ML20237G530

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Safety Evaluation of Util Response to Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Ltr 83-28, Equipment Classification (Reactor Trip Sys Components) TMI-1. Util Response Acceptable
ML20237G530
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1987
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20236E280 List:
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8708240116
Download: ML20237G530 (2)


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ENCLOSURE 1 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION GENERIC LtlitR 83-28 ITEM 2.1 (PART I)

EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (RTS COMPONENTS)

THREEMILEISLANDNUCLEARSTATION,UNITJ l

DOCKET NO. 50-289

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the i

operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal.

The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking j

of the undervoltage trip attachment.

Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up.

In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.

The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000 " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigate n9 the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8,1983 ),

all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted by GPU Nuclear Corporation, the licensee for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, for Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28. The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at the end of the report.

Item 2.1 (Part 1) requires the licensee to confirm that all reactor trip system components are identified, classified and treated as safety-related as indicated in the following statement:

Licenseesandapplicantishallconfirmthatallcomponentswi.use functioning is required to trip the reactor art identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.

8708240116 870812 PDR ADOCK 05000289 P

PDR 1

. 2.0 EVALUATION The licensee for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station', Unit I responded to the requirements of item 2.1 (Part 1) with an initial submittal dated November 8,1983 and an additional submittal dated May 29, 1987 The initial submittal stated that RTS components fall within the scope of systems identified i

as "important to safety" and stated that RTS components were identified as "important to safety" on plant documents that controlled activities relating to them and that replacement components are procured as "important to safety." The staff was unable to determine that this met the requirements of this generic letter item since the classification "important to safety" is not the same as

" safety-related." In a subsequent submittal the licensee described a modified component classification system which included the designation of " nuclear safety-related" for RTS components and further stated that these components were designated as such on plant documents that control activities affecting these components.

3.0 CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we find the licensee's statements confirm that a program exists for identifying, classifying and treating components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function as safety related. This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of the Generic Letter 83-28, and is therefore acceptable.

4.0 REFERENCES

1.

NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits, " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28),"

i July 8, 1983.

2.

Letter, H. D. Hukill, GPU Nuclear Corporation to D. G.

Eisenhut NRC, November 8, 1983.

3 Letter, H. D. Hukill, GPU Nuclear Corporation to Document Control Desk, NRC, May 29, 1987.

Principal Contributor:

D. Lasher Dated: