ML20237G861
| ML20237G861 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/11/1987 |
| From: | Vissing G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Berkow H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PROJECT-675A NUDOCS 8708140224 | |
| Download: ML20237G861 (41) | |
Text
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Tg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 August 11, 1987
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Project No. 675 l
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Herbert N. Berkow, Director Standardization and Non-Power 1
Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects FROM:
Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate
' Division of Reactor Projects III, IV V and Special Projects
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING OF NRR STAFF WITH DOE /I. T.
CORPORATION /CE CONCERNING AN APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT OF CRITERIA FOR SEVERE ACCIDENTS, AUGUST 3, 1987 INTRODUCTION A meeting was held on August 3,1987, between DOE, I.T. Corporation, Combustion Engineering and the NRR staff to introduce the DOE sponsored Advanced Reactor Severe Accident Program (ARSAP) to the NRR staff. The purpose of the meeting was to present the industry approach to resolve the severe accident issues for the Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) program. provides the attendance list for the meeting. Enclosure 2 provides the viewgraphs which were presented at the meeting.
DISCUSSION The DOE / industry approach to resolve the severe accident issues for the ALWR program will be through the development of separate topic papers on the severe accident issues which will not be addressed by the EPRI Requirements Document.
These papers will be submitted to the staff for review and approval on the CE Advanced System 80 docket. Although the topic papers for the severe accident issues will be submitted on the Advanced System 80 docket, the resolution of-the issues will be applicable to other designs in the ALWR program. The papers will be developed early in the Advanced System 80 schedule with the goal of resolving the difficult issues such that they will not impede the completion of the Advanced System 80 project for Design Certification in the 1990s. The industry requested the staff to provide resources for review of the issues.
It was recognized that such an approach to resolve issues which have not been resolved by the staff and the Commission would ultimately be addressed by the licensing boards during hearings for the Design Certification. Only then will
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8708140224 B70011 y'
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August 11, 1987 7,
the issues be completely resolved. This approach appeared to be a reasonable approach and it was indicated that the staff would work with the industry with this approach towards achieving the completion of the Design Certification for the Advanced System 80 design.
S. Vissing, Pro et Manager Standardization Non-power Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects
Enclosures:
As stated CC:
See next page O
August 11, 1987
, the issues be completely resolved. This approach appeared to be a reasonable approach and it was indicated that the staff would work with the industry with this approach towards achieving the completion of the Design Certification for the Advanced System 80 design.
Original signed by Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager Standardization and Non-power Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, Y and Special Projects
Enclosures:
As stated cc:
See next page DISTRIBUTION
'iDocket. File:
NRC PDR PDSNP Reading HBerkow w/o enclosures GVissing
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OGC-Bethesda EJordan JPartlow l
NRC Participants w/o enclosures ACRS(10) l PIlSN PDS P
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i Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Project No. 675 Advanced CESSAR i
cc: Mr. A'. E. Scherer Director l
Nuclear Licensing Combustion Engineering, Inc.
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l 1000 Prospect Hill Road Windsor, Connecticut 06095 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager Washington Nuclear Operations Combustion Engineering, Inc.
7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 1310 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 en 4
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ATTENDANCE LIST OF THE MEETING BETWEEN
~ DOE /CE/I.T. CORPORATION AND THE STAFF CONCERNING ARSAP AUGUST 3, 1987 l
NAME ORGANIZATION / PHONE NO.
Mario Fontana ITCorp.(615)481-3300 i
Paul Haas ITCorp.(615)481-3300 Guy S. Vissing.
NRR/PDSNP Paul Leech NRR/PDSNP
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T. J. Kenyon NRR/PDSNP Mark P. Rubin NRR/ DEST / SAP Herb Berkow NRR/PDSNP Steve Long NRR/DREP/RAB Ashok Thadani NRR/ DEST l
Tony Buhl-IT Corp. (615)481-3300 Tom Murley NRC/NRR-Bob Henry FAI(312)323-8750 Dan Giessing DOE George A. Davis C-E(203)285-5207 e
ADVANCED REACTO.R SEVERE ACCIDENT PROGRAM {ARSAP)
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M. H. FONTANA P.M.HAAS 1
PRESENTED TO THE
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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AUGUST 3,1987
MEETING OBJECTIVES 9
o introduce ARSAP Objective / Mission Approach Participants
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Obtain concurrence on an approach for o
arriving at a mutual basis of understanding between NRC and industry for the resolution of severe accident issues for ALWR.
Summarize severe accident issues to be l
o addressed Request that the NRC provide resources for o
review of severe accident issues I
Obtain general concurrence on schedule for o
interaction l
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ARSAP OVERVIEW o
Objective o
Mission o
ARSAP Participants o
ARSAP Approach o
Status
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DOE ARSAP OBJECTIVE i
Assist in the early resolution of risk significant severe accident issues so that they will not be 1
major issues for evolutionary advanced light water reactors during the 1990's
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DOE ARSAP MISSION l
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1.
Support vendors in DOE design l
verification program by severe accident l
assessment and analysis.
1 o
Design Evaluations Safety Analysis Report o
Input / Preparation l
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o Defense Before NRC i
2.
Input to, review, and support EPRI requirements document in severe accident areas.
3.
Achieve more generic resolution of severe accident issues -- than may occur through support of vendor certification or of EPRI requirements document -- such that they are not issues for ALWR's.
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ARSAP PARTICIPANTS DOE: Supporting Agency EG&G Idaho: Program Manager IT Corporation: Technical Director Fauske & Associates: Subtier Contractor for Analysis Methods Development IEAL: Subtier Contractor for Regulatory issues I
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ARSAP SUPPORT TO INDUSTRY Development and Application of Seve~re o
Accident Analysis Methods o
Resolution of Severe Accident issues Direct Support to ALWR Vendors o
Support for the EPRI ALWR Requirements o
Assess Regulatory Compliance Alternatives o
and Address Severe Accident Relevant Certification issues e
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ARSAP SUPPORT TO INDUSTRY (2)
Development of Severe Accident Analysis' Methods 1
i Development of Deterministic Methods o
(MAAP) l Review of Experimental Data, Benchmarking, o
Validation Guidance, tools for PRA Applications o
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ARSAP SUPPORT TO INDUSTRY (3)
Resolution of Severe Accident issues Identify, categorize, prioritize. issues o
o Write topic papers o
Obtain Industry /NRC concurrence
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o Document Resolution
ARSAP SUPPORT TO INDUSTRY - (4)
Direct Support to ALWR Vendors CE System 80+
Identify and analyze severe accident sequences Support PRA Assess severe accident mitigation features Support interaction with NRC GE-ABWR Provide direct support for MAAP Code Assist with Fission Product Modeling Assist in seismic analysis Assistin analyses of ATWS Westinghouse - APWR Track Westinghouse program and coordinate with ARSAP program a
ARSAP SUPPORT TO INDUSTRY - (5)
Support EPRI ALWR Requirements Document l
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Review, comment, write sections relevant to severe accident issues Supply input, review PRA ground rules and assumptions Provide supporting analyses as necessary O
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ARSAP SUPPORT TO INDUSTRY - (6)
Assess Regulatory Compliance Alternatives and Address Severe Accident Relevant Certification issues Support of risk based assessments of o
ineffective requirements and propose
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alternatives Regulatory assistance to vendor certification o
efforts
PARTICIPANTS IN INTERACTIONS WITH NRC l
l Combustion Engineering has Agreed with o
DOE to " Sponsor" Severe Accident issue Resolution with NRC as it Relates to System 80+ Certification ARSAP will Provide Topic Papers, Technical o
Support, and Appropriate Support for NRC/ARSAP Interactions NRC is Requested to Provide Appropriate o
Resources to Review Severe Accident Material NRC is Requested to Participate in High Level o
Management Discussions as Appropriate i
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PROPOSED SEVERE ACCIDENT ISSUF RESOLUTION PROCESS CE/ARSAP Propose identification of Issues, l
o Topic Papers, and Schedules for Presentation l
to NRC issue Sets identification and Schedule o
Completed After Agreement with NRC CE/ARSAP Present Topic Paper to NRC
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o (After Industry Review) l 1
CE/ARSAP and NRC Discuss Topic Paper f
o issues to arrive at mutual basis of l
understanding (5 mos. Allowed) f
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PROPOSED SEVERE ACCID':NT ISSUE RESOLUTION PROCESS (2)
NRC issues Written Guidance on issue o
and Criteria for Compliance issue Reviewed with ACRS as Appropriate o
NRC Writes NUREG Documenting issue o
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Resolution NRC issues SER for Specific Design o
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ISSUE RESOLUTION CAN TAKE THE FOLLO'NING FORMS issue is Resolved, No Further Actions o
Necessary issue is Resolved if Actions Agreed To o
Are implemented Meeting Criteria Design Configuration Operations Further Analysis issue is Resolved if Actions Agreed To o
Are implemented As Above, But Subject To Confirmatory Research O
TOPIC PAPERS WILL ADDRESS 1
THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS o
What is The issue?
What is The importance Of The issue To o
Reactor Safety Assessments?
What is The Status Of The Technical And.
o Research Base Pertinent To This issue?
o What Are The Outstanding Questions?
What is Required To Resolve The issue o
And Criteria For Compliance:
Further Analysis?
Design Features?
i Confirmatory Research?
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4 TOPIC PAPER SETS AND SCHEDULE.
Draft to NRC Set 1.
Resolved IDCOR/NRC issues -
Applicability to ALWRS 9/87 Set 2.
Plant Response Under Severe Accident Conditions 9/87 e
Set 3.
Probabilistic Methods 12/87 Set 4.
Risk Reduction Methods 3/88 Set 5.
Risk Results 5/88 Set 6.
Applications of Methods 7/88 e
TOPIC PAPER Set 1: RESOLVED IDCOR/NRC ISSUES -
APPLICABILITY TO ALWRS (Single Paper) o Reactor coolant system natural circulation (IDCOR issue 2) o In-vessel steam explosions and alpha mode failure (IDCOR Issue 7) o Ex-vessel heat transfer models from molten core to concrete (IDCOR Issue 10)
Fission product release prior to vessel failure o
(IDCOR issue 1) o Release model for control rod materials (IDCOR issue 3) l Release product and aerosol deposition from o
primary system (IDCOR issue 3) e
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c TOPIC PAPER SET 1: RESOLVED
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IDCOR/NRC ISSUES -
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APPLICABILITYTO ALWRST2)
Ex-vessel fission product release (during core o
- concrete interactions) (IDCOR issue 9)
Fission product and aerosol deposition in
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o containment (IDCOR issue _12)
I Amount and time of suppression pool bypass o
(IDCOR issue 13a) 4 Revaporization of fission products (IDCOR 11) o Secondary containment performance (IDCOR o
(ssue 16) (Resolved b'y design)
Modeling of emergency response (IDCOR 4
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TOPIC PAPER SET 2: PLANT RESPONSE UNDER SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS j
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i In-vessel hydrogen generation (IDCOR o
Issue 5)
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Core melt progression and vessel failure I
o (IDCOR issue 6)
Direct containment heating by ejected core o
materials (IDCOR issue 8)
Containment performance (capability, failure o
modes, isolation, bypass) (IDCOR Issue 15)
Hydrogen ignition and burning (IDCOR o
issue 17)
Fission product release during high pressure o
core ejection O
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TOPIC PAPER SET 3: PROBABILISTIC METHODS o
External events -- seismic (Fire and flood resolved by design o
Human factors -- required operator actions o
Human factors -- unexpected operator actions.
with potential adverse effect o
Human factors -- quantification of human error probabilities o
Success criteria -- partial success and mission time 1
o Common cause failures l
o identification of dominant sequences 1
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O TOPIC PAPER SET 4: RISK REDUCTION MEASURES Essential equipment performance (IDCOR o
issue 18)
Severe accident management -- plant o
equipment /information system capability e
Severe accident management -- conditions for o
safe stable states o
Mitigation features
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I TOPIC PAPER SET 5: RISK RESULTS
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Consensus on integrated severe accident j
o analysis code capability, validation, and l
application Safety goal implementation -- interpretation of o
goals and usage of PRA results in comparison with goals, including interpretation of uncertainties l
Uncertainties in plant risk -- effects of system o
analysis uncertainties Uncertainties in plant risk -- effects of o
uncertainties in severe accident analysis (Phenomenology, plant damage states, methodology)
Uncertainties in plant risk -- treatment of o
propagation of uncertainties
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Uncertainties in plant risk -- completeness of o
choice of sequences and cutoff probabilities l
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1 TOPIC PAPER l
SET 6: APPLICATIONS OF METHODS l
o Effect of severe accident issues on regulations -- probabilistic accident design j
I bases o
Effect of severe accident issues on regulations -- assessment of regulatory i
compliance alternatives l
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Effect of severe accident issues on regulations -- effectiveness of technical
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SUMMARY
CE/ DOE /ARSAP are committed to complete o
resolution of severe accident issues, consistent with the NRC Severe Accident Policy Statement,in suppod of certification of evolutionary advanced light water reactors NRC is requested to provide the resources in o
licensing and research to assure that severe accident issues are resolved consistent -in technoiogy and schedule - with ALWR certification NRC is requested to participate in high level o
management discussions with CE/ DOE /
ARSAP as appropriate to review progress, apply midcourse corrections as necessary, and assure that program objectives are being
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O APPENDIX ARSAP PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND STATUS e
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ARSAP PROGRAM STRUCTURE-The ARSAP Program is designed to support resolution of severe accident issues, keyed to the NRC Severe Accident Policy Statement WBS 1. Management and Planning Policy Development
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Program Management Organization Interfaces WBS 2. Severe Accident issue Resolution Issue Identification Topic Paper Development Issue Resolution and Documentation WBS 3. Severe Accident Analysis Methodology Selection and Development of Analysis Tools L
Review of Experimental Data and f
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Recommendations Benchmarking and Validation and f
Verification i
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ARSAP PROGRAM STRUCTURE (2)
WBS 4. PRA Methodology and Application Criteria Guidance for use of PRA in Design Guidance for Regulatory Applications of PRA Development of EPRI Functional
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P RA's l
Development of EPRI PRA Ground l
Rules and Assumptions WBS 5. Regulatory Compliance Alternatives Support of Risk Based Assessments of ineffective Requirements Proposal of Alternatives Support of Vendor /EPRI Efforts with NRC WBS 6. Certification Process Development and Support Regulatory Assistance to Vendor Certification Efforts WBS 7. Lessons Learned Notebook Annual Updates
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ARSAP PROGRAM STRUCTURE (3)
WBS 8. EPRI Requirements Document Review, Comment, and input to EPRI Requirements Document in Severe Accident Areas l
WBS 9. EPRl/ Vendor 600 MWe Plant Design and l
Certification GE Design (SBWR) Review Westinghouse Design (SPWR)
Review WBS 10.CE System 80 Plant Design and Certification Review of Severe Accident issues Relevant to CE Design Definition of Severe Accident Sequenc.es for Analysis Performance of Severe Accident Analysis Support to System 80 PRA Assessment of Severe Accident Mitigation Features Support of Final Design Approval and NRC Review Process
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f ARSAP PROGRAM STRUCTURE (4)
WBS 11.GE ABWR Plan Support MAAP User Support Assistance in Development and Applications of MAAP Model Analysis of Fission Product Particle Size --
Effect on Suppression Pool DF Support for PRA Seismic Analysis Support for ABWR ATWS Analysis WBS 12. Westinghouse APWR Piant Support Monitoring of Activities WBS 13.Chernobyl Related issues j
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ARSAP STATUS Program Plan and Implementation Plan o
Complete l
Interfaces with EPRI and Vendors Defined o
and Agreed IDCOR/NRC issue Resolution Experience o
Summarized With Relevance to ALWR's Major Severe Accident issues identified, Topic o
Papers and Schedule Identified o
MAAP and MELCOR Chosen as Prime Analytical Integrated Codes o
Use of PRA for Design Guidance Being Developed o
Severe Accident Groundrules and Assumptions Developed High Level Functional PRA Models Developed o
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ARSAP STATUS (2)
White Papers Written and Under Review for o'
Regulatory Compliance Alternatives and For.
Certification Process Development I
Report on IDCOR Lessons Learned Published o
First Draft of Lessons Learned Notebook o
j Under Review J
EPRI ALWR Requirements Document input o
j Provided for Chapter 1 and 5 Requirement of Document Chapters 1,3,4,5, o
Reviewed; involved in planning of Chapter 6 Provided PRA Related input o
External Events (Seismic)
Ground Rules and Assumptions Functional PRA Models Containment Capability and Mission Time e
ARSAP STATUS (3) l 9
Agreements in place to Support CE System o
80+ Certification f
Review Severe Accident issue Relevant to f
CE Design Define Severe Accident Sequences for f
i Analysis Perform Severe Accident Analysis Assess Severe Accident Mitigation f
Features Support Final Design Approval and NRC Review Process Defined Support for ABWR Certification o
Provide MAAP User Support Develop MAAP Model for Secondary Containment Determine Aerosol Particle Size and Effect on Suppression Pool DF Support PRA Seismic Analysis support Support ABWR ATWS Analysis Support
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Participated in U.S. Involvement in IAEA o
Chernobyl Activities j