ML20236V927
| ML20236V927 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1987 |
| From: | Shawn Smith TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 87-21, NUDOCS 8712070180 | |
| Download: ML20236V927 (2) | |
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TENNESSEE. VALLEY AUTHORITY ~
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.
Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee-37379 November 25, 1987
-U. S. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission
= Document. Control Desk'
' Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITYL-SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 21-DOCKET-NOS.- 50-327 AND 50-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR SPECIAL REPORT'87 The enclosed special report ~provides details'concerning'al fire barrier being
' nonfunctional for greater than seven-days. :This event is reported in
~ accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting' Conditions-for!
Operation 3.7.12.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY r
. Smith Plant Manager
~ Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marletta Street, NW.
Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center
-Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 l
1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339
..c NRC Inspector, Sequoyah' Nuclear Plant a
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8712070180 871125 PDR ADDCR 05000327 I
g PDR An Equal Opportunity Employer u
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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2-SPECIAL REPORT 87-21
-DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
'On' November 4, 1987, at 1030 EST with units 1 and 2 in A.de 5 (0 percent power, 3 psig, 128 degrees F and 0 percent power, 240 psig, 111 degrees F, respectively), a fire barrier. penetration-(fire door C-53) was nonfunctional for an interval greater than seven days. This breach (permit No. 5311) was anticipated as.Workplan 12604 was'in progress pursuant to the completion of Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L6860 issued to install main control room bullet-resistant doors. The fire door, C-53, is located in the Control Building elevation'732.0.
CAUSE OF EVENT The time to perform all the modifications required to replace the subject door with the bullet-proof replacement was a major modification.which required a time interval of several weeks to complete. It was anticipated that these major modifications would render door. C-53 inoperable forz a period of greater than seven days ~and this was incorporated in the overall work package.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT This report is being submitted in'accordance with the requirements of action statement (a) of LCO 3.7.12.
l An hourly roving fire watch, required by the LCO action statement, was established, and the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the fire barrier penetration was verifled. The fire suppression system for the area was operable and would actuate in the event of a fire to limit its l
propagation.
1 CORRECTIVE ACTION As stated above, a roving hourly fire watch was established and fire alarms l
verified operable. This action will be maintained until fire door C-53 is replaced and verified-functional. This work is scheduled to be completed by December 19, 1987.
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