ML20238B019
| ML20238B019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 08/22/1987 |
| From: | Nobles L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 87-09, 87-9, NUDOCS 8709010033 | |
| Download: ML20238B019 (4) | |
Text
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a TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 August 22, 1987 l
l U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327/50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77/79 - SPECIAL REPORT 87-09 j
The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire damper which was nonfunctional for a period in excess of seven days. This event is reported in accordance with Sequoyah units 1 and 2, Technical Specification 3.7.12.
Very truly yours, l
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Nobles Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 l
)
NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant I
B709010033 870822 PDR ADOCK 05000327 S
PDR v
'V 1983-TVA SOTH ANNIVERSARY
\\
An Equal Opportunity Employer
a SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 87-09 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On July 26, 1987, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 3 psig, 132 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 0 psig, 134 degrees F), a fire breach permit iseued on July 18, 1987, for fire damper XFD-31A-218, exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by Technical Specification (IJ) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.
During performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI)-234.1, fire demper XFD-31A-218 did not actuate for fire zone 48 (Corridor, Control Building, Elevation 669) because zone module SR-32 was wired incorrectly.
Fire zone 49 (Corridor, Control Building, Elevation 669) also actuates this fire damper, and it was determined operable.
Fire zone 48, activated by smoke, is not covered by the TS.
Fire zone 49, activated by a fire (heat), is I
covered by LCO 3.3.3.8 fire detection and was operable at all times.
A work request (WR) to correct wiring connection of zone module SR-32 was initiated, and a roving fire watch was established immediately.
CAUSE OF EVENT The root cause for the incorrect wiring is indeterminate. A review of past performances of SI-234.1 has shown that previous revisions of this j
instruction did not contain the detail required to verify this wiring.
Therefore, there is a high probability that the miswiring has existed since initial installation.
Since no other wiring errors were found using the revised SI-234.1, this is considered an isolated case.
The root cause for exceeding the LCO has been determined to be the performance of six fire protection sis (234.1 through 234.6) simultaneously.
Several WRs, which we:e initiated as a result of the SI deficiencies identified, caused a delay in scheduling the repair work for zone module SR-32.
This scheduling delay caused the fire breach to exceed the seven-day limit. Normally, fire protection SI's are performed one or two at a time. However, due to recent major revisions made to all six fire protection sis, it was necessary to schedule the performance of all the sis simultaneously to ensure operability of all the local fire panels and fire detection equipment within the TS allowable extension due dates.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement A of TS LCO 3.7.12.
A roving fire watch was established in fire zones 48 and 49 as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12.
In the event of a fire, the existibg fire detection and suppression systems would actuate; therefore, there was no danger to redundant safety-related equipment.
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1 CORRECTIVE ACTION A roving fire watch at a regular interval of one hour was established immediately and maintained until fire damper XFD-31A-218 was declared operable. The zone module, SR-32, wiring was corrected and is now consistent with the "as-constructed" drawing.
SI-234.1 was successfully performed, the fire damper XFD-31A-218 was returned to service, and the fire breach was closed on August, 13, 1987. Appropriate planning personnel have been counseled not to schedule performance of several sis simultaneously that would create delays and prioritize the maintenance activities which are required to comply with TS requirements.
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