ML20237E410
| ML20237E410 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1987 |
| From: | Shawn Smith TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 87-21, NUDOCS 8712280319 | |
| Download: ML20237E410 (2) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 i
December 18, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Dest Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR SPECIAL REPORT 87-21 REVISION 1 The enclosed special report has been revised to reflect a date change in the corrective action. This event was previously reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12 on December 14, 1987.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY ff
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S/. Smith Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Y
8712280319 871218 ff PDR ADOCK 05000327 S
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An Equal Opportunity Employer
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT
'l UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 87-21 REVISION 1 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT l
On November 4, 1987, at 1030 EST with units 1 and 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 3 psig, 128 degrees F and 0 percent power, 240 psig, 111 degrees F, respectively), a fire barrier penetration (fire door C-53) was nonfunctional for an interval greater than seven days. This breach (permit No. 5311) wac anticipated as Workplan 12604 was in progress pursuant to the completion of Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L6860 issued to install main control roota bullet-resistant doors.
The fire door, C-53, is located in the Control Building elevation 732.0.
CAUSE OF EVENT The time to perform all the modifications required to replace the subject door with the bullet-proof replacement was a major modification which required a time interval of several weeks to complete.
It was anticipated that these major modifications would render door C-53 inoperable for a period of greater than seven days and this was incorporated in the overall work package.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12 An hourly roving fire watch, required by the LCO action statement, was established, and the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the fire barrier penetration was verified. The fire suppression system for the area was operable and would actuate in the event of a fire to limit its propagation.
CORRECTIVE ACTION As stated above, a roving hourly fire watch was established and fire alarms verified operable. This action will be maintained until fire door C-53 la replaced and verified functional. This work is scheduled to be completed by January 31, 1988.
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