ML20238C760
| ML20238C760 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1987 |
| From: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Cockfield D PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20238C763 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8712310202 | |
| Download: ML20238C760 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000344/1987031
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DEC 171987
Docket No. 50-344
Portland General Electric Company
121 S. W. Salmon Street
Portland, Oregon 97204
Attention: Mr. Duke Cockfield
Vice President, Nuclear
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Gent'emen:
Subject: NRC Inspection of the Trojan Nuclear Plant
This refers to the special team inspection, conducted by Mr. W. .P.
Ang and
other members of our staff on September 21 - October 2, 1987. This inspection
examined your activities as authorized by NRC License No. NPF-1. Discussion
of our findings were held with Mr. Lindblad, yourself and other members of
your staff, at the conclusion of the inspection.
Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection
report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective
examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with
personnel and observations by the inspectors.
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Based on the results of this inspection, it appears that certain of your
activities were not conducted in full compliance with NRC requirements, as set
forth in the Notice of Violation and Notice of Deviation, enclosed herewith as
Appendices A and B.
Your response to these notices are to be submitted in
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accordance with the provisions stated in the Notice of Violation and Notice of
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Deviation.
The primary objective of the inspection was to assess the ability of the
Trojan Nuclear Plant to safely respond to a postulated event (s) of a type
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actually experienced at similar facilities.
Inherent in this evaluation, is a
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determination as to how aggressively your staff pursuest industry experience,
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problems, and lessons learned to preclude similar-type occurrences at Trojan.
The secondary objective was to assess the effectiveness of your organization
in the identification, resolution, and prevention of onsite safety significant
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technical problems and deficiencies in plant systems and operations.
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The Instrument Air (IA), Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Air Start System and
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the Main Feedwater System were selected as the sample systems for the
inspection. The team used industry experiences with air systems that were
compiled in the USNRC AE0D case study report C701 as a basis for evaluation of
the Trojan air systems. The inspection plan also included a review of
engineering work and design basis documents related to the selected systeras.
The results from the 1986 team inspection was used as a reference for this
inspection.
8712310202 871217
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ADOCK 05000344
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The NRC inspection team found that, although, you have a system for evaluating
events from other plants, your staff has not consistently applied the lessons
learned from industry experience and event from other plants to the Trojan
plant systems. Weakness in instrument air system testing and operation
described in the industry literature was not identified by your staff's
evaluations when similar weaknesses existed at Trojan; i.e. gradual loss of
air test and planned routine system blowdowns. Also it appears that your
failure to implement a comprehensive and effect trending program and root
cause program significantly detracts from your ability to aoply lessons
learned from events at Trojan and identify problem situations before they
manifest themselves in plant transients.
Increased management attention is
needed to ensure more critical evaluations are performed of onsite and offsite
events.
Our 1986 Safety System Functional Inspection Team identified examples of poor
engineering work and weak management control of the engineering disciplines in
the inspection of the Component Cooling Water and Service Water Systems. This
team inspection identified the following similar findings for the IA and EDS
air start systems:
1.
Testing of plant safety systems did not adequately confirm system design
requirements.
2.
Deficiencies and errors were observed in documents associated with
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modifications of the IA System and EDG Air Start System.
3.
Lack of available documentation of the IA and EDG Air Start System design
basis resulted in your engineering organization being unable to
adequately address team questions, such as the adequacy of the sizing of
the accumulators for the AFW Terry turbine steam admission valves.
In light of the weakness identified above, the inspection team concluded that
PGE does not fully understand the design of the Instrument Air and the EDG Air
Start Systems at Trojan. Design engineering personnel did not appear to have
open communication nor adequate interface with the plant staff. Several areas
were noted where engineering involvement in modifications to the Instrument
Air system was poor. The above deficiencies taken together (lack of
understanding the design, poor communications and lack of involvement)
indicates that there is a need to improve the " pride of ownership" of.the
Engineering Department for the design of assigned plant systems.
During the exit meeting on October 2,1987, you and your staff reemphasized
that you had an on-going program to define and maintain the design base for
the Trojan plant. The team's findings again reinforces the need for you to
pursue this program. Also, proper attention should be given to consistently
applying lessons learned from your own experience and from the experience of
others. As discussed in our management meeting on December 1, 1987, your
aggressive pursuit of corrective actions to 13 prove your performance in
establishing and maintaining the design basis for the plant is an important
part of your engineering improvement program. Also, the management meeting
and the team inspection findings reinforced that a viable corrective action
program is highly dependent on your organization's ability to be self
critical. Your improvement _ program in these areas should include a realistic
appraisal of the effectiveness of your present programs and increased
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involvement by your corporate engineering in the improvement to these
programs.
In addition to your response to the enclosed Notices of Violation and
Deviation, we request you provide a detailed written description of your
action plan to address the deficiencies described above and include the
necessary improvements to that plan to ensure successful implementation.
We
anticipate periodically meeting with you and your staff to discuss the status
of your actions.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures
will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
The responses directed by this letter and the attached Notice are not subject
to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required
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by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.
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Should you have ar.y questions concerning this inspection, we will be glad to
discuss them with you.
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Sincerely
Yh{
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O.F.Kfrsch, Director
Division of Reactor Safety and Projects
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Enclosures:
1.
Appendix A - Notice of Violation
2.
Appendix B - Notice of Deviation
3.
Inspection Report No. 50-344/87-31
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cc w/ enclosures:
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C. A. Olmstead, PGE
J. W. Durham, Esq., PGE
W. Dixon, DOE
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Resident Inspector
Project Inspector
G. Cook
B. Faulkenberry
J. Martin
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Drew Persinko, NRR
bec w/o enclosure 3:
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M. Smith
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