ML20236T241

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License DPR-66
ML20236T241
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 11/24/1987
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20236T234 List:
References
NUDOCS 8712010092
Download: ML20236T241 (3)


Text

    1. ,

g o

UNITED STATES

[

g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g

p WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555

'\\.

./

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.119 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66 DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY OHIO EDISON COMPANY PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-334

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated June 9, 1987, and supplemented by letter dated August 7, 1987, Duquesne Light Company (licensee) proposed changes to the Beaver Valley Unit 1 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed Technical Specifications addressed the addition of two control room radiation monitors for the initiation of cont *ol room isolation on a high radiation signal. The provision of radiation monitors for the Unit 1 control room normal ventilation system was necessitated by a reevaluation of the dose consequences of postulated accidents as documented in the Unit 2 FSAR, Amendment 13, issued by the licensee in January, 1987, and in the Safety Evaluation related to Amendment No. 109 to the Unit 1 TS, issued May 20, 1987.

PROPOSED CHANGES The proposed changes consist of the addition of the control room isolation I

area monitors (RM-218 A & B) to TS Tables 3.3-6 and 4.3-3 and the addition of Action Statement 41 to TS Table 3.3-6.

REVIEW CRITERIA / REQUIREMENTS (1) Safety Evaluation related to Amendment No. 109 to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications, issued May 20, 1987.

(?) NUREG-0452, Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors, Revision 4.

(3) NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan, Revision 2, Section 6.4, Control Room Habitability System.

hk P

1

\\

EVALUATION j

i Unit 2 FSAR Amendment 13, issued by the licensee in January, 19P7, described a i

reevaluation of the dose consequences of postulated accidents in which the small-line break outside containment was determined to produce the most severe dose consequences for the control room operator, rather than the large-break LOCA.

Due to a common control room envelope, this reevaluation necessitated the pro-vision of radiation monitors for the Unit 1 control room normal ventilation systems, whereas none was required previously to protect control i

roon, operators from a large-break LOCA. Such radiation monitors were not pre-viously required when the large-break LOCA was the limiting accident because (1) containment systems are designed to return the containment to a sub-atmospheric condition within one hour following a large-break LOCA, thereby limiting any radiation release and (2) containment isolation signals automat-icall.y isolate and pressurize the control room during this tin.e interval to insure no net radioactive in-leakage.

The radiation monitors incorporated in the ventilation system associated with the Unit 1 control room are designed to initiate control room isolation and pressurization in the event of radioactive in-leakage. Control room ventila-tion isolation and actuation of the bottled air pressurization system will occur on receipt of a high control room radiation signal from either Unit 1 cr 2, thereby providing a level of redundancy.

(For details of the design and the staff's evaluation, see the Safety Evaluation supporting Amendment No. 109).

The proposed Technical Specifications would require a minimum of two radiation monitors, each on a separate power train, to be available from the combined Unit 1 and Unit 2 systems (Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 and Modes 5 and 6 during move-6 ment of fuel or movement of loads over irradiated fuel, in either unit). The included Action Statement identifies steps to be taken by the licensee in the i

event the required number of monitors are not available. Therefcre, we conclude i

that the licensee's proposal to modify Technical Specification Tables 3.3-6 and 4.3.3-3 is acceptable.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION This amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and in surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical ex-clusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). F'ursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environ-mental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in ccnnec-tion with the issuance of this amendment.

m __

.?

CONCLUSION I

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: October 8,1987 Principal Contributor:

Robert M. Loesch, reviewer l

l 1

_. - _ _ _ _. _ _. _ _ _.. _ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _