ML20237A167
| ML20237A167 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/08/1987 |
| From: | Vissing G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Scherer A ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| References | |
| PROJECT-675A, REF-GTECI-A-29, REF-GTECI-SA, TASK-A-29, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8712140305 | |
| Download: ML20237A167 (4) | |
Text
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-* # o UNITED STATES
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o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
, { .. $ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 t
} k,,***.*p' December 8, 1987 Project No. 675 l
Mr. A. E. Scherer, Director Nuclear Licensing Combustion Engineering 100 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500
Dear Mr. Scherer:
At the November 19, 1987, CESSAR-DC review kickoff meeting, it was apparent that CE was just beginning to think abcut how they would address safeguards considerations of this review.
The Severe Accident Policy includes the statement:
"The Comission also recognizes the importance of such potential contributors to severe accident risk as human performance and sabotage.
The issues of both insider and outsider sabotage threats will be carefully analyzed and, to the extent practicable, will be emphasized in the design and the operating procedures developed for new plants."
In this early stage of design, it may be useful t'o identify the following considerations relating to tne resolution of generic issue A-29 and 10 CFR 73.55 and which would support our review:
- 1. CE's proposed resolution of A-29 as it applies to the System 80+ Design.
- 2. Reactor design criteria proposed to assist or to reduce the dependence on security systems for protection against radiological sabotage.
- 3. Description of designs or design changes that implement these criteria without impeding emergency access to safety related equipment.
- 4. Analyses of insider and outsider tabotage that demonstrate the effectiveness of the design features. Methods exist, developed under NRC/RES and DOE contracts, that, although not perfect, can check for inconsistencies in the protection claimed against both insider and outsider sabotage, and there are a number of companies that could assist in performing them, if necessary.
- 5. Consideration given to the regulatory position on physical barriers in Regulatory Guide 5.65, which could impact on design of some ducts and ventilation openings. (As some equipment within the CE scope will be vital, consideration of the needs of vital barriers during building design could be beneficial.)
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-Discussion of how many decay heat removal systems would have to be
' defeated to' prevent mitigation of a loss of offsite power transient. How would this be affected by loss of cooling water to the diesel ger.erators, l or loss of other systems that may be outside the CE scope?
- Also, while it is reasonable that physical protection equipment and organization be utility specific, it would simplify licensing of sites if the identification of equipment to be protected as vital within the CE scope, was standard. rather than utility specific.
the systems and components (including piping runs and valve motor controlIt w I centers), and their locations, within.the CE scope, that should be considered vital in the sense of 13 CFR 73.2(1). It would suffice to limit the list of components to those outside the containment. In addition, CE should identify systems not within the CE scope (e.g., a service water system) that applicants vital in-securityfor licenses plans.to operate a System 80+ plant would need to list as with either 10 CFR 50.34(e) or 2.790.)(This information should be protected in accor Sincerely,
=
f Guy S. Vissing, ject Manager Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, Y and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ec: See next page i
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Combustion. Engineering, Inc.
Advanced CESSAR' Project No. 675 l '
-i' L , cc: Mr. A. E. Scherer, Director !
Nuclear Licensing Combustion Engineering, Inc.
l 1000 Prospect Hill Road j Windsor, Connecticut 06095
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.1 Mr. C. B. Brinkman, Manager I Washington. Nuclear Operations -
Combustion Engineering, Inc.
7910 Woodmont_ Avenue, Suite 1310 4 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 i
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December 8', 1987 l
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- 6. . Discussion of how many decay heat removal systems would have to be. i defeated to prevent mitigation of a loss of.offsite power transient. How '
would this be affected by loss of cooling water to the diesel generators, or loss of other systems that may be outside the CE scope?
Also, while it-is reasonable that physical protection equipment and
, . organization be utility specific, it would simplify licensing of sites if the identification of equipment to be protected as vital within the CE scope, was standard, rather than utility specific. It would be useful for CE to identify the' systems and-components (including piping runs and valve motor control centers),.and their locations, within the'CE scope,'that should be' considered vital in the sense of 10 CFR 73.2(i). It would suffice to limit the list of components to those outside-the containment. -In addition, CE should identify. systems not within the CE scope (e.g., a service water system) that applicants.for licenses to o)erate a System 80+ plant would need to list as vital in security plans. (T11s'information should be protected in accordance with either 10 CFR 50.34(e) or 2.790.)
Sincerely, original signed by Guy S. Vissing, Project Manager Standardization and Non-Power Reactor.
Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ec: .See next page DISTRIBUTION: 3 Centra 1J ile s NRC'PDR
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