ML20236X523

Application for Amend to License DPR-46,consisting of Proposed Change 49 to Tech Specs,Changing Source & Intermediate Range Monitors Loss of Negative Voltage Indication.Fee Paid

ML20236X523
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	12/01/1987
From:	Kuncl L NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20236X525	List: ML20236X523 ML20236X561
References
NUDOCS 8712090261
Download: ML20236X523 (10)

Text

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GENERAL OFFICE .

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'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission L Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.'20555-K Gentlemen:

Subject:

Proposed Change No. -49 to. Technical Specifications Cooper Nuclear Station NRC Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46 In accordance with the applicable provisions s aecified in 10CFR50, '

Nebraska ~Public: Power District requests t1at Technical

, . Specifications for Cooper Nuclear.. Station (CNS) be revised . to .,

incorporate the. changes listed below: '

Attachment Subject

1. SRM/IRM Loss of Negative Voltage Indication

2. ' Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation

3. Main Steam Line High-Flow Isolation Setpoint A discussion and the9 applicable. revised Technical Specification-pages;are contained in the attachments. The modifications to the l Technical Specifications within this proposed change have been -

evaluated with. respect to. the requirements of - 10CFR50.92. The.

results of the evaluations.are included within the attachments.

By copylof this letter and the attachments, the appropriate State'of Nebraska Offfcial is being notified in accordance with' 10CFR50.91(b).

Thisiproposed change incorporates all amendments to the CNS Facility Operating License through Amendment 111 issued September 17, 1987.

This change has been reviewed by the necessary Safety Review Committees and- payment of $150 is submitted in accordance with 10CFR170.12. In addition to the signed original, '37 copies of this submittal are also submitted for your use. Copies to the NRC -

Region. IV office and the CNS Resident Inspector are also being sent in accordance with 10CFR50.4(b)(2).

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- - , q-Pag].2 L . December 1, 1987 i Should' you have any questions ' or require additiona'l information, i l- please contact me. i Sinc ely,  ;

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L'. G. K 1 Vice-President, Nuclear LGK/grs:mh23/1-(CHNG49) I Attachment .

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- cc: H.-R. Borchert 'l Department of Health j State of Nebraska l 1

NRC Regional Office d Region IV- '

Arlington, TX ' q NRC. Resident Inspector Cooper Nuclear Station j

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Page 3 December 1, 1987 STATE OF NEBRASKA)

)ss PLATTE COUNTY )

L. G. Kuncl, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an authorized representative of the Nebraska Public Power District, a.

public corporation and political subdivision of the' State of Nebraska; that he is duly' authorized to submit this request on behalf of Nebraska Public Power District; and that the statements contained herein are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

I L. G.IKuncl N Subscribed in m presence and sworn to before me this inh day of Dom , 1987.

0b000 W. $

NOTARY PWBlit faEML WIMY4th sihkata COLLEEN M. KUTA Ily CemL Ext Aug 4,129

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c Attachment 1 Revised' Technical' Specification for SRM/IRM Loss of Negative Voltage Indication Revised.Page: 62

Reference:

1) General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL) No. 445 dated September 10, 1986, "IRM Blown Fuse Event."

Reference 1 describes an event which occurred at a BWR where both positive,and ,

negativeLDC supply voltages were lost to the Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) detectors but only the positive power was restored. The affected IRM channels appeared to be; operating normally, despite the lack of the negative supply .

voltage for which there was no indication on Control Room panels. However, in this condition the instruments were unable to process the flux signals and were in an inoperable condition. ,

Reference'l alerted utilities to this possibility . and -advised, among other things, that utilities consider adding voltage-sensing relays which would monitor each.SRM/IRM. chassis to' provide an INOP trip in response to loss of negative - supply voltage power. This INOP trip is used as an instrument

. trouble . trip and is described in detail for the IRM detection in Section VII 5.5.3.5 of the CNS Updated Safety Analysis Report. The District is planning on installing the negative voltage sensing relays ar discussed in Reference l' and proposes to revise note 10 of Table 3.2.C on page 62 of'the CNS Technical Specifications to add the loss of negative supply voltage condition to the list of functions that will produce an INOP trip.

Safety Evaluation i The implementation of this proposed change will provide for the addition of negative voltage sensing relays to the IRM and Source Range Monitor (SRM) systems. These relays will give an INOP alarm and annunciation on the Control Room panels upon loss of negative voltage to the instruments. The loss.of positive voltage to the SRM and IRM already gives'such an indication. The remaining safety functions, trips, and _ alarm circuitry of the SRM and IRM systems as described in the CNS Updated Safety Analysis Report will be unaffected.

The voltage sensing relays will be installed in accordance with applicable Quality Assurance and industrial codes and standards. All new equipment will be procured, handled, and installed per applicable controls and procedures for '

essential (safety-related) components. The relays will be designed and installed in accordance with Seismic Class I criteria as defined in IEEE Std. 344-1975. The relays and wiring will be tested and qualified to i

. mild environment standards for environmental qualification considerations, The change will not affect the physical or electrical separation of redundant

-divisions. The single failure criteria of IEEE--279 will remain in effect after the modification. The contacts of the voltage-sensing relays vill be placed in series with the primary of the INOP trip relay. The INOP trip relay is normally energized and fails open to produce an INOP trip. The negative voltage sensing relay will be a normally energized relay that will hold a set

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'of contacts closed providing continuity l to the INOP relay. Upon loss of;

negative' voltage, ~ the voltage sensing relays will fail open which opens the contacts to the INOP relay,fde-energizing the INOP relay and producing the INOP, trip. The change will not affect how the-INOP signal is received or processed in'the'RPS or Rod Block Systems.

Evaluation of'this Revision with Respect to 10CFR50.92 l The . enclosed Technical . Specification change is judged to involve no significant hazards-based on the'following:

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1. Does the' proposed license amendment involve a significant. increase in.the probability.or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?. '

Evaluation:

The proposed 1 change will add' voltage-sensing relays to the IRM and SRM neutron-monitoring systems for the' purpose of indicating 1 a loss of negative supply voltage. condition so that operators may take corret ive i

" actions and restore the instrument's operability. 'This,will improve the 1 overall dependability of the instruments because under certain conditions

-with.a loss of negative supply voltage,. instrument-inoperability is not readily apparent. The IRM has input to the Reactor Protection System and serves as a.backupfto the 120 percent APRM scram for termination of the Control Rod Drop. Accident. accident.as analyzed'in Section XIV of the CNS~

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LUpdated~ Safety Analysis Report (USAR). The SRM and'IRM also have input to the Control Rod Block System which provides no protective actions for the Design. Basis Accidents as described in the CNS USAR. The change will add the loss 1 of negative supply voltage condition to the functions that

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initiate a SRM and IRM INOP trip. The remaining safety functions, trips, and alarm' circuitry of the SRM and IRM systems as described in the USAR are unaffected and will not affect the analysis for the Control Rod Drop Accident. The. proposed change will not degrade the protective functions and will involve. no significant ' increase in the probability or consequence of the previously evaluated accident.

2. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility for a new or-different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Evaluation:

The proposed amendment.affects the SRM and IRM neutron monitoring systems by adding a new condition that will result in an instrument INOP alarm and trip. The SRM and IRM function will remain the same as described in the CNS USAR and will not create the possibility for a new or different  ;

ikind of accident from any previously evaluated. j

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3. Does the prosed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

The IRM provides the following features as described in the Technical Specifications.

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c 3 . a. Provide protection against local control rod withdrawal' errors;and  ;

,,1 1 :.'. -. ' continuous withdrawal oof control rods Jin sequence :andj providess  ;

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1 backup. protection..for the APRM for.the' Rod Drop Accident.

b. Provides' protection' against - short ' reactor periods -in the -

' intermediate range,

c. Provides through'the IRM rod block. function, local as well as gross core protection. ,

The SRM's . are provided to . monitor the core during~ periods of station shutdown'and to guide the operator during refuel'and~ shutdown conditions-.

The: proposed ariendment.will not alter the function of the'SRM and IRM

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system in carrying out the above , features and so will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

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Attachment 2

.. Revised Technical Specification For-Post-Accident Monitoring Instrumentation-Revised Pages: 67a 67b-

Reference:

1) Letter from D. G. Eisenhut to all Boiling Water Reactor Licensees dated November 1, 1983, "NUREG-0737 Technical Specifications (Generic Letter No. 83-36)"

Reference 1 requested Licensees to review their facility's Technical Specifications and to submit a-license amendment application for those items not consistent with the ' enclosed guidance or not addressed by the Specifications. A license amendment application was submitted to incorporate-

-these instruments into Table 3.2.H of Technical Specifications which was subsequently approved by Amendment 90 to the Cooper Nuclear Station Facility Operating License.

l The guidance contained in Reference 1 statied that the noble gas effluent monitors and the containment high-range radiation monitors should be operable at all times except for cold shutdown and refueling outages. However, the l: approved Technical Specifications required these monitors . to be operable at all times including during periods of cold shutdown and. refueling outages. To allow for greater ease of maintenance and testing of these instruments while the plant is shutdown and in the cold condition, Nebraska Public Power District. requests the following Technical Specification revisions be made:

4 l'. On page 67a, Table 3.2.H, add Note 1 under the minimum number of operable instrument channels for the three high-range noble gas instruments and the primary containment gross radiation monitor instruments.

2. One page 67b, add Note 1 which requires the instruments to be operable at all times except when the reactor is in cold shutdown or during a refueling outage.

Evaluation of this Revision with Respect to 10CFR50.92 The enclosed Technical Specification change is , judged to involve no significant hazards based.on the following:

1. Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Evaluation:

The proposed amendment involves the post-accident noble gas and gross containment radiation monitors that provide detection capabilities for the ranges that might exist during the extreme conditions postulated to occur during and after a loss of coolant accident. The instruments have detection and indication functions only. The amendment will allow the instruments to be inoperable during times the plcnt is in cold (<212*F) shutdown with the reactor vessel depressurized. During these plant 1

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'* conditions.the: probability of.a loss.of coolant: accident is negligible so

there will be'no demand.to have the instruments monitoring capabilities. ]

The' instruments will still be required to be. operable' 'during- all other i modes of plant operation. The proposed amendment is' consistent with previous NRC guidance (Generic , Letter ' 83-36) on these ins trument's operability requirements. The proposed amendment does not involve .a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident-previously evaluated.

12. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident-from any accident previously. evaluated?,

i Evaluation:

' The . proposed amendment affects the_ operability requirements of.

post-accident monitoring instruments that are able to measure the. effects expected : during a loss of coolant - accident. No new mode of' plant-operation'is allowed by the' amendment and current accident analysis will-remain bounding. The amendment will'not create the possibility for a new or different kind'of accident from any accident previousl evaluated. .

3. .Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction'in a' margin of safety?-

The . proposed amendment affects the . operability ' requirements of the post-accident monitoring instruments which are not required for th* safe shutdown of the ' plant. The instrumentation will remain available to monitor parameters in the event of a loss of coolant accident. The 'l instruments are used for indication only with no input to any protective systems. -The proposed amendment does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

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. Attachment 3 e

. Revised Technical Specification For

• Main-Steam-Line High-Flow Iso 1~ation Setpoint

' Revised Page: 52 Refhrence: 1) Amendment No ; 96 ' to. the Cooper N' uclear Station : Facility Operating License dated. March 17,- 1986.

The District 1 requested a Technical Specification' change ' under - emergency :

' circumstances ' when it' discovered - the maximum setpoint for mainisteam j

.high-flow' isolation.needed revision. This request was approved by Reference 1  !

which . allowed ' changing the setpoint -from .140 percent of rated steam' flow to

- 150 percent of, rated' flow. The isolation.setpoint was revised on pages 50.and 84' of the Technical Specificationsin the original submittal, however, the  ;

reference to the setpoint on page.:52, under initiation . signals'. for - a Group 1 -

isolation, was' inadvertently omitted. The. District requests that page:52 of

'the CNS q Technical l Specifications be ' revised - to indicate that- the "j main steam line high-flow isolation setpoint is < 150 percent of rated: flow as

. previously approved in Reference 1. This w'ill eliminate the ambiguity;that:

exists regarding this setpoint.

Evaluation of this Revision-with Respect to 10CFR50.92 A. The' enclosed Technical Specification change is judged to involve no l significant ha::ards . based on the following:

1. Does the proposed license amendment involve a significant increase in1 the - probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

-Evaluation:

i The proposed amendment would change the main-steam line high-flow isolation setpoint indicated on one page of the facility Technical '. Specifications fr om 5140 percent to 5 150 percent of j rated steam-flow.

Adjusting the' main-steam line high-flow isolation setpoint from .

$ .140. percent . to $ 150 percent of rated flow was previously evaluated and approved in Amendment 96 to the Cooper Nuclear Station Facility Operating License. This change will make the indicated value of the setpoint consistent throughout the Technical Specifications and is administrative in nature.

2. Does the proposed license amendment create the possibility for a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Evaluation:

The proposed amendment will make all' values of the steam high-flow isolation setpoint consistent throughout facility l-Technical Specifications. The setpoint has been previously .

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Determination:'

..The commission has provided guidance' concerning : the application of. the standardsD fore determining ; whether i a c significant - hazards '. consideration r - exists ; by providing certain ' examples -(48CFR14870) . The examples' include: 4

"(i)' A. purely l administrative change ;to Technical: Specifications! .For'

example Ja i change = to fachieve : consistency throughout the itechnicali-ls Specifications". It is' the District's belief this change request falls 4 f..

Sunderfthe;above example.

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