This tests knowledge of the process for liquid radioactive release approvals and execution..

PSA Applicability N/A 9/2018 ILT NRC Q#98

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator Tier# 3 responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as Group#

medical requirements, no-solo operation, K/A # G2.1.4 maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc. Rating 3.8 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 98 From previous 2 NRC Exams 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#94 A CRS, who is also qualified as Shift Manager and as STE, began reactivation as SRO on May 1st, after an extended absence.

The SRO signed into eSOMS and completed Procedure 2.0.7 [Licensed Operator Active/Reactivation/Medical Status Maintenance Program], Att. 4 [SRO Reactivation] per the following:

May 1 May 2 May 3 May 4 May 5 May 6 May 7 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> as under under under on-shift STE on-shift STE instruction instruction instruction (CRS (CRS (Shift Mgr initialed as initialed as initialed as coach) coach) coach)

May 8 May 9 May 10 May 11 May 12 May 13 May 14 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> under under under instruction instruction instruction (Shift Mgr (CRS (CRS initialed as initialed as initialed as coach) coach) coach)

When did the SRO complete the minimum proficiency time for reactivation IAW Procedure 2.0.7 [Licensed Operator Active/Reactivation/Medical Status Maintenance Program]?

A. May 6 B. May 7 C. May 10

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 D. May 14 Answer: C Explanation:

IAW Procedure 2.0.7 [Licensed Operator Active/Reactivation/Medical Status Maintenance Program], step 2.8.5 specifies a minimum of four 12-hours shifts to meet the NRC required 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> for reactivation of an SRO license. Att. 4, SRO Reactivation, specifies 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of under instruction proficiency time is required for reactivation, and SRO Licensees proficiency time is performing on-shift license authorized (CRS and/or SM) position tasks under active SRO (Coach) direction, so under instruction of either CRS or SM counts toward the required proficiency time.

Time acting as STE, not under instruction for proficiency, does not count. Therefore, the four 12-hour shift (40 hour4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> NRC) requirement would be completed after the fourth 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> day under instruction of either the CRS or SM, which is on May 10.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible because it reflects the fourth day of work after beginning reactivation, so 40 work hours would have elapsed. It is wrong because only 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> of under instruction time for proficiency would have been reached, which is less than the required 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />.

Answer B is plausible because it reflects the fifth day of work and 60 total hours, the normal period required in a quarter for maintaining proficiency. The unprepared applicant may confuse the proficient requirement of 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> with a familiar limit of 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> and select this answer. It is wrong because only 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> of under instruction time for proficiency would have been reached, which is less than the required 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br />.

Answer D is plausible because it reflects the day 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> of U/I time under the CRS is reached. The unprepared applicant may believe, since he/she is primarily a CRS, only U/I under the CRS counts toward his/her proficiency. It is wrong because procedure 2.0.7 Att 4 states U/I time to regain proficiency may be under CRS or SM; therefore, the minimum requirement is met earlier than this answer reflects.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.0.7 [Licensed Operator Active/Reactivation/Medical Status Maintenance Program](Rev 11)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: INT032-01-01 EO-S1e, Discuss the following as described in 2.0.7 Licensed Operator Active/Reactivation/Medical Status Maintenance Program:

Reactivation

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Question Source: Bank # From previous 3/2017 ILT NRC 2 NRC Exams Q#94 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental Comprehensive/Analysis X 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(1)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question tests knowledge of requirements for maintenance of active license status related to shift staffing requirements of the Operating License that is specific to SROs.

PSA applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 3/2017 ILT NRC Q#94

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in Tier# 3 emergency plan implementation. Group#

K/A # G2.4.40 Rating 4.5 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 99 A General Emergency Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) is being issued for the first time during a SLOWLY progressing event.

Wind direction is from 180° directly to and along the centerline of Sector A.

Assuming no impediments for evacuation exist, (1) What is the MINIMUM radius for which ALL sectors must be evacuated?

AND (2) What is the MINIMUM number of downwind sectors that must be evacuated beyond the ALL sectors radius?

A. (1) 2 miles (2) 3 B. (1) 2 miles (2) 4 C. (1) 5 miles (2) 3 D. (1) 5 miles (2) 4 Answer: A Explanation:

The Shift Manager is an SRO and assumes the role of On-shift Emergency Director when an EAL is met. The Shift Manager is responsible for approving PARs IAW Procedure 5.7.20. The standard PAR for a GE requires evacuating all sectors out to

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 two miles and downwind sectors out to five miles. Affected downwind sectors are determined based on wind direction using Procedure 5.7.20 Att. 5. There are 16 equal sectors covering the entire 360 degrees around the site. Each sector covers 22.5 degrees. A minimum of three sectors are affected for PARs, the sector covering the direction the wind is blowing toward and one sector on either edge/side of it. If the wind direction is within three degrees of the boundary of two sectors, then those two sectors plus their other adjacent sectors, which makes a total of four sectors. For the case given, the wind direction is along the centerline of sector A, which is ~eleven degrees from the closest edge of sector A: therefore, only three sectors are required to be evacuated out to five miles. (sectors R,A,B)

Distracters:

Answer B part 1 is correct. Part 2 is plausible because if the wind direction is within three degrees of the boundary of two sectors, then those two sectors plus their other adjacent sectors, which makes a total of four sectors. This answer is wrong because the wind direction is along the centerline of sector J, which is ~ eleven degrees from the closest edge of sector J: therefore, only three sectors are required to be evacuated out to five miles.

Answer C part 1 is plausible because the standard PAR for a GE requires evacuating downwind sectors out to 5 miles. It is wrong because all sectors are only required to be evacuated out to a radius of 2 miles. Part 2 is correct.

Answer D part 1 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor C. Part 2 is plausible and wrong for the reason given for distractor B.

Technical

References:

procedure 5.7.20 [Protective Action Recommendations](Rev 31)

References to be provided to applicants during exam: none Learning Objective: ERO001-01-15 EO-3b, State the PAR to be given to off-site authorities at a General Emergency for the following: A Non-Rapidly Progressing Severe Accident (RPSA)

Question Source: Bank #

(note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New X Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(5)

Level of Difficulty: 3

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 SRO Only Justification:

Requires knowledge of specific information in an Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure attachment required to approve Protective Action Recommendations.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Examination Outline Cross-Reference Level SRO 2.1.35 Knowledge of fuel handling responsibilities Tier# 3 of SROs Group#

K/A # G2.1.35 Rating 3.9 Revision 0 Revision Statement:

Question 100 Which activity REQUIRES Refuel Floor Supervisor permission during refueling operations in Mode 5?

A. Using greater than 50 gallons of demineralized water on the refuel floor B. Re-commencing fuel handling operations C. Allowing access to Reactor Bldg 1001 D. Allowing under vessel access Answer: B Explanation:

Refuel Floor Supervisor permission is required to re-commence fuel handling operations IAW Procedure 2.2.31 Attachment 2 (Reset Checklist) which shall be used each time the normal fuel handling process is stopped/interrupted. This includes, but is not limited to, Shift Turnover, Fuel Mover/Spotter mid-shift role change, or following a distraction which interrupts the normal fuel handling process flow. Putting the applicable procedure in the stem would eliminate under vessel access plausibility due to title being Fuel Handling - Refueling Platform.

Distracters:

Answer A is plausible due to the Refuel floor SRO is required to brief available refueling floor personnel on limiting demineralized water usage and requirement to notify Control Room if using > 50 gallons demineralized water each shift. The candidate who confuses briefing vs. giving permission would choose this answer.

This answer is incorrect because Refuel Floor Supervisor permission is not required to use greater than 50 gallons of demineralized water on the refuel floor.

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 Answer C is plausible due to the Refuel floor SRO permission is required to access the fuel handling area - the fuel handling area is located Rx Bldg 1001. The candidate who confuses refuel floor with fuel handling area would choose this answer.

This answer is incorrect because Refuel Floor Supervisor permission is not required to allow access to the refuel floor.

Answer D is plausible because under vessel area gets posted to prohibit access without Shift Manager's permission. The candidate who confuses access permission authority would select this choice. This answer is incorrect because Refuel Floor Supervisor permission is not required to allow access to the under vessel area.

Technical

References:

Procedure 2.1.20.3 [RPV Refueling Preparation (Wet Lift of Dryer and Separator)](Rev 67), Procedure 10.25 [Refueling - Core Unload, Reload, and Shuffle](Rev 65), Procedure 2.2.31 [Fuel Handling - Refueling Platform](Rev 57)

References to be provided to applicants during exam:

Learning Objective: INT0231002001160A Identify the administrative duties and responsibilities of the each of the following: Refueling Floor Supervisor Question Source: Bank # 4/2015 ILT NRC Q#95 (note changes; attach parent) Modified Bank #

New Question Cognitive Level: Memory/Fundamental X Comprehensive/Analysis 10CFR Part 55 Content: 55.43(b)(7)

Level of Difficulty: 3 SRO Only Justification:

This question requires knowledge of Refuel floor SRO responsibilities.

PSA Applicability:

N/A

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 From 4/2015 ILT NRC exam

ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401 ES-401 Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401