ML20237D916

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Special Rept 87-22:on 871128,fire Breach Occurred for Greater than 7 Days for Removal of Existing Pyrocrete, Drilling,Installing,Welding & Insp of Mod & Reinstallation of Pyrocrete.Fire Watch Established
ML20237D916
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 12/14/1987
From: Shawn Smith
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
87-22, NUDOCS 8712280030
Download: ML20237D916 (2)


Text

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. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Seguoyah Nuclear Plant Post Offite Box 2000 Soddy-Da*isy, Tennessee 37379 December 14,.1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Dest Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR SPECIAL REPORT 87-22 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire breach for greater than seven days. This event is reported in accordance with action statement-(a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

$b 8712280030 871214 gj PDR ADOCK 05000327 An Equal Opportunity Employer S

DCD

t SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 f J' SPECIAL* REPORT 87-22 I

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On November 28, 1987, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 4 psig, 125 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 60 psis, 117 degrees F),

a planned extended' breach (Breaching Permit No. 5502) for removal of fire retardant pyrocrete around a duct between the cable spreading room and the main control room exceeded the seven-day Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.

The breach was required for performance of Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L6860 which was issued on January 26, 1987, to fulfill 10 CFR 73.55, " Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities'in Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage."

Subsequently, Work Plan (WP) 12603 was issued as part of ECN L6860. This WP called for the removal of pyrocrete from around two ducts.

In the planning of the pyrocrete removal, the work package addressed the requirements for a fire breach and fire watch and also addressed the modification timeframe exceeding seven days, CAUSE OF EVENT j

The pyrocrete was removed in order to fulfill 10 CFR 73.55 requirements.

In planning ~ stage of the WP, it was realized that the seven-day time limit would be exceeded due to the (1) removal of existing pyrocrete, (2) drilling, instelling, welding, and inspection of the modification, and (3) reinstallation of the pyrocrete. The reinsta11ation of the pyrocrete is in itself a multi-step process involving (1) cleaning the area, (2) reinforcement in-tallation, (3) application of the pyrocrete, (4) curing of the pyrocrete, anu (5) inspection.

ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.

According to TS requirements, a roving fire watch was established to inspect the area of the breach on an hourly basis. The existing fire detection and/or suppression systems for the area were operable and would have actuated-in the J

event of a fire. There was no danger to safety-related equipment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION i

For immediate corrective action, as stated above, the fire watch was I

established and fire detection and suppression systems were verified operable.

Long-term corrective action is to return the pyrocrete to functional status

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and close Breaching Permit No. 5502 by December 19, 1987.

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