ML20236N662

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-267/87-28 on 871007-08.Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of Emergency Plan & Procedures in Response to 871002 Fire
ML20236N662
Person / Time
Site: Fort Saint Vrain Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/05/1987
From: Baird J, Bangart R, Fisher W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236N642 List:
References
50-267-87-28, NUDOCS 8711160278
Download: ML20236N662 (6)


See also: IR 05000267/1987028

Text

s . . . l

APPENDIX B

U.S.. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

.

NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/87-28 License: DPR-34

Dccket: .50-267 ,

Licensee: Public Service Company of_ Colorado (PSC)

P. O. Box 840

Denver, Colorado 80201-0840

1~ Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclu e Generating Station (FSV).

Inspection At: Fort St. Vrain, Colorado

Inspection Conducted: October 7-8, 1987

'Ing actors.: p GT. //[F/07

La 7.I.Baird,TechnicalAssistant

J Date

1.

i kwr

William L, Fisher, Chief, Nuclear Materials

// /C/E 7

Date~

and Emergency Preparedness Branch

Approved: () (st r '

Gwfis //f05 ftl*h

'

Richard L. Bangart, Diregtor, Division of Dath

Radiation' Safety and 56feguards

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted October 7-8, 1987 (Report 50-267/87-28]

Areas Inspected: Nonroutine, announced inspection of the implementation of the

emergency plan and procedures in response to the fire of October 2, 1987.

Results: Within the areas inspected, one deviation was identified (paragraph 4

- failure to staff the Forward Command Post within time commitments). No

violations were identified.

.

8711160278 871112

PDR ADOCK 05000267

G PDR

,

_

,

s. ,.

!

DETAILS

o j

i

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee

  • R. Williams, Jr., Vice-President, Nuclear Operations
  • C. Fuller, Station Manager
  • F. Novachek, Technical / Administrative Services Manager
  • F. Borst, Support Services Manager .
  • P; Tomlinson, Manager, Quality Assurance j

'

  • P. Fuller, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Technical Support
  • K. 'Purnell, Licensing 1
  • 0. Clayton, Emergency Planning Coordinator

T. Schleiger, Supervisor, Health Physics

J. Switzer, Training

D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

T. Dice, Shift Supervisor

D. Evans, Superintendent of Operations

G. Reeves, Manager, Media Services

M.' Deniston, Administrative Shift Supervisor

NRC

  • R. Farrell, Senior Resident Inspector j
  • P. Michaud, Resident Inspector i
  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Chronology of Licensee Emergency Response

The NRC inspectors reviewed selected records generated during the

emergency and. held interviews with key individuals to determine the

chronology of licensee emergency response activities. The following

significant. times, events, and actions were noted:

Time Event or Action

October 2, 1987

11:59 p.m. The turbine equipment operator reported a

fire around Valve HV-2292 on Level 6 of the a

turbine building. The control room sounded i

the fire alarm. The five person Fire Brigade .

was activated and dispatched to the fire.

l

I'

i

._ _ _ __. _

r

,,

,

-.I s

-

3 ,

, .,q

l

3

y +

,

. Octo'ber 3, 1987 f

g ~12:03 a.m. The shift supervisor requested outside fire

fighting assiu+,ance via the Weld County

_

'!'

Emergency Comhuirica'tions Center.

12:09 a.m. A manual reactor scram was initiated.

'k Airline respirators donned:in the control

12:09 a.mc

'com, due to in-leakage of smoke.

, Only three

_ respirators for seven persons.

12 : .15 . a . m. The fire was reported to be out. Heavy smoke' <

reported in the. turbine building. )

12:25 a.m. The.Platteville Fire Department reported

"

onsite. ,

' 12:30 a.m. The shift supervisor declared an' Alert f

emergency classification, based on the fire

~

!

and loss of ':: ore cooling forced circulation  :

12:40 a.m. Denver! telephone lines out preventing

initiation ~of emergency pager system from

control room. Local telephone line used to

contact assistant operations superintendent

to activate pagers.

j

12:43 a.m. Emergency pager system initiated with

response code for Alert.

.i

12:48 a.m. Colorado Department of Health answering k

service notified.

12:50 a.m. Weld County notified of Alert via the {

Emergency Communications Center

12:50 a.m. Initial accountability reported to the

control room by'the Central Alarm Station

(CAS) operator. Two persons not accounted

for. 1

.12:55 a.m. All personnel accounted for.

1:00 a.m. NRC senior resident inspector notified. i

,

1:08 a.m. NRC notified via the Emergency Notification

System (ENS).

1:25 a.m. Assistant operations superintendent relieved l

shift supervisor as Control Room Director. l

i

_w___. _ S

-

' gg

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4 ' ll ,

,

fy .

R. .:

4

,.

1:58 a.m. Technical Support.Cente.r (TSC) fully staffed l

and operational.

~

d

f 2:45 a.m. Station manager relieved emergency planning

d 4-

coordinator as TSC Director. j

2:59 a.m. Personnel Control Center (PCC) staffed and

operational

'

h

3:45 a.m. The Forward Command Post fully staffed and

$ activated. Vice president, nuclear

operations assumed duties as Corporate ,

.. Emergency Director (CED). i

w

4:55'a.m. "A" waste gas receiver planned release

initiated.

,

6:14 a.m. "A" waste gas receiver planned release

^

4

' terminated.

8:17 a.m. Alert classification termina*.ed and recovery

phase initiated. i

8:20 a.m. NRC notified'of change in classification via

L ENS telephone.

<

'

3. ' Emergency Classification and Notifications

n

? The NRC' inspector's held discussions with key licensee reactor operations

staff and examined logs and records to determine whether the licensee's

emergency classification and subsequent notifications had been performed

iniaccordance with:the RERP.,-Sections 4.0 and 6.0, and RERP Implementing '

,

Procedure RERP-CR, " Control Room Procedure."

,

, y

The'NRC inspdctors' determined that the shift supervisor on duty when the ,

fire. occurred. classified the emergency and declared an Alert at 12:30 a.m.

('approximately 30' min'utes after the fire was detected) based on the nature-

of the fire and'the difficulty which had been experienced in establishing

stable core.cocling. The shift supervisor stated that this classification

was made withost' entering _the procedures. An assessment of the .,

classification, subsequently conducted in the TSC at 1:55 a.m. , verified ,

that-this classification was appropriate and consistent with-the Alert 1

Emergency Action Level,(EAL) No. 10, " Serious fire which could lead to

, substantial degradation of plant systems." The Alert classification was

L terminated by the CED in the FCP at 8:17 a.m., based on a determination  ;

!:, ,that the plant was in a safe and stable' condition, and the Recovery Phase  !

initiated in accordance with Section 9.0 of the RERP. The inspectors l

noted that the initial classification and subsequent declassification of 1

the emergency appeared to be consistent with the RERP.

F i

i

'

-- _-

,

m -

,

4

J

,: . ,.

l

l'

h -

~ _

Y "%. ,

-

. _

'The N'RC inspectors determined that the control room attempted to activate-

_

the emergency pager system in Denver for notification of the emergency l

L  : response organization personnel at the time of the Alert classification,  ;

but were unable due to the loss'of offsite telephone lines, except for the i

local lines to Greeley'and Longmont, as a result of fire damage to the

telephone cable in the. turbine building. The shift supervisor first

attempted to contact the operations superintendent, but was unsuccessful. i

He then was able to contact the assistant operations superintendent on a

' local .line at about 12:40 a.m. The assistant operations superintendent

activated the pager sys+.em from his home at 12:43 a.m. 'The encoded pager

message for.all of the emergency response organization staff notified them-

of the Alert, the wind direction, the location of the PCC, and the f l

requirement to call back a verification that the message had been received  !

and notified.them to respond to the emergency response facilities in

accordance with the staffing plans. It was later found that the callback

verification system did not work,' as it depended on an offsite telephone ,

link to a computer at the plant. {

In regard to offsite agency notifications, the inspectors noted that the

'

Jcontrol room initial calls were made to the Colorado Department of Health i

at M 2:48 a.m...the Weld County Emergency Communications Center at.

12:50 a.m., and the NRC Operations Center at 1:08 a.m. The NRC inspectors

determined that these notifications webe timely in relationship to the

status of the emergency, but wereLapproximately 3 and 5 minutes,

respectively, in excess of the 15 minutes specified in the RERP and  !

procedures for notifying the state and local agencies. The' primary factor  ;

in the delay of these notifications apparently was the unexpected delay 1

incurred in activating the emergency response pager system.  !

^ During interviews with the licensee's staff, the NRC inspectors found that l

there had'been a lapse in the offsite notification network, in that the ,

Weld County Emergency Communications Center had not notified the Colorado ,

Department of Disaster and Emergency Services of the Alert classification l

as required in the offsite plans. Apparently the Weld County communicator

recognized that no additional Weld' County. support was necessary to respond i

to the fire, but did not recognize that additional notification was

required. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will follow up

on this observation during a remedial alert and notification drill to be

conducted in the near future.

No violations or deviathns were identified.

4. Emergency Response Facilities Staffing and Activation

TheNRIinspektorsreviewedemergencyresponsefacilitieslogsand

recor K and held discussions'with key emergency response organization

personnel to determine;whether the staffing and activation of the

licensee's emergency response facilities had been in accordance with the

RERP, Section 6.0, and RERP Implementing Procedures RERP-TSC, " Technical

% Support Center Procedure;" RERP-PCC, " Personnel Control Center Procedure;"

and RERP-FCP, " Forward Command Post Procedure."

-

7

!

'

tp

1

=

,

7 _ _.

.: .,. ,

k,

6

Section 6.0 of the RERP states that all onsite and offsite energency

response facilities will be staffed for emergency classifications of Alert

and above. The inspectors noted that the first responders to the

I; . emergency pager notification arrived onsite at about 1:15 a.m. and at the

FCP approximately 1:40 a.m. . Staff augmentation continued until all of the

emergency response facilities were fully staffed and declared activated as

follows:

Emergency Response Facility Time Staffed and Activated

Technical Support Center 1:58 a.m. (*88 minutes)

j Personnel Control Center 2:59 a.m. (149 minutes)

l

Forward Command Post 3:45 a.m. (195 minutes)

__________________________

j * denotes time since Alert

i

L The inspectors noted that the times to achieve minimum staffing and

activation of the FCP and PCC were significantly in excess of 90 minutes,

the staffing time commitment made to the NRC in letters dated August 28,

1980, and December 7, 1981. The failure to meet this staffing time frame

represents a deviation from a commitment to the NRC (267/8728-01).

The inspectors discussed the delays in achieving the st'affing commitments

with the facility emergency directors and reviewed the staffing checklist

records. For the PCC, it was determined that the minimum staff

discrepancies of three health physicist staff and the maintenance

supervisor prevented activation within the required time. In the FCP, it

was noted that five of the minimum staff, including the CED, had arrived

by 1:55 a.m. The remaining positions af Dose Assessment and Technical

Liaison and were not filled until 3:05 a.m. and 3:32 a.m. , respectively.

The common factors in the staffing delays appeared to be: (1) the failure

of personnel to maintain the pagers in a mode to alert them at all times

and (2) a limited number of alternates for each emergency response

organization position. The failure of the call-back system also revealed

that there was no alternate, notification verification procedure to

implement if the system went down.

Ne violations were identified.

5. Exit Interview

The NRC inspectors met with the NRC senior resident inspector and licensee

representatives identified in paragraph 1 on October 8, 1987, and

summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as presented in this

report.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ -