ML20237K790
| ML20237K790 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/07/1987 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2511, NUDOCS 8708270296 | |
| Download: ML20237K790 (19) | |
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SUMMARY
/MINllTES.0F THE ACRS Sl'BCOMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS JllNE 22 and 23, 1987 WASHINGTON, DC The ACRS Subcomrrittee on Occupational and Envir'onmental Protection Systems j
met at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. to: (1) review emergency plan-ning issues, (2) hear a stctus report of AEOD's evaluation of radiation and l
chlorine monitor failures and their implications, (3) discuss NRR's evaluation of control roem habitability program, (4) hear a update report on nuclear power plant occupational exposures, (5) review AIF's computer studies on dose calculations at riuclear power plants, and (6) review " hot particle" concerns at operating nuclear power plants. A brief status report on the NPC's requirements for portable vacuum cleaning systems and of emergency planning issues regarding Shoreham and Seabrook was also heard, Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on Junr: 5,1%7; (Attachments).
The schedule of items covered in the meeting is it; Attech-ment B.
A list of handouts kept with the office copy of the minutes is included in Attachment C.
There were no written or oral statements received or presented from members of the public at the metting.
E. Igne was the Cognizant ACRS Staff Member for the meeting.
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DESIONATED ORIGINAL 8708270296 870807 Certified By PDR ACRS 2511 PDR
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.5/02-23 Minutes of O&EPS July 21, 1987 PRINCIPAL ATTENDEES:
ACRS NRC-D. Moeller, Chairman J. Hayes R. Alexender.
G. Reed, Member R. Kathren, ACRS Consultant R. Hernan J. Shapiro, ACRS Consultant C. Nichols L. Soffer E. Podolak H. Peterson Others M
H. Specter, New York Power Authority L. Ritchie, Sandia J. Driscoll, Argonne National Lab.
R. Masse, INP0 W. Kindley, INPO
~A. S. Leiper, AIF S. Cohen, AIF F. Roasome, Oak Ridoe Associated Universities HIGHLIGHTS Energency Planniro Issues:
H. Specter, NYPA, discussed graded or focused response in regards to emergency planning.
He approached this matter by not addressing directly: (1) smaller EPZs, (2) reduced source terms, (3) modifying the PAGs, (4) the probability of an accident occurring, and (5) any particular license, plant, or site.
Instead, the following premises was presented:
Given a major release of radioactive material (SST-1 Source Term) and a 10 mile EP2, can we improve upon our emergency plans so as to protect the public better than we do today?
He believes that the graded' response approach to emergency planning.results in significant improvements in public protection as compared to massive evacua-tions.
This type of emergency response emphasizes sheltering with a subsequent
. selective relocation of a limited percentage of the EPZ population. He further
1 6/22-23 Minutes of 0&EPS July 21, 1987 stated that those sites that utilize the graded response would easily meet the-NRC's early and latent fatality' safety goals, even without. reduced' source terms.
9 The following important findings were attributed to anelysis by DOE.
The individual mean early fatality risk decreases very rapidly with distance. An evacuee (with a one hour delay time) initially at 2 miles-
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from the point of release has a risk several thousand times smaller than
'anevacueeatthepointofrelease(on' site).
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Timing is important.
There is about 50 fold increase in the individual.
mean early fatality risk when the evacuation delay time is increased from 1 to 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (for evacuees initially at two miles).
1 Sheltering, followed by relocation out of the contaminated area within a reasonable time period, is an effective response to large releases,
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especially at distances greater than 2 miles.
l The Chernobyl experience is consistent with DOE analysis. All early
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fatalities and early injuries were due to on-site exposures.
Increasing the size of the EPZ could actually increase risks. There is virtually no contribution to the mean.early fatality risk beyond 10 miles.
If even more massive evacuations (larger EPZs) are utilized, the evacuation process could be slowed down, possibly to the detriment of those nearest the plant.
H. Specter stated that although the history of emergency evacuations shows a i
high degree of public conformance to the directions issued by officials, such public conformance is not required for graded response.
Here emergency actions are focused on those who are most at radiological risk and emergency workers can be depended upon to respond according to their training.
Further, the use l
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6/22-23. Minutes of 0&EPS July 21, 1987 of graded response means that the need for buses is either eliminated or sharply reduced.
For those core melt accidents where releases are significantly delayed, the source terms would be very small and available l
emergency response times would be long.
People could even walk out of the
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inner 2 miles prior to release of radioactive material. _Therefore, buses may not be necessary.
For prompt releases, buses'ma'y not be a timely response for a prompt evacuation of the inner 2 miles.
Therefore, the importance of buses has been greatly overstated. Similarly, the need for so many congregate care centers may be over done since only a small p'ortion of the EPZ would be contaminated and would require relocating people.
G. Reed questioned public conformance with evacuation guidance.
H. Specter replied that history shows that people obey orders in an' emergency.
Dr. Ritchie, Sandia, discussed the influence of heated plumes with respect to graded resportc.
With heated plumes, he stated that there is essentially no fatalities withir.10 miles, and that sheltering provides more protection and, except for a prompt release, it is.as good as evacuation. The benefit derived from sheltering are somewhat less when latent fatalities are compared to prompt fatalities, however, the benefit from sheltering is still comparable to evacuation.
Control Room Habitability:
P. Lam, AE00, briefly discussed operational data involving radiation and chlorine monitors from 1985 to 1987.
He stated that AE0D has no formal studies underway on this subject at the present time.
It was noted that some plants do not have chlorine monitors. He mentioned that if a radiation or chlorine monitor fails, the. plant manager can tag it, and the plant may continue to run for an extended period with the monitor not in working order.
He stated that the major cause of false radiation signals is equipment failure followed by personnel error. At the present time, P. Lam stated that cursory observation 1
6/?2-23 Minutes of O&EPS July 21, 1987 i
of operational data shows no trend toward improvement and where improvements are noted the reasons are not always know.
J. Hayes, NRR, and J. Driscoll, ANL, discussed the control room habitability
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survey findings.
Twelve plants have been evaluated during this program, which was completed in January of 1987. One of the'si'gnificant findings was that the updated FSARs did not reflect actual control room habitability systems.
Many surveys showed systems perforrring not as designed, e.g., unfiltered in-leakage.
It was shown, for example, that in-leakage can change the iodine protection factor significantly, in reply to a question, it was' stated that potassium iodide is provided for some control room operators but that it is the NRC Staff's position that it must not be the principal protective action.
The Staff found that during the in-plant survey that the control room's HVAC was never tested to determine if the system worked as designed. They had focused i
on component and nct systen testing.
The major conclusions reached as a result of this study are es follows:
as-built and as-operated systems are different from systems described in the DU Ill.D.3.4 submittals; capability of existing control room ventilation systems to maintain i
control room habitability and meet GDC 19 is questionable; present Technical Specifications are inadequate and erroneous; and ventilation systems are the "Rodney Dangerfield" of nuclear power plants.
l C. Nichols, NRR, discussed the safety significance of the control room habitability survey findings. They are as follows:
Changes to Tech. Spec. will be considered on a generic basis.
6/22-23 Minutes of 0&EPS. ' July 21, 1987 j,
The Staff has not completed its review of. unfiltered control room in-leakage.
With respect to dose calculations, there are many questions regarding whether the current dose calculation method-is appropriate for
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demonstrating compliance to GDC 19..
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Results of the survey will be documented, NUREG/CR-4960, and will be sent to the utilities.
In reply to a question, it was stated that enforcement action is underway at Trojan on a plant-by-plant basis.
J. Hayes noted that the IE notice did little good.
I Research on Radiation Protection and' Health Effects:
I R. Alexander, RES, discussed research activities in the radiation protection-and health effects prograns for FY 1988 and FY 1989. A peer review gr_oup is being established to review the research program. He also stated.that RES is trying to better coordinate the programs of federal agencies doing research on radiation protection.
Plans are also being made to work with National Council on Radiation Protection (NCRP).
Current research needs are as follows:.
l large uncertainties in current risk estimates (risk coefficients) used by NRC(earlyardlateeffects);
health physics technology improvement; inadequate dose and' dose rate-l measurements, due to lack of performance' criteria in' regulations; compicx c.hanges in radiation protection recommendations; occupational protection in emergencies; and development' of standards of performance for classes of licensees for occupational radiation protection.
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t-6/2?-23 Minutes of 0&EPS July 21, 1987 R. Alexander s'tated that he must develop radiation protection guidance for NRC in anticipation of new NCRP recommendations.
He wants to involve the international community in research efforts in this area.
He wants also to start research programs on neutron health effects and effects of uranium on the kianeys.
Emergercy Response (Continued) q 1
F. Rowsome, 0ak Ridge Associated Universities and formerly of NRC, discussed perspectives en emergency preparedness based upon PRA, with WASH-1400 source terms. This work by F. Rowsome is an outgrowth of the Commission study into the risk posed by Indian Point and the status of emergency preparedness for that facility.
The key question posed by the Commission:
"What risk may be 1
posed by serious accidents at Indian Point 2 and 3, including accidents not considered in the plant's design basis, pending.and after improvements..."
He stated that of the many parties to the hearing, only the NRC Staff applied reactor risk assessment to eyeluate the risk significance of emergency planning.
Based on this study the Commission decided to let Indian Point continue operating.
F. Rowsome stated that what little data exist on evacuation show no statis-tically significant correlation between planning and the speed or effectiveness of evacuation.
The biggest delay is in the decision to evacuate, not the evacuation itself.
The NRC Staff analyzed three response models as follows:
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Earthquake and hurricane accidents.
In this case evacuation is not plausible due to disruption.
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The " Evac /Reloc" model.
Evacuation may proceed as expected or as planned.
In this model public notification occurs before the beginning of the release.
The assumptions are:
(a) a two hour delay between decision and population movement, (b) population within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ-1
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6/22-23 Minutes of 0&EPS July 21, 1987 1
1 moves radially outward at-11 mph, and (c) beyond 10 miles everyone remains, those in hot spots are relocated 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after plume passage, I
and those in less contaminated areas are relocated within 7 days..(Hot spots are defined as having a projected 7-day dose of 200 rem.)
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Evacuation may fail. ' The early relocation model assumes that the j
population within 10 miles is subject to shielding factors typical of the undisturbed everyday life (SF =.1.5) for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after plume passage, relocated from hot spots after plume passage, and then relocated to areas of lesser residual contarrination after 7 days.
The results of coi e b on of risk between successful and failed evacuation for Indian Point plants for models 2 and 3 above (with and without a successful evacuation) are very similar, except that it was stated that in Indian Point i
Unit 2, hurricanes and earthquakes contributed to most of the risk, while in l
Unit 3 risks from hurricanes and earthquakes are much less important.
During the discussion it was stated by F. Rowsome that state and local civic 1
leaders want a release before they order an evacuation.
They fear liability otherwise.
If there is nu release, Price-Anderson Policy does not apply.
In addition, he further stated that state and local people are not used to making I
I prompt decisions.
Evacuation occurring before a release is probably a nonrcelistic assumption.
He further stated that there are weaknesses, distractions, and counterproductive features in emergency plans, such as the j
following:
emphasis on dose avoidance, e.g., PAGs, to the exclusion of life-
- saving, delay in public notification, and 1
emphasis on bulk evacuation on notice rather than shelter / relocation.
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6/22-23 Minutes of 0&EPS July 21, 1987 I-i In conclusion, F. Rowsome sugaested the following:
" Good Neighbcr Policy." Plants are safe enough to pose an acceptable i
risk of property damage and latent casualties (neither of which can be reduced by emergency planning) and are safe enough without locally
. j preplanned, short-term offsite emergency response.
Graded Emergency Response.
There is convincing evidence that very l
l rapid evacuation of the first mile, or so, paired with shelter /
relocatinn beyond that produces.substantially lower risk than what we have today.
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G. Reed asked if there is a "de minimis" for emergency planning.
Is a reactor l
pressure vessel failure so improbable that it is a "de minimis"? Is Chernobyl l
"de trinimis" for U.S. reactors? Further he asked if we can ever " sell" a l
scier.tific approach to emergency planning. 'In response, F. Rowsome stated that
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0 preplanning only helps with respect to early casualty control and, in turn, it l
only helps for the rapidly developing accident.
He advocates close-in l
evacuation -- and ahead of the plume, if possible in the near field.
The disruption may simplify the risk.
His final suggestion:
bring science back into emergency planning.
1 Collective Doses and Radiation Protection at Nuclear Power Plants:
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W. Kindley and R. Masse, INPO, discussed annual collective radiation exposure experience at commercial nuclear power plants. They have set goals for 1990 as 288 man-ren per unit year for PWR units and 469 man-rem per unit year for BWR l
units.
For the third year in a row, the man-rem per year' collective doses have j
l been decreasing even as more plants are being brought on-line, e.g., from 70 i
1 plants in 1983 to 82 plants in 1986.
They further stated that most plants use l
a 3-4 rem / year occupational dose administration limit.
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6/22-23, Minutes of O&EPS July 21, 1987 j
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The " hot particle" problem was discussed.
They stated that it was difficult to detect hot particles by frisking. This problem is a concern in probably 50% of
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all commercial nuclear power plants.
In reply to a question, it was stated j
that ICRP-26 says to average the dose over 100 cm2, while the NRC regulation
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l uses 1 m2 INP0 is issuing a significant event report generically addressing the " hot particle" issue.
San Onofre has developed a control program for " hot particles."
It includes new detection procedur'es and suggest extensive training in this area.
Z. Pate is writing a. letter to NCRP on this matter and has indicated that INP0 is willing to assist NCRP on this matter.
j S. Leiper, AIF, discussed the results of their study reported in'AIF/ NESP-039,
" Estimating Collective Dose in Nuclear Facilities with Emphasis on the Design l
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Process.'
In March of 1986, National Environmental Studies Projects (NESP) l published AIF/NESP-033, a report detailing the relationship between collective occupational radiation doses and NRC-mandated multi-plant backfit actions.
During the conduct of that study, it became apparent to the industry Task Force directing the contractor's work that the nuclear industry and its regulators would both benefit from having a more accurate systematic method than had been l
available up until thtt time for predicting worker doses which might be
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incurred during routine and non-routine work in radioactive areas at nuclear facilities.
To that end, the same group of industry representatives offered to direct a follow-on study to develop a predictive model that would be reasonable, practical and cost-effective.
The NESP report is the product of their effort.
In addition, the results of the study was adapted for use on a PC and demonstrated during our meeting.
G. Reed stated that this adds a lot of i
paper work on the licensees, and that they should try it out within a plant for a year before further decisions are made.
G. Cunningham, NRR, discussed the problem of " hot particles." He stated that hot particles range in size from less than 0.0001 cm (one micron) up to about 0.2 cm.
Their activity ranges from a nanocurie to millicuries.
Essentially, they are irradiated fuel fragments (" fuel fleas"), neutron activated corrosion
,s products (nearly pure Co-60 from neutron activation of Stellite), and antimony L
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124 (at Palo Verce only).
The hot particle is dNficult -to detect with' l
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conventional radiation monitoring instruments and methods. They have been
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detectedatnuclearpowerplantssinceabout.1984withdwhighly-sensitivity personnel contamination portable monitors. About 75% of power reactors now are', \\
i usina these monitors.
INP0 SEP. 42-85 and IE info Nqtice 86-43'have called
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attention to these problems.
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Skin contamination gives high beta dose to small areas ' % jn6; nc qv}dic r
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of inhalation or ingestion problems has occurredi T.ae/se hot ' particles can be _
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1 transferred offsitt by workers to their home. The maximun teta dose rate i.e.3 3{
skin from a hot particle is about 9 rads per hour pgr micro' curie (d[se avera'ghd over areas of 3 cm2 at a depth of 7 mg/cm2, per NBS Handbook 59). U U dose q
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O' limits for skin (10 CFR Part 20) are as follows:
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7.5 rem / quarter for skin of whole body, and l
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18,75 rem / quarter for (skin of) hands and forearms, feet,'tud pLles.
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[1 rem equals 1 rad for x, gamma, or beta radiation]
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G. Cunningham stated that a change to Part 20 is beink d vissed - 50 rem /
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year. Hestatedthatthereisno"hotparticleeffect."Onjthebasisof
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evaluations some years ago relative to " hot particles" in the lungs, it was y
concluded that a lower tumor incidence occurs from highly localized exposuges l
than from uniform exposures. There have been no observed effects to date from
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apparent overexposure to skin from hot particles at commercial' nuclear p0wpr; j
plants.
f EXECUTIVE SESSION Possible letters on Emergency Planning and Control Room Habitability were reviewed and commented on. The Subcommittee suagested that these matters be brought to the full ACRS in July 1987 for action.
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i July 21, 1987 i
f/?2-23 Minuter)cf,0&EPS
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NOTE: ! A transcript of the meet'*cq'is available in the NRC Public Document
'(lt Roen, 1717 H Street, NW, Weshington, D.C. or can be purchased from
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< Ace-Federal Reporters, 444 N. C.1pitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20001
- (202)'343-3700.
All documents listed on Attachment C are available in ACPS Files, y
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q' Federal Register / Vol 52, No. ice / Fr6 day, lose L em /Weeisms' 6 *.,
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or nitrogen und should not be hated in with an atteadient incmaand expeesse rooms hohrWsAlmirMM4
.5 5e Table 3.7-4 The amendment also potential to plant workers.lt escasid mise briefing on nuclear posser plant apob ould incorporate revisions to the table perpetuate erroneous mesa==4ah-e and c-
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a c M 'WD o hah correct errrmeous ncmeraclature valve / penetration relansonharm.sn the maattaan.
and uhe/ penetration relationships.
Technical Specifimtions and a refesence Oral statements may he'M
The amendment also would conect the to an incorrect test pmssure for the members d he pdes umrtur VM test pressure for the MSIVs to specify a MSIVs.
concummca d adh*
presrmre of 28 psig instesd of % Pa The A/ternative Use ofResourcas;%1s Omabunsuc warbum senemmentrasSW ong;rtal staff cvaluation (October 30.
ection does not involve the use af socepted ausd anode emmamated 4
,J 198W uad a Lt st pressure of 2a paig. but resources not previously &W A=M in Committee.Recordhags WE'he the term % pu was ermneously entered connection with the Nuclear Regulatory only d thsee pertemine * % t in the Tet bra al Specification.
Commission's Final Environmental maeeting a trene@ tr Statement dated October 7872 related to and pestions assybe enked g
Environmentallmpacts of tbc Proposed this facihty, me rs of the ssir====ttena,Me +
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Actmn A encies andPersons Corrsubd %e consatlants, and9taE Perseen A==h%r -
A Occoactiorw/Rodiolo3;icalExposure NRC staff reviewed the haensee's to anake oral sistements should seWy h.
Correctmn of the test pressure for the requsts f March 4,1987, and Aprd 21, the ACRS staff member tinmed betour as tw. and did not consult other egencies far in ebence as is pmetlomble as lhet MSIVs and correction of the nomenclature and valve / penetration or pem ns.
appropriate arrangement can be smede, relationships would had no impact on fmdmg ofNo Srgnifhmtimpact The During the initial portlan of the Commission has determmed not to meeting, the Subcommittee, along with occupational exposure Deletion of the papan an endenentalimpact any uHts consuhams who sney be valves required to be pressure tested statement for the proposed license present, may exhange pmilarinary vtsees would have a mmor impact on a mendment.
regardmg metters to be considered occupational exposure by reducing the Based upon this environmental during the balance of the meeting number of valves t.redmg testing'. ne assessment, we conc}ude that Ibe The Subcommittee w!!! them best changc. if any, wculd be a decreee in proposed action wm not have a presentations by andheid discussions occupa tional exposure.
signmcent adverse effect on the gua!!ty with representatives of the !GtC Staff, B Radiological / reports Dariras F/cnt of the human environment.
its consultants, and other innarestad Operaten or,d Acen/en!3 For further details with respect to this person regarding this review, The amendments evould have no aetion. see the request fo; amendments Further Laformation regarding topics impact on radiological release dunng dated March 4,1E as supplemented by to be discussed, whelher the meeting inal plant operutwn or mder request dated Aprff 23,1E, which ars.
has been cance!!ed or rescheduled, the
. dent conditions The valves to be available for public inspection at the Chairman's ruling on requests for the acted from the 1able 3.7-4 do not Commiuion's Public Document Room, opporturdty to repesent oral statemeses constitute leakage pathways since they 1717 H Street, NW., Washington. DC and the time allotted therefor can be are scaled by water. The staff analyr:s 20555 and at the Appling County Public obtained by a prepaid i.t.h. call to l'
for lenkge through the MSIVs was IJbrary. 301 City llall Drive, Baxley, the cognizant ACRS snaffinersber,Mr.
l originall> performed (SER dated Georgia 31513.
FJpidio lena (telephone 212/434-1414)
October 30.1WM at a test pressum of 28 mted at Bethe da MarylassL. thss zeth sin, between 815 A.M. and fua0 P.hL Puraams P anning te attend this -ah r are l
f psig The amendment to the Technical oi May LE Specification would mewly corre et an For the Naclear Ragetary Cosmosash urged to contact one of the aheve maaned erroneous entry of % Pu to the 28 psig g
y" individuals osa er teso days beface the schdM meeting to be advised of any used m the stoff analysis.
Dmctor. Prmeet Dirresentfe lM, Drrisabe of chap (a ackdals, etc., wiscM G h,on Redsloga, of finimc!s Reactor Protects-Itti.
have occurred.
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" " **I The proposed amendments invohe p, g go,3,ggay systems located entirely withm the Worton W. tharkhn, 8-restncted area as defmed in 10 CFR part ddvisory Committee on Reenctor Aniston ExecutieeDaectorforPrelrot
- 0. They do not affect non radiological h Safeguards Meeting of the Reeiew.
i plant effluents and has e no other Seccmmittu on N'<-- %w" ed p ww N m M M
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m, essass em ww o tr s i n on udes th i ere e no signMcar,t non. radiological
%e ACRS Subcomrnittee on Draft Repistory Guhtspeemence, enuronmental impacts associated with Occupational and Environtnental gy gg ggs,,y the proposed amendments.
Protection Systems wW held a meeting Alternatit e to the Proposed Actionst on June 22 and 23,1987, Rooma 1946,1717
%e Nuclear Regonatory Camademism Since we have concluded that no H Street. NW., Washington, DC has issued for pubiac comment a absit of adverse environmental tmpacts are The entire meeting wm be open to a new gnide planced for its Reguletsup l
essociated with the proposed action, public attendanca, Guide Serres.This series has been.
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any alternatis es would have equal or The agenda for the subject meeting develcped to descnbe and ineke i
l greater environrnentalimpact and need shall be as follows:
available to the pubbe such tufonameen not be selected.
Monday, fune 22,19s7--a to A.M.
as methods saaeptaban to t%e letC memE.
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The principal alternative woehl be to unt1/ the conclusion ofhuerwes for implementing specffic parts of the deny the amendments.This,in effeet, Monday, June 23, Jas7--d 30 A.M.
Comnaasson's segulatoons, '=A*P==
l muld require continuation of untilthe conclusion of businese used by the the sesEin " ~.
eceuary te:ts of those valves The Subcommittee will discuss issues specific problems arpartmasted md to be deleted from Table 3.7-4 concerning emergency plana, control acoidents, and dets needed try tastuff Au zw nt A
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REVISION 2 June 17, 1987 l
TENTATIVE AGENDA ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEM MEETING JUNE 22-23, 1987 June 22, 1987 8:30'- 8:45 a.m.
Chairman's Opening _ Statement &.Conenents 8: 45 - 11:15 a.m.
Emergency Planning - Spector NYPA with Dr. Ostermeyer or other Sandia personnel as backup (15 Minute Break at 10:30 a.m.)
i 11:15 - 12:15 p.m.
Status.of AEOD Evaluation of Radiation and Chlorine Monitors Failures and it Implications.Rosenthal/ Lam (AEOD) 12:15 - 1:15 p.m.
LUNCH j
1:15 - 2:15 p.m.
NRR Evaluation of Control Room Habitability Progran Generic Issues Jack Hayes o
Safety significance and licensing issues - Craig (NRR)
I 3:15 - 3:30 p.m.
BREAK i
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Research Programs FY '88,'89 4
Radiation Protection & Health Effects.BobAlexander(RES) 4:30 p.m.
Subcommittee Recess June 23, 1987 8:30 - 8:45 a.m.
Chairman's Comments 8:45 - 9:45 a.m.
Emergency Planning. Rowsome, OPAU 9:45 10:15 a.m.
Discussion 10:15 - 10:30 a.m.
BREAK 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.
Update on Nuclear Power Plant Occupational Exposure - Kindley, INPO 11:30 - 12:30 Compter Studies on Dose Calculations at Nuclear Power Plants - Leiper, AIF 1
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June 22-23, 1987 Occupation &
2 Environmental Protection System Meeting 12:30 - 1:00 p.m. Computer demonstration (using ACRS Office IBM 4*
computer)
LUNCH 1:00 - 2:00 p.m.
2:00 - 2:30 p.m.
Hot particles - Cunningham (NRR) requirements for portable and cleaning 2:30 - 3:00 p.m.
systems i.e., filter specification
- (J. Hayes *)
3:00 -(:45 p.m.,
Status of Emergency Plan Issues; j
u' L.4enericWbrook,4horetii5i,' kesFaFoh,..etc.s (Hernan*)
1 BREAK 3:45 - 4:00 p.m.
4:00 - 4:30 p.m.
Subcommittee Discussions, i.e., possible ACRS letters l
4:30 p.m.
Adjournment
- R. Hernan to determine speaker I
i
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t' LIS1 0F HANDOU15 q
l ACRS SUBCOMM111LL MLL11NG ON OCCUPA110NAL AND ENVIRONMEN1 AL PR01LC110N SYS1 EMS WASHING 10N, DC j
JUNE 22 AND 23, 1987 1.
Handout, H. Specter, New York Power Authority, June 22, 1987 la Handout, Dr. Len Ritchie, Sandia National Laboratory, June 22, 1987 2.
Handout, Peter Lam, ALOD/ROAB, "A Limited Review and Observations on Operational Data Involving Radiation and Chlorine Monitors f rom
)
1985 to 1987" j
3.
Handout, John Hayes, NRR/PD21, and Jack Driscoll, Argonne, Idaho Falls, June 22,1987 i
3a. Handout, Charles Nichols, NRR/ Plant Systems Branch, "NRR is Evaluating j
Saf ety Significance, of Control Room Habitability Survey Findings,"
i June 72'~~IW 7 4.
Handout, R. E. Alexander, RES, " Radiation Protection and Health Ef fects Research Programs FY 88, 89," June 22, 1987 j
S.
Handout, Frank Rowsome, Oak Ridge Associate Universities, " Perspectives on Emergency Preparedness Based Upon PRA (With WASH-1400 Source Terms)"
June 23, 1987 i
6.
Handout, Bill Kindley and Bob Masse, INPO, June 23, 1987 6.
Report, AlF/NESP-039, Atomic Industrial Forum, National Environmental Studies Project, distributed by A. Leiper and S. Cohen, " Estimating Collective Dose in Nuclear Facilities, With Emphasis on the Design Process," Lemoine J. Cunninahan, NRR/PRPB Of.M f
(.
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June 22h 1987 DATE:
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