ML20238F311

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Special Rept 87-10:on 870814,fire Breaches Issued on 870807, for Fire Doors A77 & A78,exceeded 7-day Limit Allowed by Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.12.Caused by Delay Due to Matl Acquisition.Roving Fire Watch Initiated
ML20238F311
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/10/1987
From: Nobles L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
87-10, NUDOCS 8709160071
Download: ML20238F311 (2)


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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy Tennessee 37379 September 10, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Dest WaLhington, DC 20555 Centlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.

50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 87-10 The enclosed special report provides details concerning fire doors breached greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with the special report requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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. M. Nobles Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 9%h P

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An Equal Opportunity Employer

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 87-10 DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS CD On August 14, 1987, withunit1inmode5(0percentpower,3psig,130ff degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 0 psis, 133 degrees F); fire breaches issued on August 7, 1987, for fire doors A77 (to air lock room,2

,a Auxiliary Building elevation 690) and A78 (to annulus, Reactor Building unit.'y elevation 690) exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.

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VJ w The fire breaches were issued to keep the doors open to support repair Npyk on nonessential control air containment isolation check valve 2-CKV-32-387 by allowing temporary air supply hoses to pass through the doors.

CAUSE OF EVENT During performance of SI 158.1, control air containment isolation check valve 2-CKV-32-387 failed leak rate test. A work request was initiated to repair the valve, and a portion of control air supply header was required to be isolated to facilitate the repair work.

Interruption of air supply would render several valve operators and equipment required for. mode 5 operation inoperable; therefore, a continuous air supply to the valve operators and equipment was provided by temporary air hoses taken through the above specified doors. A delay occurred during the repair process as a result of material acquisition, and subsequent to resolution, the work was completed on August 16, 1987. The fire breaches exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by TS LCO 3.7.12.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is being reported in t.ccordance with the requirements of action statement A of TS LCO 3.7.12.

A roving fire watch was establisicd for both fire doors as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12.

In the event of a fire, the existing fire detection and suppression systems would actuate; therefore, there was no danger to redundant safety-related equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION A roving fire watch at a regular interval of one hour was established

-immediately and maintained until the fire doors were closed and declared operable on August 16, 1987.

Maintenance work-planning personnel were counseled to exercise care while planning repair work to ecsure correct parts were specified and obtained. No further actions are required.

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