ML20237J458
| ML20237J458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1987 |
| From: | Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| LIC-87-550, NUDOCS 8708260178 | |
| Download: ML20237J458 (6) | |
Text
-_
h Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha. Nebraska 68102 402/536 4000
@M OMM r August 7, 1987 l, <i, /dj9 l 7 lgg[
LIC-87-550
- h u~
J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Tx. 76011
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Dear Mr. Gagliardo:
SUBJECT:
1987 Annual Emergency Exercise Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) held its annual emergency exercise for the Fort Calhoun Station on July 22, 1987.
During the post-exercise critique on July 23, 1987, Mr. Nemen Terc of your office requested that OPPD provide a compilation of the individual critique items. A copy of the attached list was telefaxed to Mr. Terc on July 27, 1987.
This letter serves as the formal transmittal of the subject exercise critique items. The more serious items are shown on OPPD's list as deficiencies for timely attention, and other less serious items are designated as improvement areas.
If you require additional information or have any questions concerning these items, please contact us.
Sincerely, R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production RLA/me cc: LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector D-hh h
8703260170 070007 c'I PDR ADOCK 05000P35 i
'A F
PDH I
p (#
V asse4 tms.hmm r r a opportururu
^'
Deitciencies from Annual Exercise July 22, 1987 1.
Sirens failed to sound in Washington County, NE, within 15 minutes of declaration of Site Area Emergency, i-2.
Communications i
a)
Exchange of monitor team data-from the State of Iowa to OPPD was slow to nonexistent.
b)
A breakdown occurred in the data flow from OPPE to the State of i
Iowa operating locations, Logan, IA, and Des Moines, IA.
c)
Communications between OPPD facilities (Technical Support Center /
Control Room / Emergency Operations Facility) was poor at times.
I d)
Communications about the injured man was incorrectly transmitted to the Control Room and subsequently incorrectly to the University of Nebraska Medical Center.
3.
First aid response by OPPD was inadequate to nonexistent - EPIP-OSC-7 was not correctly followed.
4.
No procedures exist for evacuation of OPPD personnel from onsite to re-mote (Emergency Operations Facility) location nor are there procedures for monitoring evacuees when reporting to an alternate evacuation loca-tion.
5.
Augmentation a)
Did not meet the requirements of Table B-1, NUREG-0654.
1 L
b)
EPIP-0SC-2 was unclear as to which location is responsible for making pager/ call list caller notifications at the Alert level.
c)
EPIP-RR-1 does not specify a notification procedure for all posi-tions in the Recovery Organization.
I I
4 1
1 1
i l
-.____--_____--A
Improvement Areas for Annual Exercise July 22, 1987 A.
Training 1.
Emergency Operations Procedure training needed for Technical Sup-port Center personnel.
2.
Monitor teams did not adequately direct the use of protective clothing or SCBA's.
3.
Monitor teams did not adequately give consideration to contamin-ation control on or in their vehicle.
4.
Training is needed on who is to operate and how to operate record-ing equipment for press briefings.
5.
Corporate Spokesperson should utilize technical experts more dur-ing press briefings.
6.
No iodine cartridges were placed in air samplers.
7.
Individuals assigned to General Education and Training Building were not kept aware of plant conditions.
8.
Frequency of radiation surveys were not increased when significant increase in radiation levels in the area were noted.
9.
Security did not inform all incoming employees of bomb threat as they entered site.
10.
Training is needed in radio use while wearing SCBA.
11.
Training is needed on how to remove SCBA when it is potentially contaminated.
12.
Information passed by communicators should be verified before giv-ing it to another facility.
13.
Control Room Communicator needs training on establishing confer-ence calls.
14.
Need to develop and train a specific position in the use of the writing board.
15.
Injured man was not monitored for contamination initially (prompt-e().
/
16.
Mmitor teams were not briefed on plant status or conditions to expect when deployed from Techrical Support Center.
17.
Radio operator in Emergency Ornrations' Facility did not use radio properly in that he didn't 1.et the other operators know when he was going off the air.
18.
Recovery Manager didn't follow procedure EPIP-RR-10 in getting Emergency Coordinator concurrence.
f
/
o t_ _ _ _.
r
. ~.
1
'A.
Training (Continued) 19.
No RWP written for taking a PASS sample.
20.
No RP technician coverage for PASS.
21.-
Training for offsite support groups needs to include more than just supervisory personnel.
22.
Rumor control representative needs training on how to handle incom-ing phone calls from news agencies.
B.
Material 1.
RM063 primary filter element jammed - unable to use.
2.
No lead bricks were readily available to construct shield around
-RM063.
3.
A monitor vehicle stalled.
4.
The SAM II timer was not accurate.
5.
Maps of Room 81 and surgeon caps were missing from Onsite Monitor Locker. Also gloves are old, deteriorating and there were not enough sets.
6.
Inverter in a monitor vehicle failed.
7.
Need to clarify Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) board.in Emergency Operations facility for posting of OPPD PAR's along with actual state issued PAR's.
8.
Basic systems diagrams identifying major components and locations should be sent to state facilities for their reference.
9.
INP0 Nuclear Network disconnected in middle of message transmis-sion and then would not allow reaccess for a period of time.
10.
Problems were encountered with security force radios interfer-ences/ breakup.
11.
No Radiation tape or dosimeters at General Education and Training Building or warehouse.
12.
No Standard Operating Procedures in Technical Support Center.
13.
When monitor teams were deployed, no dose rate instruments were in General Education and Training. Building.
14.
Supplies of protective clothing.and step off pads at Control Room, Technical Support Center, Security Building and warehouse are inad-equate.
15.
Large scale graph paper missing from Technical Support Center.
.I
,,I..
O C.
Procedures 1.
Security procedures are needed on search priorities for bomb threat.
2.
EOF-17 update form not signed by Site Director before issuance.
- 3..
Need to.specify who writes information on writing board.
4.
RP technicians should only be assigned to one position.
5.
Need step in Recovery Manager's procedure to hold separate brief-ing for NRC upon their arrival and when time. permits.
6.
Potential exists for confusion between names for emergencies used by Security and the plant Emergency Action Level classifications.
7.
Need to define phone communication route and responsibilities be-tween Technical Support Center / Emergency Operations. Facility and' Generation Station Engineering.
D.
Facility 1.
Need to use mockup for Control Room personnel vice actually in Control Room.
2.
Alarms in Technical Support Center (fire & nuclear) made commun-ications difficult during their sounding.
3.
Noise level high at times in Emergency Operations Facility.
l 4.
Dose Assessment, Public Information and Nebraska State areas crowded - need to enlarge facility.
l l-5.
-Traffic too high through command center at Emergency Operations Facility.
6.
Replace desks in command center with tables (Emergency Operations l-Facility).
l 7.
Concern expressed about the location of PASS in a post-accident situation and subsequent radiation levels which would be encoun-tered.
E.
Scenario 1.
Lacked containment radiation levels given with no fans operating.
2.
Delta T problem occurred near end of data.
3.
Needed to prompt on plant trip.
4.
Datt not supplied for all of State sampling locations within 10 mile EPZ.
5.
Cue card missing for second explosion.
6.
Plant would have been tripped much earlier than scenario allowed.
L E.
Scenario (Continued)l 7.
5-hour fire not credible - plant. design basis is 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and anal-
' ysis shows maximum of I hour.for Room 69 if everything burns and no fire fighting action is taken.
8.
Disparity on loss of subcooling late in drill.
9.
Cue cards changed by one controller (Control Room) without ensur-ing other. facilities controllers changed their cards.
10.
Cue card for valve position and subsequent position check did not coincide.
'll.
Alarms not simulated when setpoints reached.
l 12.
Personnel exposure data was not supplied.
13.
Contamination occurred in. Security Building before any. release.
14.
SPDS plots not supplied.
15.
Failed fuel monitor data was not provided.
16.
Information about initial conditions not given at all locations.
17.
No allowance was made for the disposal of fire fighting water.
F.
Miscellaneous 1.
Disparity between OPPD PAR's and what the States recommended for issuance 2.
Need guidance from NRC on information they'll require when first arriving at Emergency Operations Facility / Technical Support Cen-ter.
3.
Disparity occurred between State and OPPD monitor results vs. pro-jected rosults.
_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _.