ML20236W099

Notice of Violation from Insp on 871001-30.Violations Noted: Failure to Properly Control Measuring & Test Equipment & to Indicate Operating Status of Component Important to Safety Such That Inadvertent Operation Prevented

ML20236W099
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	12/03/1987
From:	Barr K NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20236W086	List: ML20236W084 ML20236W099 ML20236W107
References
50-259-87-37, 50-260-87-37, 50-296-87-37, NUDOCS 8712070275
Download: ML20236W099 (2)

Text

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. ,. ',.f ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION Tennessee Valley Authority Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 l

l During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on October 1-30, 1987, violations of NRC requirements were identified. The violations involved: (1) failure to properly control Measuring and Test 1 Equipment; (2) failure to properly indicate the operating status of a component important to safety such that inadvertent' operation is prevented; and (3) failure . to have an adequate procedure for controlling core drilling operations through secondary containment boundaries.

A. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by instructions or procedures of a type appropriate to the' circumstances, i Contrary to the above, the requirement was not met in that Browns Ferry Standard Practice -14.4, Drilling, Chipping, or Altering Concrete or Masonry and Excavation, dated October 16, 1985, contained an inadequate methodology for computing secondary containment in-leakage resulting from core drilling operitions. The Standard Practice indicated that a 6-inch diameter hole through the 4.5 foot thick reactor building wall could be modeled as a square-edged orifice in an infinite diameter pipe. Basic engineering fundamentals as :ontained in the licensee's reference material for this type of calculation (Crane Technical Paper No. 410, Flow of Fluids Through Valves, Fittings and Pipe) would require this situation to be modeled as a 4.5 foot length of 6-inch diameter pipe.

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I) and is applicable to all three units.

B. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIV requires that measures shall be established for indicating the operating status of structures, systems and components of the nuclear power plant such as by tagging valves and switches to prevent inadvertent operation.

Contrary to the above, the requirement was not met on October 13, 1987, when Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump suction valve 2-74-24 was inadvertently operated by a Reactor Operator. Maintenance personnel had released the valve from a Clearance Hold Order for manual operation only on or about September 14, 1987, under the provision that the valve was not suitable to have electrical power restored. Following completion of the activity which required manual operation of the valve, the restriction over electrical operation was not maintained by tagging switches or any other mechanism. As a result, power was subsequently restored to the valve and when the operator positioned the control switch to close the valve, it's disc was driven against its seat until its associated breaker tripped on overload.

8712070275 871203 PDR ADDCK 05000259 G PDR 1

Tennessee Valley Authority 2 Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296 Browns Ferry 1, 2, and 3 License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I) and is applicable to Unit 2 only.

C. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XII requires that measures shall be established to assure that tools, gauges, and instruments used in activities affecting quality are properly controlled, calibrated and adjusted to maintain accuracy within necessary limits. ,

Contrary to the above, an instrument mechanic improperly adjusted pressure gauge E82214 which was being used in a post-modification test instruction on instrumentation used by the Reactor Protection System and Emergency Core Cooling System. The zero adjust screw on the pressure gauge was erroneously adjusted during the performance of Step 5.4.12.18 of PMT-116, Rosemount Trip Calibration System on October 6, 1987. The only authorized adjustment of the gauge is during a multi point calibration procedure traceable to the National Bureau of Standards.

l This is a Severity Level V Violation (Supplement I) and is applicable to Unit 2 only.

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are hereby required to submit to this Office within 30 days of the letter transmitting this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply including:

(1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the

! results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid l further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y*A Kenneth P. Barr Acting Assistant Director for Inspection Programs Division of TVA Projects Office of Special Projects Dated at Atlanta, Georgia thi s 3 rd. day of December 1987

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