ML20237E686

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Rev 1 to Special Rept 87-23:on 871122,fire Barrier Penetration Found Nonfunctional for Interval Greater That 7 Days.Caused by Personnel Applying Addl Force to Lever Arm Handle of Door.Roving Hourly Fire Watch Established
ML20237E686
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  
Issue date: 12/18/1987
From: Shawn Smith
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
87-23, NUDOCS 8712290126
Download: ML20237E686 (3)


Text

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 December 18, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Dest Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PIANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR SPECIAL REPORT 87-23 REVISION 1 The enclosed special report has been revised to reflect a date change in the corrective action. This event was previously reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12 on December 15, 1987.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 8712290126 871218 DR ADOCK 05000327 PDR

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An Equal Opportunity Employer L-______.

L SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT l

UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 87-23 REVISION 1 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On November 22, 1987, at 1000 EST with units 1 and 2 in mode.5 (0 percent power,.3 psig, 125 degrees F and 0 percent power, 110 psig, 121 degrees F, 4

.respectively), a fire barrier penetration (fire door C-37) was nonfunctional

.for an interval greater than seven days. The breach (Permit No. 5500) was initiated when the door-latching mechanism and door handle were determined to be nonfunctional. The fire door C-37 la located in the Control Building elevation 732.0, north end. A new door, C-37, was recently installed by Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L6860 to fulfill the requirements as stated in Code'of, Federal Regulation 10 CFR 73.55, " Requirements'for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities-in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage."

CAUSE OF EVENT A preliminary investigation of the door mechanism failure has concluded that an intermittent failure of the~Russwin 5061 electric lock set has resulted in personnel applying additional' force to the lever arm handle of the door. This-additional force produced overtorque failure in the form of spindle shear and/or roundout of.the square: spindle. keyway. The overtorque' failures

' rendered fire barrier penetration C-37 nonfunctional.

Repair of door C-37 requires the door-latching mechanism to be returned to the manufacturer (Overly Manufacturing).

The extent of'needed repair (up to replacement) will be determined by the manufacturer. 'It is anticipated an interval of several additional days;will be required to return the door to functional status.

' ANALYSIS OF EVENT This report is being. submitted in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.

During the breach interval, an hourly roving fire watch, as required by the LCO action statement, was established.

In addition, operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the fire barrier penetration was verified.

The' fire suppression system for the area was operable and would be actuated in the event of a fire to limit its propagation.

i CORRECTIVE ACTION As stated above, a roving hourly fire watch was established and fire alarms verifled operable. This action will be maintained until fire door C-37 is verlfled functional. The investigation to establish the root cause associated with the door-latching mechanism failure will continue as additional information describing the cause of failure is anticipated from the manufacturer. A review for generic implication is pursued by Condition Adverse to Quality Report (CAQR) SQp 871630.

Upon determination of the root cause which rendered fire barrier penetration C-37 inoperable, a revision of this Special Report will be submitted.

Fire door C-37 is expected to be returned to functional status by January 31, 1988.

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