ML20236W385
| ML20236W385 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1987 |
| From: | Shawn Smith TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 87-20, NUDOCS 8712070431 | |
| Download: ML20236W385 (2) | |
Text
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1 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l.
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 November 25, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICEllSE DPR-77 AND DPR SPECIAL REPORT 87-20 The enclosed special report provides details concerning,FTire barrier being nonft.'.ctional for greater than seven days. This event is report.ed in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY S. J. Smit Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 8712070431 871125
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An Equal Opportunity Employer
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 SPECIAL REPORT 87-20 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On November 2, 1987, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 3 psig, 128 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 250 psig, 107 degrees F), a fire breach permit issued on October 27, 1987, for fire door A-159 (personnel and equipment access room south side of refueling floor, elevation 734, Auxiliary Building) exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.
The fire breach was issued because a broken latch rendered the fire door nonfunctional.
The door also acts as a boundary for the integrity of the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Er"losure (ABSCE). However, the ABSCE is not required in mode 5 to be drawn to a negative pressure. Subsequently, the door is not required to be functional as an ABSCE boundary in mode 5.
CAUSE OF EVENT The latching mechanism of the door was wornout due to high employee traffic during the present extended outage. The replacement parts for the broken latching mechanism could not be obtained within the seven-day limit allowed by action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.
A roving fire watch was established to inspect the affected fire zone on an hourly basis as required. The existing fire detection and suppression system for the personnel and equipment access room were operable and would have actuated in the event of a fire. Therefore,
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there was no danger to redundant safety-related equipment.
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CORRECTIVE ACTION A roving hourly fire watch was immediately established for door A-159 and will be maintained until the latching mechanism is replaced and the fire door declared functional. The integrity of this door as part of the ABSCE boundary will be verified before unit 2 enters mode 4.
No further actions are planned.
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