ML20237E770

Forwards Pages15-133 Through 15-139 Which Provide Summary of Criticality Safety Analysis for Recovery of U from Pellets in Gd Scrap U Recovery Facility for Info & Inclusion in Chapter 15 of Siemens Power Corp License Application

ML20237E770
Person / Time
Site:	Framatome ANP Richland
Issue date:	08/26/1998
From:	Edgar J SIEMENS POWER CORP. (FORMERLY SIEMENS NUCLEAR POWER
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
JBE:98:086, JBE:98:86, NUDOCS 9809010163
Download: ML20237E770 (14)

Text

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.:-SIEMENS August 26,1b98 JBE:98:086 U.S.' Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Part 11 License Changes, Docket 70-1257 Enclosed for your information and to include in Chapter 15 of Siemens Power Corporation's (SPC) license application are six copies each of pages15-133 through 15-139. These pages provide a summary of the criticality safety analysis for recovery of uranium from pellets in the Gadolinium Scrap Uranium Recovery Facility.

If you require additionalinformation, please contact me at 509 375-8663.

Very truly yours, James B. Edgar Staff Engineer, Licensing

/ms' Enclosures l\\/

9809010163 990826 PDR ADOCK 07001257 C

PDRg Siemens Power Corporation i

l.

Engineering & Manufacturing ~

2101 Horn Rapids Road Tel:

(509) 375-8100 I

Nuclear Division '

P.O. Box 130 Fax:

(509) 375-8402 l'

Richland, WA 99352-0130 l

t

Siemens Power Corporation - Nuclear Division EMF.2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 d

PARTll-SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REV.

37 construction (approximately 70 x 172 x 12 ft high) 11 of concrete block on poured-in-place skirt walls. The inner side of all exterior walls are insulated and covered with fire rated gypsum board. The gypsum panel joints are taped and sealed, and the interior surfaces are suitably painted. The interior partitions throughout the building, used for process

.ontrol, are either concrete block or fire rated gypsum board. The roof is made of steel deck plates supported on steel trusses, covered with insulation, and a 20-year, builtup roof system.

The fire loading of the building is kept to a minimum through monthly inspections j described in Paragraph 2.6.4 of Chapter 2 of Part 1.

Fire extinguishers are strategically positioned throughout the building and inspected T monthly. Fixed / rate-of-rise temperature sensors throughout the building provide fire alarm capability.

l 15.3.1.4 Environmental Safety 15.3.1.4.1 Qntainment/ Confinement - Material processed Iri the ELO Building is i

cont @ed or confined in open or closed primary containers for UO or UaO.

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powders and UO, pellets; tanks for uranyl nitrate (UNH); tubular glass, plastic, 2

Q fiberglass or metal columns for various solutions going through solvent extraction or lon exchange; hoods for powder and pellets; and fumaces for calcining powder and sintering pellets.

I The concrete floors in the ELO Building are sealed to be liquid tight and there i,

L are no floor. drains. Liquid effluents which could contain uranium or other I

hazardous material are treated to reduce such materials to levels. within l

regulatory limits prior to discharge.

15.3.1.4.2 Heatina. Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC)- The ELO Building has i three independent HVAC systems. The north side of the building is basically i

an office / service area recirculating-type (K26) supply system with an l

unfiltered exhaust. The southwest portion of the building is a research and I

development area with a combination once-through and recirculation (K24) supply system and a double HEPA filtered exhaust (K25) system. The southeast portion of the building is made up of engineering test operations, instrument laboratory, metallography laboratories and various chemical.

laboratories with a once-through (K45) system, double HEPA filtered POG I (K56) exhaust system. The north and south sides of the building are isolated t

with a structural wall and access to the south side is gained via an airlock.

Simplified schematic diagrams of these HVAC systems. are shown in Figures !

11-10.25 and 26.

MENOMENT APPLCATON DATE

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I September 4,1997 15-132 i

SPC ND 3330 96 (R 1/07/92)

SiemanS Power Corporation - Nuclear Division EMF-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 O

PART 11 - SAFETY DEMGNSTFATION REV.

15.3.2 Gadolinia Scrao Recoverv i

The Gadolinia Scrap Uran'ium Recovery facility (GSUR) is located in the basement of l

the ELO Building.

The function of GSUR is to purify off-spec lfication uranium streams (solids and liquids), including streams containing gadolinium oxide (gadolinia). The GSUR pellet dissolver converts UO and/or UO /Gd 0 pellets into 2

2 2 3 uranyl nitrate (UNH) feed for the solvent extraction process. The pellet dissolver is a continuous process which uses hot, concentrated nitric acid to dissolve the pellets, deionized water or recycled UNH to adjust the uranium concentration in the UNH to approximately 200 grams uranium per liter (g U/l) of UNH solution, and

finally pumps this solution to the solvent extraction feed tank.

Purification is

! achieved by solvent extraction (SX). The process for powder is essentially the same l except that powder dissolution conducted in batch-mode dissolvers and powder -

i derived UNH is filtered prior to the solvent extraction step. The product from j

l solvent extraction is a low uranium concentration UNH solution in 55 gallon drums j

that is suitable for addition into the nuclear fuel fabrication process.

l The main components of the GSUR process are:

j For Powder

1) Dissolver tank and hood;

2) Various 9.5 inch ID tanks and filters and mop sinks l

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3) Mixer / settlers, carbonate wash tank, and drip pans i

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4) UNH product barrels l

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5) Moderated five gallon storage

6) Raffinate storage tanks i

7) The facility scrubber system l

l These components are located in Rooms 51 and 53 of the ELO Building.

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For Pellets I

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1) Vacuum transfer system

2) Dissolver and oxidation tanks

3) Pump, lag storage and dump tanks

4) Boiler I

5) Vac-U-Max transfer filter and drip pans I

t These components are located in Room 52 of the ELO Building.

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t i AMENOMENT APPLCATON DATE:

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August 26,1998 15-133 l

SPC-No 3330 947 (R 1/07S2)

SicrnenS Powcr Corporation - Nuclear Division eup.2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 l

[m\\

.V PART11-SAFETY DEMONSTRATION l

REV.

15.3.2.1 Criticality Safety - Powder Criticality safety of the equipment included in this process is provided by controlling the uranium mass allowed in the dissolver tank, the geometry of the cylindrical tanks and slab mixer / settlers, the uranium concentrations in scrubber solutions and product drums.

Dissolver Tank and Hood The batch controlled powder dissolver is located in Room 53 and is a starting point l

of the operation. UOx powder is placed in the dissolver where nitric acid is added.

i j Usually, any available UNH that requires purification is blended with the dissolved 1

l uranium oxide at this step. The powder dissolver can also be used to produce i

f uranyl nitrate with a controlled free nitrate concentration by combining UNH and i 1

l nitric acid.

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l Criticality safety in the dissolver (and hood) is maintained by controlling the mass of the batch operation to 20 kg UO (17.6 kg U) and by limiting the material forms to 2

j UOx and UNH. An inventory sheet is maintained at the hood. The only uranium-j

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O bearing feed streams to this process are (1) hand addition of UOx powder and (2)

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low concentration (s; 140 gU/l) UNH from a five gallon tank. The dissolver itself is an 18 inch tall by 12.75 inch OD stainless steel tank.

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! Summarv of Accident Conditions I

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i The dissolver hood is controlled for criticality safety purposes to 20 kgs of U. The 3

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1 l process is limited to approximately 8 kg per dissolver batch for process reasons.

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Abnormal conditions include double batching. Double batches (40 kgs - which is ;

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l about 5 times the process limit) of 5 wt.% enriched UO powder in the dissolver tank, fully reflected, will result in a k,n less than 0.95.

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l Sensitivity studies show that adding more than 50 kgs of powder with a density i

near 1.5 g/cc to the dissolver, fully reflected, is needed before unacceptable k,y i

values are reached in the dissolver. This is a very large margin considering that a normal process batch is about 8 kg and that, occause of the dissolver offgas (DOG) !

system design (including over flows and drains to other favorable geometry tanks),

j fissile solutions cannot be transferred to this tank through the DOG header.

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9.5 inch ID Tanks: Filters and Map Sinks in Room 53 i

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l l The cylindrical tanks used in the solvent extraction (SX) process, which include the i I

SX tanks and the supply and metering tanks, are fabricated from 1/8 inch thick i

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' EMF-2 l

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 PART 11 -SAFETY DEMONSTRATION

. REV.

stainless steel. The tank inside diameter is 9% inches. The lengths of these tanks are either 3'3" or 5'6" depending on where they are located. The bottoms of the tanks are six inches above the floor.

Three types of UNH recycle filters are used in the process: a sock filter that is 9%

inches in diameter by 34 inches long; a basket filter that is about six inches in diameter and 12 inches long; and several cartridge filters which are two inches in diameter and 20 inches long.

A mop sink (filter pan), located in the northeast corner of Room 53, is a four inch deep by 12 inch diameter open topped cylinder welded to a 14 inch long funnel, and j

l is used to filter solids from mop and other waste water. A filter sits inside the top l

I portion of the sink. The overall length is less than 16 inches with a one inch i diameter overflow line at the top of the funnel.

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Criticality safety in this equipment is maintained by the safe geometry of the vessels l t

I and by controlling the enrichment to 5% maximum.

Summarv of Accident Conditions l

System geometry precludes a criticality accident in any of the tanks, filters, or mop l

sinks discussed in this section. The potential accident interfaces with the DOG scrubber are prevented by overflows installed on each vessel that will routinely l

l contain fissile material and by drain lines on the vessel vent lines to the scrubber.

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l Even if solutions were to get into the scrubber, the concentration will be less than i i

j 140 g U/l and would be quickly diluted by the scrubber solution.

l Mixer Settlers, Carbonate Wash Tank, and Drio Pans l

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i I The mixer settlers, carbonate wash tank and drip pans are all slab geometry. The j j carbonate wash slab tank also has a poly-mass that floats on the carboncte to j

facilitate separation of the organic and carbonate. The mixer settler and carbonate wash tanks are 6.25 inch thick horizontal slab tanks with 0.5 inch overflow holes i

centered 4.25 inches above the bottom of the tank.

The drip pan under the dissolver is s 1 inch deep. All other drip pans are s 4.0 inches deep.

Criticality safety in these vessels is maintained by the safe slab thickness for the i uranium forms allowed. Enrichment is also controlled to 5% maximum.

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j Summarv of Accident Conditions l

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1 No conditions leading to unacceptable k,,, values in these vessels were identified.

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l AMENOMENT APPLICATIONDATE:

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I August 26,1998 15-135 l

SPc-ND 3330.947 (R 1/07/92)

'Siemens Power Corporation - Nuclear Division eup.2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 PART 11 -SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REv.

UNH Product Barrel Fillina and Storaoe

' After verifying that UNH concentration is less than 140 g U/l, it is pumped to 55-gallon barrels and placed in storage. Criticality safety is maintained by controlling enrichment to 5% maximum and by controlling the uranium concentration in the UNH to a maximum of 140 g U/1 (50% of the minimum critical concentration).

Sumrnarv of Accident Conditions i

, The 55-gallon product barrel is an unfavorable geometry. The conditions that could _

l lead to a criticality accident are:

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1) Exceeding 289 g U/lin multiple drums stored edge-to-edge; l

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'2) Exceeding 450 g U/l UNH in a single drum; and

3) Exceeding 300 g U/l UO -H O in a single drum.

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2 2 The defenses against these accidents include:

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p Before UNH can go critical in a 55-gallon drum (23 inch diameter), the U concentration must exceed 450 g U/l. (Minimum critical diameter.for 450 l

g U/l UNH solution is over 25 int.hes),

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- The target solvent extraction feed concentration from the powder dissolver is 200 g U/l.

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The maximum theoretical loading using 100% tri-butyl phosphate (TBP) as l

the organic is about 435 g U/l.

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t The maximum theoretical loading using SPC's Criticality Safety approved -i j-mixture of 30 volume % TBP and 70 volume % dodecane organic is i

nominally 130 g U/l. The process make up of TBP-dodecane typically will never extract more than 95 g U/l. If organic in the proce is loaded to j

i 130 g U/l, the solvent extraction process will not work w this will be i

1 detecteo by the operator.

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The specific gravity of the UNH is measured and confirmed to be within l

established limits before the UNH is transferred to the drum.

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1 l AMENOMENT APPLCATION DATE:

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August 26,1998 15-136 l

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SiemenS Power Corporation - Nucisar Division

' EMF-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 PART 11 - SAFETY DEMONSTRATION Rev.

Moderated 5-aallon Container Storaae and Volume Controlled Oraanic Seoarator Five gallon containers are used to store moderated compounds from the GSUR process.

Criticality safety depends upon controlling the enrichment to 5%

maximum; controlling the mass to one s6fe batch per container; and maintaining a minimum 12 inch spacing between containers.

Summarv of Accident Conditions j Overmatching, flooding (between containers), and spacing violations were considered. Shauld overmatching occur, k,,is less than 0.95 for an infinite array of 4 containers on a 23 inch square pitch with a double batched container added in the I center. Overmatching is prevented by requiring an inventory label with net wt. and

! enrichment be affixed to each container. Criticality safety limit cards giving safe l

batch weights by enrichment are posted at each storage location.

Spacing j violations are prevented by metal floor grids into which the containers are set. If an l

,I array is flooded, the moderator between containers isolates containers from each other, resulting in k,,, being that of the individual container; i.e., 0.698 for a single I

batched container and 0.925 for a double batched container.

i:O e

Raffinate Storaae Tanks The raffinate storage tanks in Room 51 are 10-inch Sch. 80 polypropylene pipe with I a length of approximately 15 feet. The ID of these tanks is 9.56 inches. The tank i i

wall is % inch thick polypropylene reinforced with resin rich fiberglass. The tanks i i consist of two I:Mks of four tanks each. These tanks are used to store raffinate i until the U concentration of the raffinate is verified to meet the limits imposed on

Lagoon 3 (1000 ppm) to which the raffinate is discharged.

I The raffinate storage tanks are favorable geo.~.stry for UNH with concentration up l to 1000 g U/l and enrichments up to 6% asU.

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Summarv of Accident Conditions l

l The normal concentration of the raffinLte is about 150-250 ppm U. Concentrations !

l of up to 5 g U/l would be the result of a major process upset. Hypothetical upset conditions such as flooding due to a flow reversal can cause the feed to go to the i

product state with little ex1raction.

i Product can also be discharged to the raffinate tank instead of the product tanks if i

j the orgarac flow to the solvent extraction process is stopped. The raffinate is !

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i transferred to interim receiver tanks where the contents are checked prior to being l l

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'Siemens Power Corporation - Nuclear Division 4

EMF 2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM 1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 PART 11-SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REV.

transferred to the raffinate storage tanks. All of these tanks are favorable geometry tanks. No identified process upset could cause the raffinate storage tank contents to approach the 1200 g U/l modeled.

ELO Facility Scrubber System The scrubber system used in the ELO Facility in Room 51 consists of the following components:

1) Dissolver offgas (DOG) scrubber / stripper tanks; l

2) Makeup tank;

3) Mystaire scrubber; and

4) Mystaire scrubber surge tank I

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I The DOG receives offgas from the powder dissolver, pellet dissolver, and a mop l i

powder dissolver. This offgas is routed to two favorable geometry packed column l scrubbers which scrub NO, from the offgas stream.

A" water makeup tank is uthized to maintain the proper amount of water makeup to i

O the system.

A continuous bleedoff of scrubbed solution is discharged to the ELO drain system which automatically discharges to Lagoon 3.

The offgas that exits the DOG scrubbers is routed to the POG portion of the sys'. m I and enters upstream of the Mystaire scrubber. At this point exhaust from the SX l i

! slab tanks ano product loadout drums is combined with the DOG exhaust and enters.

t i the POG scrubber portion of the system.

The combined exhaust then passes through a Mystaire scrubber to remove any residual chemical fumes.

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' Summarv of Accident Conditions I

i Large quantities of UOx in the scrubber pads and sump or filling the Mystaire I

i scrubber with concentrated UNH solution will both result in unacceptable conditions.

I The only method of getting UOx into the scrubber is for it to be entrained in the i

scrubber offgas.

The scrubber design ensures that all offgases that have the potential for entrained UOx powder must be processed through the DOG system I

l l before it gets to the POG. It is not credible for significant amounts of UOx to enter the ELO Mystaire scrubber via this route.. Also, the pH of the UNH facility Mystaire i

scrubber solution is typically less than 3 4. Similar operating conditions in the ELO i scrubber prevent solid buildup in the ELO Mystaire scrubber, in addition, the Mystaire scrubber operates with minimal liquid hold up in the sump by design.

Multiple overflows provide control of liquid depth in the sump to safe levels.

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! measuramwonoars:

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August 26,1998 15-138 l

sPC-ND.3330 947 (R-907/92)

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Siemens Power Corporation - Nuclear Division sup.2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 Ol PART 11 - SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REv.

15.3.2.2 Criticality Safety - Pellets Criticality safety of the equipnient included in this process is provided by controlling the mass allowed in 5-gallon buckets, the geometry of the cylindrical tanks, and the form and enrichment of uranium compounds in the pump, lag storage and dump tanks and the pellet transfer system.

Vacuum Transfer System i

The vacuum transfer system, operating within a hood, is used to convey small batches j

. (approximately 5 kgs at a time) of pellets to a separator and hopper, from which the pellets j

l are discharged at frequent intervals into the dissolver tank.

l l Criticality safety in the vacuum transfer system is maintained by restricting the form of the i

uranium to 5 wt% enriched UO2 Pellets. The transfer lines are geometrically safe at 2 i I inches in diameter. The separator and hopper are geometrically safe 8.5 inch ID i

cylinders.

l Summary of Accident Conditions The separator and funnel were analyzed with UO at various pellet diameters and volume 2

of water to fuel ratios (VW,) with concrete upper reflection, because the separator is near I the ceiling, and water reflection on all other sides. The pellet diameters were varied from i

! 0.5 inch to 0.1 inch and the range of VW, used was 1.6 to 3.4. The peak reactivity for j i

j 0.10 inch diameter pellets in the separator and funnel occurs at VM,=3.4. The peak k, i

(0.931, including 20) occurred with 0.2 inch ditmeter pellets and VM,=3.0. The analysis l does not include the system's wall material.

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Dissolver and Oxidation Tanks i

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I The pellets delivered to the dissolver tank sink to the bottom, maintaining a " bed" of pellets I

several inches deep in the dissolver tank. Concentrated nitric acid is continuously pumped I

i into the bottom of the tank. Steam from the boiler is added to the nitric acid to heat it. As i

! the hot acid flows up through the pellet bed, it dissolves the pellets to make a high-

! concentration UNH. The UNH then " overflows" through a pipe near the top of the !

dissolver tank and into the oxidation tank. The high-concentration UNH in the oxidation f

tank is mixed continuously. The specific gravity of the UMI is monitored and adjusted to l

. meet the solvent extraction (SX) feed requirements of approximately 200 g U/l.

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j AMENDMENT APPLCATON DATE:

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August 12,1998 15-138a SPC-ND.3330 047 (A UO7/92)

'Siamens Powcr Corporation - Nuclear Division ew.2 i

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257

[

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PART 11-SAFETY DEMONSTRATION 2

Rev.

1 Criticality safety in the dissolver and oxidation tanks is maintained by the geometry of the i

tanks and the form and enrichment of the material in them. The dissolver tank and the oxidation tank were modeled as 43 inch long 7 inch diameter cylinders (actual ID=6 inches with the dissolver tank having maximum a height of 43 inches and the oxidation tank, 25 inches). The Pyrex glass wall material of the tanks was not included in the model. Since j

these tanks do not sit on the floor, full water reflection was assumed.

Summarv of Accident Conditions

)

j The pellet dissolver and oxidation tanks were analyzed with UO at various pellet j

2 diameters and volume of water to fuel ratios (V,/V,), which is more reactive than i

UO in nitric acid or UNH. The upper bound on the pellet diameter was 0.5 inch.

2 l Since pellets are dissolved in this equipment and get quite small, the lower bound on i

l

~ [ pellet diameter was 0.1 inch. The range of V,N, used was 1.6 to 3.4. The peak l

k,,,-(0.833, including 20) occurred with 0.2 inch diameter pellets and a V,N, of 3.2.

This model does not include the wall material of the tanks and, because the tanks i

f

! do not sit on the floor, full water reflection was assumed.

i Pumoi Lao Storaae and Dumo Tanks i

A' t

After dissolution, UNH of the correct uranium concentration (approximately 200 g j

U/l) for feed to SX is routed through the pump tank, the lag storage tanks, and then i

j the dump tank from which it is fed to the SX in Room 53 of the ELO Building, j

Criticality safety in the'se UNH tanks is maintained by the geometry of the tanks and by controlling the enrichment and form of the materialin them. The tanks have OD's of 9.75 to 10 inches and were modeled with 10 inches of UNH.

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j O; _AWENOWENT APPLCATCN DATE:

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. REV.

Summarv of Accident Conditions Calculations were performed with various concentrations of homogenous UO -H O 2 2 mixtures taking credit for ;/8 inch thick steel walls on the tanks. A 10 inch diameter of fissile material is maintained (actual tank OD), while the wall thickness is based on the volume of steel present in the actual tank, i.e.,9.75 inch ID and 10 inch OD. This assumption maximizes the fissile material present and does not overestimate the amount of steelin the tank walls. The results of these calculations

show a k,,, plus 2o of 0.953, which is slightly greater than the 0.95 limit for normal conditions, but less than the 0.97 limit for abnormal conditions. It should be noted l

that these tanks normally contain less reactive UNH and no mechanism has been l

! identified which would result in significant amounts of UO being transferred to 2

them.

l

. Additionally, the UNH tanks were evaluated at various UNH concentrations. ARH-600 shows that optimum UNH concentration occurs between 700 and 1100 g U/l.

In these calculations, no credit was taken for the steel walls. The maximum calculated k,,, plus 2o for this model is 0.816, well below the 0.95 limit. This j

j reactivity occurs at a UNH concentration of 1,060 g U/l.

l Boiler e

l i The boiler, which provides steam to tha pellet dissolver, does not contair, fissile j material. However, if the steam pressure collapses, a vacuum could be drawn on the piping to the pellet dissolver, j

Criticality safety for the boiler is maintained by its safe geometry.

i j Summarv of Accident Conditiona n

! The actual dimensions of the boiler are 10.25 inch ID and 16.75 inch inner height I

and it was assumed to be filled with 1,060 gU/l UNH.

K.,, under these conditions is O.853, inc!uding 2a.

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Vac-U-Max Transfer Filter and Drio Pans e

The Vac-U-Mex filter collects UO " dust" from the transfer system and the 4 inch 2

deep drip pans are catch basins for the dissolver, oxidation, pump and dump tanks on the north side of the room and the lag storage tanks on the west side of the room.

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August 12,1998 15-138c sPC 'JD 3330 947 (R 1/07/9?)

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'SiemenS Power Co p r tir o a on - Nuclear Division EMF-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 l

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PART ll-SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REV.

Criticality safety for these components is maintained through safe geometry.

Summarv of Accident Conditions The effects of these components were calculated in the analysis of interactions of l

components in Room 52.

l The evaluation of neutron interaction between respective tanks used a KENO.Va model of the entire room. The following is a description of the general model:

l

- The pellet dissolver, oxidation tank, separator and funnel, half-full 5-gallon l

bucket (28.9 kgs UO of 5 wt.% U s) at vacuum transfer station, and 23 2

l Vac-U-Max filter contain an optimum heterogeneous UO -H O mixture.

2 2

- The UNH tanks are fi!!ed with the optimum 1,060 g U/l UNH solution.

- The two 4 inch deep drip pans (one along part of the north wall and one along part of the west wall) are filled with 1,060 g U/l UNH solution. The drip pans contain the bottom 4 inches of the tanks which sit in them.

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V

- Concrete reflection is used for the six sides of the room.

l The interspersed moderation in the room was varied from dry to fully flooded. The I

I results show that the room is adequately suberitical with a maximum k n of 0.930 (including 20) The maximum reactivity occurred with 99% interspersed moderation.

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i A calculation was performed to address the interaction of a 5-gallon bucket of pellets (28.9 kg UO ) passing over the Vac-U-Max filter. The maximum k n under 2

o this condition is 0.888 (including 2o), which is adequately subcritical.

4 l Abnorma! conditions are the same as normal conditions, with the addition of a 5-l gallon bucket of UNH located between the pump and dump tanks and between the lag storage tanks. The buckets were filled with UNH solution at a concentration of l

1,060 g U/l. No credit is taken for the steel w6lls of the buckets. For the system l

under abnormal conditions with 5 wt% 22sU, the maximum k,n is 0.925 (including I

2c), which is adequately subcritical.

t 15.3.2.3 Radiation Protection Gadolinta scrap recovery is performed in a limited access radiation controlled area.

Personnel entering the area, who require monitoring under 10 CrR 20.1502(a), are l l required to wear radiation monitoring devices and protective clothing / equipment i

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August 12,1998 15-138d sPC ND.3330 947 (Rtob92) 1 1

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Siemens Power Corporation - Nuclear Division EMF-2 SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 PART 11 - SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REv.

appropriate for the work to be performed. Personnel are required to survey themselves prior to exiting the controlled area. Equipment leaving the controlled area must be released by Radiological Safety personnel. All personnel also receive initial and yearly refresher training on radiation protection principles and requirements.

Airbome uranium contamination is controlled by extensive use of hoods which are maintained at negative pressure and ventilated to the POG or DOG system. An example of such a hood location h a dissolver tank hood.

Routine surveys are performed and housekeeping practices are enforced to minimize 3

surface and airborne contamination in the processing areas. Air is continuously sampled and period;cally analyzed to detect any airbome contamination.

l Urine sample analyses and lung counts are periodically performed for personnel who work

. In the controlled access area. The frequencies of such testing are described in Chapter 3.

j l 15.3.2.4 Fire Protection

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The ELO Building is rated as noncombustible. Monthly inspections confirm that fire j

loading is kept to a minimum. Fire extinguishers, alarm pull boxes, and heat detectors are j

strategically placed throughout the procecs areas.

I 15.3.2.5 Environmental Safety I

l Hazardous materials are contained to prevent their introduction into the l i environment. All unit operations are served by POG vent lines or by hoods. Hoods I are maintained at a negative pressure and vented to the POG or DOG system.

I Floors are sealed and have no drains.

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i The POG and DOG systems treat and remove fumes and particulate from the I exhaust air using scrubbers, dryers and two stages of high efficiency filtration.

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(HEPA).

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All room and building air is processed through the heating, ventilation, and air i conditioning system and then HEPA filtered to remove particulate.

Certain chemically hazardous solid wastes may be disposed of in special containers !

distributed throughout the process area. These wastes are treated as hazardous {

mixed waste as appropriate and periodically transferred to a secured storage area !

for future disposal.

Liquid chemical wastes are typically routed to the surface impoundment system which is appropriately designed, constructed, and operated to I

provide safe and effective storage / treatment of these effluents.

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Aucucucut ApptcaTcuoars

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August 12,1998 15-138e l

sPC 8 WO 947 (R 1/07/92) 4 i

1 Siemens POwcr Corporation - Nuclear Division eur.2 l

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL LICENSE NO. SNM-1227, NRC DOCKET NO. 70-1257 U

PART ll -SAFETY DEMONSTRATION REV.

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15.3.3 ELO Drain System The ELO drain system collects various liquid waste streams which are generated in j

the ELO Building. Some of these sources originate in rooms that are safe batch workstations.

These sources normally do not contain significant quantities of uranium compounds; however, they have the potential to contain up to a safe batch of uranium.

Liquid waste streams received by the ELO drain system are then

discharged to Lagoon 3 which is an unfavorable geometry system. The system is operated such that allliquid waste discharges must contain s 1000 ppm U.

i The main compounds are:

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ENOMENT APPLCATION DATE:

August 12,1998 15-139 l

SPC ND.3330 947 (R 1/07/92)

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