ML20238A388
| ML20238A388 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1987 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-5-I-SC-077, OL-5-I-SC-77, NUDOCS 8708310053 | |
| Download: ML20238A388 (73) | |
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REGION III EXERCISE EVALUATION REPORT I
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FACILITY:
3ALEM GENERArtNa STArten i
LOCATION:
LOWER ALLOWAYS IOWNSHIP, SALEM COUNTY, NEW JERSEY I
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RE?CRT DATE:
Il0VEMBER 25, 1933 ExERc!SE DATE:
OcT0sER 26, 1933 PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS:
STATE OF DELAWARE COUNTIES OF KENT AND NEW CASTLE 8708310053 870507 PDR ADOCK 05000322 PDR l
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Executive Se:=ary State Loca:1ces and Activities Page 1 County Locacices and Ac:ivi:les Page 3 II.
Exercise ?,eport Introdue: ion Page 4 Narrative State Locaciots and Ac:ivi:ies Page 3 County Loca:1 cts and Activities Page 23 III.
Sursary of N ficieccles Par: A Page 43 Part 3 Page 49 Listing of Ce ficiencies f:ca 1982 A::achmen: A l
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II2C"TIVE 5'.EGY 5:a:e Locations and Ac:ivities Delaware IOC Capability for notification and activation of emergency ECC staff was adequately de=enstrated.
The DE?0 Director and his support staff demonstrated capable leadership and decision-=aking ab111:7 The Operations staff were kept well-infor=ed via briefings, an effec:1ve =essage handlicg procedure, and a comprehensive array of status boards and pos:ed infor:ation.
Good coordination was observed between Operations and the PIO at the Media Center, but there were several instances of a coordination failure between Operations and the Accident Assessment staff, re-peating a previous defic!.ency. Protective action decisions for areas within the I?Z were sound and :1:ely, bu: a sheltering decision for arecs beyond the EP2 houndsry, al: hough appropriate, was not ti=ely.
Furthermore, a discrepancy in desiena:ing the af fec:ed areas preven:ed proper i=plementation of the shel:aring ac ion.
Another previously-iden:ified deficiency which was repeated was the f ailure to notify or advise the New Jersey ECC of protec:ive action decisions.
The EOC is located within :he 10- 11e E?Z, but the air fil:ericg syste: necessarv for continuous opera:1on during plu=e exposure was not operational.
Plans to repair the sys:ee sust be i=plemen:ed.
Plans to add new sleeping and shower facilities will also improve the EOC's capability for continuous operation.
The EOC has a very good co==unica: ions syste=, vi:h : ore than adequa:e backuo or al:erna:e co unica: ions capabili:y, All systems were moni:ored, both incoming and outgoing =essages were logged, and incoming nessages were conveyed to the appropriate recipien: via message forms.
The only co unications proble cc:ad was a difficui:y experienced by Ken: County staff in reaching specific 5: ate IOC l
s:aff via ec :ercial :elephone.
l The Acciden: As s e s sme n Advisory Group experienced a variety of problems which greatly complica:ed exercise play, and resulted in a confusing and difficul:
situa: ion.
The AAAG generally perforced well in copiug with these problems, w1:h one notable exception:
the failure to address in a timely cancer a high dose rate beyond the 10-=11e E?Z.
Public Alerting and Instrue:1on were perforced efficiently and without probles.
Appropriate E3S messages were prepared and forwarded to the EES station in a ti=ely =anner, i
Capability to i=ple=ent protective actions was also well de=onstrated.
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Delaware S: ate Felice and Department of Eighways performed well in coordinating and establishing the access control pos:s.
The Delaware > brine Police denon-stra:ed good capabili:y for alerting and controlling access of =arine traffic on the relaware ?.1ver.
The most serious deficiency no:el in this category was the late activation of the registration /=onitoring and disaster shel:er centers.
As a result, the centers were not fully coera:ional when evacuees arrived, i
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e Radiological exposure c:ntrol procedures were adequately demonstra:ed, including
' decisions by the AAA0 regarding use of K1 and requests. by organizations :o. allow e=ergency workers to exceed :he I?A PAC 11:1:s.
Sales EOF The State's represenza:1ve to the IDF has received adequate technical training so as to enable interpreca:1on of available data, and ability to iden:ify the.need f or additional information, which =ay be of 'i=portance ' to the AAAG.
Mass Care Registration precedures at the regis: a: ion / decontamination center were adequa:el' demonstrated, but radiological =onitors. were not ' adequately f a=111ar wi:h procedu-' 1, and should receive addi:1ocal training.. The disaster shel:er staff was well pre-pared, and the facility and operations were adequate.
Media Center L
The Media Center was found to be an excellent f acility, with good co==unications resources and staffed >by professionals.
The only deficiency was a failure by the FIO :o use the prescripted =essages as the basis for news releases.
As a result, news teleases were unnecessarily delayed and did not provide. sufficient emergency instrue:1ons.
Field Activities Capability to es:ablish access control posts and implement route aler:ing'were generally well de onstraced, although the report con:ains reco==endations for improvemen:.'
Radiological Field Monitorinz Tears Mobili:a:lon of the field tea =s occurred according to plan.
The teams had the appropria:e equipmen: and exposure control items, and :eas members demonstrated' competency in performing technical operations.
Field Sacolinz Tears Me=bers of the sa:pling teams were pre-positioned, and they were not fully briefe; on current plan: status prior to deploymen:. ' Technical opera:1ons, co==unic at i o n a and all aspects of exposure control were adequately demonstrated.
E=ergency"orkerDecontaminatkon u
i The abili:y of the 's:sf f a: -the decontamination s ation to cenitor and de-con:a=inate emergency workers and vehicles was very well de onstra:ed.
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e Cour y Locations and A::ivi:ies Kent Coun:v EOC Opera:1ons a: the I:C were hampered by several problems.
The main proble: was a failure to properly identify the affected sectors, as repor:ed by the S:a:e ICC.
Discrepancies and inconsistencies in posted icfor=ation concer:ing sects s and wind diree:1oc were not recognized.
Protective actions were implemented in a sector which was not affected.
Another problem r?2 was the poor conveyance of infor=a:ioc within the ECC.
.An effective message handling procedure was not employed, the status board was to:
used effectively, and staff briefings were to: held.
These deficiencies are primarily :he result of insufficiec: train'ing a:d e.<
perience, and are chas correctable.
I: should be noted tha: this was the County' first full-scale RI? exercise (i.e. requiring i=ple=en:ation of protec:1ve action.
Another citigating factor is :ha: the area of the County within the 10-a11e EF" is rela:ively small and sparsely populated.
New Castle Coun:7 ECC The Cout:y ECC staff dicplayed professionalism and capability in performing their designated responsio111 ties. All aspects of e=crgency response, :o the degree
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required by the s:knario, were adequately de=onstra:ed, and no deficiecties or reco=mendations were nn:ed.
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s EXIRCISE RE?CRT Introdue icn 3ackground A j oint, f ull-scale exercise was condue:ed on October 26, 1953 in order :o demon-strate the radiologi:al preparedness of the Sale: Generating Station (SCS) and the State and local e=ergency response organi a: ions of New Jersey and Delaware.
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exercise provided the basis for an evaluation of the adequacy of the participa:'
org anizatiens' emergency response plans and their capability to i=plement :he plans. The purpose of this exercise evaluation report is to identify deficienc.,
and reccc=end corrective actices which are required to improve preparedness acd response capabili:7 The las joint, f ull-scale exercise was conducted one yes:
previously, on Oc:ober 13, 1952.
l The exercise was observed jointly by 7EMA Regions II and III, their respective Regional Assis:ance Cocai :ee (RAC) members, and NRC Region I.
III team observed the Delaware participants, which included tne State and :he Counties of Kent and New Cas:le.
Participants There were no Delaware jurisdictions within the 10-mile E=ergency Planning Zone
( EPZ) which should have participated but did not.
Jurisdictions located beyond the 10-mile EP2, but w1:hin the 50-=11e Inges:1on Zone were cot tested in this exercise.
Those non-participating Ingestion Zone jurisdictions within Region III include:
Sussex County, Delaware; the Sta:e of Maryland and the Counties of Bal:i=cre, Caroline, Cecil, Earford, Kent, and Queen Annes; the Co= enwealth of Penn-sylvania and Counties of Berks, Bucks, Chester, Celaware, Lancaster, Mentsc: 2:
Philadelphia and York.
Observer Assiznnects Name Acencz Location /Assizn20:
Thomas Hardy FEMA Overview James Asher FEMA Overview - RAC Chairman Stephen Hopkins FEMA State EOC - Operations Karen Larson FEMA State ECC - Opera:1ocs i
"1111am 3elanger EPA State EOC - Accident Assess =en:
Richard Kinard FEMA New Castle County 100 Joseph Cavin FEMA Kent County ECC Mans Eenzel FEMA Media Center Walter Pierson FEMA EOF David Collins NRC EOF 1_
Fred Donnelly FEMA Communications Janet lamb FEMA Mass Care John Forco DOT Access and Traffic Con:rol; Route Alerting; Decontamination
'a' alt e r Ad ams DCT Access and Traffic Centrol; Peute Alerting; Decontacina:1on Rudolf Zantopp LGE Radiological Monitoring Teams Henry Mitskas FOA Field Sampling Tea =s Mary Conoscen:1 FEMA Observer Coordination s
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q, Evaluation Criteria Evaluation criteria for this exercise consisted cf the planning standards contai-~
in NUREG 0654/TEMA RIP-1, Rev-1; the regulations of 44 CTR 350; the State of Delaware Radiological Emergency Plan, April 1983 revision; the Delaware Off-site Objectives for the 1983 SGS exercise; and the Delaware Response Improvement Program, designed to correct 1982 exercise deficiencies.
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Sencary of Exercise Objectives The Delaware Off-site objectives included demonstration of the following:
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Overall adequacy of emergency operations f acilities and resources, including communications resources.
2.
Capability for ti=ely alerting and =obili:ation of officials and staff.
3.
Capability for effective emergency operations management, including inter-j jurisdictional coordination and participation of elected officials.
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Effective and timely public alerting, notification, and instruction via the siren system and Emergency Broadcast System.
- 5. ' Ability to establish effective public and media relations.
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- 6... Capability for independent accident assessment, including field monitoring and air sampling, plume tracking, dose assessment, protective action recom-mendations, and ingestion zone protective actions.
7.
Capability for implementing protective actions, including evacuation, and establishing a registration / decontamination center and = ass care facility.
8.
Proper implementation of health, medical and exposure control measures, in-cluding briefing of emergency workers, maintenance of dose records and monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and equipnent.
Su= mary of Scenario The onsite scenario called for a major LOGA (Loss of Cooling Accident) caused by the explosion of a bomb placed on a reactor coolant pump suction line from the steam generator. The bomb was placed by a saboteur during a recent outage.
The unusual event declaration was prompted by the control room receiving a telephoned bomb threat. The discovery of wire cutters and blasting caps in the Unit I Aux-111ary Building resulted in the Alert declaration.
The Site Area Emergency was declared upon the discovery of a simulated bomb in the Auxiliary Building.
Folloe ing the bomb explosion, containment overpressure damaged the pressure /vaccuum a
reJief isolation valves creating a pathway for release to the environment. This re sulted in the General Emergency declaration.
1 Offsite, the scenario called for the initial wind direction to carry the plume l
southwestward into Delaware.
Af ter several hours a wind shif t carried the ple=e eastward into New Jersey.
Both States were thereby brought into exercise play.
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l '.1 A wind direction toward 213' resulted in the plu=e affecting both New Castle and i
Kent Counties in Delaware.
The release race was such that the resulting exposure rate at the closest inhabited area of Delaware (within 5 =iles of SGS) was high L
enough to warrant evacuation. The State monitoring teams were to be accompanied l3 by exercise controllers, who were to prov' de them with simulated field data to i
report back to the Accident Assessment Group at the State EOC.
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The proj ecte-d and actual times for significant eve'nts affecting Delaware are as follows:
4 Proj ected Actual c;
Event Time Time t
Unusual Event Declaration 1430 1450 Alert Declaration 1500 1515 Site Area E=ergency declaration 1600
.607 General Emergency Declaration 1700 1708 Plume reaches closes inhabited aren 1845 1850 L
of Delaware (apprcx. 5 =1. from SCS) l Wind shif ts toward New Jersey 2000 2010 Demonstration of Resources The exercise plans called for demonstrating the following State and local resource:
State and County EOCs and accoutrement l
- Cot =unications systees and equip =ent Full staf fing of all f acilities, includf. g 24-hour capability Prompt Notification Syttem, including siren system and E3S Route alerting by one fire company State Media Center, including resor control Two radiological monitoring teams and equipment Two field sampling teams and equipment A Registration / Decontamination Center for evacuees An A=erican Red Cross Disaster Shelter for evacuees
- One bus evacuation route Six Access Control Points
- Dosimeters, TLDs, KI, and dose records for emergency workers A monitoring and deconta=1 nation station for emergency workers.
Previous Deficiencies A list of previous deficiencies, in three categories, is included as Attach =ent A to this report.
Delauare's Response Improvement Prograc, which explains the in-tended corrections, is included as Attachment B.
The degree to which the State and Counties were successful in implementing the intended corrections is addresscC in the Narrative section of this report.
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Objectives Not Yet Achieved The scenario did not call for a demonstration of Reentry and Recovery.
It was agreed to by FEMA Regions II and III during the scenario development procedure,
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and in accordance 4th FDiA National guidance that Reentry and Recovery capab111:.;
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The Delaware objectives did not include a Health and Medical demonstration of d
hospital capability to creat contaminated, injured patients, also agreed to by f.',a 7EMA Region III.
Suc5 a demonstration should be 1.cluded in future exercises.
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Narrative i
State Locations and Activities Delaware ECC Activation and Staffing 1
Th'e Delaware State ECC was notified at 1523 by the utility control room that the
.d" plant had entered Alert status at 1515. This call was verified by call back to the control room via dedicated line. The Operations Of ficer conducted a staf f briefing at 1525, requesting sign-in of on-site DEPO staff and initiation of the call down notification procedure. The last agency representative to arrive was l
from the Department of Public Instruction, at approximately 1830. Full staffing was not achieved, as three organizations expected to participate were not represented. These included the Division of Fish and Wildlife, National Weather Service, and Delmarva Power and Light.
(It should be noted that the Delaware i
Marine Police assumed the duties of the Division of Fish and Wildlife, and the State has no control over the latter two organizations.)
g A 24-hour system is in place to activate the State EOC, although it was not demon-strated for this exercise.
During non-working hours, when the EOC is not nor= ally manned, the initial emergency notification is to be received at the 1
Delaware State Police communications cenr.er, which is manned continuously.
The DSP is then to notify the DEPO Director (or, alternatively, the Deputy Director) l at home.
Thia triggers EOC activation and continuation of notification call down, if warranted. Pre-set telephone nunber capability has been installed in the State EOC to speed notification / call down completion, and, as reported by the Operations Officer, has also been installed in the Director's, Deputy Director's, and Operations Officer's homes for use during non-working hours.
In general, first shift staff displayed adequate knowledge of procedures.
Most agencies represented at the State EOC had a minimum of two representatives present
,i for the duration of the exercise, with Social Services having three and Depart ent of Transportation having four staff me=bers present.
It is commendable that represented agencies took advantage of the exercise to provide simulated experienes te additional staff = embers, thereby increasing agency respor.se depth.
Round-tne-clock staffing was also demonstrated by the provision of dou11e staffing rosters.
An actual shif t change was observed only for the Amateur Rad;o representatives at 1909. The replacement person was knowledgeable of the available radio equipment, and was briefed as to current status of operations at the EOC.
Emergency Operations Management The DEPO Director was effectively in charge of the EOC operations, and demon-strated very capable leadership and decision-making ability.
F.e effectively utili:ed the support staff in making key decisions. The Operations Officer acted as manager of operations and kept the staff well-informed as to major event changes and decisions via periodic briefings. These were generally held on a timely basis, although on one instance the staff briefing followed the status board update of a major event change (a briefing was held. ; 1758 regarding a 1730 uncontrolled release at the plant, notification of which was forwarded to the State EOC at 1746 and i= mediately placed on the status board).
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I= addition to the briefings, coordination and information flow at the State EOC was augmented by an expanded array of status boards, including those for key events, protective actions, proj ected doses, and staffing.
These were generally maintained in a timely canner.
Both Kent and New Castle Counties sent repre-sentatives to the State EOC who were responsible for providing periodic updates and maintaining informational contacts with their respective j jurisdictional E0Cs.
I It could not be determined at the ECC if these representatives were successful in 9
providing the Counties with adequate information, but the provision of liaisons established the capability.
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l Message handlieg was icitiated oc a multi-form, carboced sheet which was dissem-
.5 1..ated through a log system, numbered, transmitted to the action agency, and retu; d
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to the originator and log keeper to transmit action taken. This proved to be very effective ar.d timely.
Access to the EOC was coctrolled via sign-in and -out sheets, and distribution of numbered badges. Security was provided by a State Police officer.
TLDs were aisc issued at the time of participant sign-in.
.q The State EOC vas notified of plant Alert status at 1523, of Site Area E=ergency sq at 1618, and of General Emergency at 1716.
The revised notification procedure was j
used, whereby the State ECC is the primary contact point for the utility during working hours. The State Police Communications Center provides coverage during con-working hours, but only for the initial notification message (regardless of emergency status), and they are responsible only for relaying the notification to the DEPO Director, or alternate (and not to other State agencies, as previously).
No notification problems were experienced.
Notification of Federal agencies (FEMA Region III and DOE's Brookhaven Lab) vas demonstrated at the Alert, Site Area and General Emergency states.
A request for FEMAP assistance, in the form of four radiological monitoring teams, was also successfully demonstrated.
The protective action decisions were made, and implemented, in three phases. The first two decisions were sound and timely. The third phase was for areas beyond the ten-mile EPy. Although an appropriate action, two mistakes combined to render it virtually ineffective.
First, it was not timely, and in fact was prompted by the intervention of an exercise controller.
Second, implementation was further flawed due to a discrepancy in designating the affected area between Operations and AAAG.
This mistake was never discovered, icdicating that the previously identified deficiency regardicg coordination betveen the two groups has not been adequately addressed. These matters are discussed in greater detail in succeedie3 sections. There was also a lack of coot ination or cocmunicatiocs with New Jerse regardicg protective actions. Although the neighboring states of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Maryland were notified by the 20C staff regarding emergency classification changes, no attempt to coordinate or communicate informatica re-garding protective action decisions was observed between DEPO and their New Jerse, counterparts, repeating a previously-identified deficiency.
Coordination of activites associated with the protecti"e actions were adequately demonstrated.
The second phase of protective actions, which was the 10-mile evacuation of Sectars W, WSW, SW, SSW, and S, was accompanied by the authorization s
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to distribute KI to the Delaware Corrections Center in Smyrna and the Governor Bacon Relach Center in relaware :::y; the activation of the registration /
decontamination ce.ger and aster shelter, and the activatioc of the emergency worker decontamination er.... at the Middletowm National Guard armory.
Approximately 16 special problem messages, designed to imitiate specific response activities, were inserted by an exercise controller, in a manner which was not overly promptieg or instructional.
In those cases observed, the operations staff responses were appropriate and timely.
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Support of elected officials was demonstrated at the State EOC by a visit of the Lt. Govermor, who was briefed on operatices.
The DEPO Director also maintained contact, via telephone, wir? the Governor's representative, and provided infor-mation regarding status changes and response activities.
Facilities The State EOC is located within the 10 :11e E?Z (about 7 miles Northwest of SGS) but the air filtering system cecessary for continuous operation in the " buttoned up" mode was not operational.
Although not a problem durity the exercise, the possibility exists that plume exposure could force relocation of the State's ECC to an alternate site. This would result in a major disruption of communication 1
and control. Plans to repair the filter system must be implemented.
The EOC was equipped with adequate furniture, lighting, and telephones. An emer-gency gener ator was demonstrated.
Space was limited in the Operations room as provided to agency representatives, which proved cumbersome for message handling, but was not an overriding problem and did not significantly hamper operations.
Although the facility includes kitchen and sleeping provisions, there are to showers or decontamination capability. A plan to add new sleeping and shower facilities will, when completed, greatly improve the EOC's capability for con-tinuous operation, and make present sleeping space available for operatiocs.
A large status board was used to provide visible detail of recently transpired significant events, present and forecasted weather conditices, protective actions, and proj ected dose rates. Actual dose rates were not provided oc the board.
Pro-j ected dose rates included three listed time frames, three distances (.8; 5, and 10 miles), proj ected whole body and thyroid doses.
Neither sectors affected nor distance from plume center-lice were provided on the board.
Protective actions were added to the board as announced, but were not time-coted.
Maps were posted in the EOC depicting the plu=e EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, access control points, population, and environmental air and ILO monitor-ing locations.
Co=munications The primary communicacices between the EOC and the licensee was a dedicated hot line that terminated at the communications console in the ECC and also in the AAAG Both statioco could monitor or answer the line cnd take necessary actions area.
without any delay.
Backup communications were available by commercial telephones, emergency management radio (EMRAD), NAWAS circuit, and amateur radio nets.
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d The primary consunications to FIMA was by the NAk'AS circuit, with teletype capa-9 bilities available using the nationwide teletype net or the FEMA CDNATS nircuit.
1 All traffic going to FEMA vent by both means.
d The EOC has a de'dicated ring dowr. phone line to the CDCS-1 rad.'o station ('40EL) for passing E3S traffic.
This line is backed up with a remote pick 2p unit.(RPU) link and an amateur radio link.
radio bility to ring the radio station; if the station has to call the E0C it mustThe dedica j
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co=mercial phone.
use This dedicated line should be provided with two-vay ring dowT y
capability.
This will save the station personnel valuable time in ecncacting th,
.i EOC.
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Teletype message traffic was available by using the nationwide teletype net that ties in all States and FEMA Regional offices.
Backup teletype was provided by
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using the FEMA national teletype circuit ( CDNATS).
Communications to the media center, local schools, support hospitals, embulances, q
State Police, National Guard, Red Cross and other agencies was provided by either
- i commercial telephones or dedicated radio links.
a All message traffic was recorded on the proper forms and the State had written j
guidelines explaining use of the forms.
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Communications with the County EOCs was provided by commercial telephones with backup provided by the Civil Defense radio net, plectron radio, EMRAD, or fire /
police radio nets.
Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation A.
Dose Proj ection The Division of Environmental Control is responsible for performing radio-logical field monitoring.
Two teams, Red and Blue., were de=onstrated for the exercise.
The observer's report is contained in the Radiological Field Moni-toring Section.
The Depart =ent of Public Health is responsible for collectint water and milk samples.
The observer's report regarding the two teams which were demonstrated is contained in the Field Sampling Team section.
The Accident Assessment Advisory Group (AAAG) had to contend with a number of problems which greatly complicated exercise play.
These problems cocbined to create a very difficult operational situation. The AAAG generally performed well in addressing these problems, with one exception:
a high dose beyond 10 miles.
the failure to address The first problem appeared at 1715 when it was apparent to the AAAG from the data coming in that a release was in progress.
However, the fact t 'aa t the plant had declared a General Emergency did not reach the AAAG until 1745.
Thi s news took 1/2 hour to travel 50 feet f rom the Operations area, which is adj acent to the AAA0 room.
This reveals a weakness in AAAG-Operations coordination.
AAAG communicator maintained contact An was exchanged over this link.
with the utility, but only numerical data There is a need for high-level AAAG personnel t 11
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regularly speak directly to their counterparts se the utility in order to discuss protective action recommendations and the basis for these recom=er" tions and other critical plant data.
This link should not be thrcugh communicators or other non-technically trained persocs.
l A secced problem appeared as the first dose projections ca=e in.
attempted to duplicate the utility's calculations, the hand-held calculats When the 'AAG produced numbers that were higher by a factor of 10.
J The State i==ediate used the terminal link to the University City Science Center computer, whn i
confirmed the utility's calculations.
j A manual calculation then. performed ty the State as a check confirmed that 1
20 minutes.
the computer was correct. This took aoout The reason for the calculator proble= was an error in the progrca which did not calculator programs were provided by the utility's consultant,show u had previously exercised the programs using the sa=ple data provided for thi; and the State.
purpose).
the problem and compensate for it.The State demonstrated resourcefulness in their abi j
Another problem occurred when the utility reported a source term which was considerably higher for iodine than it scenario release information.
should have been, according to the data, both dose calculations agreed atSince the AAAG uses the utility's source ters this point. However, the iodine reler had been over-estimated by at least a f actor of four.
The AAAG quickly notic' a discrepancy in the noble gas to iodine ratio and discussed it with the util1-(not through normal communication channels), but in before the Delaware part of the scenario was over.a corrected value did not cc:.
the State was able to identify this discrepancy.
It was commendable char The end result of this probl was a calculated iodine dose that considerably exceeded what in the scenario. At had been plannec hour, which exceeds the pAGs.10 miles, the iodice dose commitment was over 11 rem per However, the State did notSome protective action was therefore appropria beyond ten milec.
act on this until they were promoted by a rentroller.
the possible need for extending protective actions beyond the 10-=11e boundary.
The high icdine doces would have resulted in potentially high exposures to those evacuees subjected to the plume, even for a short time.
The AAAG recog-nized this, and authorized the use of KI not only for emergency workers and certain institutional 1:ed people (as specified in the plan), but also for
.i nenbers of the general public who, upon arrival at the registration /
decontamination center, were found to have been exposed to the plume this was an appropriate protective action under the circumstances While provision in the plans for distribtuion of KI to the general public.there is no more, the plans indicate that Further-a reserve supply for only 350 people exists.
t it is the State's policy to provide K1 to members of the general public If details of the policy should be addressed in the plan, and an adequate supply
, the maintained.
A deficiency identifi*d during the previous exercise was repeated - f ailure the accident assessment of regarding dose calculation and protective action recommendations. organizatio of this problem was an enercise objective, and Correction the ALAG met with the New Jerse 4
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3ureau of Radiation Protection prior to the exercise to resolve dif ferences ani agree upon a coordination prccedure.
However, no discussion or coordination
.egarding ple=e directioc, dose rates, and protective actions occurred.
4 An other problem involved the transfer of data from the utility.
The forms used by the AAAG for data transfer (Station Status Checklist) do not to the forms used to enter data into the calculator, thereby creating the correspond sibility for errors in the calculations.
'e s-Further, the utility made some y
changes in the data as transmitted - in one case adding a second "ti=e" t..
,, )
form and in other cases changing the units.
he This caused additional confua sc.
ii Finally, the units reported are very confusing.
Ji{
in millirems and are reported in exponential formatDose projections are reported (eg 1.1 E+4 mr).
This is y~
confusing because it requires two decimal point adjustments before a meaningful number is produced.
It is recommended that either the exponential form or the use of millirems be dropped.
It would be preferable to report doses directly in rem or rad for comparison with the PAGs.
.j In summary, the AAAG staff knew their procedures well, demonstrated a shift change, and were competent in their dose assessment calculations.
The AAAG l
high-level staff would benefit j
from direct communication with the utility dose assessment sta.~f.
The = ore serious deficiency in the AAAG performance that j
not remedied unilaterally during play was the failure to extend protective ws:
actions beyond the 10-mile zone.
with New Jersey repeating a previous deficiency.The AAAG also failed to initiate c i
The other problems (failure of the programmable calculators and data exchange forms and units) added to tF general confusion but did not result in major errors.
should be corrected and maintained to assure a similar problem does notThe calculato in the future'.
occur i
j B.
Protective Action Reco=mendations 1
Protective action decisions for plume pathway hazards were reached in three phases, corresponding to changes in conditions.
The first phase was in response to SGS's General Emergency declaration (at 1708, received at the State EOC at 1716).
At that no release in progress, and made no protective action recoceendation. time, the utility r i
[
Director, upon consultation with appropriate staff, decided (at The DErJ 1725) to implement evacuation out approximately t raffic on the Delaware River) and sheltering out to five milesto two miles (which affe
, in three sec~
tors:
The Socchwest, which was directly af f ected, and the two adjacent South southwest and West southwest.
sector;.
3, upon plant conditions rather than a release.This was a good, prudent dec.ision based
{
The second protective action decision occurred about 30 minuter later, follow-ing the utility's report of an uncontrolled release.
.i the decision was made to evacuate out to ten miles in Sectors SouthAt approximately 180 southwest,
, South Southwest, West southwest, and West. This included the affected s ector (SW) and two neighboring sectors on either side.
This decision was made by the Director with AAAG concurrence, and was based upon a utility recommenda-tion rather than an AAAG dose projection.
The recommendation was received directly by the Director, via telephone, from the utility's Response Director.
o 13
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This information was not received by the AAAG through " official" channels.
4 at least O
twenty =inutes later.
It is recommended that, in order to cainca' lj the AAAG's effectiveness in its assigned role of accident assess:ent, the chairman be included in such discussions with high-level utility represent-y atives.
This would allow exchange of information on a more technical level, y
and provide Delaware with greater capability to interpret conditions.
.)
Regardless of the method of notification, this was also an appropriate an?
jj timely decision.
ry d
Sheltering from ten miles out to fifteen miles was the third protective ae-0 decision, made at 2020 hours0.0234 days <br />0.561 hours <br />0.00334 weeks <br />7.6861e-4 months <br />, about ten minutes after the wind had shifted d
towards New Jersey.
This was based on an AAAG recommendation, which in turr j
was prompted by the intervention of the exercise controller.
L1 being somewhat late, there was a misunderstanding between AAAG and DEPO In addition :
i
Operations as to the area affected.
The AAAG identified the affected area the Southwest quadrant (one quarter of the entire 10-mile E?Z).
However, tr i
9 was misinterpreted as the SW sector, and implemented only in that area.
j In order to avoid such problems, a standard designation, preferably the sector s 3 designation =ust be agreed to and used by all parties.
1 Public Alerting and Instruction fj Those activities regarding public alerting and instruction which originated at 2
State EOC occurred smoothly and without t?
probles.
Within 10 minutes of the State' receiving the site area emergency notification, the sirens were sounded (at
.1 1637) and the EBS station, which had been notified at the alert stage, was provided wit.
]
an appropriate emergency message.
An exercise test message was actually broadcas-at 1640.
The Operations Officer dealt ef ficiently with a simulated siren f ailure.
1 by directing a local fire company to perform route alerting.
Additional E3S messages were prepared and forwarded to the E3S station throughor the exercise as warranted by escalation of the emergency classification and chany 4
in protective action.
The message assembly procedure was used and worked ef fectf s ly.
The EBS messages were generally clear and appropriate to the situation, and d
provided adequate instruction.
report, the news releases did notAs discussed in the Media Cancer section of thia provide adequate emergency instruction to the public.
These were not prepared at the EOC, but they were telefaxed for the Director's concurrence. They also were not timely; there was often a significant lag between the evect and the corresponding news release.
i 1
Route alerting was imple=ented to cocify the public of the third phase of protect j
actions (sheltering between 10 and 15 miles f rom SGS), as the affected area, bein:
beyond the 10 mile EPZ, does not have siren coverage.
protective Actions 1
S.'.x access control posts (B12 through 317, inclusive) were established, and de=onstrated in the field, by the Delaware State Police (the field demonstration t.
described in the Field Activities section).
of the SV sector, and thus were consistent These were located along the periphery with the scanario. However, complete coverage of the evacuated area (Sectors S, SSW, SW, JSW, and W) would have require 1
at least 18 periphery locations (39 through 326), plus locations along the sides the W and S sectcrs.
Establishment of these additional locations was not simulate
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nor were they even identified at the EOC.
While it is unreasonable to expect s.
g complete a rield demonstration, the responsible organizations at the State EOC should demonstrate capability by identifying all required access control point locatins, and simulate their establishment by determining the storage locations nd means for delivering the necessary traffic control devices, and by identifying the necessary staf fing resources ceeded to man the posts.
j For the six posts which were activated, good coordination was observed between
- ,i Righway Department and the Delaware State Police (DSP).
Both organizations beger me making preliminary arrangements during the Site Area Emergency phase, and were ready to activate the posts upor. declaration of the General Emergency.
The posts were manned shortly after the general evaccation decision, which occurred at s
approximately 1800.
Although all six posts were identified on maps at the IOC, a
l filling out a message form directing delivery of traffic control devices to the j
location in the field, the Righway Department
~
representative inadvertently omitti post 173 from the list.
This was later discovered by the DSP, and corrected by ~^e Righway Department representative, who ordered the materials delivered to the
'j location.
Unfortunately, this did not occur pric - to the FEMA field observer's visit to post 17B.
Benause of the nature of this mistake, and the fact that it j
corrected, it is not considered a deficiency.
Activation of the Delaware Marine Police (DMP) for alerting and controlling acces.
of marine traf fic on the Delaware River was also prompt.
All units were placed c-standby during the Site Area Emergency, and were ordered to implement 3j evacuation and access control of ~he area within a 2-mile radius of the plant immediately after the first phase protective action decision was made.
DSP requested U.S.
Coast Guard assistance in implementing both this, and the second phase of pro-tective actions.
In response to implementit.g messages inserted by the exercise controller, both DSP and DMP demonstrated very good capability in resolving problens.
spec; I
A deficiency noted in this category was the late activation of the registration /
monitoring center and the American Red Cross Disaster Shelter.
Although these we r claced on standby during the Site Area Emergency, DEPO Operations did not order then activated until 1800, in conjunction with the evacuation decision.
As a re-s ult, these centers were not operational when the evacuees arrived.
The plans specify that these centers be fully activated during the Site Area Emergency.
Although information regarding mobility-impaired persons is maintained by the Counties, the State arranged a very limited demonstration of one mobility-impairs.
individual.
This was ordered shortly after evacuation, at about 1815.
Arrangements for evacuating school children were not 1
hour of evacuation.
cecessary, due to the late The State EOC has very complete information regarding location of dairy f arms, f oc processing plants, water supply intake points and crops, for use in implementing ingestien pathway protective actions.
Although some ingestion pathway decisions were nade by the AAAG, implementation of only one was demonstrated prior to termin-ation of the exercise.
Just prior to the general evacuation, the AAAG recocuendec y
sheltering of livestock out to 5 miles, and placing aninals on stored food.
in concurrence with the evacuation, this area was extended to ten miles within sever:
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The ASC3 was advised c initiate a (simulated) call-out the information was provided to the PIO, who prepared a news r l to far=ers, c e ease.
Radiological Exoosure Control Because it State EOC after the Alert declaration were issued TL0s.is located within th l
j subjected to the plume during the exercise, self-readicg dosi etry and KI were As the ECC was not neither issued nor required.
As noted previously, the air l'iltration s N
would permit continued operation of the f acility during ple=e exposure,ystem, C c.h j
operationa'.
repaired to ensure continuous operational capability.Although not a fact was not be Id, H
Dosimetry and KI are not distributed to field workers from this location agency representatives were well aware of decontamination procedures.
, but e=ergency workers were directed to the decontamination station at All 5
- j
>7 National Guard Armory prior to their returning from the field.
the Paddletown Decisions regarding use of KI were made by the AAAG, and are described in thi I
section under the Accident Assesscent s
heading. The AAAG also made decisions (these requests were triggered by controller-introduced initiati cases, these requests were denied on the basis that s).
In a.
they were not directly relcte to life-saving activities.
)
i Media Relations
' Media relations were the responsibility of the State PIO, operating at j
center.
the State EOC was assigned to act as liaison between the PIO a the media PIO at cations were by way of telephones and two telecopiers.
Co== uni-Director's concurrence, then retu ned. news items prepared by the P!O vere tele delay in releasing the news items, this procedure is importantAlthough the transmission t coordination between the two locations.
in maintaining Recovery and Reentry Recovery and reentry were rot demonstrated as part of this exercise.
Scenario i
The scenario events were adequate to test to respond to a radiological emergency at the capcbility of State level organizati the Introduction, the scenario did not Salem Generating Station. As noted in c
include a demonstration of response cnd recovery.
This was agreed to by FEMA Regions II and III during the scenario d ev e lo pme nt peccedure, in accordance with FEMA National guidance.
to exclude a Health and Medical demonstration of hospital capabili YEMA also agraec contaminated, inj ured patients.
ty to creat included in future demonstrations. Demonstration of both capabilities should be I
i 16
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4 Previous Deficiencies j
Major Deficiency 1.
A reevaluation of the State's communications system has confirmed that adequate alternate or backup communications capability, not commercial telephone lines, exists between the State EOC and all emergenc util an;
]
This deficiency has been corrected.
ocationso Major Deficiency 2.
The revised notification procedure, as described in Delaw Response Improvement Program, was demonstrated during the exercise.
's 1
cedure has simplified notification by largely eliminating the Delaware State F The new F i
as an intermediate link, responsible for relaying the notification messag d
o e
variety of State and County organizations.
]
es to This deficiency has been corrected.No notification problem enced during this exercise.
Major Deficiency 5.a.
methodology for performing.the calculations using the hand-h problem experienced was a program deficiency, and was not l
e This deficiency has been corrected.
related to performance,'
J Major Deficiency 6.
The plan has been revised to include an SOP protective action at for automatic the General Emergency level, as specified in Delaware's Response Improve =ent Program.
plan, as the utility's General Emergency declaration included neither r this information nor a protective action recommendation.
ease 4
sultation with appropriate staff, decided upon and impic=enced a sound andThe conservative course of protective actions conforming with the SCP notifi' cation, and was accompanied by appropriate EBS This was
=ergency This deficiency has been corrected.
o co the publi:
Major Deficiency 7.
magnitude to initiate a demonstration of evacuation and related deficiency has been corrected.
t es.
This Major Deficiency 8.
recovery and reentry operations, in accordance with FEMA Na ca, ability should be demonstrated in future exercises.
nce.
This Minor Deficiency 1.
Federal agencies by notifying them of the emergency and changes successfully recuesting FRMAP assistance, in the form of radiological monit n status, and by teams.
This deficiency has been corrected.
oring Finor Deficiency 5.
exercise controller, adecuately demonstrated the decision process exposure in excess of PAGs for emergency workers.
authorizing This deficiency has been corrected.
Minor Deficiency 6.
of hospital capability for treating injured, contaminated victimsDelaw demonstration should be included in future exercises.
Such a 17
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Miscellaneous Deficiency 1.
The State has hired a full time Communications Offi' and communicctices ecuipment has been consolidated. All systems were =onitored, o
c both incoming and outgoing =essages were properly logged, and incoming =essages were conveyed to the appropriate recipient
..i[
been corrected.
via =essage forms.
This deficiency hau v
(
Miscellaneous Deficiency 2.
The telephone used by the AAAG communicator to recei i
station status reports and protective action recom=encations was equipped with a R
headset, which eliminated interference from background noise. This deficiency hc..
1 been corrected.
- i. ",
N Miscellaneous Deficiency 3.
Sufficient information was obtained by the AAAG com-
,]
municator to complete the Station Status Checklists.
This deficiency has been
]
corrected.
1 a
Miscellaneous Deficiency 4 Neither Operations staff nor AAAG staff were observed j
to provide the County EOCs with information regarding plant conditions or radio-logical release.
This confor:s with Delaware's response, which concluded that the Ccunties have minimal need for detailed radiological assessment.
Furthermore, neither County atte=pted to contact the EOF directly to obtain this information.
l However, observers noted that the Counties do desire such information, anc Kent County was successful in obtaining it via their State ECC liaison.
This deficienc-has been corrected.
Miscellaneous Deficiency 5.
Generally, coordination and information-sharing at t h.
State ECC, both internally, among the staff, and externally, with the Media Cente:
and Counties, was adequate, and an improve =ent over the previous exercise experi-However, there were still some problems, especially in coordinating with Oc-ence.
The following co=r.ents address the specific deficiencies noted previously:
Coordination and information exchange between Operations and the PIO were a.
effectively demonstrated, attributable primarily to the designation of an j
assistant PIO at the State EOC, exclusively responsible for relaying infor-mation between the PIO and the DEPO Director and Operations staff.
Co-ordination and information exchange between Operations and the AAAC was not i
successfully demonstrated, as indicated by AAAG's failure to correct Operation's misinterpretation of the areas affected by a pro':ective action recommendation.
This deficiency has not been adequately add ressed.
b.
An effective and efficient message handling procedure was utilited by the stafi in keeping the Director and others adequately infor:ed of activities and de-velopments.
Both Counties were represented by liaisons at c.
all information.
the State ECC, who had access to d.
Coordination of protective action decisions between Delaware and New Jersey were again deficient.
The DE?O Director did not discuss nor advise the Seu Jersey EOC regarding his protective action decisions even though the phase I two-mile evacuacion included parts of the Delaware River under New Jersey's j urisdict ion.
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a Miscellaneous Deficiency 6.
exercise controller in a manner thatSpecial problem =essages were inserted into play by
~!
This deficiency was corrected.
overly prompting or instructional.
was not Miscellaneous Deficiency 7.
The Lieutenant Governor visited the EOC and was briere-3 on operations. The DEPO Director was also in contact with the Governor's recre-I sectative to advise him of changes in status and response actions.
has been corrected.
This deficienco
- i Miscellaneous Deficiency 10.
The AAAG again failed to coordinate with their count y
O parts in New Jersey regarding dose rates and protective actions, despite the fact that this was a stated objective, and the two groups had agreed upon a procedure prior to the exercise.
This deficiency has cot been corrected.
1 Present Deficiencies / Recommendations, 1.
Initiation of protective actions for areas beyond the 10-mile EP2 were not timely, and were prompted by the intervention of an exercise coctreller i
Both AAAG and DEPO officials should be more cognizant of the possible need i
for extendicg protective actions beyond the IPZ boundary.
2.
A discrepancy between the Operations staff and AAAG in designating affected areas resulted in the third phase of protective actions being implemented only in the Southwest Sector, rather than the Southwest Quadrant, as intended.
A standard designation, preferably the Sector designation, must be agreed to and used by all participants.
3.
Se'veral instances were noted of a lack of coordination or ir_ formation sharing between Operations and AAAG at previously.
the State EOC, repeating a deficiency noted developed and implemented. Procedures for such coordination /information sharing should be 4.
DEPO f ailed to notify or coordinate with the New Jersey EOC regarding protec-tive actions, even though the evacuation area announced by Delaware included portions of the Delaware River within New Jersey's jurisdiction.
This re-peated a previously-identified deficiency.
Procedures for such coordination should be developed, and implemented.
5.
The air filtering system necessary to permit continuous operation of the State EOC during plume exposure was not operational.
The State's reported intention :o repair this system must be carried out continuous operation of the facility.
to assure capability for 6.
The State EOC currently has no showering or decontamination facilities, and limited sleeping space.
Existing plans to add new sleeping space and showers l
should be completed, as this will greatly enhance the EOC's capability for continuous operations.
7 A dedicated telephone line linking the State EOC vich the primary E35 station allowed only one-way call initiation:
)
from the ECC to the station. This
)
line should be converted to allow two-way call initiation, which will provice station personnel vich a prompt and reliable means of contacting the E00.
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The utili:y's Response Direc:or provided to maintain the AAAG's effectivenesvia telephone, directly to th or, recommendation, s in its assigned role of accidentic is recomme
- ment, representatives.the AAAG Chairman be included in su h d in o:
c iscussions with high-level uti.
assese 9.
A defec:
was discovered in the calculator progr p roj ections.
The calculator program should be corree:am used by the AAAG for dosc 10.
orized use of KI for members of the generalBecause of t ed and thoroughly ter oses among evacuees, the AAAG -u.h-ever, there is no provision in the plan fo public exposed to the plume.
indications are that He.-
is intended for emergency workers.the State has a reserve supply for onlr use of KI d
the plan, and an adequate s'upply maint imembers of the ge If it y 330 people, whic the policy should be specified -
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a ned.
11.
The AAAG failed to coordinate or exchang i-despite specific arrangements prior to thcounterparts regardin e exercise to correctotective action considera:1ons, 1,dentified deficiency.
Procedures for such coordination should be dthis previously-implemented.
eveloped an-12.
The Station Status Checklist form used b utility does not In order to reduce the possibility for ecorrespond to the form used to enter recommended that the State and-the utility explore thrrors in transposing the da:a, 1:o the c ing direct compatibili:y between status repor:s and pre possibility of es:ablis~
is 13.
Dose projections 'are reported in millir ogram data requirements.
to convert this data to tem or rad f ens, and in exponential format.
point adjustments are required. In order to reduce the possibility foror compa In or:
it is recommended that the exponential format this is an acceptable number for a fi lSix access control posts and/or use of milli-units be dro; 14
- error,
.ed.
e e d demonstration, it was notand demonstrated provide complete coverage of the entire e While it is recommended that EOC personnel make vacuated area.
sufficient and simulate the establishment of all n the necessary arrangements to idFor future exer ecessary access 15.
enti-The plans specify that control posts.
ter(s) be activated during the Site Athe registration / monitoring center (s)
[
not activate them until the evacuation de irea Emergency phase.
and disaster shei utes after they received notification of thc sion was implemented, abou: DEPO Operations the centers were not should develop and implementfully operational when the evacuees arrie General Emer 45 min-As a result,
specified in the plans.
procedures to assure activation of the cente ved.
The State 16.
When Kent rs as includinz :he Ken: County EOC personnel attempted to con:act EOC switchboard.
County liaison, calls were often notSta:e ECC personnel, problen resolved. The nature of this difficulty should bcompleted past the 5:cc-e determined, and the 20 t
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E3S Station The CPCS-1 station is WDEL in Wil=ington.
Notification from both SGS and the State IOC is via a dedicated ring-down circuit.
Backup circuits are provided by the remote pick-up units (RPUs) and amateur radio net.
.1 the dedicatad ring-down line appears in the master control room at WDEL d
, which i manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. The R?U link appears in both the chief engineer's office j
the news room.
.nd The ESS message from the State EOC was received by the CPCS-1 71 station and aired within two minutes.
Stations within the State that are require:
'/
to monitor the CPCS-1 station did so and rebroadcasted the E3S =essage within fice j
minutes of receipt.
Overall the EDS in Delaware worked very well.
-1 4
The C?CS-1 station does not have a backup means of communications to the Salem j
County EOC. The station engiceer has attempted to get an RFU link established between the station and the EOC in Salem but so f ar has been unable to do so.
j The dedicated rieg-down line betseen the Delaware State EOC and the station can only M
be rung by the EOC.
This line should have capability for two-way call initiation.
']
The station could have the need to contact have to do so using a dial phone.
the.EOC to confirm a cessage and would 1
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Salem EOF
- o g
Activation and Staffing e3 f2 The State's EOF representative is a DEPO employee who is normally on duty at the
'j State IOC during working hours (as was the case when the exercise commenced).
- j Mobilization occurred upon activation of the EOC,'at the Alert stage. The? rep-
@g-resentative arrived at the EOF at 1630 hours0.0189 days <br />0.453 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.20215e-4 months <br />, approximately 30 micutes 'priot to its activation.
Transit time was one hour. Mobilization from home during non-Ji working hours is activated by a telephone calldown list.
@1:
In accordance with the plan, there was.only one Delaware representative at d,
the J
EOF.
Normal channels of communicating data from the EOF co ' the EOC utilize i[i utility personnel to transmit data.- The DEPO representative demonstrated ade-quate knowledge of plant status boards and relationships within the EOF from which he could independently verify that accurate data was transmitted.
y At j
f-times during the exercise, he expressed concern to the utility Recovery, Services-y
~
Mana5er (RSM) and staff about the legibility anc timelicess of data being trans-2 mitted.
These concerns were recognized and addressed by the appropriate staff 3
members.
His ability to verify da a points was only used sporadically by the AAAG..
^j Backup staffing was not present during the exercise, but capability for added 4
staff was demonstrated by provision of a staffing list from the SOP for critical d
s taff positions.
The individuals named are knowledgeable and capable of render-
]
ing appropriate services.
?
3 Tacilities s
3 The utility's EOF is an all-weather facility, vich adequate dedicated space for che Lelaware representative to perform his duties.
i Storage space was availaole
~
for additional =aterials.
Free access to all areas of the facility was provided.
A conference room was utilized for executive staff briefings, and the Delawara
)
t representative was specifically invited to participate.
1 x
Communications a
Communications between the utility and the EOC were by a dedicated telephone line.. The EOF representative had access to a commercial telephone line set aside for his use.
Additional cocaunications available were the National Warn-ing System (NAWAS) and the New Jersey Emergency Radio (EMRAD) Network which has 1
been extended to the Delaware EOC.
3 Also available was a pickup and ring emer-gency line to DEP0/ Delaware State Police.
Conferencing was available on the emergency line but was not used.
No com=unications were made between the EOF representative and the Delaware media center.
One of the responsibilities o f the representative is coordination with the State of New Jersey's EOF personnel.
This was not demonstrated at the EOF; little, if any, information gathered in-dependently by the two staffs was shared.
Informacienal Functions I
i According to the olan, the EOF representative is a liaison for the A.AAG ex:1_3tve; He is not responsible for performing informational functions, including clearing 3
i d
1 22 I
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j news releases or coordinating with the State P!9.
During the exercisa, the I??
,j representative was provided with copies of the utility's press releases, and was l
'*j advised of press briefings.
He participated in one briefing and responded to 6,5 media inquiries concerning Delaware actions. As he is not specifically author-4 ized to speak for the State, such inquiries should be referred to the Delaware
)
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/7 Si Rumor Control I
c q?
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?.j Rumor control was not provided by the State of Delaware at the EOF.
Q kl Dose Assessment and Protective Action Demonstration j
1 :.
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Mi These activities are not performed at the EOC by the State of Delaware.
d No discussion concerning the use of KI was conducted between the EOF represent-I '. D, ative and utility personnel.
..i m
Protective action recom=endations were discussed in briefings, and were coccuni-4
?$
cated to the EOC by both utility and the State liaison representative.
Co-l i,]
ordination with New Jersey was not demonstrated here, although both States had I
()
individuals at the briefings.
,. )$.
.}i Scenario IN The scenario provided adequate opportunities to, demonstrate the capability of the
'g Stats liaison representative. The release time within the scenario provided i
lj adequate dose commitments, although the windspeed was low, causing a long lead G
tine prior to field verification of projections.
l 1 Previous Deficiencies 1
1 The AAA0 has improved th'e technical abilities at the EOF by replacing the non-c'echnical person with a rember of the DEPO staff.
The individual demonstrated an adequate basic knowledge of power plant conditions so as to be able to interpret data available at the E0i and tequest appropriate information from the utility staff which may not be readily available, but of importance to the State person-7 nel.
Alternate EOF staffing is indicated within the SOPS to provide extended l
coverage if and when needed.
This deficiency has been corrected.
l Present Deficiencies / Recommendations 17.
The EOF representative does not have sufficient access to information to respond to media inquiries concerning Delaware resoonse activities.
Such inquiries should be referred to the Delaware PIO.
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Mass Care
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.s t ra tion and M ni:o rin2
,q'I Evacuee regis::a:1ce and moni:oring took place at the 5:a:e Police Academy in j
jj Dover, Delaware.
Na:ional Guard personnel, responsible for meci:oring, arrived rj to open the center at 1710 hours0.0198 days <br />0.475 hours <br />0.00283 weeks <br />6.50655e-4 months <br />.
They proceeded to set up signs directing f?
evacuees where to go and what to do with vehicles.
P At 1755 a bus picked up 15 evacuees in Odessa, Delaware.
The bus driver.did no:
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have dosimetry. The evacuees were transported to the registration center and 33' arrived there a: 1835.
9 b
Sj The registration center was not completely staffed when the evacuees arrived q
(this deficiency is included in the State EOC section).
Separate areas for j!
contaminated and non-con aminated evacuees were no: marked (they were directed :o FU, separate sides of the room).
Protective noverings were not'placed on the floors; C,j monitors were told to check the floors for' contamination after they finished U
monitoring the evacuees.
If the floors were contaminated, they were :ci oe fy scrubbed down with mops and : hen the water was to be diluted.
!b D)3 Initially, cce monitoring :eam was available to monitor evacuees.
Procedures
?
outlined in SOP 402, Radiological Monitoring of Evacuees, were not followed: the d
equipment probe was not covered, bottoms of feet were not menitored, and thyroids j1 were not checked. Additional training in this area is needed. About 15 minutes j
af ter the arrival of evacuees, a Civil Air Patrol troop came into the center.
]y They were equipped with enough monitoring equipment to se: up two additional teams and were quickly put in:o service by the National Guard. The CAP personnel Q
were well trained and knew the SOPS.
After their arrival monitoring of the Ni evacuees proceeded rapidly.
Contaminated individuals were sent to a registra: ion l]
desk on one side of the room and non-contaminated to the other side.
Thirty.
- }
evaucees were meni:ored and registered.
I Decontamination
+
,j National Guard personnel escorted contaminated evacuees to the shower area, which
[l was well marked with signs.
Separate shower areas for een and women were avail-A able.
Clothing was reques:cd from the Salvation Army and arrived approximately y
20 minutes after requested.
The decontamination center is physically separaced Ji from the Disas:er Shelter.
As the paper clothing provided would not be suitable i
to transport evacuees to the Disaster Shelter it is recommended that more sub-i stantial clothing be made available for evacuees.
Af ter decontamination, evacuees were checked again and then sent out a separate exi: to the evacuacion bus.
n' 4
^
There was a delay upon arrival at the Disaster Shelter, which was established at the Dover Middle School; a high school band concert was being performed at' the time.
It took approximately 30 minutes'to locate the area where the Disaster Shelter was se: up.
Additional pre-planning could eliminate this type of confusion.
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i Reloca: ion Cen:er 1
t The following or;ani:a:1ons were represen:ed at the Dover Middle School Disas:er Shel:er:
American Red Cross ( ARC), S: ate Child Protective Services, Board of Educa: ion, Red Cross yirs: Aid Teams, Radiological Mccitors, and the Sta:e Oe-partment of Public Health.
Initial notification was made :o the Red Cross
,y Chapter in Wilmington by Red Cross representatives in the State EOC.
N The Wilmington Chapter then notified the local Chapter to stand by at 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br />.
1820 they were instructed to activate the Disaster Shel:er.
The other agencies sj present were notified by their respective co-workers in the Sta:e ECC at jj Del awat City.
The staff preses.t in the Shelter were sufficient 1
They had the background, training and equipment to handle the emergency.
necessary to perform their j
emergency functions.
Twenty-four hour manning was demons: rated by shif t changes y
and by double manning.
j Another nonitoring point was established at the entracce to the Disaster Shel:er i
for evacuees who did not go to the registration center.
If evacuees were found A
to be contaminated they would be sent to the Middletown Armory for decontamination, 1
In order to save time it might be more appropria:e to send the evacuees to the registration center at the State Police Academy.
I4 t
Congre2 ate Care i
1
'(
The Disaster Shelter is located approximately 19 miles outside the 10 mile EPZ and can f eed 1000 and sleep 500 individuals.
In the event that shelter capacity is exceeded, 10 additional schools are available.
Sufficient toilet, shower facilities, secure storage and parking are available.
)
l e 2nough food supplies were available to feed 300 people for a week.
Additional 4
supplies, as needed, sould be requested from ARC Chapter Headquarters and USDA.
The school is equ.pged with handicapped f acilities.
A nursing station was established and manned by Department of Health and Red Cross personnel.
The school oublic address system would be used to keep evacuees informed abou:
conditions in the affec:ed area.
Registration cards were checked at the door, Com=unica:1ons i
Primary cocaunications between the shelter and the State IOC was by means of the Red Cross radio net.
Backup communications were available using the amateur radio and Civil Air Patrol nets.
No forms were available for personnel being sheltered who may have wanted to ge:
a message out to relatives.
Previous Deficiencies l
l Minor Deficiency 4.b.
All Red Cross emergency workers were equipped with the procer dosime:ers and dose record forms, and were instructed to read the dosi-j me:ers and record these readings every 15 minutes.
They were further instrue:ed to report to the Middletown Armory for moni:oring and decontamination, if necessary, upon costletion of their assignmen:s.
This deficiency has been corrected.
1 25
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1 Miscellaneous teficiency 11.
The Disas:er Shel:er at Cover Middle School was s taf f ed in accordance w1:h the S:a:e ?lan.
The Red Cross reoresen:ative was effec:ively in con:rol of :he manageren: of the shel:er.
Staff =e: bars were provided by the S: ate repar::en: of Social Services, Superintendent of Schools, and S: ate Child Protec:ive Services. This deficiency has beec adequately d
corrected.
Miscellaneous Deficiency 12.
The Red Cross procedures observed were in con-j formance with the revised State plan, as described in the Delaware Response ij Improvement Progrs=.
This deficiency has been correc:ed.
a Presen: Deficiencies /Recom=enda:1ons i
18.
Radiological monitors were not adequately f aciliar with procedures.
Addi-
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tional training in this area is needed.
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- .q Media Center t
h Activation and Staffing Activation of the Media Center (referred to by the State as the Emergency Sews Center) occurred, as specified in the plans, upon declaration of the alert stage.
a At that time, the DEPO Public Information Officer relocated from the State IOC to m
the media center.
j
.. f Using the resources of Del =arva Power and Light's Corporate Cecmunications De-d partment, the State PIO organized an emergency response cea= in two shifts.
.Ji Members of this team had sole responsibility to maintain liaison with each of the f5 following, exclusively:
Kent County EOC, New Castle County ECC, Sales Generating j
Station, and New Jersey Office of Emergency Management. Another staff member was assigned to ru=or control, and the PIO =aintained contact with the State EOC.
I j
As DP&L headquarters is located across the street from the media center, the en-1 tire team was present only minutes after activation.
Capability for a secend
.]
shift was de.sonstrated by presentation of a roster. The second shift was on call
]
and there were provisions for telephone activation during off-hours.
1 44 The team members are professionally trained in coe=unications, and were therefore
-]
readily able to assume their duties.
Each team included a typist for handling 1
j clerical assignments.
3, Facilities 9
j The facilities for the =edia center are excellent.
The operations room is located
.i on the eleventh floor, one floor below the Governor's office, in the State Exec-Il utive Office Building, and provided excellent security and well-appointed working
)j conditions. An e ergency diesel generator was available for backup power.
1 News conferences were conducted in the auditorium, located on the second floor.
This was also an excellent facility, capable of accommodating 300 people. As this room is used for legislative hearings, it was complete with all audio-visual, j
graphic and video capabilities. There was also an exclusive restricted elevator for the Governor to use if he wished to speak at news briefings.
y A
Co==unications
- )
Both primary and secondary communications links were demonstrated between the media center and the EOF, Delaware and New Jersey State EOCs, and the County EOCs.
The primary connunications link was dedicated phone lines, with commercial phones
- .3 and ham radio providing backup.
In addition, the media center has access to the Governor's communications network as a backup.
Hard-copy transmission capability, via telecopiers using dedicated lines, was C
established to the State EOC, the County EOCs, ard the utility.
Conferecce capability between any three stations (the Media Center and any two others) was also available.
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The Media Center was notified of significant events as follows:
alert status, 1523 hours0.0176 days <br />0.423 hours <br />0.00252 weeks <br />5.795015e-4 months <br />; site area e:ergency status, l.
hours; public advised to take shelter, 1634 hours0.0189 days <br />0.454 hours <br />0.0027 weeks <br />6.21737e-4 months <br />; general emergency status.
0~
1810 hours0.0209 days <br />0.503 hours <br />0.00299 weeks <br />6.88705e-4 months <br />.
1717 hours0.0199 days <br />0.477 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.533185e-4 months <br />; public advised to evacuate, 3
Informational Functions Prior to the exercise, y
materials were developed to inform the public aboutthe State sponsored a nuclear-awa
.f Collace:='
j nuclear energy and the Saler Generating Station.
The 1983 public infor=ation brochure, which reportedly had been prepa j
1 yet been distributed, nor was it available to observers at the exercise., had not
.n!!
The PIO had prepared a very good press kit, which contained complete background
~;
information.
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One briefing was held, at Unfortunately, there was no interest 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />, and was attended by the Gover y
Secretary.
i by the media at this location, and no media representatives attended the briefing.
I between the various locations.The public information liaison demonstrated adequate e j
prior to release, the news ice =s prepared by the PIO vere telefaxe
]
procedure:
to the Scace EOC for the DEPO Director's concurrence j
Although this was a good procedure for establishing the nacessary coordi, and then telefaxed some unavoidable delay resulted (as explained in the next
- nation, 3
delay was avoidable, and could be eliminated by the use of pre-scripted ins section, cuch of the l
tional messages).
truc-Public Instruction i
3oth preparation and distribution of e=ergency public instructions occurr d i
the Media Center.
Following approval of news releases, the e at was very efficient Media center staff in distributing the information.
however, did not provide a suffi ient The news releases thenselves, instructions to the public.
level of detail in explaining emergency The PIO made a point of totally abstaining from the use of pre-scripted inst tional messages, instead drafting all news releases in the ori i ruc-use of such messages during the previous exercise. reportedly was the resu g nal.
This Exercise Assessment,
These co: cents, contained in the Post use of presceipted messages, per se.were mistakenly perceived as a condemnation of the ing protective actions was omitted.
As a result, much vital information regard-For example, the news release announcing evacuation did not take; instructions for people withoutprovide sufficient detail as to items evacuees were and not hoc respiratory protection.for handicapped or mobility-impaired people; or descriptions Ironically, f ollowing the 1982 exercise, the plans were anended to include a Standard Operating Procedure (SCP 502) for the PIO, which sets forth news rel ease 28 y y;T % : f } Q y M,T W W T '
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procedure and content, and includes pre-scripted infor:ational =essages keyed et
.j the various energency classifications and protective action options.
Confor=ane.
with this SOP in the future will not only assure more cceplete public infornacim.
but will also eliminate a great deal of the delay experienced in releasing the information.
Rumor Control 3
~j Capability for rumor control was well de=onstrated by activating and publici:i:
g several rumor control numbers, including one coll-free.
The person assigned cc i
lj rumor control was a part-cise radio announcer whose calm, well-intoned voice wa:
y ideal for such a position.
Eight calls were received on the rumor control lin:
4 during the exercise.
Scenario
.+
3 The scenario provided an adequate basis for testing the Media Center and PIO capability, to the extent possible in a simulated emergency.
'2 Previous Deficiencies
- )
Maj or Deficiency 3.
The State Media Center was fully de=ons trat.ed at this exer-
.x!.i cise, and found to be an excellent facility.
This deficiency has been corrected.
ia l
Maj or Deficiency 4.
The State REP plan was amended to include a PIO Standard Operating Procedure (SOP 502), as described in the Delaware P.esponse. Improve =ent J
Program. Coordination between the State PIO and his counterparts at other j uris-l i!,!
dictio'ns and organizations occurred as intended, and was adequate.
This deficienc-has been corrected.
.i l '
Present D2ficiencies/Reco==endations l
'i1 19.
The PIO did not make use of the prescripted news releases keyed to the variout l
e=ergency events, as contained in 50? 502.
As a result, the exercise news j-releases did not provide sufficiently detailed emergency instructions for tne l
public, and the time required for drafting original news ite=s added signifi-cantly to delaying their release.
Use of the prescripted =essages will both save time, and provide more complete instructions.
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u Field Activities i
Traffic and Access Control k
A limited field denenstration of access control was perfor:ed b a
Police (DSP) and Delaware Department y Delaware State
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of Transportation (DOT).
Six access'contrr vere consistent with the scenario. posts on the EPZ boundary were establis{
ations All were visited by the Federal observers.
(
The six DSP officers involved had assembled at hours to standby. They were dispatched at 1815, about 15 minutes after the Odessa barracks about 1500
)
)
cile evacuation had been ordered.
each case, the officers had high and low range self-reading dosimeter Ir dose record forms, and KI, and had received full instructions on th, TLDs,
)
raase devices.
e use of All'were clearly aware of their function at i
posts.
the access control decontamination center to which evacuees should be directedH i
livered a stack of cones to each of the sites, except for post The DOT had de-i aarlier in the exercise.
173, someti=e to deliver cones to Post There were no signs of any sort, however (the f ailure I
173 is discussed in the Delaware EDC section).
l j
_Special Evacuation Problems A very limited de:onstration was coeducted of the evacuation of a l
1mpaired resident.
single mobility-Fire Station to.the Middletown Arsory.The individual was transported by ambu althcugh the arrival of the asbalance at the Armory was verified latThis dem i
conduct of the demonstration cannet be evaluated.
er.
The handicapped pipson to the Armory is questionable.
However, the transfer of the i
the Armory is intended "or emergency workers, not The decontamination center at ties Ior handling the handicapped ars the general public.
No facili-i the processing and deconcemination of evacueesreadily available.
The plan provides for including handicapped, at the registration / decontamination centers.
Route Alertinz de=orstration cf route alerting if ordered to do so.The Townsen o perform a observers during the course of the exercise.
Both were visited by Federai At Odessa, or.ly high-range self-reading dosimeters were available KI.
Route caps were available fue cach of the 6 teams, but
, along with message.
Since cae Federal observera ' Anew that Cdessa would not not a prescripted l
f orm the route a.'.erting, they did not remain to observe full activati actually per-teams.
on of the t
l The Townsend Fire Company has a special locke-for radiological equi it are kept bagged for each route alerting crew. kits of dosimetry, KI, respiratory protection pment.
In
, neatly No prescripted messages were available,.butSurveySceters are also available locker.
advised the First Assistant Chief the Federal obairvers that l
on radios.
the crews would broadcast a
w.ge to turn l
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Thefirebrati4.receivedno:
i-1ficatiot of alert et 1550.
rowever, in cecordance' i j, with thej,phe, grews do not actually report totkatationuntilsiteemergency3 i
/
2n.4e;the E?3 airens sounded at 1637, the Assistrat,5;hief also sounded his fire 2,'
aler'lI siren. ' Firemen began arrivdg withi,n ginutes.
a "i
The Assistant Chief brie 9t d o crews on what was happening and explained the.desimetars.
i fire company received a message from the fire' bganf to run the " yellow" At a bo ut 1645, the,'
' because a particular siren had failed.
route Thi crem co actually danonstrate that 1
e' route were giren totoed dosimetersl peeren' crew lefg ththfire station atand dose recor'd forms were cc:ap'.eted.
The :
t j-1700g began the route at 1705, and comp? ate:.
l the rdute at'1S % - We Federal observers followed the ale d vehicle, which j
( y travci'nd at a)o c. 20 nyh while passic.g hoctes - a bit fast.* Thrxefore, the route,
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would probat,17 pke L d? hours or more if iuc as a more hppr driate' speed of 15 l
p m >h Af ter cor.plati n of r.he routeg the ter:t traveled on to the Middletown 3:)
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Ardory f ot cultoring ' and, if > r.vcess'ary, ~ decontamination.
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The " yellow" toute which was demonstrated covers many =11es, as do al? 5 other
/
, routes in the Townsend Distrier., The area covered ay each route incluces =any strens.
If the pur;ne of the tuu::e alert is simply'to promptly notify resicehts q
in an area whe:4 g seien f ailed, there is no need to cover many square elles over e perted of hourti keyed to areas of si,icific siren coverage.I:. would bd much more efficient to hav
)s the area where the oirens were not This voulu insure chat res1d nts in d(
so.ci point on a 1 to 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> long routhc';.dible could be alerted promptly, rt.cher than at Of course, short routes could alwaya be cambinec into longer routes, should mot e extensiae EPZ coverage be desired.
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Previous Deficiencies
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4 4
Minor' Deficiency 3.
sisted of establishing six posts, twice the number adThe field demonstration in the previous exe.reise, This was a more realistic demonstration, a s both the timing ald s j
i d
locations were consistent with scenario events. This deficiency has been corraeted.
esent Deficie ncies / Re co:=.end a tiew Qs 20.
Some officers =anning acco.ss control points were uncertain' ed where to direct
~ '
All officers invcived in access control should be instructed where cvacum s.
s U
to diiect evacuees for deconttsination and registration.
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l 21.
It af fd contrtl devices at access control postsicon'sisted only of cones.
f, addition, it is suggested that " Road Closed" signs be provided.
In N
q 22.
Evacuation of one mobilicy-i= paired person was demonstrated.
C The individual was taken to the emergency worker decontamination center.
The plan provides for the processing of evacuees, including handicapped, at the registration /
decontamination centers.
This procedure should be demonstrated in future
\\,
^
exercises.
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23.
To insure accuracy and ' consistency, written, prescripted messages shculd be provided to all fire cotpanies in the TPZ acc'sesequently to $4ch cot.tg i
alerting team.
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Ly f-24 li Rou:es for aler:ing shoulet be reviewed to de:ernine if a larger nu ber of L,'
shor:er rou:es would provide more.ptc=p:, efficien: alerting of residen:s in l
specific areat here sirens have failed.
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- i. t O
Radiological Field Monitoring Tea:s Red Team Mobilization Mobill:ation
. observed from the Division of Ecviron= ental Control's Wil=ingte Lab.
The notification call was verified by the DEC supervisor.
Both red and blue teams were called by telephone and given available plant a
and weather con-y ditions. At this time they were also told to prepare to leave for a field trip.
Eculocent 1
A check list was used in aquipment check-out. All items were located.
Equipment i
checks were completed on field survey instruments, and all were found ' to be functioning properly.
Although an alpha detector was available, it was thought
.i to be necessary for this trip.
not taken as this is done by other teams.No soil and vegetation sampling kits were l 0 715) did not have a calibration sticker.Two survey instruments (CDV-700 and CDV-Mos't of the equipment was stored in two cases and ready to be loaded in a timely fashion.
and seemed quite familiar with the equipment.
Team members worked quickly y
Technical Operations
- 1 Team members were generally very competent in the use of all field equipment.
Two minor exceptions were noted, however.
First, the C.M. probe taped to the truck',s rear view mirror was in the open position purposely.
and risks a broken probe from a rock or tree branch, and the SOP instructs thatThis is unn l
l it be closed during transit.
was made to determine whether itSecond, when the plume was encountered no attempt was at ground level or overhead. This may be determined by comparing raading, with both open and closed probe.
(
Co =unicatio7s Radio co==unications were perfor ed at sed in a professional manner.
appropriate intervals, without problems Exoosure Control All necessary ite=s needed for exposure control were available and team members
~
demonstrated adequate knowledge of when and where to use them.
l Self-reading dosi=ecers were monitored during the exercise.
According to the plan, a 0-200 R dosimater is not required in their inventory.
The proper handling of posstoly contaminated items was de=onstrated.
A final check at the e=ergency worker de-contamination center was completed.
Scenario i
The scenario was adequate to demonstrate the readiness of the field teams.
33
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.::s Blue Teas Ac:ual observation of blue reas activities did not begin until approximately 207 l
hours.
Se:veen this time and the ti e field ac 1vities were ter=inated (approx _
mately 30 =inutes) only consucications to relocate were observed. However, c:her consunications be:veen blue cess and the State EOC were overheard during the red team observation, and were performed co=peten:1y.
i 4
Previous Deficiencies Minor Deficiency 4.a.
As explained in the Delaware Response Improvement Progra the SOP for air monitoring teams requires that initial dosimeter readings are l,
logged prior to the field. trip and again upon completion of the field trip a: th-
- 1. i decontamination center. Tea = members are required to periodically check their l
dos 1=e:ers, but are not required to fill out record fo rms.
Supervisors at the
's' AAAG are kept informed of the dose rate levels encountered and approximate stay i
ti=es.
These p;ocedures were demonstrated. This deficiency has been corrected.
I i Present Deficiencies /Reco==endations 25.
The radiological field moni:roing teas, while traveling vich the G.M. probe
,j coun:ed outside their vehicle, deliberately left the probe in the open
.i position. The 50? instrue:1ons, which specify that the probe be closed I
during transit, should be followed to avoid subj ecting the probe unnecessarily l
to breakage.
t 26.
The radiological field monitoring ea= did not attempt to deter =1ne the elevation of the plu=e.
It is recommended that this be de:ersined by co -
paring readings with both open and closed probe.
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milk and water sa=ples.The Depart =ent of Public Health (DPH) is r Notification of DPR headquarters in Doveresponsible for ing to plan.
The tall was performed by DEPO staff at after receipt of the Alert notification occurred accord-the State Eoc at 1530 short demonstrated, due to repositioning.
Focification of team members was n,ot were made for the sampling teams to report ata second sh ng team me:bers), arrangements notification.
There is, however, a call-down systa= to notify 1430, an hour p time.
tea: = embers at an-Prior to their deploy =ent at they were not provided with information r193 and responsibilities, but rent plant conditions, current meteorological conditi procedures procedures, as specified in the SOPS.
egarding cur-ons or exposure control Field Tear jouiement l
The teams had equipment equpiment checklists, but they were not specified in the plan.
700, Eberline Ro-2, and a CDV 715. SOP 401 lists three survey instruments: supp check of the calibration stickers showed thatadequate eq The team had only the CDV 700.
a CDV The teams had mples, and suitable vehicles.
time fra:es.
the equipment was within calibration A
Field Team Technical Coeration Written SOPS were followed for the set collecting samples. team ce=bers demonstrated adequate capabiliup and operatio and the Team members were familiar with the area and h dty for op locating the sampling points.
and a
no problems Reld Team Communications Contact with the AAAG at No communications problems were notedthe State E00 was maintained radio.
the exercise, via
)xoosure Control All aspects of exposure control were adequat equipped with full anti-contamination suits a.
ely de=onstrated.
Team = embers were with procedures for the use of KI, recording dKI, and dosimetry, and were faciliar dose, and deconta=1 nation procedures.
osi=eter readings, maxi =um allowable Previous Deficiencies buscellaneous Deficiency 9 - Sampling teams deficiecey has been corrected.AAAG, and sampling procedures were de a
a ed as specified in the SOPS.
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present Deficiencies /Recom=endations 27.
Sampling team cembers were pre-positioned, arriving at the DPH assembly location an hour before DPH was notified of the emergency.
Fu:ure exercises should demonstrate the notification and mobili:stica procedure for team
- members, 1
28.
Sampling team members were not properly briefed prior to their departure to the field.
Information regarding plaat status, type of releases and meteorological conditions, as specified in the 200 Series SOPS, should be provided before teams are fielded.
}
29.
The entire assortment of monitoring equipment listed in the SOP was not supolied to the sampling teams. The equipment needs of the tes=s should be reviewed, and equipeent inventory and/or SOP lists should be modified accordingly.
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Deconta:1 cation for I=ergency Workers
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A decontamination center for emergency workers was set personnel at the Middletown Armory.
The center manager works at the ar=ory, and up by National Guard' was at the facility when DI?O called to activate the center at manager called in his staff and the center was fully operational by 1800 1645 hours0.019 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.259225e-4 months <br />.
The first e=ergency workers arrived a few nicutes later.
,a The z.j' Fifteen National Guardsmen were on hand to operate the center.
after 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />.
The medical officer did not 1
vehicles and personnel were wearing protective clothing and arrive until ll 3
The center operation was quite realistic and conducted is accordance with monitoring procedures.
ment vehicles were pr icessed.During the Federal observers' visit, 4
proper i
several fire depart-Occu, ants were monitored, also.They were carefully and thoroughly co inside and out.
be " contaminated" and isolated in a wash area.Several vehicles were found to thoroughly monitored and walked through a simulated showering pro" Contamina clothing were available. contaminated clothing, cleaning materials (soap, brushe cess.
Bags for All conitoring personnel were familiar with their duties and properW procedures.
Dosimeters were checked and dose records completed and file onitoring passing through the center, contaminated or not.
persons Replacement per= acent clothing was not available, however.
t The ability of the center staff to monitor and decontaminate emerg was very well demonstrated.
ency workers Present Deficiencies /p.ecc=cendations 30.
The medical officer did not arrive at center until more than two hours after its activation.the emergency worker decontam available at the decontamination center throughout its operationA doctor should be 31.
The only replacement clothing available at center were disposable paper hospital gowns.the energancy worker decontamination Decontaminated individuals cannot should they stay atbe expected to laave the centar wearing such flimsy clothing the center indefinitely.
, nor provide more substantial replacement clothing,The State should arrange to l
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't County Lccations and Ac:ivi:1es Kent County ECC Activation and Staffing Station (SGS).The County is furnished with a dedi munications Center (ECC) which is loThe line is located in the State P However, as specified in the RIP placa:ed in a room adjacectce-operated E=erg a ng
- Alert, 1509, 1530 and 1637 respectivelyand Site Area E=ergency to the County EOC.
at Notice of General Energency was re rom DEPO.
, and were verified by voice recognitionThese dedicated line at ceived directly from the utility on the ECC 1732, 24 Director and deputy director were minutes af ter its declaration start of the exercise.
at 1708.
A Civil Air Patrol officer, who cainton duty during board during the exercise, and thre the the Cout:y plan, the fire com1420 when the observer arrived ate at the EOC.
pany representative, a County public hThe additio place by 1730.and several other con =unications perso s :1oned during the exercise.No members of the County levy courtnnel and a County she were presen:
n a: the EOC j
The staff did not double staffing roster.see sections below for details].in all areas Round-the-clock staffing was demons: training director during a prolon:;ed emerg, the deputy director However a
and experience to fulfill a director' rated by a demonstrate sufficient, who would relieve ency, did not s responsibilities.
knowladge A County liaison was dispatched t Doerati,ons Management o the State EOC in Delsware City.
Emergency The County Directer vas in charge plan.
status board, which was actually usedInformation was com=un as a =essage log, and by informal en e Coun:y one conversations between the coordi briefings were conducted nator and individual staff members i
~
Messages case from severa.
Message handling was not e-:o-l different the EOC and from the ECC.
i.e. f'om telephones and r disufficie sources system was cet in effect.
The ICC is notAn EOC message cen,ter was in oper ti r
of this lack of controlExercise =essages in and out of the ECC a o in a on, but may have suffered in coordination a uniform 5
Copies of messages were.
No l
uniform message numbering system was in followed for routing from various m piled in various locations.
3, use effect.
to the message center and to th There was no set e status board.essage generating points, including th procedure trained in the use of the EOC's e ECC,
'.g ECC personnel were obviously not not use the forms according to their fmessage forms.
9 For that matter EOC personnel did o rma t.
Access to the EOC was c0ntrolled b i
n list and who demanded identification of pery the deputy sheriff who maintained a p,m sons seeking access.
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The Coun:y received timely notic:
notice of General Emergency ucs to:and a propria e explanatory inform 1732.
- irely, rea E=ergency.
line froc SOS a:
from the County's State EOC liaison advised of thThis was 24 mi b
phone Subsequen: calls handling of this information, i.e. failure to reciden:1fied the affe rection.
The County's =is-use of ter=inology and incorrect pos:ing of data ognize inconsistencies, incorrec-attention to, or a misunderstanding of, the informati, revealed either a lack of have an impact on response activities, howeveron being provided. This did not was within Kent Co un ty.
as none of the area affected A similar probles occurred upon the County's notifi protec:ive actions, which was evacua:1on to 10 =1les ication of the second phase of and S.
SSW, and S [ sic}.The County, however, listed the sectors on the stn see: ors W, WSW
- WSW, unquestioned through the exercise.These see: ors were listed on the status board and ratus bo e:sinec Parts of the S and SSE sectors of the EyZ affe :
sec:Or was not included in the protectiv c Kr.n t County.
Although :he SSE mistakenly implemen:ed evacuation of the sector whene action notice from DE?O, County o there.
This was not the result of a conscious decision, such as to include thethey orde sector as a precau:ionary =easure, it was simply car i d of even:s.
along with the comentum re A =essage received at action, recor:ed as sheltering in the SW sector 2022 notified the County of the thi
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the SW sector, officials took no action o ective As the County 10 large parts of Kent County.sec:1on of this recore, the intended area wasHoweve not IOC the SW quadran:, which does include Facilities There are adequa:e fac111:1es at the EOC and at ter adjacent to the E00.
At tices noise in the ECC was distrac ing c i lthe Emergency Co of inccming traffic on the several amateur radios in u a n y becaus.3 se.
The sta:uc board was not used as a status board b i
cessa2e that The board reached fros ceiling to floor and was cocame into tne ECC vas re Every ut horizontal lines.
e status board.
As a resul:
vered with closely-spaced therefore somewhat difficult messages were written in a small script and were
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to read.
Maps of the EPZ, evacuation routes, access and tr ffi coints and decon:a:ination and relocation centers we c con:rol points, conitoring a
re posted.
_Co munications The pri:ary commercial telephone wi:h emergenc'. can:agementeans of co==unications vi h th
- polics, ICCs was by and acateur radio nets as backup.
radio (EF. RAD), DE!.WAS, fire!
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The County was in contact with the CPCS-1 statior (~E V)
A re=ote pickup unit receive the E3S =essage and broadcasted it(R?U) w:s available as a backur.
in Dover by telephone.
The CPCS-1 station did within 5 minutes of receipt.
The County has a dedicats commercial circuit on the communications console in the Comitunications Roomto the power station which appea intended primarily for direct notification at This line, which is backed up by regular dial phone lines.
the General Emergency level, is 1
by commercial telephones. Primary coc=unications to the local schools and sup hospitals were provided ical radio link and fire / police radios. Backup co=sucications were available using the =ed-The County had amateur radio nets established at point, VHF and UFH bands, and the Air Force TdF/ MARS netthe EOC in the HF point-to-being utilited for any con unications means, either pri:ary or b but they were not ackup.
Additional radio links were also available to the State Polic civil defense, power and light e, County fire, company, NAWAS, and the citizens band channel 9 Primary and backup communications systems were demonstrated t between the County and the following organi:ations:
o some degree erating Station, the State =edia center in Wilmington the Scace ECC, Sale: Gen-panies. Cornunications exist
, and County fire com-ESS stations, schools and hospitals but vere notbetween the New Castle County EC Problems were encountered in the use of the coccereial phneeded during the exerci asateur radio.
f erence, particularly when the call was transferred to the lReceptio one to DEPO and er-Director's desk.
including the Kant'inen the EOC staff attempted to contact oudspeaker oc the State ECC personnel, would be reached butCounty liaison, they often failed.
appropriate people.
there was much difficulty in getting thrcugh to thThe switchboard opera through to Staca EOC personnel,The anateur radio crev had similar. difficulty in getti e
The uergency communications forms were not of instructions.
Tha Co:=unicacions Roon personnel recorded some traffic inco the form and some on their own emergency dispatch sages, because they were notcaused problems when they were asked to provide center fire report.
This ous mes-The Civil Air Patrol was given a form with a message on itsure e:<actly where the in receipt or source were noted.
- but no time of unable to discover who took the message.After 25 minutes CA? representatives were still There vere long delays in obtaining releases from the hard co nected to the Media Center.
py device con-Sales at 1700 was not A press release concerning discovery of a bomb at received in the County EOC until 1857.
discussed in the Media Center section.
J-This problem is
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Dese Assessment and ?rotective Action ?. recommendations
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i The County has no responsibility in thi~s trea Public Alertinz and Instruction
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1 A.
Public Alerting 4
Route alerting was implemented to notify'the public of At 1810 County officials contacted the fire companiepro y was notified.
alerting was in progress in the Woodland Beach v s that cover the' area t
that route-1 sector SSE even though only sector S vas one of the s As noted above sector S and-evacuation by the State.
ors designated for The fire company responsible reported to the EOC that completed by vehicles equipped with PA systems within app route alerting was 60 minutes.
roximately 45 to-As noted above a message was received.from DEPO that th mended sheltering between 10 and 15 miles in the Southwe t e AAAG had recom-than the Southwest quadrant s
as was intended.
sector rather located the SW sector, and appropriately butthe County f e of the recommendation, Kent County was not aff ected. -
incorrectly concl d d ue that.
B.
Public Instruction The route alerting demonstration, and thus the em used by the teams, were not seen by the Kent County observer.ergency public instructions Protective Action
'l A.
Evacuation and Access Control
' Y This function is not controlled or directed by the C 1
ounty.
B.
Special Evacuation Problems
.a According to the State and County plan the names and l a
impaired individuals in the EPZ are maintained by the Kent Cocations of m Board.
An actual list or its use was not observed.
nursing homes or hospitals in the Kent County portion of thThere are to school
~4 ounty Fire Call e EPZ.
f[4 C.
Implementation of Ingestion Fachway Protective Actio
't.
ns This function is not controlled or directed by the Co
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unty.
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?.adiolori:21 N:osure Control The County ICC is not field workers from :his ECC.in the 10 =11e I?, nor was desi=e:ry distributed :o Media Relations Convenient and a=ple space was set aside for press' briefings and several were given.
allowed to obserte EOC activities and interview some participants.In a of the press did not The presence The County FIO gave :he briefings; the information given was consonan: appear to information coming out with any of the media center and was accurate and as comple:e as necessary.
F.u=or control was demonstra:ed at the State Media Center.
As noted previously, the press releases coming from the media cen:er in Wilmington :ook too long to reach the County.
This proble= is addressed in :he Media Center section of this report.
Scenario The scenario provided enough ac:ivity to test =ajor areas of the County's responsibilities.
Previous Deficiencies Major Deficiency 4 Adequate coordination was observed bitueen the State P:0 and the Xen: Count:. PIC.
Major Deficiency 9.
The scenarfo did fully involve Xent the County to demons:ra:e capability for e ergency roeponteCounty and required has baen corrected.
Tnis daliciency Minor Defician;y 2.
energency response operations by presar. cation of a doubla staff rosterThe deficiency has been corrected.
This Miscellaneous Deficiency 7.
There was no de=onstration of participation by elec:ad officials at the County level in this exercise.
not been corrected.
This deficiency has Present Deficiencies /Reco==endations 32.
Some nembers of the Kent County EOC staff were repositioned.
should be avoided during exercises in order to more realistically testPrepositioning and effort needed for activation and staffing.
- 1:e 33.
There was no demonstration of participation by Ken County elec:ed officials.
For purposes of both suppor: for the County e:ergency cperatiens staff ef fer:
and in order to gain so:e degrae of f amiliarity with radiological enar;;ency operations, a presence at :he ICC is desirable.
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34.
Members of the Kent County staff did not. adequately de=enstrate cec unica-j tions procedures.. The County's plan.and operating procedures for internal
]
EOC connunications, external co==unications (particularly with the State i
EOC), and use and control of the 'e ergency co==un1 cations center should be 1
reviewed and practiced.
i-35.
The Kent County Deputy Director (who is identified on the staffing list as-3.
the second shift replacement for the Director) did not demonstrate sufficien-d training, knowledge, and experience to' fulfill a Director's responsibilities,
.1 The Deputy Director should receive additional _ training and be provided b,.. '
opportunities in future exercises to assume the Director's responsibilities.
)
.l 36 Information was communicated to the Kent County 20C staff primarily by posting.=essages on the status board.
In future exercises the director
'l should conduct periodic briefings for the EOC staff.rather than rely on the a
s tatus board to keep the s taf f up-to date.
e 37.
The unfamiliarity of Kent County 20C personne1'with sector and zone uesig -
nations and wind direction vectors resulted~in confusion regarding areas j
affected. It is recommended that appropriate County personnel receive ij training in the designations of sectors and zones in the E?Z and in the
-ce correct designation of wind directions to be employed on ~ plume tone caps in
'j the County IOC.-
i 38.
Kent County mistakenly evacuated Sector SSE, which was not included in the affected area as identifted by the State EOC.
The County should take what-
.o l
ever steps are necessary to avoid a repetition of a sector being evacuated
.)
vithout a specified reason..
39.
The Kent County status board was used as a cessage log.
It is reco:= ended J
g that the status board be used for posting information concerning significant 1
energency events and actions.
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40.
A uniform =essage handling procedure was not used at the Kent County IOC.
It i
is recommended that a procedure be established, and personnel be trained in j
its use.
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New Cas:le Coun:7 ICC Ac:ivation and Sa:ffin:
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Ac:1va:1on of the County staff took place in two stages; at :he Aler: (call
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received 1529) a par:ial =obili:ation :cok place, with the remaining s:aff called to the EOC at the Si:e Area Emergency (call received 1632).
In both cases the calls were received from DEPO and were logged utilizing the standard notificacio.
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form. A call down list was used to contact designated individuals a: a specific lj classification level, with full staffing essentially occurring by about 1700.
yi The last staff me=ber repor:ed to the ECC by 1720.
J 6
Il Organi:acions at the ECC included Public Safety, Police, A=bulance, Oc=municaticr-FIO, Parks and Recreation, Public Works, a Message Recorder, a Messenger, and a 1
l Private School Con:act. The en:1re staff displayed a thorough sense of profes-1 sionalsis and a knowledg2 of their duties throughout the exercise and cust be
(~-
recognized for both their enthusiasm and their capabilities.
Round-the-clock s:affing was de=enstrated through the presentation of a roster.
Emergency Goerations Managemen:
The plan specifies the Director of Public Safety, or t.1:erna:a, is responsible L<
for coordica:ing the County's response.
During :he etercise, the individual in
'l charge of Coun:7 operations was the Coordinator of Esergency Planning, who is the designated alternate for the Direc:c: of Public Safe:y.
Periodic briefings of i
l the s:aff were condue:ed to ensure :ha: they were kept informed of all signift-l' cant events.
Copies of the plans were available and each staff member (including the coordinator) had checklists to, serve as a re inder for du:ies to be acco -
lk plished at the varicus classification levels,.
An organi:ed =esaage systen as ir evidence throughout :he exercise which proved to be very efficient. Access to the ECC was con: rolled through a locked door, sign-in sheet and bcdges.
The County received notifica. ion of the Alert at 1529 after it was declared at i
1515, with Site Area
- 2. ergency 1632/1607 and General Emergency 1734/170S.
A:
j Geceral Ecergency no:1fication use received from both DEPO and the utili:y.
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There is concern :ha: in tne la::er two cases there was a long delay be:waen the i
classification of the event and the notification of the County.
Actions were taken to activate other response organizations (including police, fire and ambulance) and private schools were kept notified of the accident throughou: :he exercise.
..s t
The Director of Public Safety came to the ECC at 1700 to be briefed by the i
Coordinator and both he and the County Executive were kept inforced by the o
Coordina:or concerning significant even:s and the County's response.
Facilities The EOC is adequate for a long-ter: emergency response, having sufficient furn-j iture, space, ligh:ing and mos: impor:an:ly, :elephones.
A sta:us board was l3 clearly visible and was kep: up-:o-date throughout the even:.
A good varie:y of ma:s were posted, which included information such as the plume E?Z vith sectors labled, evacua: ion rou:es, reloca:1on cen:ers and decontanica: ice loca:fons, l.d I
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,'a l-J i 4 access con:rol poin:s, schools and persons in need cf :ranspor:ation.
In addi--
J tion, the County posted an inven:ory 11s:1:g of rescurces which Jas reviseduas
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coe=ercial telephone.
Backup coccunications available are a dedicated ring-down
' y line and the emergency management radio, asateur radio, DELWAS radio, and fire /
.[j police radio nets.
This is a vast improvement over previcus exercises when no id radio nets were available, i
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1, The County has a mobile communications van that was on stand-by but not required l '3 for use during this exercise. The van has the sa:e radio capabilities as the l
TOC.
.c f.d'4 The County has commercial phones available tc the media center, local schools and
,1 support hospi: sis.
Backup communications ava'lable.are the fire / police net,
.)
dedicated ring-down li'nes or EMS radio. The County did have the capability to 4
conference in all their emergency response tea =s using the radio nets.
3 the dedica:ed line :o the State 20C does not appear in the County EOC, be:.messa;e:.
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are relayed rapidly by the co=sunications room to the IOC.
Once =essages were received in the EOC they were raad aloud and pos:ed on a board for everyone's U
infon:ation.
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The coc=unications personnel were'vell briefed on their responsibilities and were using all required forms for recording and passing traffic.
a Is l ['
Overall the com=unications capabilities and procedures used during this exercise l
l*
vers excellent.
l, l -..
Dose Assessment and Protec-ive action Recornendation 1'
Iu The County has no responsibili:y in this area.
i, l
Public Alerting and Instruction 1h 1 i SJ Because of a simulated siren failure, DZ?O directed'New Castle County to dispatch l f the Townsend Fire Company to run a pre-designated rouca and notify the public to j
turn on their radios or televisions and listen for instructions.
In addition,
]
the County is responsible for no:1!ying private schools, which they did.
In only j
one case (a boarding school) were 'there any students at the school, due to the il time of day when the exercisc occurred.
These assignments were accomplished by I
approxi=ately 1700.
The County also conitored one of the EBS stations (WSTW)
]
utili:ing a tone-alert radio. Tests occurred at 1642 and 1705.
The county is not responsible for drafting ins :uctions to the public.
1
?;
Protec:ive Actions J
A.
Evauca:1ce and Access Con:rol I ;14
_ d The New Cas:le County Police Departmen: se:res as a support orja.-izn:1cn :o j
the Delaware State Police in ss::ing up access control points.
Ini:ially, 2
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e
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4- ?
l access con:rol was handled entirely by :he OS?. v.ovever, ac'2005 :he Coun:y was infor:ed : hat DSP personnel a: five locatiens had' exceeded' cheir dose and 1
needed to be replaced.
I: vas simulated equipping five officers wi:h :he i
. proper dos 1=e:ry, KI, e:c. and sending. the= to the necessary locations, :he j
vhole o?ocess :aking approxi=a:ely 25 minu:es.
<s d
B.
Soecial Evacuation Proble=s q
q-The County is fully aware of transi:-dependent. individuals in the plume.E?Z yy having the infor=ation noted on a map and. a' list noting the person's nase, it fire district, sector, mile zone, telephone number, address. location, mail-('j box number, =ailbox na=e, and any other information, including special 2) transportation requirements. At the time Si:e Area Emergency was. declared-,
j the County deter =ined who might.need to be evacuated based-upon:the sectors j
effected.
When the evacuation was ordered and the effected sectors expanded, they updated their list.
They then simulated having the appropriate organizations evaucate these individuals. They did. ensure cha: the resourcesc i
were available and were prepared to u:ilize backup resourcee, if necessary.
9 The County is not responsible for evacus:ing school children.
q C.
Isolementation of Ingestion Pathway Prosective Actions 4i k
l j, The County has no assigned duties in this area.
- q l
Radiological Exoosure Control m
i
]
Adequate lov (0-200 mR) and mid range (0-20 R) self-reading dosime:ers were in a
evidence for e=ergency workers, along with a dosimeter charger,. record-keeping cards (both daily and permanent), TLDs, protective clothing and KI.
The lac:er
}
j two would not be utilired or consunad except by specific direction from the State.
l The Department of Public Health instructed the County to inform emergency workers to take KI at 1820.
Specific instrue: ions were available for use by supervisors,
)
including the direction :o read their dosisecers every 15 minutes and the point that they should notify their supervisor acc report to the deconta=ination cen:c (a dose of 150 at).
Media Relations As specified by the plan, the County Public Information Officer has no authority to originate press releases or conduct briefings, and is responsible ocly to l
release the information provided to him by the State FIO. All such releases i
would be given to the New Castle County Police Department so they would be avail-able if the press or cedia vould call in on a designated line that is used en a Jj day-to-day basio. Hard copies of the releases were provided via a telefax link l
l j vich the State Media Center.
The County experienced long delays be:veen the-time 1
o f an event and receipt of tt.e corresponding press release. As an example, the d
County received the Alert press release at 1645 when the plant was in a Si:e' Area Emergency classification, the Site Area E=ergency release was received at 1740 when the plant was in General Inergency status, and the General Emergency release was received approxima:ely 1 1/2 hours after notifica: ton, 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after it had g
been declared.
This proble: 13 addressed in the Media Center see: ton of this recor:.
Rumor control was handled a: :he S: ace Media Center through :he use of a
,a
- 311 free number.
4
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7ecoterv at.d ?.een:r-r This func: ion was not tes:ed during this exercise.
Scenario j
The scenario provided sufficient activity to test.the Coun:y's capability :o i
c.;
respond to an energency at the Sales Nuclear Generating Station and the Coun:y L
staff must be com= ended for ac:ively a: tempting to anticipate events and plan for j
various contingencies.
1 E.'
Previous Deficiencies t
1 Major Deficiency 4 The Sca:e and County FIOs de=onstrated adequate coordination.
The State PIO assured the lead role and kept the Coun:y FIO aware of all news l
releases, and forwarded hard copies via the telefax machine.
This, deficiency has been corrected.
1 1
i Minor Deficiency 2.
?senty-four hour operational capability was establish (d 1
through the presentation of a staffing roster de ctstrating two-shif: capability.
This deficiency has been corrected.
1 j
Miscellaneous reficiency 7.
The Director of Public Safety visited the ICC for a j
briefing by the Coordina:cr.
Throughou: the exercise, the Coordina:or kept the Direc:or of Public Safety and the County Executive advised of Coun:y e.nergency
. activities vis :elephone. This is considered adequate, although the County Ixec-l utive should beco: e note directly' involved in f uture exercises.
This deficiency 3
har been corrected, i
i Miscellaneous reficiency ?.
The plans have been revised to reflec: a voll-defined chain of cormand.
Both the State and the County have a clear concept of tne response process, and worked well together. This deficiency hr been correc:ed.
Miscellaneous Deficiency 9.
The New Cas:le County authorities are aware :ha:
they are to act only upon DEPO instructions and demonstrated this throughout the exercise.
This deficiency has been corrected.
.I 2
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Sc=nar' of Maj or C+fi:icn te:
Major defielencies are those which have a basis in the requirements of the NU?.I; 1
0654 Planning Standards and, by their presence or absence, are considered serious
' ~
enough to have a signift an: 1:;ac: on :he State and/or counties' de= ens::a:ed ability to respond :o a radiological accident. These deficiencies =us: be cor-rected to ensure an adequa:e level of preparedness,.
m
'd 1.
Although the co==unications systes in use by the S:ste and counties perfor:ed
- ))
adequately during the exercise, it was judged less than adequate for an accur i
emergency due to a heavy reliance upon co==ercial and other land-based tele-W phone lines, and the lack of a radio back-up. The Sta:e should aug=en the
?}
existing pri=ary ce==enications syste= with an al:ernate or back-up ce== uni-cations capabill:7, not based upon co==ercial telephones, which links the i
State IOC vith SNCS, the New Jersey ZOC, the coun:7 Zocs, and other State j
sgancy locations. 7.clerance :
NUZIO 0654 E.1C, F.1D.
n
.3 1
2.
The -elaware 5:ste ?olice (DS?) Co==unication Center, because it provides 21-
[
hour capsb111:7, is responsible for receiving fro = SNGS all initial energency l
no:ifications and subcaquent changes in e=ergency classification, and relaying j
such notices te the appropriate State and county organi:azions. This inter-
]
=edia:a link in the no:1fics: ion procedure was :he source of several notifica:1
[l failures, yht:h occur:2d a: all participating jurisdictions during the exercis.
l Ll The 5: ate should inies:i;ste the notifiestion procedure to determine the cause Lg for chase failures and cdify the procedure accordingly.
I: is suggested that 1
the Scace consider simplifying the procedure and/or providing additional train' for :he responsible personnelt The S: ate should further consider conducting s j
subsequen: no:1?ientien/co==unica: ion drill :o demons: rate renewed capability.
Referance:
NU?2G 0554 E.1.
4 3.
The Ste:e plan speci.'ies that, upon ac:ivs: ion of the ICC, the State =edia
!?
center v11 be.es:sbl.ished in a separate building neirby.
This facill:y vaa not demonstrated during :he exercisa; instead, public infer ation ac:ivities J
v:re condu::ed fr : :n inadequa:e space VL:hin the 200.
In future exarcisas I;
the S:st: should fences: rata :he capability to ast:blish an adequa:e medis center, in accordance vith che S: ate plan. This should be coordinated vi:h 2
yIMA :o establish the criteria for 'an adequate demons::acion.
Reference:
NUR2" C651 G.3A.
l7 4.
Both the Sta:e and New Castle County de=enstrated a lack of coordination re-garding public infor:s: ion.
3ecause the State PIO did not establish effectivt coordination with the Operstioss and Accident Assess =en: personnel 3: the State EOC, he did not have access to the full scope of informa: ion'.
- Likevise, ther: vas virtually no evidence of publi: infor:stion coordina: ion vi:h the l.
'l New Jersey pIO, the facili:y's PIO, and with the 5:a:e's representative at :ha J,
facility's =edia center.
Coordination with :he New Castle County ?IO, who was dependent on :he Sta:e ?IO for secess to infor=a: ion and copies of navs releases,
was de enstra:sd by only evo phene calls - one each initiated by the coun:7 and S: :e.
1: is reco== ended : hat the Ste:e ?!O assu e :he lead role in es:ablis't l ::i ing affae:iv co:rdins: ice 'uring future exercises.
This should includa perie.:
c:nsul:stian vi:h ::.4 ?;;a in all other par:icipe:ing jurisdi::1:ns and orSsn'
- s: ions, and concurren:2 on the coc:ents of news releases as approprie:e.
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5.
Altheu;h the AAA0 de::nst:s:ed espi. " 1:7 for ecleu12:1:g estica:ed dosas ar' evaluz:ing pro:ee:ive action alternatives, their assessment vcs no: :1:ely (the tes: required over two hours to conce: on the facility's reco= enda:ic-
,?
for shel:ering) no: do : hey have the necessary technical exper:ise to perior
];
an independen: a:alysis of reactor ceeditio:s. The Sta:e should consider th.
following in c der to i= prove the AAAG's perfor=ance:
s 4
cf a.
Tea: = embers should acquire grea:e: fa=iliarity vich the methodology for "j
perfor=ing the calcula: ions and usicg the hand-held calcula:or and relat,
software through infor=al ::aising.
wa
[]
b.
The AAAG should 1:clude a member or obtais access te an advisor having j
technical exper:ise in nuclear engineering, who would be able to interpre:
A reactor conditions. Consideration should be given to using this ten:
'd member to augne:: or replace the State's present liaison to the facility's
?
E07, nho does not hcve such training.
Reference:
NU22G 0654 J.9.
s!
.,1 6.
yollowing the fse111:y's declaration of General 2:e:gency a: 1015 the publi:
j was not pro:p:17 notified of this change is e:ergency status and was not y
provided with updated information regarding SNGS conditions for al=os: 2 1/2 j
hours, at which time the S:ste belatedly implemented protective actions.
Such j
s' long delay for ini:iating bo:h of these a:: ions is unae:eptable. A::ording
'2 to Appendin 1 of the NURIO 0654 planning s:nnds ds, the appropria:e 3: ate
/
]
responsa to a Genercl Emergancy declaration includes the i==ediate activation of the notifics: ion systes to advise the public of the c ergency s:a:us, and
]i the provision of periodic updates. The minimus protective action at the d'j General I=ergency level should be sheltering for a 2 mile radius, ex: ended to 5 j
miles devnvind.
Is the exercise situation, :he S: ate should have quickly l
4 i=ple:cated this cetion as a safeguard, if not adopting SMGS's core l
conservative reco==cedation for shel:ering to 5 =iles, extended to.10 =ilsc I
s devnvisd.
In so doi:g, the State would have properly provided for the publi '
i protae:1on while " buying time" :o continue thoroughly assessing the' situs: ion.
l if varranted, the shel:ering area could be si:ered,'o: the protective ac:1on l
i could ba up;rsded to evacuation. The S:ste should :ensider ado;;ing su.:h serion as standard opers:ing procadures.
Reference:
hURIG I.5, I.6 I.d.
I Appendin 1.
4 7.
24cause of the scenario's lov simulated release levels, the Sta:e's prote::1ve I
l 3
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i action was sheltering, rather then evscuation.
yu:ure enercisa scenarios
~
should include a s1=ulated release rate of sufficient magnitude :o ini:ia:e i
i evacuation.
Such exercises should include de=onst:a: ions of related activi:let 1
-)
such as methods for i=ple=enting relocation of population, =tinods cf i
- 1 evacua:ieg those sd:hout access to. private transportation, se: hods of l
evacuating mobility-i= paired persons, and methods for deallag with 1:pedicen:s te evacus: ion.
Reference:
NUR20 0554 J.10.
1 l
8.
Due to the occurrence of an setusi e=ergency involving a ben:ene spill in the Town of Cdessa, exercise ac:1vities were ter=ina:ed early. Consequently, the:4 vas no dersnst:stion of recovery and reen::7 operstions.
yuture enercisas p
should provide for such a de:onstra:ioc, including :he =eens for no tifying
,K respon:e organizstists to initiate recovery and :eentry, and the procedures f e:
i reen::y and :he relaxa-ion of pro:ec-ive =easures alloudng reentry.
Reference I
z St?.IG 0654 M.1, M.3.
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LOS2 Deficienei 5 1
9.
7an: Coun:y egain >:s no: providad with a si:ca: ion in which to de: ens::::e 1:
e=e:gency resp:nse capability, due to a scanario hi:h vi :uall;' ex:1udad c
Coun:y energency response personnel from play.
The 3:::e should assere ths:
future exercises include even:s tha: vill' fully involve Ken: County in:o play 1
and require the Coun:7 I?O :o de: ens::ste r.apabili:7 f or e:ergency resp::nse.
P.e f e r e ac e :
E; RIG 0654 N.1,
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- 4 F.inot' deficiencies are th:se which have a ' basis in the re uiren,en:s 0,(":ne N"?l";
065!. ?lanning S:n.d sds au: ara no: considered serious enoup.':o hav da cignifi-can: 1 pce: upcn the S*,4:s and/or counti'es' de:onstrated abili:7 to resp:nd :: s radiological acciden:. C:rrac: ion o.f :hese deficiencies vill result in i=;r:ved preparedcassj t
t
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p.,1.
Neither the State nor :oun:les de=onstrated r.o=enication vi:h the Federal mergoney rispense 9rgani:::f dns, and there was no demonstration,de cn-of sup.por:
g
.r[9 resourced for such rest:ense. A future exercise should include a' h.
t 8
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- d. ration of such ac:Lona.
Reference:
NU?lG C654 7.1.c., C.1.0.
1
.)
i 2,
Feither New Cas:le nor Zent County de= ens::ated a capabill:y for 24-hour continuous e:ergency response operations.
.N ure exercises should include such a de:ons::a: ion, whch could be by se:aal replacement of personnel, or 5:-
]
establishing n call-up lis: of available replace: ant personnel.
?.aference:
3 NURIG 0634 A.4.
.n 3.
Although a fiaN.ede=enstra:Lon of thret a::ess can::ci poin:s was adequa:ely de:onstrated, this was a very ll=1:cd tes: of capability, and nei:her the
.% cation nor timing rein:ed to the exercise events. Future enercises should
,,c (y]
iactade a ore intensiva and realis:1: ace.ess cos:rol damens:::: ion vi:S locations determined by the 5:ste ICC persennel based on actual exercise l >;.
events.
Reference:
W?l0 0554 J.10.
'i l
4.
? o problems were noted regarding the provision of dosi=e:ry, frequency of readings, and aintenance of dose record s by Sta:e-level e:ergency verkars :
e.
The air =cci:oring taans, although :nking frequen: readin;;s, f ailed ;o
=aintain records, "f
b.
~hs Red Crosc verkar: a: the Relocation Canters tera supplied vi:h l
dosize:ers, bu: vere no: Novided vi:h instrue:1ons on rudir;; :he or with dose record for:s.
l 1
Tor future exercises, the State shruld assure ena: :he air =enittring tesa l
end Red Cross workers are suppliad with dose record forts, and are instrue:ed on the use of such for s and the require =en: for =aintaining records.
Further
=cre, the Red Cross workers should receive instruction on the readi:g of
)
dos 1=e:ers.
Reference:
HU?lG 0654 7. 3.
l S.
'~here was no de=onstration of a decision process for authori:ing exposures in excess of PA0s for e=ergency workers.
Future exercises should include su:h a de=onstration.
Reference:
hT?lG 0654 K.4.
1 i
6.
Due to the a::ual e=ergency, c=bulances were no: available to de=ons: rata j
,l capability for transporting radiological accident victi=s to medical j
facilities.
Such a demons::a:lon should be included 'n future exercises.
Reference:
NU?l0 0654 L.4.
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i, Su==ar? ef Miscellaneous Efficiencies s
Miscellaneous deficiencies are thesa which do nc: have a basis in the require:en::-
of the NU?.20 36!4 Planning S:cndsrds, but, in mos: cases, ar: based up:n :he 3:a:'
l and/or county radiological energency plans.
Correc: ion of these deft:iencies is
[
not r64uired, but is reco==endad for i= proved preparedness.
l-g 1.
The S:a:e IOC has neither a specific co==unications :com or area, nor a Co:-
R
=unications Officer.
Obssrvers felt that this lack of a focal poin: caused :
[!;
diffusing of co==unica: ions and con:ributed to the State's infor=ation en-
]
change proble=s.
The 5:a:e should-coesider consolidating IOC co==cnications L'
resources, preparing an SOF, and appointing a co==enica: ions officer.
-li!'
2.
At the S:ste IOC, the telephone used to receive sta:icn sta:ua cnd protectiva H
action reports.r:= SNGS is subject to interference fro: background noise and O
a public-address sp2aker. This telephona s:ation shouls be acoustically 9
isola:ed to allov = ora effective co==unications be:veen AAAG and the facility, i
[9 3.
'4 hen providing s:::1on str.us reports, SNOS did no: always provide cuffi:1ent p
infor=a: ion to complete the Station Sta:us Cheek 11st. The AAAG cocmunica:or b
should reques: all necessary infor=a: ion needed to co=ple:e :his fo r=,
if ne:
lI 1hitially cupplied.
- 4 1
E 4.
5: ate IOC personnel did not apprise the counties on a regular besis as to station a s:us reports, causing New Castle Coun:y to conta:: the facill:y directly to ob: sin this infor=ation. It is reco== ended tha: the AAA0 be the sole recipien: of this data, and assure th'a: the counties are advised j
accordingly.
l 5.
Overall, the exercias was =arked by a general failure to coordina:a by all U
participants. A nenber of situs:1ons have been cited where :he need for con-firming, advising, exchanging infor:ation, or seeking clarifica:Lon was indics:ed, but such se:1ons were not perfor:cd.
Following are so:e spacific instances whera effective c:ordina: ion was no: adequately damens::s:ed:
a.
A: the State IOC, thera was a lack of effec:1ve coordina: ion a=ong the l
Operaticos, Acciden: As c e s s= e nt, and Public information groups.
73 ex-ample, the Public infor:ation Officer was no: kep advised of curren:
developmen:s.
b.
Infor:a:1on flow be: ween the DIPO Director and the IOC staf f tended to be one-way - fro = the :op dows. Apparently, the Director was no =ade aware of so=e key even:s, auch so Operation's =oni:oring of :he facility's 1030 General I=ergency declaration, or the AAAG's receipt of : hat sa:e infor:a:
n in the form of a c:ation status repor: shortly thereaf:er, c.
Coordination be:veen the State and coun:ies vas lacking. A county liaiso-at the IOC, who was responsible for contacting New Castle County every 30
=inutes failei :s provide that periodic coordination. The county also failed :o ini:iate this upda:e call.
d.
There was no enchange of infor=ation be: ween DI?] and the New *ersey 110,
[
such as would have been appropria:e to coordina:e protective ac: ions.
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5.
A nu ber of special problan cessages vare inser:ed in:o. play.by :he ener:ise referee.
Some of these cessages were overly pr :p:1:; or ou:righ: ins: rue-tional.
Even when the resulting actions are appropriate or corree:, full b
credi: canno: be given because 1: cannot be de:er ined whe:her the responsi'1 organiza: ions vould have initiated the proper acti:n vi hou: the ini:ial
'j prc=p:ing message.
The State should assure tha:, when special proble=s are 4
posed in future exercises, it is done in a manner which is no: pro:p:ing or instructional.
This will assure that full credit can be given for resulti:g i
1 ac: ions.
m C,
ca 7.- There was no demons:::: ion of participation, and virtually no descas::a: ion of lj
'suppor by elec:ed officials at ei:her the Stac: or county levels.
yu:ure U
exercises should include such a de=onstration.
1 '.;
l]
8.
New Castle ' County declared a "Sta:e of' e:ergency" a: approx 1:stely 1035 hours0.012 days <br />0.288 hours <br />0.00171 weeks <br />3.938175e-4 months <br />, and turned control of the County's response over to the S:ste. The County t'rr
!,T assumed the role of a support orge:1:ation to DIpo. This does not confor: to L
the procedure as it is contal:ed in the plan, because the'Covernor had no: ye:
1
- sde the requisite State Occiaration of 2:ergency. yeu C:stle County and the Lj State should egree on the proper procedure, and, if necessary, change the State 9
a,nd county plans accordingly.
y 9.
2egarding the 50? for water sa:pling, two sinor proble=s vere coted:
a.
It is ne: 4::1 ely clear from the pisas who deter = ices za:pling points,
i although the tes:s were directed by the AAAG during the exercise.
i, b.
At one loca ion, the trea:=ent f acility, the plan specifies tha: :rea:ed q-curface v::ar is to be ca: pled, whereas tap vacer was drawn for :he ac:er' q
s =ple.
The Sta:e should resolva these problems and alter the plans and/or procedure:
~"
accordingly.
L t LO.
The AAAG did no: coordinate with their counterpar:3 in New Jersey, despi:e receiving a repert tha: New Jersey was considering evacua: ion rather than she.'.
r-ing, as reco--aa A =A by SSGS.
In future exercises the AAAG should consult vi:1 New Jersey regarding dose calculations sad' protective n : ion reco==enda:icca.
. W.
11.
The relocation canter a: lbunt Pleasant High School was staffed only by the p Q
Cross; the S:2:e Division of Social Services did not provide staff as required JJs by the plan, reportedly because they did not -agree to accept responsibility fm
{J the reception centers.
The State should resolve this proble: and adj ust the plan, if necessary, to reflec: the actual procedures that will be used in staf-ng j
and supplying this center.
y 1
12.
Red Cross procedures cbserved at the ralocation center vere not in confor:ance vich those procedures as described in Attach =ent Two to the State plan. The j
State should eli=ina:e this disparity by causi g ei:her the plans, or a :ual
,J Red Cross c.rocedures, or both to be al:ered so as :o es:ablish confor:i:7 i
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point, as requ'. red.
The County should review -he Imple:er.:ing ?:o:2dures and assure that p ccac:1ve ac: ions vill not be i=plemen:ed withou: the 5: ate's l_J authori:s: ion.
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332 Deficiencies'
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A :achre : I Sta:e of Delaware Fe:ponse to the I
2xer::se ; valuation Repor; TIMA and RA. r,egie:
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for the October 13, 1932 Radiological Ire: gen:y Iner:ise A.
Sur:srv of Mafor De:'.clencies 1
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Communications System
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Although NURIG 0554 F.lc and F.1D do not state a require:ent for j
non-concercial back-up cot =usication equipment, DIPO's presen:
com=usication links (see Appendix) provides significant radio a
back-up.
It is our contention that Delaware is in compliance in this respect. The State of Delaware h:s been implementing a prog:a= ::
j upgrade the concunication capability of all State and coasty
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agencies. The pla--ad 5750 com=uci:stion improvement progra:
includes augmentation cf the present equi;:en by additional rad.o equipment.
This is an ongoing State p cs:sm.
As systems are installed and beceme operational, they will be incorpora ed into the plan, equipment testing schedule, s:d training
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progracs.
In additien, II?O recognizes the need for a Co==unica: ions Specialist on its staff to improve the reliability c:d operations I
utility of all its communications systems.
SNGS is proviling I
funding for this position as a catch against Imergency Ma:a genea:
l Assistance Funds. We expect to fill this position shortly after re 77 83 FIMA - Dalaware Cc:prehensive Cooperative Agreemen; is approved by Region III.
1 l
1.
2.
Notification ?::cedure i
j We agree that the present notification: procedure can be improved.
I We rece::ly conducted a notift:sticc/communicat:.o drill to be :e:
identify potential problems and evalua:e proposed solutier.s.
As a result of the exercise and this drill, we will modify our procedurec so that after the State IOC has been activated, notification J
procedures will be implemented from the State SCC.
The plan will be modified to designate that once the IOC is activated, SNGS notification of emergency level changes will go to the ICC.
Additionally, a training schedule and a notification /com=unication drill schedule will be prepared and implemented.
3.
State Media Center In future exercises, :he State Media Center will be activated to ensure that our capability is fully and adequately demonstrated.
1 Telephone acd F.umo Control lines will be activated fc: use during eXc:cises.
.I 4
Public Information In order to i pr:ve au: public inf e r:::icr. respons e, we have decided to aid the State ?:0 by ceveloping a PIO preceiure for l
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radiological emerge:cies whi:h would supple:en the Delaware I
Emergency Opera-ing ?lan.
This procedure will clearly define :hr i
interface, working relatic: ships and coordination practices betwee:
l2 the Sta:e ?!O and each of the following organi:stions; utility PIO, l.!,
New Jersey PIO, New Castle and Ke:: Counties ?*0's, the Acciden:
Assess:en: Adviscry Group and the DEPO Operations 5:aff.
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5.
Accident Assess:ent 7 s 4
i The exercise scenario revealed that the AAAG was inadequately Jj prepared to make protective action decisiens based on a potentia *.
E release.
The plan and accident assess:ent procedures are also L'
inadequate as they focus on release levels and do not address making protective actics decisiota when only the potential exists for a release exceeding the PAGs or for the =inimu: protective action for the General Eccr3ency level.
The plan and procedures will be 3
l i= proved and revised to include p ctective action decision =ahing steps for accident situations involving low releases with potential for : ore serious plant conditions and/or larger releases.
t-e bi We now have a designated individual with sufficie technical L'
expertise '<ho will be our representative at the 207.
Ve are in the ii process of arranging for an alternate ECT representative, Selected lj AAAG perscanel vill receive technical ::aining which will provide the: with a basic k owledge Of power plant operations.
1.
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6.
Protective Action 4
The present plan and erocedures do not delineate the minimu:
protective actica decision which could be made at the General I:e:gency level in the absence of radiological data which lead to protective ac-ion decision.
An analysis of the protective action decision-=2 king pcocess and criteria vill be ini iated and will result in the development of a procedure for an automatic p:ctectiva action decision at the General I:ergency level.
The AAAG will receive specific training on this new procedure.
An interi:
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pre-detennined protective action response procedure will be ff completed February 1933 which will eet NURIG C654 requirements.
The pre-deter ined response will provide a " buying tice" period.
1 7.
Evacuation j
1 i 4.
The State of Delaware will ensure that the next scenario will L9 include the require:ents to initiate evacuation in order to L
demonstrate related procedures. DEPO will request that onsite 3
exercise lead referees at both the EOF and EOC adequately control i
j the exercise so that the conduct of the exercise = ore closely Lq follows the planned responses of the exercise scenario.
Please note that evacuation w:: deconst:sted for the 1931 exercis>
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Recovery and Reentry l.t I-dj
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.i 5j DEPO disag res that this is a =ajc deficie:cy in the State exerci:e respo::e.
I-is stand::d State policy to dis:::titue any c: all
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portic:s of an exercisa if a real eeergency occurs. We rec:gnize that reentry and recovery was cet deco:strated at this exerci e and will make provisions to exercise these actions within the required 5 3
ll year time fra=e.
We strongly object to FIMA's i= plied requirement j
that a State should continue to play in an exercise, despite the 4.!
occurre:ce of a rea1 emergency, c: the State is subject to a cajo:
deficiency.
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Scenario e
j NRC/TEMA exc:cise criteria do not require full-scale testing cf all
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aspects of the emergency response and in fact only eequire testing
,11 of all major elements of the plans and preparedness organizati::s l'
withis a five year period.
(NUREG 0654 Evaluation Criteria N.1.5).
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In the future a scenario will be written to equire Xect County to
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!j involvement as defined in the Radiological Emergency Plans and q
consistent with the consequences of an accide:: when considering its 0]
distacce frem the plant and the small area within the E:- which is Ji, mostly comprised of the Woodland Beach Wildlife Area.
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1932 Deficiencies
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Summare of ".iner Deficiencies
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1.
Federal Support In accordance with the present plans, the responsibility to request y
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Federal involvement and support or to provide information :o Federal 1
authorities resides with DEPO.
This de :nstrazion item was
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overlooked during the exercise.
We are deter =ining the need te develop checklists for key DEPO personnel to ensure that all s
required consunicatices to all agencies and organi:ations are initiated.
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2.
24-Hour Capability u!
t In future exercises, the Sta:e will ensure that New Castle and Ken:
County demonstrate their capability for necessary 24-hour continuous e=ergency response operations.
3.
Acces Control N
Due to the nature of police work in performing their normal duties to protect the public and in responding to emergency situations, j
availability of police personnel at the appropriate time in the sequence of th: exercise s:enario cansct be assured.
The State will 3
make every ef fort through discussion uich the State Police to have them provide a more cocplete demonstration of access ccetrol point implementation in future exercises.
U 4.
Dese Rec:rds 2
Air monitoring teams are required to periodically read their a.
dosimeters but do not fill out their own dose record forms.
When they complete their emergency assignments they are required to check out through the decon center where decon
,j personnel read the desimeters and reccrd the final readings on appropriate dose record forms.
b.
The Red Cross Dosimetry Plan and Training Program is completed and is included in the present plan upgrading progrsm.
For future exercises, the Red Cross personnel will be provided with TLDs and dose record forms.
i 5.
Protection of Emergency Workers n
DEPO will ensure that a future exercise includes a demonstration of the decision process for authori:ing exposures in excess of the PAGs icr emergency workers.
6.
Medical Support i
An ambulance was available and ready :: de=cnstra:e radiological emergency respcase capabili:y.
Due :: the bennene spill in Odessa and its actual acciden; vs.::ims, all New Castle county ambulances y
in:luding th:se set aside f:: the 133; Iner:ise were dispat:hed to
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using a private auto consequentiv,, the State's et, ability was cet fully de:::s rated.
In the nex exercise, a de enstratic: of the ability to.ransport injured (and contaminated) persennel to medical facilities will be included as it was in the 1982 Exer-ise.
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Miscellacecus reficie cies 1.
Cc :enications 6
DIPO is prese::1y evaluating the ECC coteuticatica areas and SC?s in J'.
order to deter =ine the most efficient =ethod to excha
."e information.
A co cunications specialist position has been funded and the yj position vill be filled as socn as administrative procedures are cocpleted.
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Co :anications Facility DEPO is investigating the best meth:d3 to i creve the c:ccunication systems, facility, and procedures.
3.
Co==unications A review of EE?O records of the exercise show that all pertinent
- 1 information was received and recorded.
3 4
Coordination a
4 j
DEPO is reviewing our overall inter-organization coordi:: tion in order to deter =ine how to improve our response, however, it should j
be noted that once the State IOC has been activated, tha county EOC's ha.re minimal need for detailed radiological assessment.
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Coordination 4
These items vill be included in the review of our inte -o a-en_4 _,_a_,
.o c o o rm,ina tion.
6.
Conduct of the Exercise The 19S2 FEMA /S?,0 Observed Salen Generating Station 2xercise Scenario which was sent to FIMA and RAc. Region III, on Acril 2' 1982, and on September 22, 1932, contains a summary of ofisite initiating events (Section II-Part 1.2) and a detailed list of the initiating events (Section II-Part 2.3).
No FEMA comments on the inappropriate contents of the messages were received by DI?O prior to the exercise.
The timeliness of inserting initiating events required to maintain the scenario schedule is often difficult to determine for the special problems inserted into the scenario that are not critical to the overall scenario schedule.
Referee supplied initiating events are prone to interpretation of prompting, In future exercises, DE?0 would appreciate FIhA's review and 4
copments to the scanario par:icularly with regard to offsite initiating events.
DEPO will carefully rain and brief exerci22 referees, prior to the exercice in order to reduce the possibility-
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I 7.
Supp::: by Ilected Officials DI?C vill =eet with the Governor's st:ff in the nes future to obtain their assistance in i= proving the particip2-io: of both the Governor and other responsible elected officials in future drill:
and exercises.
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Command and Coordination
~1 The New Castle County energency respense was in error. The County Lj Emergency Coordinator has been informed, k'e a re reviewing F) inter-orgaci:stion coordination to deter:tte how we could ensure U
that this does act happen in the future.
9.
Ingestion Pathway Sampling a)
As part of the present plan revision, the procedure will =ako it clear that the AAAG is in charge of selecting sa:pling pol ts.
j b)
Future training vill include training on collection of sa:ples.
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10.
Coordination:
Changes are being made in th? present plan revision progra= to ensure that the AAAG will interface with their New Jersey co un te rpa rts.
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11.
Relocation Center i
Just prior to the 1932 Exercice due to a change in agency directors, the interagency responsibility for admin'.stration of the Relocation i
Centers became an issue of misunderstauc; g and disagreement.
Neither agency understood the responsibility of the other in the management of the centers' ad ministration.
The problem had only been resolved shortly before the exercise, so insufficient ti=e had remained to implement the resolution.
The plan is currently bei:g revised to reflect the following agreements:
1.
The Red Cross will solely manage the Relocation Centers vita assistance from the Depart ent of Social Services culy when requested.
2.
Red Cross procedures will be incorporated into the plans replacing the existing procedurcs.
12.
Relocatic Center See the reply to No. 11 above.
i 13.
Command and C:ctdication The County shculd not have proceeded without State authori:sti:.
DE?O has met with the County e=ergency responsa perscanel in order Z
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Procedures.
See also the reply to No. S above.
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