ML20236R413
| ML20236R413 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 11/18/1987 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8711230263 | |
| Download: ML20236R413 (2) | |
Text
1 o
NOV I 8198f In. Reply Refer To:
Docket:
50-285 Omaha Public Power. District 3
ATTN:
R. L. Andrews, Division Manager-J Nuclear Production 4
1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Gentlemen:.
Attached is.a copy of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Region VII exercise evaluation report of the July 22, 1987, Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station exercise, j
The report indicates that FEMA observed one' defic'iency, and that it has been corrected.
If you have any questions please contact Mr. Nemen M. Terc at (817) 860-8129.
A. B. Beach g L. J.. Callan, Director Division of Reactor Projects I
cc w/ attachment:
W. G. Gates, Manager Fort Calhoun Station P. D. Box.399 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 Harry H. Voigt, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae i
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, NW l
Washington, D. C.
20036 Director j
Nebraska Civil Defense Agency 1300 Military Road 4
Lincoln, Nebraska 68508 Kansas Radiation Control Program Director j
Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director l
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D:DRP-AI 87-450 rc;ap WLFisher TFWesterman LJCallan
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Omaha Public Power District cc w/o attachment:
Program Manager FEMA Region 7 911 Walnut Street, Room 300 Kansas City, Missouri 64106 bec w/ attachment DMB (A045)c/'
l Resident Inspector l
Section Chief DRP/B l
NMTerc RIV File bcc w/o attachment:
RDMartin l
RLBangart REHall l
WLFisher l
Project Inspector, DRP/B DRS DRP NMEPB MIS System GFSanborn DBMatthews, NRR
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, i Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Washington, D.C. 20472 N.
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- y. upJ MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Congel g
Director 1
Division of Radiation Protection gg and Emergency Preparedness
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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Re ulatory Commission FROM:
Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological C
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Hazards Programs
SUBJECT:
Exercise Report of the July 22, 1987, Exercise of the Iowa and Nebraska Offsite Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans for the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station.
This is to transmit a copy of the Exercise Report of the July 22,1987, joint j
exercise of the offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Fort J
Calhoun Nuclear Station, located in Blair, Washington County, Nebraska. This was a joint exercise for the States of Iowa and Nebraska (full participation)*
1 Harrison and Pottawattamie counties in Iowa: Sarpy and Washington counties in q
Nebraska; and, the Omaha Public Power District. The counties are impacted by i
the Fort Calhoun plume exposure 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), The final report dated September 24, 1987, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region VII.
]
In the July 22, 1987, exercise there was one deficiency observed.
It was a failure to alert all residents in the Washington County portion of the EPZ within 15 minutes. The State of Nebraska was notified in writing on July 31, 4
1987, that it was required to develop a standard operating procedure (S0P) for the sounding of sirens and train the siren operator in the S0P within thi rty. days.
FEMA Region VII acknowledged to Nebraska that the State had complied with this requirement on September 3,1987.
Based on the results of the exercise activity, it is FEMA's view that there was nothing that adversely impacted the FEMA approval in December 1984 for Nebraska and in May 1987 for Iowa of their offsite radiological emergency preparedness plans site-specific to the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station under 44 CFR 350. Therefore, FEMA continues to find that there is reasonable assurance that offsite preparedness is adequate to protect the public health and safety in the Fort Calhoun EPZ.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 646-2871.
Attachment As Stated Ahhh jBS D
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Q' s
i EIERCISE EVALUATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF STATE l
AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCT RESPONSE PVES-for the FORT CALBOUN NUCLEAR STATION Blair, Washington County, Nebraska Omaha Public Power District, Licensee EXERCISE CONDUCTED July 22, 1987
Participants:
State of Nebraska State of Iowa County of Harrison County of Sarpy County of Pottawattamie County of Washington (All affected jurisdictions participated) prepared by Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VII Eansas City, MO September 24, 1987 J.D. Overstreet, Regional Director
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CONTENTS AB3REVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS...................................i11 vi EXERCISE
SUMMARY
1 1
INTRODUCTION............................................
1 1.1 Exercise Background................................
1 1.2 Exercise Evaluators................................
2 1.3 Evaluation Criteria................................
3 1.4 Exercise Objectives................................
4 1.5 Exercise Scenario..................................
4 1.6 State and Local Resources..........................
6 2
EXERCISE EVALUATION.....................................
6 2.1 Nebraska Operations................................
6 2.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center...........
7 2.1.2 State Field Command Post....................
9 2.1.3 Information Authentication Center...........
10 2.1.4 Media Release Center........................
2.1.5 Dose Assessment and Field Team Coord........
12 13 2.1.6 Field Monitoring............................
2.1.7 State Radiological Laboratory...............
14 16 2.2 County Operations..................................
2.2.1 Washington Co. Emergency Operations Center., 16 2.2.2 Decontamination Center - Dana College.......
19 2.2.3 Blair Rescue Squad and UNMC Hospital........
19 20 2.2.4 Sarpy County Emergency Operations Center....
2.2.5 Sarpy Co. Evacuee Registration and Care.....
21 22 2.2.6 Sarpy County Evacuee Decontamination........
23 2.3 Iowa State Operations..............................
23 2.3.1 Emers. Operations Center - Dose Assessment..
25 2.3.2 Forward Command Post........................
28 2.3.3 Media Release Center........................
30 2.3.4 Field Team Coordination.....................
31 2.3.5 Field Monitoring............................
2.3.6 Pottawattamie Co. Emers. Operations Center.. 33 34 2.3.7 Missouri Valley Ambulance & UNHC............
2.3.8 Council Bluffs Ambulance & Clarkson Hosp....
35 37 3
SCENARIO................................................
4
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCY AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE 38 ACTION................................................
38 4.1 Deficiency.........,...............................
38 4.2 Areas Requiring Corrective Action..................
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0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACBORYMS ANL Argonne National Laboratory BLUEBIRD Nebraska State Patrol Mobile Emergency Communications Center CD Civil Defense CRUSH Nebraska Civil Defense Portable Operations
- Center (Field Command Post)
DOE U.S.-Department of Energy DOI U.S. Department of Interior DOT U.S. Department of Transportation EBS Emergency Broadcast System EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FAA Federal Aviation Administration FCNS Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station FCP Forward Command Post l
FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration j
FEMA Federal Emergency Management A'gency FHWA*
Federal Highway Administration FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan HCEOC Harrison County (IA) Emergency Operations Center IAC Information Authentication Center 1
IDOT Iowa Department of Transportation INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory ING Iowa National Guard
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c ISDH Iowa State Department of Health ISP Iowa State Patrol 4
KI P'otassium Iodide I
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MRC Media Release Center NPPD Nebraska Public Power District i
i NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 0654 Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of l
Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (1980).
i ODS Iowa Office of Disaster Services l
OPPD Omaha Public Power District PAG Protective Action. Guidelines PAR Protective Action Recommendations PCEOC Pottawattamie County (IA) Emergency Operations Center l
l PHS Public Health Service l
l PIO Public Information Center
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RAC Regional Assistance Committee 1
l RCIC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan
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SCP (Iowa) State Compensatory Plan SEOC State Emergency Operations Center j
SOP Standard Operating Procedures SCDA State Civil Defense Agency TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter l
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UNMC University of Nebraska Medical Center 1
USDA-U.S.. Department of. Agriculture i
WCEOC Washington County INE)'Energency Operations Center 1
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EXERCISE
SUMMARY
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l The purpose of an exercise is to determine the ability of f
the various off-site agencies to respond to an emergency covered by State and local-Radiological Emergency Response plans.
The I
evaluation of such an effort will, of necessity, tend to focus on the negative aspects of the exercise, on inadequacies in plan-ning, preparedness and performance.
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j This summary's focus on the negative should not be taken to mean that there were not a great many positive accomplishments as well.
Indeed, there were.
But in the interest of brevity, only j
inadequacies will herein be summarized.
FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or ar-eas requiring corrective actions, f
Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed-inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate i
protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of a radiological emergency.
j Area reauiring corrective actions are demonstrated and ob-served inadequacies of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required, they are not consid-
- ered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.
In addition, FEMA identifies areas recommended for improve-
- ment, which are problem areas observed during an exercise that I
are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety.
While not
- required, correction of these would. enhance an organization's level of preparedness.
In several instances, objectives are judged to have been only partially demonstrated.
A partial demonstration need not lead to an inadequacy.
It can result from limits of demonstra-tion imposed by the scenario, or the choice of one response option over another.
NEBRASKA OPERATIONS State Energency Operations Center (SEOC)
While the staff of this facility performed well, there was a j
problem in the notification chain.
The licensee notified the Ne-i braska State patrol at 0820 that an Alert had been declared at 0818.
- However, this was not relayed to the SEOC until 0842.
Since this is the message that triggers deployment of the Forward i
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Command Post to the EOF, the consequences of this excessive time period are evident.
This will be an area requiring corrective action through a timely demonstration at the next exercise.
State Field Command Post (FCP)
The major functions of this operation were adequately per-
- formed, placing the Governor's representative at the nexus of command and control activities, just as the State's plan pro-vides.
No areas' requiring corrective action were observed.
Information Authentication Center (IAC)
This facility had responsibility of formulating EBS messages after the initial notification.
At the General Emergency, the message containing protective action recommendation did not uti-lize landmark descriptions in describing the affected areas.
This will be an area requiring corrective action at the next ex-ercise.
Media Release Center (MRC)
The key actions scheduled for demonstration were generally done well.
- However, a temporary hot line established for rumor control was not properly staffed at the SEOC where the number rang in.
This will be an area requiring corrective action at the next exercise.
Radiological A'ssessment and Field Team _ Coordination i
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Both these functions were adequately performed, with no ar-eas requiring corrective action being observed.
Field Monitoring Teams Two teams were deployed, and all objectives were demon-strated by~both teams.
State Radiological Laboratory proper procedures were observed in the demonstration of j
sample analyses.
Washington County Emergency Operation Center At the time of declaration of the Site Area Emergency, the sirens were ordered to be sounded.
The dispatcher who was re-sponsible for this action did not use the proper radio frequency, sounding only the sirens in the town of Blair.
The sirens in the rest of the county did not sound at this time.
When the error was discovered and rectified, 43 minutes had elapsed from the time of initial notification.
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Failure to alert the total population within 15 ainutes is a deficiency.
FEMA Region VII required the development of a
Sop / checklist within 30 days.
This was accomplished and the re-medial action acknowledged on September 3, 1987.
Two areas requiring corrective actionzwere also observed.
The first calls for a more accurate method of recording, confirming and distributing messages during the course of an emergency.
The second requires the provision of low rang'e dosimeters for the EOC staff.
Washington County Emergency Worker Decontamination All planned objectives were fully demonstrated at this fa-cility.
Blair Rescue Sq.uad and University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC)
All planned objectives were fully demonstrated by both orga-nizations.
Sarpy County Emergency Operations Center No areas requiring corrective action were observed at this location.
Sarpy County Evacuee Registration and Care No second shift roster was available.
This will require corrective action at the next exercise..
Sarpy County Evacuee Decontamination All objectives planned for demons'tration at this site were accomplished.
IOWA OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center - Including Dose Assessment The major command and control functions, as well as the dose assessment function, were successfully carried out with one ex-ception.
The decision to administer KI was erroneous and will require corrective action at the next exercise.
Forward Command Post (FCP)
There were three areas cited that will require corrective action:
(1) There was not demonstration of mobilization of local l
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staff through use of " call up" procedures.
They had simply been informed on the previous day to report to the FCp.
(2) The ODS Liaison erroneously transcribed a message containing sector des-1 ignations.
Correct affected sectors where E, F,
G, and H.
He omitted H.
(3) The person charged with distribution of dosimetry was not aware of the maximum dose allowed without authorization.
All of these will require corrective demonstration at the next exercise.
Media Release Center (MRC)
Two areas requiring corrective action were observed:
(1)
Mobilization call-up procedures were not demonstrated.
Staff simply reported at predetermined time, and; (2) press briefings 4
and releases referred to affected areas by sector designations l
instead of landmark descriptions.
Both of these must be demonstrated at the next exercise ~.
Field Team Coordination l
l No sreas requiring corrective action were observed.
1 Field Team Monitoring 1
i Two teams were used in this exercise.
The following com-ments relate only to the " Blue" team from Ames, Iowa.
j They failed to demonstrate proper instrumentation procedures l
i for measuring ambient radiation levels.
In measuring airborne re.dioiodine concentrations, they failed to account for instrument i
efficiency and got erroneously high readings.
They also failed l
to properly bag and label samples of soil and vegetation.
i All of these are areas requiring training and successful demonstration at the next exercise.
pottawattamie County Emergency Operations Center No areas requiring corrective action were observed at this l
facility.
Missouri Valley Ambulance Aside from a' failure to cover the survey probe with plastic, all functions were performed well.
Council Bluffs Ambulance and Clarkson Rosoital The ambulance crew performed well with the exception of a
too rapid use of the survey instrument.
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Clarkson Hospital exercised for the first time.
The;.
per-formed adequately, but would have done better if SOPS had been readily available.
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1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACIGROUND Radiological emergency response plans for the Fort, Calhoun Nuclear Station (FCNS) for the Staten of Iowa and Nebraska and affected local jurisdictions have been approved by FEMA.
The Nebraska State and local port' ions of those plans were approved by FEMA on' December 3, 1984.
The Iowa State Plans were approved on May 6, 1987.
Both approvals are conditioned upon final approval of the Alert & Notification System.
This joint radiological emergency preparedness exercise was i
conducted for the FCNS on July 22, 1987.
'It was classified as full participation for both states.
The results of the exercise i
are presented in this' report.
The exercise was conducted between l
the hours of 0800 and 1500.
The plans exercised included the l
Iowa Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the. Iowa State Compen-satory Plan, the Nebraska Radiological Emergency Response
- Plan, and the Sarpy and Washington County, Nebraska, Radiological Emer-gency Response Plans.
This scenario did not require activation of the Dodge County EOC.
Previous exercises for this ~ facility were held July 22, 1981, September 15, 1982, December 6-7,
- 1983, October 24, 1984, July 24, 1985, and June 25, 1986.
This is the beginning of a new six year cycle.
1.2 EXERCTSE EVALUATORS Sixteen Federal Agency personnel and eleven FEMA contract personnel evaluated the off-site emergency response functions.
j Evaluators and their assignments are listed below:
Observer Agenev Assignment Wo'lf Biedenfeld PHS Medic Bob Bissell FEMA NE FCP/IA ROF John Bowlin FEMA Pottawattamie Co. EOC Bill Brinck EPA NE Dose Assessment & F.T.
l Coordination Mike Browne DOT (FHWA)
Sarpy Co. BOC-l Tim Burke ARC Sarpy Co. Relocation & Mass 1
Care I
Marlee Carroll FEMA IA FCP Tom Carroll ANL Sarpy Co. Registration /Decon j
Nate Chipman INEL.
IA Field Team Coordination Carol Coleman FEMA IA SEOC John Coleman FEMA IA MRC Ed Hakala ANL NE Worker Decon/ Crush &
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E_________________-_
Bluebird Carolyn Herzenberg ANL IA Dose Assessment Gerald Jacobson FDA Washington Co. EOC Rich Leonard FEMA
- Overview, Mark Lickers USCG IA FCP Gary McClure FEMA NE SEOC Bob Nebeker INEL NE Field Monitoring Jim Opelka ANL NE RAD LAB Gary Sanborn NRC NE IAC Ed Sears ANL IA Field Monitoring Tim Seidel FEMA
.NE.MRC
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Dee Seymour ANL Washington Co. EOC 1
Lyle Slagle INEL NE Field Monitoring l
I Dick Sumpter FEMA Overview f
Dianne Wilson FEMA
'IA SEOC Frank Wilson-ANL IA Field Monitoring 1.3 EVALUATION CRITERIA The evaluation criteria for this exercise were:
1 1.
NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.'l (All Applicable require-ments).
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1 2.
The 35 Objectives used by FEMA serves as a composite j
of the exercise demonstrable elements contained in NUREG-0654.
These objectives will be referenced by number throughout the report.
3.
Nebraska Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, March 31, 1986, (with all current changes and amendments, thereto).
4.
Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, Washington County, Nebraska.
5.
Suelear Incident Reception Plan, Sarpy County, Nebraska.
6.
Iowa Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Section B, Nuclear Power Plant Accident / Incident (Rev. 12/84).
7.
Chapter 12, " Fort Calhoun Station Site Response Plan" of No. 6 above, February 1986, (Also referred to as " Iowa Compensatory Plan".)
1.4 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES
'On March 18,
- 1987, the State of Iowa, Office of Disaster Services (ODS) submitted off-site objectives for the exercise.
On May 7, 1987, the Nebraska State Civil Defense Agency sub-mitted its list of exercise objectives.
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I Copies of lists from both states rollow, l
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1 STATE OF NEB.RASKA STATE CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY l
KAY A. ORR ST ANLE) \\1. HENG
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i SCENARIO FORT CALHOUN NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ANNUAL EXERCISE 22 July 1987 INTRODUCTION The licensing procedures of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) require each nuclear power plant to hold an annual emergency exercise.
Also, the State of Nebraska has to demonstrate that State and local radiological emergency situation. plans and operations are adequate to cope : with emergency response an Thus, the combination of these two annual require-ments will test the integrated capabilities and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans of the licens-ee, and State and local governments.
The NRC also requires (10 CFR Part 50) that exercises test as much of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public particip)ation.Exercises may be full or partial in scope.(on an alternating basis as defined in NRC and FEMA guidelines.
The. exercise' will simulate an emergency resulting in offsite r' radiological releases that will require response by offsite authorities. This will include mobilization of State and local personnel and limited material resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to the conditions simulated.
In some cases due to the short exercise time available as well as the ongoing activities-of the State and local agencies involved, certain simulations related to such - matters as mobilization of personnel and i
equipment resources will be necessary.
These simulations will be clearly acted in exercise logs and other control mechanisms.
The exercise conducted' 25 June 1986 at this facility was considered a
" partial exercise" as defined in 44 CFR Part 350.
This exercise will be considered a " full exercise" as defined by the above referenced CFR.
i Ten copies of this scenario will be sent to FEMA Region VII for use in
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advance materials provided for RAC observers.
Other observer arrangements will be published by responsible agencies concerneds Also, consult Nebraska Plan, Basic, Paragraph 8.b. for further inferination.
STATE CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCY.1300 MILITARY ROAD LINCOLN. NEBRA5KA 6aS061990, PHONE (402) 4713241 ]
AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY / AFFIRMATIVE ACTION EMPLOYER
. II. OBJECTIVES OF THE EXERCISE A.
Test the Fort Calhoun Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Plan to include:
1.
Interface with offsite government agencies 2.
Initial notification to State government 3.
Coordination of dose assessment activities 4.
Public warning interface 5.
Jointly conducted public infomation-B.
The following State support capabilities as listed in the Nebraska Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents will be tested.
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1.
State EOC a.
Mobilize staff and activate facilities, to include hour capability.
(FEMA Objectives 1 & 2).
Twenty-four hour capability will be demonstrated by double staffing the position of Operations Officer and by presentation of rosters for supporting personnel.
b.
Implement operational status and functions to include:
Notification and follow-up contacts with State, Federal,
local governments and private organizations; decision-making and coordination; and, use of visual aides.
(FEMA Objec-tives 3 & 4) c.
Demonstrate primary and back-up communications with appro-priate locations, organizations, and field elements.
(FEMA Objective 5) d.
Fomulate appropriate public' infomation releases; coorci-nate with IAC, when activated, prior to release; participate in appropriate rumor control functions.
(FEMA Objectives 25, & 26) e.
Support local government and coordinate State resources to 1
insure adequate capabilities exist to manage an orderly
)
evacuation, including:
access control and evacuation j
impediments.
(FEMA Objectives 15, 16, & 17) i f.
Identify the need for, and request Federal assistance.
(FEMA objective 32)
Support recovery and reentry (planning, including ' decisions g.
to relax protective actions.
FEMA Objective 35) h.
Coordinate ingestion pathway activities within the State E00 for the Plume EPZ area.
. 2.
FCP/ EOF (Governor's - Authorized Representative) a.
' Mobilize staff and activate facilities, to include 24-hour capability.
(FEMA Objectives 1& 2).
Twenty-four hour capability will 'be demonstrated by double staffing the positions of Governor's Authorized Representative (Director) and Field Operations Assistant 'and by presentation of rosters for supporting personnel.
b.
Implement operational status and functions 'to include:
decision-making and coordination; casununications; and, use of visual aides.
(FEMA Objectives 3, 4 & 5) c.
Provide timely notificatiores to the State E0C, field ele-ments and local governments, as appropriate, regarding changes in-plant status and emergency action levels; and, fomulate emergency instructions for the public in coordina-tion with-the IAC.
(FEMA hjective 25) d.
Based on plant and Rad Health' recomunendations detemine appropriate protective measures.
(FEMAObjective.10)_
e.
Based on reconenendations from Rad Health issue decision regarding the need for KI. (FEMA tjective 21) f.
Identify the need for Federal assistance and coordinate with State EOC.
(FEMA Objective 32) g.
Formulate recovery and reentry plans, including decisions to relax protective actions.
(FEMA Objective 35) 3.
FCP/ EOF / Rad Health (Dese Assessment and Field Team Coordination):
a.
Mobilize staff and activate facilities, to include 24-hour capability.
(FEMA Objectives 1 & 2).
Twenty-four hour capability will be demonstrated by presentation of rosters.
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b.
Implement operational status and functions to include:
decision-making and coordination;- communications; and, use of visual aides.
(FEMA Objectives 3, 4 & 5) c.
Mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely manner.
(FEMA Objective 6) d.
Project dosage to public, based on plant and field data and-reconsnand appropriate protective measures.
(FEMA tjective 10) e.-
Monitor and control emergency worker exposure and detemine the need for KI.
(FEMA hjectives 20 & 21) f.
Fomulate recovery and reentry plans, including decisions.to relax protective actions.
(FEMA hjective 35)
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4.
Ra t.
Lab Utilize ap(propriate equipment and procedures to analyze field f
samples.
FEMA Objectives 9) 5.
Rad Field Teams
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Maintain communications with Field Team Coordinator.
(FEMA-Objective 5) and s airborne l
as 10" pea'sure b.
Determine ambient radiation levels
. uti/cc in the l
radiciodine concentrations as low presence of noble gases.
(FEM tjectives 7 & 8) 6.
IAC 4
a.
Mobilize staff and activate ' facilities, to include 24-hour capability.
(FEMA hjectives 1 & '2).
Twenty-four hour
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capability will be, demonstrated.by double staffing the position of Public -Infonnation Officer and by presentation of rosters for supporting personnel, b.
Implement. operational status and functions to incluoe:
coordination with Utility, Fede ral,
States, and local government agencies and organizations; fomulate public infomation and instructions;.and use of visual aides.
(FEMA Objectives 4, 5, & 14) c.
Insure advance coordination of media releases with FCP and MRC and coordinate appropriate rumor control functiens, j
(FEMA Objectives 24, 25 & 26)
The IAC is responsible for issuing news relesses to the ' EBS station (KFAB) directly regarding imediate protective actions. 'This function will be simulated at this location.
7.
MRC a.
Mobilize staf f and activate facilities, to inc lude 24-hour capability.
(FEMA Objectives 1 & 2) 1wenty-four hour capability will be demonstrated by double staffing the State spokesperson and presentation of rosters for supporting personnel, b.
Implement operational status and functions to include:
communications, decision-making, advance coordination of news releases;. briefing undia clearly and accurately; issuing instructions to public in a timely manner; and, use of visual aides.
(FEMA' Objectives 4, 5, 24, 25) c.
Establish public hotline (including capability for hearing impaired); and, participate in rumor control functions.
(FEMA Objective 26)
Public hotline will be demonstrated using existing public service telephones.
Installation of a toll free public hotline will be simulated.
'f C.
The following local support' capabilities, as listed in appropriate local plans, will be demonstrated:'
- 1. '
Washington Coun.ty E0C a.
Mobilize staff and activate facilities to include 24-hour capability.
(FEM Objectives 1 & 2).
Twenty-four hour capability will. be demonstrated by double staffing the positions of County Commissioner, Sheriff, and. Civil Defense Director and by presentation of ~ rosters for supporting personnel, b.
Implement ope' rational status and functions to include:
Notifications and follow-up contacts with city and county government agencies and organizations; (decision-making and coordination; and, use of visual aids.
FEM Objectives 3 &
4) c.
Demonstrate primary and backup communications with appropri-ate locations, ' organizations, and field. elements.
(FEM Objective 5) d.
Alert the public within the 10 mile EPZ, and issue an instructional ' message within 15 minutes.
(FEM (bjective -
13) e.
Formulate and distribute news releases and maintain coor-dination with the IAC when activated.
(FEMA Objectives 14,
& 25) f.
Coordinate local resources and manage an orderly evacuation.
including:
access control and evacuation impediments.'
(FEMA Objectives 15, 16 & 17) g.
Monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
(FEMA Objective 20) h.
Support ingestion pathway activities within the Pluma EPZ area.
1.
Support recovery / reentry planning activities.
2.
Washington County Decontamination for Emergency Workers a.
Mobilize staff and activate facilities, to include 24-hour operations.
(FEM Objectives 1 & 2) b.
Implement operational status and functions to include:
monitor and control emergency worker exposure;- and, demon-strate' procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.
(FEMA Objectives 20 & 29).
3.
Washington County Medical a.
Mobilize staff and activate facilities. -(FEM Objective 1) b.
Demonstrate-communications between rescue unit and hospital.
(FEMA Objective 5).
c.
Monitor and control emergency worker exposure (FEMA.0bjec-tive 20) d.
Demonstrate appropriate procedures for handling. contaminated individuals.' (FEMA Objectives 30 & 31) 4.
Sarpy County EOC a.
. Mobilize staff and activate facilities to include 24-hour capability.
(FEMA Objectives 1& 2).
Twenty-four hour capability will be demonstrated by double staffing the positions of the Chief Elected Official, Sheriff, and Civil Defense Director and by presentation.of rosters for support-ing personnel, b.
Implement operational status and functions to include:
notification and follow-up contacts with city and county government agencies and organizations; decision-making and coordination; and use of visual aides.
(FEMA Objectives 3 &
4) c.
Demonstrate primary and backup communications with appropri-ate locations, organizations, and field elements.
(FEMA Objective 5) d.
Demonstrate advance coordination of news releases with IAC.
(FEMA Objectives 25) 5.
Public (Evacuees) Decontamination Station (Sarpy County) a.
Mobilize staff and activate facilities.
(FEMA Objective 1) b.
Implement operational status and functions to include:
monitor and control emergency workers exposure; demonstrate i
procedures for registering, monitoring,(FEMA Objectives and decontamination of evacuees, equipment and vehicles.
20 j
27 & 29)
~
6.
Registration & Mass Care (Sarpy County)
Mobilize staff and activate facilities, to include capabil-a.
ity for 24-hour operations.
(FEMA Objectives 16 2) b.
Demonstrate communications between EOC and Registration Center.
(FEMA Objective 5)
l IOWA STATE EOC OBJECTTYES DESCRIPTION 1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize No comment.
staff and activate facilities promptly.
2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff Roster presentation reflecting facilities and maintain staffing a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> back-up. State around the clock.
Agencies have also been requested to perform actual shift change during exercise.
(May elect to double staff
- instead, for training pur-poses.
Is their option).
3.
Demonstrate ability to make No comment.
decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities No comment.
and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate Will include back-up com-with all appropriate locations, munications.
organizations, and field personnel.
]
10.
Damenstrate ability to project No ecament. Dose assess-dosage to the public via plume ment performed by Icwa i
exposure based on plant and field Department of Public data and to determine appropriate Health at State EOC.
De-protective measurea based on PAGs, cisions on appropriate available shelter, evacuation time protective measures made estimates, and all other appropriate at State EOC.
factors.
- 13. Demonstrate ability to alert the Demonstrate a 15 minute Public within the 10-mile EPZ, time clock at Site and and disseminate an initial instruc-Gemaral Emergency for the tional message, with 15 minutes.
Initial instructional Message.
Need Bot include an off-site Protective Action Recommendation, but say.
- Vhile currently not required, it may be prudent to demonstrate a 15 minute time clock for dissemination of a few off-site protective action recommendations within the SITE Emergency stage and within the GENERAL Emergency stage.
Anticipatory TEMA guidance may ask this in the future, but NOT a requirement for this exercise, at this writing.
Complexity of any Protective Action Recommendation and resultant correct / thorough dissemination to the public may negate the logic (if extant) of this, as well as the demonstration of same.
1 OBJECTIVES DRnt2TPTION I
l 14 Demonstrate ability to formulate and See above comments. Also, distribute appropriate instructions State EOC does this.
Evicen e to the public, in a timely fashion.
coordination'with Pottawattamie and Harrison counties.
21.
Demonstrate the ability to make the DECISION to issur KI made at decision, based upon predetermined State EOC.
Do not issue to criteria, whether to issue KI general population. Coordin-to emergency workers and/or the ate with Forward Command Post general population.
and Pottawattamie County.
25.
Demonstrate ability to provide No comment.
advance coordination of information released.
26.
Demonstrate ability to establish No comment.
and operate rumor control in coor-dinated fashion.
32.
Demonstrate ability to identify No comment.
need for, request, and obtain federal assistance.
35.
Demonstrate ability to determine Recovery and reentry and implement appropriate measures discussions at State EOC.
for controlled racovery and reentry.
Simulate recevery and reentry actions. Coordinate with al' locations as appropriate.
i 4
l il-FORWARD COMMAND FOST l
l ORJECTIVES DESCRIPTION
{
l.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize No comment'except that the staff and activate facilities Iowa Rad Team Coordinator (s)
{
promptly.
may preposition from Iowa City j
and/or Ames, Iowa. ODS Liai-sons may proposition, as well.
1 2.
Demonstrate ability to fully Rad Team Coordinator (s) may j
staff facilities / maintain staff-shift change. Rosters may be ing around the clock, presented at either this-1 location, or State EOC for i
State Agency players in the j
field.
ODS Liaisons will be buttressed by Iowa National Guard.
i 3.
Demonstrate ability to make decisions Most major decisions made at and coordinate emergency activities.
State EOC.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities No comment.
and displays to support emergency operation.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate Include s back-up communica-with all appropriate locations,
- tions, i
organizations and field personnel.
13.
Demonstrate ability to alert the Initial, and further messages public within 10-mile EPZ, and disseminated from State EOC.
disseminate an initial instructional Show coordination with TCP message, within 15 minutes.
from State EOC. Harrison County to sound sirens in con-junction with Pott. County.
- 15. Demonstrate orp aizational ability Decisions made at State EOC and resources necessary to manage but implemented from FCP.
an orderly evacuation of all or part of plume EPZ.
16.
Demonstrate the organistional No comment. Coordinate with ability / resources necessary to State EOC as the TCP imple-deal with impediments to evacu-
'ments decisions.
t' ion such as inclement weather, or traffic obstruction.
F0EWA1D C0MMAED F03T OEJECTIVES DE3CRIPTION 17.
Demonstrate the organizational Decisions at State EOC with
)
ability / resources necessary FCP Laplementation. Will not to control access to an evacu-actually man traffic and ated area.
access control points.. Will simulate,same.
18.
Demonstrate ability / resources Coordinate with State EOC.
necessary to effect an orderly Will not move people, but evacuation of mobility-impaired will actually make contact individuals within plume EPZ.
with all.
20.
Demonstrate ability to cont-The Iowa Radiological Maint-inuously monitor and control ance Shop Manager will sdmini-emergency worker exposure.
tratively manage the monitor-ing and control of all State field (and limited Pott. and Harrison County local) emer-gency worker exposure from the'FCP. State, and limited local field personnel vill personally monitor / record their own pocket dosimetry readings.
Rad Team Coordin-1 ator(s) handle the Monitoring Teams.
22.
Dezenstrate ability to supply /
Decision taken from State administer KI subsequent to EOC with field implementati:n.
decision for same.
35.
Demonstrate ability to determine Recovery and Reentry discus-and implement appropriate measures sions. Simulate recovery and for controlled recovery and reentry.
reentry actions. Coordinate same with State EOC and other appropriate locations.
l
j FIELD MOEITORING/ COORDINATION OBJECTIVES DESCRIPTION i
1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize Iowa Rad Team Coordinator (s)
I staff / activate facilities promptly.
may preposition from Iowa City and/or Ames, Iowa.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to fully A roster for field teams and staff facilities / maintain staffing Coordinators may be presented around the clock.
at azercise. Rad Team Coord-inators may both shift change and double staff.
3.
Demonstrate ability to make No comment.
' decisions / coordinate emergency activities.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities /
No comment.
1 displays to support emergency opera-tions.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate No comment. Will include with all appropriate locations, back-up communications.
organizations and field personnel.
6.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize One* Iowa Rad Team to mobilize i
and deploy field monitoring teams in real time from Das Moines, j
in a timely fashion.
Iowa; and one Red Team to 1
mobilize in real time from.
I Ames, Iowa. Two teams arrive.
are briefed, and deployed in own vehicles from FCP in 1
Barrison County.
7.
Demonstrate appropriate equipment /
No comment.
procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.
1
- The only are requiring a corrective action within the Iowa State i
Operations (from the November 18, 1986 DAEC exercise) is that I
" radiation detection instruments were not calibrated within a year in 1
accordance with manufacturer specifications." This will be corrected j
during the 1987 Tort Calhoun exercise, credit for same applying to the 1986 DAEC exercise.
8.
Demonstrate appreptiate equipment /
No comment.
procedures for measurement of airborne rad {oiodineconcentrationsaslowas 10- uCi/cc in the presence of noble l
l gases.
l I
FIELD MONITORING / COORDINATION oaJzcTIvts sesemIrrion 9.
Demonstrate appropriate equipment Actual sampling of all, except and procedures for collection, snow and milk. Analysis will transport and analysis of samples be simulated. Transit will be of soil, vegetation, snow, water, demonstrated via 2ad Team and milk.
~(one)~ connection to State Patrol vehicle in the field.
Patrol vehicle transit (point to point)' to Ames and/or Iowa ~ City Labs -- will be discussed and simulated' only.
20.
Demonstrate ability to continuously No comment.
monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
An inadequacy discovered during the. August 26, 1986 Cordova exercise was "that one field t eam. was not familiar. with the maximum exposure dose allowed without authorization." This will be corrected during this exercise,-credit applying to the August 1986 Cordova exercise.
22.
Demonstrate Ability to supply and No ecument.
administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.
35.
Demonstrate ability to determine /
Recovery and reentry it:plement appropriate measures for discussions.
Simulate controlled recovery and reentry.
recovery and reentry actions.
Coordinate same with Dese Assessment Component at State ECC.
i
)
)
UTIL'ITY IOF OLTECTIVES DESGIFTIONS 1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize ODS may not have Liaison at staff / activate facilities promptly.
utility EOF for this exercise.
Iowa National Gua,rd will staff
.the ODS _ Liaison spot.
Iowa Department of. Public Health will have two (2) Liaisons in
.i attendance.
All may proposition.
1 2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff Iowa Public Health will facilities / maintain staffing present roster and do shift I
around the clock.
change. National Guard will present roster, and may also double staff and/or shift change.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities No comment.
and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate No comment.
with all appropriate locations, or-ganizations and field personnel.
~25.
Demonstrate ability to provide No comment, advance coordination of information released.
j O
_._.__.___m__-_
I i
I J
MEDIA 1ELEASE CEETER 0%IECTIVES DESCRIPTION 1.
Demonstrate ability to mobilize ODS Liaisons may preposition.
staffiactivate facilities promptly.
2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff Roster presented.
Iowa facilities / maintain staffing National Guard will buttress around the clock.
ODS Liaisons. May both double staff and shift change.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities No comment.
I and displays to support energency operations.
~
l 5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate No comment.
with all appropriate locations.
organizations and field personnel.
24.
Demonstrate ability to brief the No comment.
media in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.
15.
Demonstrate ability to provide No comment.
adequate coordination of infer-mation released.
I l
1 l
l l
MEDIC l
OBJECT 1TE DESCRIPTION l
5.
Demonstrate ability to No coesment.
communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and i
field personnel.
l 20.
Demonstrate ability to continually Usage of Pocket Dosimetry l
monitor and control emergency and TLD's.
worker exposure.
30.
Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance No comment.
facilities /proceduree for handling I
contaminated individuals.
NOTE:
There will be two separate demonstrations, one involving the Missouri Valley Volunteer Fire and Rescue Department (Harrison,
l County) and the other involving the Council Bluffs Fire Department - Ambulance Unit - (Pottawattamie County).
l The Council Bluffs Fire Department's Ambulance Unit will probably field demonstrate the morning of July 22 and the Missouri Valley Fire and Rescue Department will probably demonstrate the evening before the exercise.
i l
In both cases the victim will be delivered to the University of Nebraska Medical Center's. Radiation Health Qanter.
The UNMC Radiation Health Center takes the lead and may choose during one
- or both - of the drills to refer the victim on to the Bishop Clarkson Hospital, the secondary r=r.eiving hospital for Iowa side, Fort Calhoun 10-mile EPZ.
l l
m_____________________._____
POTTAVATTAMIE C00ETY ORJECTIVES DESCRIPTION q
1.
~ Demonstrate. ability to mobilize ODS Liasion may preposition staff / activate facilities promptly.
Local EOC staff to mobilize in real time.
I 2.
Demonstrate ability to fully staff Rosters for state / local, facilities / maintain staffing around responders presented. Iowa the clock.
National Guard to buttress ODS Liasion via roster and possibly shif t change. Possi-4 ble double staffing as well, for National Guard.
.j J
3.
Demonstrate ability to make decis-No comment, except that ions and to coordinate emergency most major decisions made activities, at State EOC.
4 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities No comment.
and displays to support emergency operations.
5.
Demonstrate ability to communicate No comment. Will include with all appropriate locations, back-up communications.
l organizations, and field personnel.
13.
Demonstrate ability to alert the Initial, and further mes-public within the 10-mile EPZ, and sages done from State EOC.
disseminate an Laitial instructional Evidenes coordination message, within 15 minutes, with Pott. Co. from State EOC. Pott. Co. will sound sirens in conjunction with j
Harrison County.
~
15.
Demonstrate the organizational Scenario driven. Protective ability / resources necessary to Action Recommendations made manage an orderly evacuation of from State EOC.
all or part of plume IPZ.
16.
Demonstrate the organizational Coordinate with State EOC ability / resources to deal with as taplemented.
Scenario impediments to evacuation, such driven.
as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.
17, remonstrate the organizational Scenario driven. Pott. Co.
ability and resources necessary will not actually man traffic to control access to an evacuated and access points. Will simu-area.
ulate same.
t
POTTABATTAMIE C00NTY OLTECTIVES DESCRIPTION
- 20. Demonstrate ability to continuously See description for objective monitor / control emergency worker
- 20 under the Forward Command exposure.
Post location.
4 22.
Demonstrate ability to supply / admin-Decision taken fros State EOC
~
ister KI subsequent to decision for with Pott. Co. implementation, same.
- 35. Demonstrate ability to determine and Recovery and reentry discus-j implement appropriate measures for sions. Simulate Recovery and controlled recovery and reentry.
Reentry actions. Coordinate 1
with all locations as approp-i riste.
)
)
i i
I e
__m_
i The 35 FEMA Objectives are used for exercise tracking.
These objectives are referenced by number in each section of the report.
It should be clearly understood that any mention of ob-jectives being undemonstrated refers only to this
- exercise, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
1.5 EXERCISE SCENARIO This scenario is based on a telephoned bomb threat which triggers the declaration of Unusual Event at 0708.
This is fol-lowed by an actual explosion and. contained fire resulting in an ALERT status being declared at 0818.
Various systems continue to fail until at 0945 a Site Area Emergency was declared due to the failure of two fission product barriers (fuel and containment integrity).
At 1108 a General Emergency was declared due to a
sudden rise in radiation levels at the Stack Monitor and the loss of all three fission product barriers.
At 1317 the fire was extinguished but the release continued until 1400 when plant was declared to be in stable condition.
The exercise terminated at 1520.
planned Actual Time Event Time 0659 Unusual Event.
Triggered by 0708 bomb threat.
0802 Alert.
Bono exploded 0818 1001 Site Area Emergency.
Triggered 0945 by pump failure and loss of two fission product barriers.
1100 General Emergency.
1108 1300 Fire Extinguished.
1317 1400 plant Stabilized 1400 1500 Exercise Terminates.
1520 1.6 STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCES organizations participating in the exercise:
State of Iowa Iowa Office of Disaster Services Iowa State Department of Health Iowa National Guard Iowa Department of public Safety (Iowa Highway patrol)
Iowa Department of Natural Resources Iowa Department of Transportation L.
4 University Hygienic Laboratory Office of the Governor Office of the Attorney General.
Iowa Department of Human Services Iowa Department of Agriculture Iowa Commerce Commission Harrison County Civil Defense Sheriff's Department Communication's Office pottawattamie County Civil Defense Sheriff's Office State of Nebraska State Civil Defense Agency Nebraska National Guard Nebraska Highway Patrol Nebraska State Agriculture Department Nebraska Game & Parks Nebraska Department of Health Washington County Civil Defense County board Chairman Blair City Administrator Blair Mayor's Representative Blair Police Chief Ham Radio Organization Public' Welfare Department Radiological Officer-Sarov County Bellevue Police Department Bellevue Civil Defense American Red Cross Sarpy County Civil Defense t - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
I 1
2 EXERCISE EVALUATION l
2.1 NEBRASKA OPERATIONS 2.1.1 State EOC The following objectives were to be demonstrated:
- 1.,
2, 3,
)
l 4,
5, 12, 17, 25, 32, and 35.
Mobilization of staff and activation of facilities were triggered by the notification of Alert.
The call was received
)
from the State Highway Patrol at 0842.
This represented a. delay of 24 minutes, as the Alert had been declared at 0818.
The State of Iowa received notification by 0820 on the dedicated phone i
line.
This will be an area for required corrective action, as it prohibited prompt mobilization and activation.
Participating State agencies reported to their duty stations at the EOC and full staffing was accomplished at 1000.
Vhile a
second shift roster was provided, no shift changes occurred, thus precluding a full demonstration of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing.
Objectives Number 1 and 2 were partially demonstrated.
Decision-making and the coordination of emergency activities were adequately demonstrated.
Facilities, displays and eqQipment were also adequate.
Primary and backup communications to all lo-cations were demonstrated.
However,- the Department of Health radiological staff at the SEOC were not always able to reach their counterparts at the FCP.
They kept encountering a busy signal until 1116, but the people at the FCP reported that their phones were not in use.
The evaluator noted that a new integrated radio (145.01 MHz) computer and printer worked well.
Objectives Number 3, 4, and 5 were fully demonstrated.
At 0954 the Governor's representative at the FCP contacted l
the SEOC and directed them to have Washington County sound the l
- However, the SEOC was told to access EBS with the ini-tial notification message, rather than allowing Washington County l
to do so as the plan states.
At 1025 a PAG placing dairy animals on stored feed was is-sued.
The representative from the State Department cf Agriculture consulted his amps of the affected sectors and phoned the dairy farmer located there to ascertain the precise number and location of his herd.
He also provided land use data on the l
affected area to the Department of Radiological Health.
This was l
l.____________________1__
the. area accomplished afterschecking to determine whether or not contained water intakes or any food l production facilities.
Ob-jective Number 12.was fully demonstrated.
1018 the call'was made to the Coast Guard to close the At Missouri River from mile markers 630 to 660.
Air space over the area'was also closed.
These actions sufficed to provide a demon-stration. of Objective Number 1" in the limited way in-which-it applies at the SEOC.
The SEOC was in' continuous con act"with both the IAC and the I
MRC by phone and by telex, and press _ releases we're - exchanged.
released by the SEOC.was the initial
.announce-(The only sessage ment of emergency conditions issued by the Governor at 0926.)
This action was sufficient.to account for a full demonstra-tion of Objective Number 25.
The State made,two requests for Federal assistance, asking the MRC FEMA to provide a public information' person to assist at and DOE to provide field monitoring personnel.
Iowa concurred in
~ this.
Objective Number.32 was demonstrated to the limits of ~ cur-rent FEMA guidance.
Though the staff at the SEOC was prepared to engage in re-covery and reentry-activities, there was no opportunity to realistically do so.
This was the fault of the scenario, as the exercise terminated with the plant still at the General Emergency no de-escalation EAL.
No relaxation of pars was permitted and occurred.
There were brief discussions with the personnel at the -FCF regarding safety precautions during' reentry and possible health effects of low-level exposure.
- However, the scenario did not permit a full demonstration of Objective Number 35.
Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were 1, 2
and 35.
Area Reauiring Corrective Action 1.
While the licensee notified the Nebraska State patrol at 0820 that an Alert had been declared at 0818, this message was not received at the SEOC until 0842.
A demonstration of timely notification will'be required at the next exercise.
2.1.2 State Field C-:- -ad Post (FCP)
This operation was located at the' EOF.
The following objectives were~to be demonstrated:
1, 2,
- 3. _--_-_-_:-__-____-_-_-_-______
)
4, 5,
10, 21, 25, 32, and 35.
The staff of the FCp were mobilized prior to receiving the notification of
- Alert, and deployed from
Full activation and staffing has accomplished at 0929 when the Department of Radiological Health personnel arrived.
Since deployment occurred prior to receiving notice of Alert, Objective Number 1 was not fully demonstrated.
While double staffing was observed as occurring briefly at the Governor's Authorized Representative position, and at greater length at the Operations Officer position, no shift change was ever performed.
i Thus, while complete staffing was fully demonstrated, capa-bility for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. operation was not.
Objective Number 2 was partially demonstrated.
Throughout the course of the exercise, decision-making and coordination of emergency activities were ably demonstrated.
particularly impressive was the coordination with the State of Iowa when protective action recommendations (PARS) were called for.
Decisions were made rapidly and with extensive staff input.
objective Number 3 was fully demonstrated.
The facilities, displays and equipment available for the FCP function were adequate', and all necessary primary and backup com-munication systems were demonstrated.
H Objectives Number 4 and 5 were fully demonstrated.
During the exercise, as radiol.ogical health persons from the plant and the State made recommendations for protective
- actions, they were duly considered by the Governor's Representative.
De-cisions were quickly made and promulgated.
This included, at 1136, the decision to make EI available to emergency workers.
This provided a full demonstration of the relevant portions of Objectives Number 10 and 21.
- These, and all other appropriate PARS were communicated to the State EOC and the Information Authentic'ation Center (IAC) for appropriate dissemination according to the State Plan.
This accounted for a full-demonstration of the relevant por-tion of Objective Number 25.
During the course of.the exercise, as additional resources were
This was communicated to the -SEOC l
which made the request.
To the extent of current FEMA guidance, this demonstrated the relevant portion of Objective Number 32.
j l
At 1345 the FCp staff began discussing the question of re-
)
covery and reentry.
The issues included the long term use of the i
National Guard for access control; policy regarding reentry for l
essential services; the location and establishment of disaster j
l assistance centers; the continuing role of the MRC, and ongoing
]
field monitoring.
l At 1425 a summary of these discussions was provided to the SEOC.
At 1450 Nebraska began discussing downgrading with-Iowa 4
and the utility.
While this would usually be a normal part of the
- exercise, the scenario was totally lacking in data or con-troller messages that would indicate the plant was de-escalating-l through the Emergency Action Levels (EALa).
When the exercise l
terminated at 1520, the EAL indicated on the statun board was still General Emergency.
Nevertheless, there was discussion about conditions required l
for the relaxation of pars.
Within the context of available FEMA l
guidance and the limits of the scenario, Objective 35 was fully demonstrated.
Summary:
Objectives Number 1 and 2 were not' fully decon-strated.
2.1.3 Information Authentication Center (IAC)
The following objectives were to be demonstrated:
1, 2,
4, 5,
14, and 25.
The IAC staff, like the FCp staff,-
mobilized and deployed prior to receiving the notice of Alert.
They arrived at 0912, at which time the facility staffing was completed.
Double staffing was practiced for training purposes.
No shift change was demon-i strated.
objectives Number 1 and 2 were partially demonstrated.
Facilities, displays and equipment were adequate.
Communi-cations to all appropriate locations were demonstrated in both l
primary and backup modes.
However, the data terminal, which was the link to State and local'EOCs and the MRC, was occasionally a t
problem.
The State should attempt to determine the reasons why access was not always immediately possible, i.e.,
why several at-tempts were required.
_g.
Objectives Number 4 and 5 were fully demonstrated.
After the initial EBS message, the rest were drafted in the IAC and released to the station from there, as the plan directs.
Messages drafted and released to the EBS station after the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency called for evacuation in some areas and shelter in others.
- However, these areas were not designated by landmark descriptions, but rather referred to as " sectors E, F,
G, and H".
The prescripted message forms in the State Plan (Annex G) call for the use of landmark descriptions at the Site Area Emer-gency "if time permits".
However, the plan does not permit this option on the prescripted forms to be used at the General Emer-gency.
Failure to' use the landmark descriptions is an Area Requiring Corrective Action.
Objective Number 14 was not fully demonstrated.
Throughout the course of the exercise there was excellent
{
coordination among all Public Information staff with a sharing of i
status reports and news releases.
Objective Number 25 was fully demonstrated.
Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were 1, 2
and j
14.
Area Reouiring Corrective Action 2.
The use of landmark descriptions in the EBS message an-nouncing the General Emergency will be required at the next exercise.
2.1.4 Media Release Center (MRC) t I
This facility is located in Omaha at the Douglas County EOCr Objectives to be demonstrated:
1, 2, 4,
S, 24, 25, and 26.
The PIO and staff arrived at the MRC at 0845, having de-ployed from Lincoln upon receipt of the notice of Unusual Event.
Since the State Plan calls for deployment at the Alert, Objective Number 1 (mobilization) was not properly demonstrated.
The early arrival of staff could be construed as pre-positioning (prior permission for which had not been granted by FEMA.)
)
The PIO position did demonstrate a shift change, being re-placed by a Nebraska National Guardsman.from the Public Affairs Department. :
o i
l i
Objective Number 2 was fully demonstrated for the PIO posi-tion; the TTY operator position must still demonstrate a
shift j
change.
j While'the facility'itself is adequate, 'the displays'used to brief theLaedia are marginal.
.Since this is a joint operation between Nebraska, Iowa and OPPD, a single common map should be used.
The continuing use of different maps by each state,-
ne2-ther of which' show the entire
- EPZ, is detractjng. from an i
otherwise professional demonstration-of public affairs. skills.
1
{
Acquisition of a single large map for use by both sates is an l
area recommended for improvement.
-Communications systems were in place in accordance with the
- plan, with the primary system being demonstrated.
- However, the
- backup, designated as the Douglas County NAWA8, was not demon-
- strated, precluding a full demonstration of Objective Number 5.
Objective Number 4 was fully demonstrated.
)
me-I During the course of the exercise there were five joint dia briefings, occurring about every 90 minutes or as needed.
While the briefings were accurate and complete, the lack of'a to-tal EP2 map detracted from their-overall effectiveness when j
dealing with off-site issues.
1 Objective Number 24 was fully demonstrated.
Advance coordination prior to releases and press briefings was notable.
Preparatory meetings were very useful, and new in-H formation was skillfully integrated into the existing body of-
)
knowledge.
Objective Number 25 was. fully demonstrated.
At press briefings,.a temporary rumor control number was an-nounced for publication.
It was temporary in nature, and was to I
be. staffed by Civil Defense in Lincoln until m' hot line into the 1
MRC could be established.
While this aspect of rumor control was planned for demonstration, it cannot be given full credit since the person answering the published number claimed no knowledge of what was happening.
When the evaluator called, they attempted to refer him to another number for assistance, but were unable to find one.
The' portion of Objective Number 26 which calls for the es-
+=h14=hment of a hot line was, therefore, not demonstrated.
Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were 1.,
5, ard i
26.
]
Area Reauiring Corrective Action 3.
The concept of a temporary hot line for rumor control must be formalized by pimelng it in the plan and assigning knowledgeable persons to' answer the phone.
This must be dem-onstrated at the next exercise.
Area Recommended For Improvement 1.
Obtain a single Ep2 map for Joint Iowa-Nebraska-OPPD use at press briefings.
2.1.5 Dose Assessment and Field Team Coordination Objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2, 3,
4, 5,
6, 10, 21, 22, and 35.
This function is performed by employees of the State Depart-ment of Health and is located at the EOF.
For this exercise the staffing included a manager, one log keeper, a dose assessor, a
l field team coordinator, and a radiological health specialist in training for dose assessmer.t.
The team arrived at 0929 after having been mobilized and de-ployed from Lincoln at 0815, which was prior to receiving the notification of Alert.
While the operation was fully staffed, 2,
j hour capability was not demonstrated.
Objectives Number 1 and 2 were partially demonstrated.
Decision-making and coordination of emergency management ac-tivities were adequate.
- However, status boards wer'e not always updated in a timely manner.
Attention is recommended in this area.
Objective Number 3 was fully demonstrated.
The space allocated to these functions was minimally ad-i
- equate, but poorly arranged, being in two separated locations.
The display for field team coordination was difficult to use.
Small (1/2" diameter) colored paper dots were posted os, the map.
They were not large enough to accommodate sufficient data of les-ible size.
A change would be helpful.
- Also, coordination of field teams was made difficult by the fact that the Iowa field data was not easily or promptly avail-able.
On at least one occasion two field teams were directed to the same location.
Collocation of the 3 field team coordinators (IA, NE, OPPD) would greatly enhance operation and is also strongly recommended.
Radio communications were demonstrated successfully. l
____-__________U
Both Objectives Number 4 and 5 were fully demonstrated.
The field teams were briefed upon arrival.at the-EOF and promptly deployed to the field.-'No problems were observed and Objectives 6 was' fully demonstrated.~
i Dose projections were made using a customized computer pro-
- gram, protective actions were recommended after conferring among OPPD staff, State Director of RadiologicalyBealth, the.Governcr's representative and the State of Iowa. -
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Objective 10 was fully demonstrated.
At 1117 the Director of Radiological Nealth authorized the l
use of KI for emergency workers and field. monitoring teams.
I Later on it was authorized for personnel manning road blocks.near-l the affected area.
Stocks of KI and procedures for distribu-ion were adequate, fully demonstrating Objectives Number 21 and 22.
l As conditions at the plant stabilized, State Department of i
l Radiological Health staff began to plan radiological surveys as part of a reentry effort, as well as the relaxation of PARS.
j They also discussed appropriate safety precautions, possible health effects and the necessity of' establishing centers for pub-
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lic information and assistance.
j I
- However, the scenario abruptly ended-at 1520 with no de-escalation from General Emergency.
This is not a new com-plaint regarding scenario shortcoming and it has become a source of serious frustration for State and local exercise participants.
j For additional information, refer to " Scenario"
'see' tion at the 1
conclusion of the report, page 44 1
Objective Number 35 was partially demonstrated.
)
i Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were 1, 2 and 35.
No areas requiring corrective action were 1
observed.
2.1.6 Field Monitorins l
Objectives to be demonstrated:
5, 7, B, and 20.
Team Number 1 The team was equipped according to the Plan with the excep-l tion of mid-range dosimeters.
Calibration was current.
The 3
vehicle was excellent and primary and backup communications sere demonstrated without problems.
The procedures for measuring am-i bient radiation were demonstrated.
1Mape used by the team to
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identify and locate acnitoring points were excellent.
They also demonstrated procedures for-measuring radioiodine levels in the j
air and performed calculations quickly and accurately, j
Objectives Numoer 5, 7,
and 8 were fully demonstrated.
l l
Though the team lacked mid-range dosimeters, they were aware of their turnaround dose of 1R, and were familiar with the use of i
all protective equiprent, and were able to monitor and control exposure sufficiently to fully demonstrate Objective Number 20.
Summary:
All objectives were fully demonstrated.
I Team Number 2 The team was properly equipped and demonstrated adequate procedures for ambient radiation monitoring.
The mix of State and utility staff was felt to be quite beneficial.
Communica-tions were fully demonstrated.
While they also demonstrated equipment and procedures for measuring radioiodine, they no longer use the multi-channel analyzer.
The plan should be changed to reflect this.
Objectives Number 5, 7, and 8 were fully demonstrated.
Like Team #1, they did not have mid-range dosimeters.
How-ever, they did demonstrate methods and equipment in a manner that would permit them to monitor and control exposure.
Objective Number 20 was fully demonstrated.
Summary:
All objectives were fully demonstrated.
Area Recommended For Improvement 2.
The turnaround dose of 1R should be included in the plan, and mid-range dosimeters added to the kits of both teams.
3.
Use of the multi-channel analyzer should be deleted from l
the plan.
2.1.7 State Radiological Laboratory l
Objective to be demonstrated:
9.
l The demonstration here was not in synch with the exercise.
- However, they did demonstrate equipment and procedures for analysis of soil, vegetation and water samples.
Written SOPS ex-isted for snow and allk samples also, and the staff was. familiar with the procedures.
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The samples were properly received and handled and written SOPS were followed for analysis.
Equipment and facilities were 1
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kept clean throughout.
The -detector system was-properly calibrated for the geometries.'of.'the samples analyzed.
Staff was well trained with a~ sufficient number-of-radio chemists to operate on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis.
Objective Number.9 was fully' demonstrated.
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l 2.2.
COUNTY OPERATIONS 2.2.1 Washington County BOC 1
Objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2,
3, 4,
5, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20, and 35.
The notification of Alert was received from OPPD over the dedicated line at 0822.
Mobilization procedures were carried out according to the plan and staffing was completed at 0935.
Double' i
staffing was done at the County Chairman's position and the Civil Defense Director.
- However, no shift changes were~ demonstrated, precluding full credit for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> capability.
Objective Number I was fully demonstrated.
Objective Number 2 was partially demonstrated.
)
i Throughout the exercise emergency operation management be-came less formal.
While decision-making positions were furnished with copies of the plan, the dispatcher and communications per-
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sonnel could have used some sort of sop or checklist to enhance message handling.
The lack of a formal procedure for recording and distribut-ing messages led to shouting across the room by the communications officer receiving data via his equipment, and also by the State Liaison when information was received over his phone.
This lack of procedure resulted in conflicting PARS concern-ing the area to be evacuated, and the eventual posting on the I
board was erroneous.
In fact, no release data was ever posted.
This will be an Area Requiring Corrective Action.
The use of the preprinted incident reporting forms in the plan (B-15, B-16) instead of the virtually blank sheets of paper labeled " exercise message forms" would help the whole process.
1 The dispatcher used the only blank incident report form at j
the notice of Unusual Event and had no more copies.
When the State notified its Liaison to sound the sirens and omit the EBS message (see details below under Objectives Number 13 and 14),
he immediately left the EOC to inform the Sheriff's Office.
Good opere.tions management would have included informing j
the Civil Defense Director what was being done.
In general, the j
State presence was rather overwhelming and sometimes kept the 1
County from playing its role as depicted in the plan.
Objective Number 3 was not fully demonstrated, j
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1 Facilities and displays were adequate, and primary and i
backup communications were demonstrated.
However, there was some I
difficulty with the data terminal on several occasions.
Users of the data terminal at the MRC and IAC also reported ' occasional difficulty.
The cause of the problem should be investigated and corrected.
The addition of several more phone lines is a decided im-provement over past years.
Objective Number 4 and 5 were fully demonstrated.
At 0950 Washington County was notified by OPPD over the dedicated line that a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 0945.
At 0954 the State
- EOC, acting on orders from the Governor's representative at the FCP, called Washington County and advised them to sound the sirens.
But contrary to the plan, told the County not to access the EBS at station KFAB.
The State EOC said that they would call KFAB and release the initial EBS
- message, precluding a demonr.tration of Objective Number 13, by j
Washington County.
l At 0957 the sirens were activated.
At 1015 the EOF called and asked Washington County to verify that the sirens had l
sounded.
After conferring by radio with law enforcement person-l nel in the field, it was determined that Washington County sirens outside the City of Blair did not sound, i
)
After additional conferral, the EOF called for another at-tempt to sound all sirens in Washington County.
This attempt was successful, with the rural area sirens sounding at 1033 and those in Blair sounding at 1035.
Editor's Note:
Subsequent investigation determined that the first attempt failed in the rural areas because the operstor failed to set the transmitter to the proper frequency.
Due to these events, Objectives Number 13 and 14 were not demonstrated.
Failure to alert the public within 15 minutes is a
defi-eiency.
Resources to manage access control were available, though not activated, precluding a full demonstration.
Discussions were held regarding the location of road blocks and manpower required.
When evacuation was called for, (1045) a request for assistance to the Highway Patrol was simulated.
They. also simulated calling the residents in the affected areas, advising them directly.
Seven lines would be used and time required is about 20 minutes.
At 1310 there was a 3 car accident on an evacuation route.
The Sheriff rerouted traffic and recalculated evacuation times. -
Objectives Number 15 and 16 were fully demonnt' rated.
Objective Number 17 was partially demonstrated.
Emergency workers were familiar with the procedures required to monitor and control exposure.
- However, they did not have low range dosimeters as called for in the plan.
This is an area re-quiring corrective action by demonstration of their use at the next exercise.
Objective' Number 20 was not fully demonstrated.-
As already noted in this report, the. scenario failed to pro-vide any de-escalation which would permit normal recovery and reentry activities by off-site personnel.
Objective Number 35 was not demonstrated.
Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were:
2, 3,
13, 17, 20, and 35.
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-Deficiency 1.
Failure to alert all residents of Washington County within 15 minutes is a deficiency.
The State was notified of this verbally on July 23, 1987 and in writing on July 31, 1987.
They are required to:
Within
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30 days develop a checklist and/or SOP for use by the person j
sounding the sirens, and apprise the siren operator of said j
document.
provide FEMA Region VII with a
copy of the document by August 31, 1987.
This was accomplished, and ac-knowledged by FEMA Region VII on September 3, 1987.
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Arpa Reauiring Corrective Action j
i 4.
A more accurate method of recording, confirming and dis-tributing messages must be developed and demonstrated at the next exercise.
5.
Staff at the EOC did not have low range dosimeters as the plan requires.
These must be provided and used at the next exercise.
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Area Recommended For Improvement 4.
Determine cause of data terminal malfunction and remedy it.
4 2.2.2 Washington County Emergency Worker Decontamination Objectives to be demonstrated:
2, 20, and 29.
This facility was located at the gymnasium on the campus of Dana College, Blair, Nebraska.
As the plan prescribed, a State health physicist was in charge and supervised three monitors.
They also had a roster of over 40 additional trained monitors who could be.
utilized.
~
Within the context of the exercise,. Ob.jective Number 2 was fully demonstrated.
The personnel were well trained in exposure control proce-dures and demonstrated a
knowledge of the use of all the appropriate dosimetry and survey equipment, fully accounting for Objective Number 20.
After observing the monitors at work on several volunteers, and timing them, the evaluator estimated that each monitor could handle at least 12 persons per hour.
They demonstrated techniques for monitoring persons and ve-
- hicles, and discussed vehicle decontamination explaining that they would use a fire engine from Blair to wash off contamination until monitoring showed the vehicle to be clean.
They demonstrated worker decontamination satisfactorily, as well as proper procedures for segregating clean from contaminated i
persons and materials, and disposal of contaminated material.
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Objective Number 29 was fully demonstrated.
Summary:
All objectives were fully demonstrated.
2.2.3 Blair Rescue Sauad and University of Nebraska Medical Center Objectives to be demonstrated:
5, 20, 30, and 31.
At 0722 the Blair Rescue Squad arrived at the plant respond-ing to a call to transport an injured and possibly contamina ed person to the University of Nebraska Medical Center.
The ambu-lance was met by a Radiation Safety Monitor (RSM) employed by 1
OPPD.
He supervised loading the patient and preventing con-tamination of the ambulance.
He also supervised exposure control throughout the event.
They left for the hospital at 0740.
The RSM conducted continuous air sampling using a Gilian 17G9.
There was some problem with radio communication with the hospital.
This was overcome by patching through the Sheriff's office, demonstrating Objective Number 5. _ _ - _ _
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At 0834 the hospital received a call from the plant notify-ing them that a contaminated patient was on the way.
At 0845 the ambulance called the hospital to report that 1
they were enroute.
Though the call was supposedly made over the i
Midland rescue channel, the hospital had no record of a call.
At 0905 the hospital called the ambulance and requested an ETA.
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Upon arrival, the hospital staff _were in place &nd followed all
- survey, contamination and treatment procedures flawlessly.
1 These even included a whole body scan and the use' of a
gamma counter.
Summary:
Objectives Number 5, 20, 30, and 31 were fully demonstrated.
1 2.2.4 Saroy County EOC objectives to be demonstrated:
1, 2,
3, 4, and 5.
This facility was located in the Bellevue police Station.
Its primary function is as a communication center and a base of l
operations out of which evacuee reception and care can be man-I aged.
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The notice of Alert was received from Washington County at
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0856.
Mobilization followed, fully demonstrating Objective Num-ber 1.
Staffing was completed at 1026, and in the course of the ex-ercise there was a shift change at the position of Mayor, pol-ice 1
- Chief, and Civil Defense Director, fully demonstrating Objective Number 2.
Emergency operations management kas adequately demonstrated j
as the decontamination, registration and mass care facilities
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were ordered operational at the appropriate times, j
The facility and displays were totally adequate for this j
EOC's role.
primary communications to appropriate locations were i
demonstrated.
However, backup communication to the State EOC was not demonstrated.
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Ham radio operators were used to establish a communication link with the decontamination facility and selected locations along the evacuation route.
Objective Number 3 and 4 were fully demonstrated; Objective 5 was partially demonstrated.
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Summary:
Objective Number 5 was not fully demonstrated.
No areas requiring corrective action were observed.
2.2.5 Sarer County Evacuee Registration and Care l
l Objectives to be demonstrated were 2, 6, and 28.
Since this f acility was staf fed. by volunteer p'ersonnel, 2t was demonstrated at a time convenient to all, rather than being synchronized with the exercise.
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The facility was fully staffed according to the plan.
No shift change occurred, and no second shift roster was available, precluding a full demonstration of Objective Number 2.
Lack of a roster is an area requiring corrective action' for demonstration at the next exercise.
A list of staff, sufficient to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> capability, must be developed and maintained as part of the Sarpy County Plan.
1 Primary and backup communication to appropriate locations were demonstrated, fully accounting for Objective Number 5.
If evacuees needed care, they were directed to the Reed Com-munity Center nearby, where there were facilities adequate to j
care for 250 persons long term.
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since radio communications were available, directly or through phone patch, the facility manager should have been uti-J lizing them to request information regarding the expected numbers of evacuees.
Objective Number 28 was fully demonstrated.
~ Summary:
Objective Number 2 was not fully demonstrated.
Area Reauiring Corrective Action j
6.
A second shift roster of County staff must be presented at the next exercise.
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Area Recommended For Improvement I
l 5.
The facility manager should be instructed to solicit in-1 l
formation he/she needs concerning the number of evacuees, if j
it is not forthcoming from the State,
- OPPD, Washington or Sarpy Counties.
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i 2.2.6 Sarpy County Evacuee Decontamination i
Objectives to be demonstrated were:
20 and 27.
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This operation was located at the First Baptist Church of Bellevue.
The staff on hand ' amounted to five radiological monitors with a roster of up to 50 other trained monitors avail-able as needed.
Personal dosimetry was properly
- used, demonstrating Objective Number 20.
1 The rate was determined to be about 15 persons'per monitor i
per hour, with 2,900 persons bei'ng the total potential number of I
evacuees.
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Proper procedures and equipment were demonstrated in the monitoring of persons and vehicles, as well as registration.
l Objective Number 27 was demonstrated, to the limits of cur-rent FEMA guidance.
Summary:
All objectives were fully demonstrated.
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2.3 IOWA STATE OPERATIONS This exercise was conducted under the Iowa State Compensa-tory Plan (SCP).
The basis of the SCP is the assumption by the State of those functions which are normally performed by the counties.
Under the basic SCP the counties are primarily respon-sible only for the activation of the siren system upon direction from the State or notification from the licensee.
Inherent in this is the understanding by the counties of their li.mited roles..
In support of the SCP the. counties are expected to continue to be involved in normal law enforcement, and the Sheriff's De-partments are expected to be involved in supporting. evacuation.
.through traffic control, communications, and public alerting.
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2.3.1 State Emergency Operations'Conter (SBOC) - Including Dose Assessment The objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2,
3, 4,
5, 10, 13, 14, 21, 25, 26, 32, and 35.
At 0825 the licensee called the SEOC with the Alert notifi-cation.
l Prior to this notification, however, two members of the Ra-diological Health Department and a
representative from the Attorney General's Office were repositioned.
Mobilization of the rest of the staff occurred in normal fashion, and staffing was declared complete at 0950.
Full staff-ing (according to the plan) was not, however, accomplished since the representative of the Commerc'e Department di-d not arrive.un-til
- 1325, and the State Office of the Elderly and the American Red Cross Representative did not arrive at all; the representa-tive of the Attorney General left at 0900.
Twenty-four hour capability was demonstrated via a
shift change by the Department of Natural Resources, Department of Ag-riculture, Department of Health, and the Department of Public Safety.
Objectives Number 1 and 2 were only partially demonstrated.
Emergency operations management and coordination was demon-strated and enhanced through an active role by the Iowa National Guard personnel.
Facilities and displays were adequate, and pri-mary and backup communications were demonstrated.
Objectives Number 3, 4, and 5 were fully demonstrated.
Dose projections were performed at the SEOC using a computer program called Mesorem Jr.. Initial PARS'were based on plant con-
- ditions, and were generated in' timely fashion after coordi'ating n
with OPPD and the State of Nebraska.
The onl-soblem encountered was the failure of the Term; net hard copy y tem, which occurred at least twice.
Though the staff shoued + aourcefulness.in working around the failure by.us-ing the FAX y1 telephone, the cause_.of the Terminet failure should be inven~1 gated and corrected.
Objective, Number 10 was. fully demonstrated.
At 0952 the State, Harrison end.Pottawattamie' Counties si-multaneously received notice of a Site Area Emergency from OPPD' via the utility direct line.
At 0955'the State-BOC siruita-l neously contacted the FCP at Logan (Harrison County) and the Pottawattamie County.EOC via the administrative hot line,. con-firmed the SAE and ordered the sounding of sirens..
At 1003 they simulated accessing the EBS station RFAB with the initial notifi-cation.
A similar sequence occurred at 1109 when OPPD again called and announced a General Emergency.
Both counties were. contacted at '1112 and were ordered to simulate siren sounding.
This was l
confirmed at 1117.
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i Objectives Number 13, 14, and 25 were fully demonstrated.
When the " Blue" field monitoring team erroneously calculated the concentration of radioiodine, both the. Field Team Coordinator and the Dose Assessor failed to detect the error, misinterpreted the data and decided to administer KI when it was not necessary.
AT 1128 the decision was transmitted to both counties.
i Objective Number 21 was not~ fully' demonstrated, and wil;'be an area requiring corrective action.
Through press briefings at the MRC and in EBS messages a ru-j mor control number was published and the line activated.
A TEMA 1
evaluator actually placed a call and requested information.
The,
call was properly handled by the operator on duty.
Objective Number 26 was fully demonstrated.
During the course of the exercise, Iowa. and Nebraska coordi-nated a request to DOE to provide assistance and support in field monitoring.
The request was properly handled and demonstrated Objective Number 32 to the extent of available FEMA guidance.
i As already stated in this report, the scenario did-not pro-l vide for recovery and reentry activities.
Due to this sc ena ri c shortcoming, Objective Number 35 was not demonstrated.
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'l Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were:
1, 2,
21 i
and 35.
Area Reauirina Corrective Action 7.
When the " Blue" field monitoring team used~an erroneous method of calculating concentrations of radioiodine, the Field Team Coordinator and the Dose Assessor at the SEOC mis-interpreted the data and decided to administer EI when it was not necessary.
proper decision-making must be demonstrated at the next exer-cise.
2.3.2 Forward Command Post (FCP)
Objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 15, y
16, 17, 18, 20, 22, and 35.
j FEMA had agreed to the prepo'sitioning of the Iowa ODS Liai-son and the Rad Team Coordinator.
- However, the ODS Liaison person said that the other staff members (Highway patrol, Depart-ment of Transportation, Department of Natural Resources, and Iowa National Guard) had been informed prior to the exercise that they were to report to the FCp around 0800.
This being the case, no mobilizing phone calls were made.
Therefore, there was a failure to demonstrate Objective. Number 1, which is integral to any exercise.
This is an area requiring corrective action.
Full staffing was achieved by 0938, and the organizations represented presented rosters.
However, no shift changes were performed; Objective Number 2.was.not fully demonstrated.
Emergency operations management was generally well done with a single exception.
At 1135 the ODS Liaison switched the Admin-istrative Hot Line from speaker phone to his handset.
The message was recommending the use of EI for emergency workers in sectors E, F,
G, and H.
When the message was copied to his los and verbally announced in the EOC, it stated sectors B, F, and G
- only, while 'the status board showed'E, F,
G, and H.
Some agencies carried it one way, some the other.
This communications practice will be an area for required corrective action.
Objective Number 3 was not fully demonstrated.
Facilities,
- displays, and equipment were
- adequate, fully demonstrating Objective Number 4.
All necessary. communications were demonstrated in both pri-mary and backup mode.
However, the scenario did not require contact with local schools, nursing homes, or hospitals.
There-l
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- fore, this part of the communications network remains to be j
demonstrated.
Objective Number 5 was partially demonstrated.
At 0952'OPPD informed all persons on their dedicated line that a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 0945, and that sirens were to be' sounded.
This line was manned by a
Deputy 1
Sheriff at the FCP, and upon receipt of the message, he asked i
that the sirens be sounded.
The Iowa State Liaison person was i
using the Iowa administrative hot line and did not w= ant to scund j
sirens until the order came from the SEOC over his phone.
This is according to the SCP and is so ordered to assure coordination between Pottawattamie and Harrison Counties for simultaneous
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- sounding, and to coordinate sirens with release of the EBS ses-sage.
- However, the Deputy Sheriff at Harrison County sounded the i
sirens at 0953 and Pottawattamie County sounded theirs at 0955
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and the EDS message was released at 0958.
Events sequenced closely enough that no problems in timely alert and notification developed.
- However, it is recommended that the staff of the Harrison County Sheriff's office be briefed on the procedure for alert and notification as delineated in the Iowa SCP.
The same usurpation by the Deputy Sheriff occurred at the General Emergency.
Notification was received from OPPD at 1109 and sounding the sirens was simulated at 1111.
The notification from the State EOC did not come until 1112.
Objective Number 13 was fully demonstrated.
Since the protective action recommendations were for evacua-tion only out to 5 miles in sectors E, F, G, and H, no permanent Iowa population was involved, precluding demonstration'of Objec-
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tive Number 15.
Free play was utilized through simulation of a
chlorine gas leak forcing partial evacuation of Missouri
- Valley, j
Iowa.
However, this protective action was apart from the racio-i logical emergency and does not qualify.
j Objective Number 15 was not demonstrated.
While the chlorine spill which was emanating from the tanker truck jackknifed across the highway was not able to be considered as sufficient to drive the evacuation, Objective Number 15, it i
did provide an impediment' to evacuation sufficient to account for 1
Objective Number 16.
Law enforcement officials discussed the necessary
- actions, and simulated dispatching wreckers and other equipment to clear the evacuation route.
Objective Number 16 was fully demonstrated.
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The chlorine l'eak also was the cause for demonstrating
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J ac-cess control, as four road blocks were set up (simulated).
One i
access control point was simulated due to_the emergency at the power plant.
(Simulation precludes a full demonstration.)
These i
locations were posted and reports made regularly.
As the wind
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changed, staff were reassigned appropriately.
i objective Number 17 was not fully demonstrated.
As stated above, the scenario did not call'for evacuation of j
any permanent population, thus, they were not actually driven to consider mobility impaired persons.
- However, before evacuation was called for.
FCP staff did brief the. evaluator on the existence of lists of, mobility im-l paired and their phone numbers and addresses as well as the means
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available to provide assistance.
For this reason, Objective Number 18 was partially demon-stra.ted.
Emergency workers based out of the FCP, were equipped with proper dosimetry, (low, mid-range, and high self-reading and TLDs) however, the individual in charge of distribution was not aware of the maximum dose allowed without authorization, or what to do if workers receive an excess dose.
This is an area of re-quired corrective action.
While he was aware that readings j
should be taken every 15 to 30 minutes, the record keeping forms do not indicate
- this, nor do they even have a
blank space specified for entering the time readings are actually taken.
objective Number 20 was not fully demonstrate'd.
At 1135 PARS came from the State and included the recommen-dation that emergency workers in the affected areas take KI.
The dispatcher contacted the Deputies in the field and. relayed the i
information.
All emergency workers had received a supply of KI prior to deploying to their assigned location.
Objective Number 22 was fully demonstrated.
As stated earlier in the report, the scenario did not pro-vide a
de-escalation of the. emergency, and so precluded any planned relaxation of PARS.
The exercise terminated with the last announced EAL showing General Emergency.
The scenario sim-ply did not provide adequate opportunity to demonstrate Objective Number 35, recovery and reentry.
Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were:
1, 2, 3,
5, 15, 17, 18, 20, and 35.,
Ataea Reauiring Corrective Action 8.
There was no demonstration-of " call up" mobilization pro-cedures.
Some staff were told on the-previous day to report to the FCP by 0800.. Permission to preposition excuses par-ticipants from real time travel.
It does not permit the omission of mobilization procedures.
This must be demonstrated at the next exercise.
9.
At 1135 the ODS Liaison erroneously transcribed a mes-sage containing Protective Action Recommendations.
Affected sectors were E.
F, G,
and H.
- However, the message as tran-scribed omitted sector H.
" Read back".of the message to confirm accuracy would have eliminated the mistake.
This function must be adequately demonstrated at the next ex-ercise.
10.
The person in charge of the distribution of dosimetry was not aware of the maximum dose allowed without authoriza-tion.
Proper instruction must be provided and the knowledge demonstrated at the next exercise.
Area Recommended For Improvement 6.
The Deputy Sheriff manning the dedicated phone line from OPPD gave the order to sound sirens as soon as he received notice of a Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.
While this did not cause any problems in timely alert and notifica-
- tion, the plan states the ODS Liaison person will give the order after receiving the notice from the State EOC over the administrative hot line.
It is recommended that this proce-dure be clearly stated in written form to the Harrison County
' Sheriff.
2.3.3 Media Release C_ enter (MRC)
Objectives to be demonstrated were:
1, 2,
4, 5,
24, and 25.
Though permission had been given to preposition staff in
However, since the staff simply arrived on their own initiative after spending the night in
- Omaha, true mobilization was not demonstrated, and will be an Area Requiring Corrective Action, i
Objective Number 1 was not demonstrated.
Only two persons comprised the Iowa MRC team, and a member of the Iowa Adjutant General's office attended as a
trainee.
While this constituted full staffing according to the plan, it is barely sufficient to handle the many duties associated with this _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
site, and increased staffing should be considered.
No staff changed occurred,-precluding a full demonstration of Objective Number 2.
While the facilities and equipment were adequate, the dis-l plays were questionable.
The lack of a single complete' map of J
the total EPZ, sufficiently detailed and of large enough
- scale, i
made that aspect of press briefings appear makeshift and' awkward.
)
It is strongly recommended that Iowa,
. Nebraska and OPPD unite in-i providing such a map for future exercises.
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Objective Number 4 was fully demonstrated.
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Primary communications were adequate,
- however, backup sys-tems were not demonstrated.
Objective Number 5 was not fully demonstrated.
1 Media kits were provided and five briefings were held throughout the exercise.
They occurred at approximately 90 minute intervals, or as needed.
They'were clear and free of jar-
- gon, but as mentioned above, suffered from the lack of a single EPZ map showing both states.
1 Very effective pre-briefing meetings were held, and all par-j ties regularly contacted information sources at the EOF to verify j
or update.
Media monitoring was provided by OPPD to rectify any
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erroneous information.
Objectives Number 24 and 25 were fully demonstrated.
Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were:
1, 2, and 5.
Areas Reauiring Corrective Action I
I 11.
Mobilization call-up procedures were not demonstrated, as staff simply arrived on-site at a prearranged time.
Per-mission to preposition does not excuse from demonstrating j
mobilization procedures.
This must be demonstrated at the next exercise.
j 12.
Press briefings and releases referred to affected areas by sector designations E, F, and G, and failed to use land-mark descriptions.
Use of landmark descriptions must be demonstrated at the next exercise.
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Area Recommended For Improvement j
i 7.
Collaborate with Nebraska and OPPD to provide a
single map of the total EPZ.
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2.3.4 Field Team Coordination i
This function was performed'at the Forward Command Post at the Harrison County EOC.
Objectives to be demonstrated were 1,
2, 3,.4, 5, 6, 20, 22, and 35.
With prior permission, the field team coordination staf f was repositioned in Council Bluffs, Iowa.
- However, mobilization procedures were demonstrated, as the call down list was utili:ed with the originating call coming from-the Dose Assessment person in Des Moines.
Objective Number 1 was partially demonstrated.
Staffing for this function required a coordinator and an as-sistant.
The function was fully staffed, and a shift change was attempted.
While the second shift replacement for the "assis-l l
tant" functioned well, the first shift coordinator remained at l
the second shift coordinator's side through most of the exercise.
The coordinator position was really-double staffed instead of a
shift change.
Therefore, Objective Number 2 was not fully denon-l strated.
The first shift coordinator was quite good in his emergency
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management responsibilities, and was in control of the operation l
throughout.
The facilities, displays and equipment were ad-I equate, fully demonstrating Objectives Number'3 and 4.
I Since primary communication with the Rad team was to be via j
radio utilizing a Harrison County antenna, and the antenna has not yet been erected, backup was required.
This involved re:ay-ing messages to the team through the. Sheriff's dispatcher.
This i
was rather cumbersome.
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Objective Number 5 was not fully demonstrated.
The teams were based in Ames and Des Moines, and were dis-patched to Logan (FCp) at around 0730.
After arriving at Logan they were briefed and dispatched to their monitoring points at 0957.
The green team arrived at 1045 and the blue team at 1048.
Therefore, Objective Number 6 (deployment from Logan) was fully demonstrated.
The only portion of Objective Number 20 (Exposure Control) l relating to this function is to assure that the field teams read and record their dosimeters in a timely manner.
This was d:ne, fully demonstrating Objective Number 20.
In taking readings and producing the appropriate c alcul a-
- tions, the Blue Team made an error which resulted in very high l
radiciodine concentrations.
Furthermore, the Field Team Coordi-l
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nator and Dose Assesscr misinterpreted the calculations resulting in the erroneous decision to take KI.
Objective Number 21 was not demonstrated.
As already noted.
.the scenario failed to provide sufficient opportunity to engage in recovery and reentry activities.
Objec-tive Number 35 was not demonstrated.
I Sum' mary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated werej 2,
5, 21, and 35.
Area Recommended For Improvement l
l 8.
Both the raw data and the calculated radicio' dine concen-2 I
trations should be transmitted to the Field Team ' Coordinator in order to reduce the chances of misinterpretation.
2.3.5 Field Monitoring Objectives to be demonstrated were 5, 6,
7, 8, and 9.
Green Team:
This group was based in Des Moines.
They de-parted from the radiological laboratory at about 0730 after checking all their equipment.
They left at the Unusual Event in-stead of the
- Alert, so that they would arrive in time to participate.
Nevertheless, they did demonstrate real time travel from Des Moines to Logan.
Objective Number 6 was. fully demon-strated.
Upon arrival at Logan they were properly briefed, but dis-covered that they had left the equipment case containing the Ludlum 2200 back at the RAD lab.
J They arrived at their first monitoring point in a
timely manner and showed appropriate equipment and procedures for. deter-
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mining ambient radiation levels.
Objective Number 7 was fully demonstrated.
Communications with the team coordinator were via the backup system and encountered only one dead spot.
- However, as noted under Field Team Coordination, the primary system was not operat-ing, thus, preventing a full demonstration of Objective Number 5.
Since they did not have their Ludlum 2200 to measure air-borne radioiodine, the radioed the other team and asked them' to rendezvous so they could borrow their Ludlum 22000 and demon-strate their capability to take. readings and perform the calculations.
They did this successfully, and fully demonstrated Objective Number 8.
1 They-also took soil and vegetation samples,. properly bagged and labeled them and prepared them for transport by the.Hignway patrol to the lab at' Iowa City.
Since there was no discussion'on'
'i demonstration of snow or milk samples,- objective Number 9.
was j
only partially demonstrated.
Blue Team:
This team was based in Ames,-~and-like.the: Green
- Team, displayed real time transportation to Logan by leaving a t' 0730 and arriving at 1000.
Upon arrival they were.' briefed. on plant and meteorological conditions and they deployed to their1 I
field monitoring locations.
j Objective Number 6 was fully' demonstrated..
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While attempting to determine ambient radiation levels,.the team did not demonstrate' instrumentation: procedures. through proper use of their Ludlum 14C.
They merely relayed to the team 1
coordinator the readings provided by the controller.
They also
-f failed to log the location,
- time, dates,
.and name of monitors I
/
with each reading.
Objective Number 7 was not demonstrated, -and is an area re-quiring corrective action.
In measuring.for airborne radiciodine, the team was using a
q new procedure, measuring pico Curies per cubic meter'instead of j
the more common micro Curies per cubic centimeter.. This probably caused them to fail to account for instrument efficiency and pro-duce erroneously high reading of radiciodine levels.
After about 15 minutes they caught the error and gave corrected readings.
i objective Number 8 was not completely demonstrated.
In collecting samples of soil, vegetation and
- water, the team displayed proper collection techniques.
.However, they did not double bag samples nor were'they properly labeled and bagged.
Neither did they discuss milk or snow sampling.nethods.
Objective Number 9 was not fully demonstrated.
Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated were: 5, 7,
8, and 9.
Area Reauiring Corrective Action J
13.
The team from Ames, Iowa (Blue Team) did not demonstrate instrumentation procedures using their Ludlum 14C in measur-ing ambient radiation levels.
They merely relayed controller-readings.
Objective Number 7 was not demonstrated.
14.
In measuring for airborne radioiodine concentrations they failed to account for. instrument efficiency and-produced
~
erroneously high readings.
Though the omission was later i
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discovered and-corrected, this did not constitute a
demonstration of Objective Number 8.
15.
They demonstrated proper. sample collect' ion techniques for soil, vegetatio.n, and water.
However, there was no dis-cussion of techniques for sampling milk and snow.
Also, they failed to double bag samples and to label-them properly.
Objective Number 9 was not fully demonstrated.
This team must receive. training in the. procedures required for the successful demonstration of Objectives Number 7, 8,
and 9, and demonstrate the procedures
't the~next exercise at which they participate.
2.3.6 pottawattamie County BOC Objectives'to be demonstrated were:
1, 2, 3,
4, 5,
13, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, and 35.
At 0820 Op?D notified pottawattamie County that an Alert had been declared.
The State Liaison person was repositioned with permission; mobilization of other staff began immediately and was completed at 0925.
Objective Number 1 was partially demon-strated.
However, since no shift changes occurred, Objective Number 2 was not fully demonstrated.
Under the State Compensatory plan, very little emergency management decision-making originates at this EOC.
But to the j
extent possible, such as ordering' traffic control and activation i
of reception centers, Objective Number 3 was fully demonstrated.
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Facilities, displays, and equipment were' adequate, and all communications were demonstrated, fully accounting for Objectives Number 4 and 5.
At 0955 a Site Area Emergency was announced.
At orders from the $ tate EOC, the sirens in pottawattamie County were' sounded at 0957.
To the extent required, Objective Number 13 was fully demon-strated.
When evacuation was called for, traffic volume was discussed and traffic control points were promptly established (simulated).
Since there is no permanent population in the area to be evacuated within pottawattamie County, Objective Number 15 was not fully demonstrated.
Staff discussed the availability of resources to deal with any impediments to evacuation, and the procedures for doing so.
No resources were actually activated, but Objective Number 16 was - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _
fully demonstrated.
The three access control points required by this exere:se were manned by the Highway patrol who had proper dosimetry and displayed knowledge of its use.
Fully demonstrating Objective Number 20.
However, since no actual deployment occurred, Objec-tive Number 17 was not fully demonstrated.
At 1140 the State recommended use of KI for emergency work-ers in the affected area.
The recommendation was relayed to the-workers in tne field who simulated taking it.
Objective Number 22 was fully demonstrated.
Since the scenario was deficient in providing adequate op-portunity, it was not possible to engage in recovery and reentry activities.
Objective Number 35 was not demonstrated.
Summary:
Objectives not fully demonstrated:
2, 17, and 35.
2.3.7 Missouri Valley Ambulance and University of Nebraska Medical Center (UNMC)
This demonstration was conducted on July 21, 1987 at
- 1800, and was not in conjunction with the exercise scenario.
Objec-tives to be demonstrated were 5, 20, 30, and 31.
After preparing the ambulance and checking their dosimetry, the crew of four left for the accident site.
Wearing their anti-contamination suits, they began an injury assessment of the victim as well as surveying with CDV 700.
The survey probe was not covered with plastic, creating the possibility of probe con-tamination.
This should be an area for future training.
The patient was wrapped in a sheet and loaded for transport.
During transport, there was a problem getting clear radio trans-mission to
- UNMC, but this was solved by relaying through the Harrison County dispatchers, fully demonstrating Objective Number 5.
Upon arrival at UNMC, the staff had protected the area with plastic runners and those in the emergency room wore protective clothing with dosimetry.
They proceeded to survey the
- patient, ambulance staff, the ambulance, and the emergency room and recep-tion area.
They also demonstrated decontamination of personnel and equipment.
Objectives Number 5, 20, 30, and 31 were fully demonstrated.
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l Area Recommended For Improvement 1
4.
The Missouri Valley Ambulance crew should receive special training in the use of the probe at the next scheduled train-
]
ing session.
2.3.8 Council Bluffs Ambulsace e=d Clarkson Bosoital objectives to be demonstrated were:
5, 20, 30, and 31.
)
J Upon receipt of a. call that a contaminated-injured person' l
had been found in a rural area, the ambulance crew
- deployed, i
maintainics radio contact with the dispatcher whi'le they. were enroute, demonstrating Objective Number 5.
1 When they arrived at the scene they were dressed in l
I anti-contamination suits with proper dosimetry.
They immediately began patient evaluati.on and surveying for contamination.
While they were generally adept in the use of their equipment, the i
I evaluator noted that they should pass the probe over the victim more slowly.
- Also, the probe should be covered with plastic.
Another point observed by the evaluator was that one worker put the headphones of the survey meter under him hood.
This could l
cause contamination.
The earphones should either.be placed under the hood prior to reaching the site, or used outside the hood.
These techniques should receive more attention in the annual training and are areas recommended for improvement.
After loading the victim and beginning the return trip, they established radio contact with the hospital (UNMC) and began giv-l ing patient data.
The hospital. instructed them to use the north emergency entrance.
i Upon
- arrival, the hospital was still engaged with another l
contaminated injured person.
They, therefore, decided to.trans-fer the arriving patient to Clarksun Hospital.
Clarkson was notified and they began immediate preparation.
Since no written Sops where readily available for-reference, pro-cedures were rather
- slow, however, they did follow proper practice and staff wore proper protective clothing.
This was the first exercise for Clarkson Hospital, and the absence of controller cues frequently left them waiting for fur-ther instruction.
Additional controller inputs would have been helpful.
Though marginal, Objective Number 31 was fully demon-strated.
Summary:
Objectives 5, 20, 30, and 31 were fully demonstrated.
i Areas Recommended For Improvement 5.
The Council Bluffs' Ambulance crew should receive spec:al training in. survey techniques and use of the probe at the j
next scheduled training session, q
6.
Clarkson Hospital should have a copy of their SOPS readily available for reference at the next exercise.
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3 SCENARIO l
The scenario was lacking in two areas, both of which pre-vented full demonstration of State capabilities.
(1)
The Field data was only prepared for specific predeter-mined monitoring points.
From this limited data it was impossible to define the plume boundaries and determine the cen-terline.
(2)
The scenario did not provide for reentry and recovery play by off-site responders.
The scenario provided for limited play be on-site personnel, but the exercise terminated while off-site locations were still showing General Emergency.
- Thus, State and local organizations were unable to demonstrate Objec-tive Number 35, Recovery and Reentry.
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4
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCY AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION l
4.1 Deficiency l
1.
Failure to alert all residents of Washington County within 15 minutes is a deficiency.
The State was notified of this verbally on July 23, 1967 and in writing on July 31, 1987.
They are required to:
Within 30 days develop a checklist'and/or SOP for use by the person sounding the sirens, and apprise the siren operator of said document.
Provide FEMA Region VII with a
copy of the document by August 31, 1987.
This was accomplished, and ac-knowledged by FEMA Region VII on September 3, 1987.
4.2 Areas Reauiring Corrective Action NEBRASKA OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center 1.
While the licensee notified the Nebraska State Patrol at 0820 that an Alert had been declared at 0818, this message was not received at the SEOC until 0842.
A demonstration of timely notification will be required at the next exercise.
Information Authentication Center (TAC) 2.
The use of landmark descriptions in the EBS message an-nouncing the General Emergency will be required at the text exercise.
Media Release Center 3.
The concept of a temporary hot line for rumor control j
must be formalized by placing it in the plan and assigning i
knowledgeable persons to answer the phone.
This must be j
demonstrated at the next exercise.
j COUNTY OPERATIONS Washington County Emergency Operations Center
)
4.
A more accurate method of recording, confirming and dis-tributing messages must be developed and demonstrated at the i
next exercise.
5.
Staff at the EOC did not have low range dosimeters as the plan requires.
These must be provided and used at the next exercise. -_____
J
f Sarpy County Evacuee Registration and Care _
j 6.
A second shift roster of County staff must be presented at the next exercise.
IOWA STATE OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center - Including Dose Assessment 7.
When the " Blue" field monitoring team used an erroneous method of calculating concentrations of radiciodine, the' Field Team Coordinator and the Dose Assessor at the SEOC misinterpreted the data and decided to administer KI when it i
was not necessary.
Forward Command Post 8.
There was not demonstration of " call up" mobilization procedures.
Some staff were told on the previous day to re-port to the FCP by 0800.
Permission to preposition excuses l
participants from real time travel.
It does not permit the omission of mobilization procedures.
9.
At 1135 the ODS Liaison erroneously transcribed a mes-sage containing Protective Action Recommendations.
Affected sectors were E, F,
G, and H.
However, the message as tran-j scribed omitting sector H.
" Read back" of the message to confirm accuracy would have eliminated the mistake.
This function must be adequately demonstrated at the next exer-cise.
10.
The person in charge of the distribution of dosimetry was not aware of the maximum dose allowed without authoriza-tion.
Proper instruction must be provided and the knowledge demonstrated at the next exercise.
Media Release Center 1 1.~
Mobilization call-up procedures were not demonstrated, as staff simply arrived on-site at a prearranged time.
Per-mission to preposition does not excuse from demonstrating mobilization procedures.
This must be demonstrated at the next exercise.
12.
Press briefings and releases referred to affected areas by sector designations E, F, and G, and failed to use land-mark descriptions.
Use of landmark descriptions must be demonstrated at the next exercise.
Field Monitoring 13.
The team from Ames Iowa (Blue Team) did not demonstrate instrumentation procedures using their Ludlum 14C in measur- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _
ing ambient radiation levels.
They merely relayed was not demon-controller readings.
Objective Number 7 strated.
14.
In measuring for airborne radioiodine concentrations they failed to account for instrument efficiency and pro-duced erroneously high readings.
Though the omission was later discovered and corrected, this did not constitute a
demonstration of Objective Number 8.
15.
They demonstrated proper sample collection techniques for soil, vegetation, and water.
However, there was no dis-cussion of techniques for sampling milk and snow.
- Also, they failed to double bag samples and to label them prop-erly.
Objective Number 9 was not fully demonstrated.
This team must receive training in the procedures required for the successful demonstration of Objectives Number 7, 8,
and 9, and demonstrate the procedures at the next exercise at which they participated.
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