ML20236M527
| ML20236M527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/04/1987 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8708110107 | |
| Download: ML20236M527 (72) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
)~
l
Title:
Briefing on Performance of New Plants l
Location:
Washington, D.
C.
1 Date:
Tuesday, August 4, 1987 Pages:
1 - 44 Ann Riley & Associates Court Reporters 1625 i Street, N.W., Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 SM S218 IRK 87
- PT9.7 PDR
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D i SCLA I MER 2
3 4
i 5
6 This is an unofficial transcript of
- a. meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 3
8/04/87 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been i
11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain i
/
j 12 inaccuracies i
i 13 The transcript is intended solely for general 4
14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.105, it is 1
15 not part of the formal or' informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of epinion in this transcript.
17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs, No 1
18 pleading or other paper may be fil'ed with'the Commission' in I
19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement
}
20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorire.
~
22 23 24 25 N3
s se l
1 UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA.
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~
3-
'4 BRIEFING ON PERFORMANCE OF NEW-PLANTS 5
'6
[PUBLIC MEETING)'
7 8
1 9
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
'10 Room 1130 11 1717 H Street, Northwest 12 Washington, D.C.
13 14 TUESDAY,' AUGUST 4, 1987 15 16 The Commission' met in open session,; pursuant 1to 17 notice, at 2:03 o' clock p.m., the Honorable LANDO.W.
- ZECH, 18 Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
19 20 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
21 LANDO W.
- ZECH, Chairman of the Commission
'l 22 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the' Commission I
23
(
FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 24 KENNETH CARR, Member of'the; Commission' s
25 I
i t.
e e
2 1
STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
2 S.
Chilk I
3' W.
Parler 4
V.
Stello 5
E. Jordan 6
R. Starostecki-7 R. Dennig 1
8 9
i 1
10 l
l 11 l
12 l
13 l
l 14 l
15 l
16 l
17
)
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19 20 1
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21 22 j
23 24 25 l
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______-________-O
a e
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PROCEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good' afternoon, ladies and' gentlemen.-
3 Commissioner Bernthal will be-joining us shortly.
This is an 4
~ informational briefing this afternoon by the Office for 5
-Analysis and Evaluation of operational data on the subject of 6
the performance o:' new plants.
i l
7 This briefing is a follow-on to a November 14, 1986 l
8 staff briefing regarding improving the effectiveness of initial l
I 9
start-up programs,,
At that briefing,.the Commission requested 10 the staff provide this follow-on briefing once the data had I
11 been correlated and conclusions drawn.
12 Since that time, the staff has produced a draft i
13 report entitled, "NUREG-1275, Operating Experience Feedback 14 Report on New Plants" dated July 1987 and a briefing paper 15 entitled, " Initiatives Regarding New Plant Performance" dated 16 July 29, 1987 which provide the basis'for this briefing.
17 I understand that copies of the staff briefing paper j
18 and the slides to be used by the staff during their i
j 5
19 presentation are available at the back of the room.
Do my f
20 fellow commissior.ers have any opening comments?
I 21 (No response.]
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
If not, Mr. Stello, will you proceed, 23 please?
24 MR. STELLO:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
About a year 25 ago, we took our first real hard look at the performance that
? -c 4,
IL we were. observing and the experience we had with new plants as 1
th'ey_were coming on-line and the one. thing that'was clear ~from 2
3 that'look is'that there was a fairly large spectrum in, terms of 4
performance, plants were' making essentially the same errors-5 over and other. plants? repeating the errors that other. plants 6'
made and it'really raised the question of is there more that 1
'7 ought to.be done both by us and by the industry.
B What we are_ going to tell.you today is what we are doing that is for both us'and the industry.
As_you recall-9 10 after that meeting I asked the. industry to look at this' 4
11
-particular issue and see what they thought _they ought to do.
12 I think.the-bottom line point of it all'is what does 13 it mean for safety and that is, if you can.really get'arplant 14 to start up well, to do well during the startup, that' kind of 15 momentum carries over into the operation of the plant and I_
16 think overall, we will see significant improvement.in the s
17 operations of the plant much faster and with much more 18 continuity if they start out well.
19 So we think_that this is an_ area that deserves 20 considerable attention and I think as you will be convinced 21 this afternoon, we are giving it that attention and I think we 22.
are starting to believe that we are on the right road-now and 23 are convinced with some time and energy that we are going to 24 make a difference.
25 So with that introduction, I will ask Mr. Jordan who I
5 1
will start and others here at the table will join in at the l
2 appropriate time.
I 3
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
All right.
Please proceed.
l 4
MR. JORDAN:
Thank you, Vic and Mr. Chairman.
I 5
would like to pick up on the background slide if I could, that 6
is slide three.
Some of the material has been covered.
I I
7 would mention that INPO does have an initiative to improve new j
8 plant performance and INPO briefed the Commission May 13th i
9 regarding the concerns that they have.
10
[ SLIDE.)
i 11 MR. JORDAN:
They indicated that new plant 12 performance should be improved and they stated that they j
i 13 fundamentally agreed with the findings of the draft report l
i 14 which was out for peer review at that time.
i 15 Since then the staff has essentially completed the 16 new plant study.
We have collected the lessons learned and 17 feedback from the peer review data and we believe that based on l
18 analysis of data and discussions with licensees that the 19 principal thing out this new plant study are, in fact, the 20 lessons learned rather than the statistical information, that 21 the meeting with the utilities and deriving from them things 22 that they felt that they should have done are for plants that 23 had relatively better performance during startup things they 1
did are the principal benefit out of this study.
24 25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I would like to point out that that
L 6
4 o
6' kind of makes sense to me because your statistical study really 1
is a very small number when you come.right down to it.
2 3
MR. JORDAN:
Yes, sir.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:.So I think your discussions of 5-lessons learned is probably the most important input you can-6 get.
Go ahead.
7 MR. JORDAN:
So we will touch on the statistics but 8
we will dwell at some length on the lessons.
Since we last met I
9 with you the staff has made some changes to our Readiness 10 Review Approach and we will talk a little bit more about that 11 later and we are planning further changes.
12 We have increased the monitoring of new plant 13 performance.
The performance indicators were implemented after.
14 the previous presentation to the commission.
Could I have 15 slide 27, please?
16
[ SLIDE.]
17 MR. JORDAN:
Just very quickly I wanted to indicate 18 that it turns out that this fiscal year is the peak year that 19 the NRC has had in terms of the total numbers of plants that 20 are in their first two years of operation and thereafter, those 21 numbers are going to decline.
22 So in order to affect real improvements, we have to I.
23 move rather quickly and so the' purpose-of that slide is just to 24 identify the peak that has occurred.
25 Go to slide nine, please.
L__-_-_______-___-_._____-________-
7
'i 1
(SLIDE.]
2 MR. JORDAN:
There were 22 plants that are in this-3 new plant study.
This is an increase from the preliminary 4
study that we issued in August.
These were the plants that 5
were licensed from January 1983 through June 1986.
These 6
represent some 35 reactor years of operating experience and the 7
review included about 2,400 event reports and root cause 8
evaluations of those events.
9 We assessed in particular from that data, scram' 10 rates, ESF actuations, tech spec violations and safety system 11 failures and we also looked at performance indicators and 12 significant events based on the AEOD evaluations.
l 13 We made statistical correlations of the data or
{
14 attempted statistical correlations and Bob Dennig will give you 15 a discussion about those in just a few moments.
We were very 16 interested, of course, in the learning curve of plants and as I 17 mentioned earlier, the object was to develop and communicate 18 improvement lessons.
19 Could I have slide ten, please?
l 20 (SLIDE.]
21 MR. JORDAN:
I just wanted to draw your attention to 22 the plants that were in the study and identify that of those 22 23 plants, we visited eight sites and those are the ones with the 24 asterisk by them and from the meetings with those utilities, 25 the lessons were derived in the subsequent documentation.
l 8
i 1
Next slide, please, slide four.
2
[ SLIDE.]
3 MR. JORDAN:
A generalization I would make from the 4
data and Mr. Stello has mentioned it already is that the 5
learning curve for new plants varies both in the duration and i
6 the magnitude.
There is a wide range of plant performance, new 7
plant performance, and then in addition to give a value to it, j
I 8
during early commercial operation the mean of the unplanned 9
scrams of new plants is about two to three times the mean of 1
10 mature plants.
11 So I am just trying to draw the partition that the 12 mature plants mean is substantially better than plants in the 13 early operation.
14 Slide five, please.
l 15
[ SLIDE.]
16 MR. JORDAN:
This slide gives you the range of scram 17 rates for new plants.
These are cumulative scrams, the top 18 curve being the plant that has had the largest cumulative 19 collection of scrams during startup and the bottom curve being 20 j
the least and if I plotted all of the data from the 22 plants 21 on this chart, it would be fairly solid in between those two so 22 there is not a bias.
There is a distribution.
23 Could I have the next slide, please?
24
[ SLIDE.]
25 MR. JORDAN:
We looked at performance indicator data
9 1
comparing new plants and the mature' plants.
This is the most 2
current set of data that includes the second quarter of 1987 3
and this shows'that indeed the scrams for the new plants is 4
about twice that of the mature plants.. Safety system 5
'actuations and safety system failures also indicate a-6 substantially larger number for the new plants.
7 Next slide, please, slide 41.
8 (SLIDE.)
9 MR. JORDAN:
There'was a question at the last
)
l 10 briefing about the distribution of plant performance in terms i
11 of plants that were licensed years ago and their startup 12 experience with the more recent plants.
For instance, two or 13 three loop Westinghouse plants or BWR-4's or 5's compared with 14 the 6's and the data indicate that there is not a bias towards 15 poor performance with the newer, more complicated plants.
16 In fact, for scrams, the distribution is random.
We 17 have additional slides that would make that point stronger even 18 but I think the point is made.
19 Then I would turn to Bob Dennig and ask him to 20 briefly go through the data analysis.
This is the statistical 21 analysis that you used.
1 22 (SLIDE.]
23 MR. DENNIG:
Thank you.
I would like to briefly 24 summarize the data analysis that is contained in NUREG-1275.
I will do that by describing the primary sources of data, the 25 i
l i
i
1 l
10 j
1 types of analysis that we employed and highlights of the 2
results.
l 3
The primary data base consisted of unplanned event 1
4 reports or unplanned events reported in LERs by the 22 plants 5
during the period covered by the study in the following 6
categories; 349 scram sequences were examined, 1,225 ESF
{
7 actuations; 661 tech spec violations and 135. unplanned loss of 8
system safety function.
9 The analysis can be divided then into three general l
10 classifications, what we would term a root cause analysis, some 11 trend analysis and some formal correlation analysis.
In the 1
12 root cause portion of the analysis, we identified and 13 catalogued for each event, each unplanned event of interest, S
14 the system that was involved, the activity at the time of the l
15 event, the general cause category, for example, human error, 16 equipment error, procedure problems and in the case of scrams, 17 unplanned scran events, the level the power level scrammed 18 from.
19 We also performed what we would call a pattern 20 comparison with the mature plants, data from 1985 for plants 21 not in this study contrasting event frequency as a function of 22 cause, activity and system between the plants in the study and 23 the more mature plants to give a point of reference.
24 Moving on, in the trend analysis we examined event 25 trends for each plant, for each type of event over the period l
L_______-_--_____-_________---_---
f-a l
g l.;
11 1
of the study looking at those events as a function of months I
i 2
since OL or cumulative critical hours, looking at how the event-l-
3 rate changed to characterize what-we have called the learning j
4 curves.
5 We also looked at trends in these cause categories 6
that I mentioned previously.
I 7
Lastly, we examined general correlations through a-l 8
formal statistical analysis of unplanned event rates as a 9
function of planned attributes such as NSSS vendor and then 10 between the average rate over startup and the average post-11 commercial rate.
12 The next slide will discuss this correlation analysis 13 in more detail.
May I have slide 9-B, please?.
l 14
[ Slide.)
1 15 MR. DENNIG:
The objective of the formal correlation 16 analysis was to perform formal statistical analysis to identify 17 significant correlations between general plant attributes and 18 startup/early commercial even frequencies for the event types 19 that we studied.
20 For unplanned SCRAMS, ESF actuations, tech spec 21 violations, and losses of system safety functions, we 22 calculated an average startup event rate for the plants that 23 had completed startup during the performance of the study.
24 Further, we went on and calculated the average post commercial 25 event rate for the four event types, using a six-month post
j l
12 I
a
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1 commercial period that had that much data.
2 We then correlated these rates with NSSS, the type of 3
AE, the date of OL, whether or not the plant was the first unit 4
at the site or a subsequent unit, and whether or not the 5
utility had previous nuclear experience.
We also went on and
)
1 6
correlated the rates themselves, correlated the startup average 7
rate with the post commercial average rates within each plant 8
and employed what would be standard statistical methods:
}
l 9
Pearson product moment analysis, analysis of variance, and j
I 10 nonparametric testing.
i 11 The assumptions used in interpreting the output of 12 this, these analyses, were the starting assumption, the usual 13 starting assumption of a zero correlation or the assumption 14 that the data isn't strong enough to knock you off of that i
15 assumption.
We set a significance level of.05, and generally 16 what that means is that there's a less than 5 percent chance 17 that cur conclusions about the presence of a correlation would l
1 18 be incorrect based on the data.
I 19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Would you move your microphone a 20 little bit closer, would you, please?
The microphone, would 1
21 you move it a little closer?
l 22 Thank you.
l 23 MR. DENNIG:
Could I have Slide 9C, please?
24
[ Slide.]
25 Some highlights of the results.
In the area of root l
i
13 1
cause, we found, for example, that SCRAM causes associated with 2
the balance-of-plant systems, especially feedwater, were 3
dominating, and this is also true of mature plants.
4 Could I see Slide 22, please?
5
[ Slide.]
6 Slide 22 illustrates that point.
l 7
The crosshatching is the new plants in the 8
precommercial phase during the startup and power ascension test I
9 program.
The solid dark area is the mature plants comparison l
10 point, and the intermediate shading is the new plants, post-11 conmercial.
So you can see a gradation through those periods, 12 and you can also see that indeed feedwater systems, as in 13 mature plants, is a dominant factor.
I 14 MR. STELLO:
It might be useful to take just a moment 15 and look at that slide and go through very quickly those things 16 we pay a lot of attention to and those we don't.
17 The first one is normally the:feedwater systems.
18 Those we don't give a great deal of attention to.
They are i
19 balance-of-plant equipment.
1
\\
l 20 The turbine, the main steam, the condensate, and the 1
21 main generator, the reactor protection system, we do spend 22 quite a bit of time with.
But I think there is another message 23 in here -- that is, balance-of-plant equipment is important ind i
4 24 significant.
It juat emphasizes tho point that hds-baen 25 (uphasized previorsi;y, in that dhe perfarnance of tb2 plant is n
l L
i i
14 1
correlated rather significantly to performance of the balance-2 of-plant.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Very good point, graphically shown 4
there.
Good.
i i
1 5
MR. DENNIG:
The next point would be greater 6
contributions to SCRAMS from surveillance testing and procedure l
7 problems for mature plants, and this doesn't come as a 8
surprise, and that's illustrated -- could I see Slide 23, 9
please.
10
[ Slide.)
I 11 Again, the same key and interpretation, and you can 12 see where originally the ratio between the length of the bar 13 for testing and the more mature and post-commercial changes, i
as i
)
14 I say, for testing.
That is surveillance testing and procedure 15 problems.
i
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l 16 The next point, most ESF actuations, it turns out in 17 practice are spurious.
That's true for new plants; it's true j
18 for older plants.
In the data that we studied for the 22 19 plants, the greatest concentrations come in radiation j
20 monitoring systems, which tend to be state-of-the-art, tend to 21 be tailored to each plant, corium monitoring, and in the case i
22 of BWRs, reactor water cleanup isolation.
i 1
l 23 The last point in the root cause area, although human I
I 24 errors dominate the cause for tech spec violations, equipment 25 problems can generate opportunities for the error, and again l
l
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15 1
this harks back to radiation monitoring, which is a problem 2
that most of the plants that'we talked with had.
3 In the trend analysis, we saw a wide range'of 4
experience exhibited on the learning curves, as has been 5
mentioned earlier.
No general trend-'in cause category, for 6
example, human error dominating in one early months and tailing 7
off in later months.
We see a general mix of. equipment 8
problems and personnel-related issues.
9 We observed that the SCRAM rate is high, particularly high until approximately 2500 critical hours into the life of 10 11 the plant, which tends to be around six calendar months on the 12 average, and then you begin to see it roll over and decline, 13 although there are cases in the study where that decline hasn't 14 i
come down to the mature plant level by the end of the startup 15 period.
16 We observed that plants with initially high ESF l
17 actuation rates began showing fairly large decreases in the 18 range of three to eight months post-OL issuance, and there's 19 quite a spread in that experience.
20 And lastly, significant moderation in tech spec violation rate usually begins-in the period six to eight months 21 22 after OL issuance.
23 (Commissioner Bernthal enters the hearing room.)
24 MR. DENNIG:
Could I have Slide 9D, please?
25
[ Slide.)
l 16 j
1 With regard to general correlations the results 2
ranged as follows:
In'the statistically significant bin, we 3
had post-commercial tech spec event rate --
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I think you've got the wrong slide up 5
.there.
j 6
MR..DENNIG:
9D;.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
There you go.
C MR. DENNIG:
Okay.. The post-commercial' tech spec 9
violation rate,.a second unit site had a significant advantage 10 over a plant that would have been a first unit at a site, and j
11 that gets into the passing on of what you've learned.
12 Startup SCRAM rate correlated significantly with i
13 post-commercial SCRAM rate, and this gets into the length of 14 the learning curve.
i 15 The startup ESF rate, again with post-commercial ESF 16 rate.
There was also a similar correlation for loss of system.
17 i
safety function events, but the numbers are so small, 18 especially in the post-commercial period, that I didn't give 19 much weight to that.
(
20 Then to give you a feeling of the gradation of 21 things, on the borderline or possible significant startup ESF 22 rate, again with a unit that would be a second unit at a site, 23 would do better.
The ctartup ESF rate with' previous 24 experience, where the utility had a previous nuclear unit 25 somewhere, and the last one, startup tech spec rate, again with
l
-l l
17 1
the second unit at a site.
2 And just to give you an example of something that 3
didn't turn out to be significant, on the post-commercial 4
period, the SCRAM with NSSS, and'the numbers at the ends of 1
5 those statements are the correlation coefficients.
l 6
MR. JORDAN:
Okay, thank you, Bob.
7 Could I have Slide 11, please, the conclusions?
1 8
[ Slide.]
9
'The conclusions.are that improvements in early 10 performance are achievable, and that seen~through the variation
)
11 between the various plants, that there are advantages for 12 second units.
The statistics show that.
And there are no new 4
t 13 regulatory requirements necessary.
It's probably premature for-l 14 me to say that in the presentation.
15 Specific improvement lessons can reduce unplanned 16 event frequencies, and I'd like to add a conclusion.
Vic 17 Stello mentioned that the balance-of-plant equipment and 18 personnel activities do provide a substantial fraction of the 19 challenges.
That is an important statement to make.
20 Now to get to what we think is the heart of this 21 discussion, Slide 12, please.
l 22 (Slide.]
1 23 And this is the summary of improvement lessons, and it's broken down into improvement ~ lessons for management 24 25 relaced to equipment and improvement lessons for NRC.
These 3
i j
18 1
have been shortened.
We have relative, successive levels of 2
detail.
3 The first one is the transition from construction to 4
an operating plant philosophy, and the expansion of that --
5 could you go to Slide 29, please.
6 Y;u don't have this one in your package.
Could you 7
show Slide 29, please?
8
[ Slide.]
j i
9 Tr's is -- there should be a transfer of 4
l 10 responsibility to the operating staff at a construction unit as 11 soon as possible in the process, and that the construction 12 presence needs to be minimized, that you must establish a post-licensing atmosphere and the need for, in this post-licensing 13 i
14 atmosphere, an attention to detail, recognizing the plant's l
15 status and directing attention to maintenance and surveillance 16 by the permanent staff.
17 So this level of detail exists for each of these 1
l 18 larger element items.
We have, as I indicated, communicated 19 these lessons within the NRC for review and to industry for 20 peer review, and so this represents, then, an assembly of their i
l 21 comments and does, in fact, represent a peer review set of 22 information.
23 We have used this in a couple of cases.
Region IV 24 has applied it in their review by developing a checklist to 25 communicate with the Licensee, to establish for South Texas
i 19 1
whether these issues have been, in fact, addressed in the i
2 review process to help assess their readiness.
3 So we are beginning to use it.
We are considering --
4 and Rich will give you more details on that -- I would, I i
5 think, pick up another one that would be interesting.
6 Could you give me Backup Slide'32?
7
[ Slide.]
l 8
This is for improving the administrative control of 9
surveillance.
Since surveillance was one in which there were a 1
l 10 number of problems indicated in the SCRAMS, we thought it would 11 be useful to identify the various things that the utilities l
l 12 have indicated would be helpful in reducing surveillance-caused l
13 problems.
Their description was to evaluate their work l
14 locations, to anticipate potential adverse effects on plant 15 operation -- that is, whe~e they do the surveillance testing, r
16 to physically review it and look for ways in which they could 17 adversely affect the plant operation, to develop schemes to 18 separate channel testing and to communicate within the plant --
19 that is, to publicize testing status, to flag and categorize 20 and schedule surveillance according to the risk of SCRAMS and 21 other ESF actuations.
22 So there are a number of things that can be done to 23 reduce the risks, rather than simply experiencing the problem 24 and then trying to solve the problem after you've experienced 25 it.
e 4
20 1
Establish an accountability for specific equipment, 2
that's an important lesson, that once you have individual 3
accountability for maintaining equipment, for performing tests, 4
you get a higher reliability.
5 Blending the engineering staff with the instrumentation and control organization is a way of making it 6
7 more professional.
8 Let's.go back to Slide 12, please.
9 (Slide.]
lo-I would focus on the' equipment, and'first on the list 11 is the need to focus on the balance-of-plant to understand 12 sensitivities.
The utilities, in fact, do recognize this.
13 They haven't in some cases paid as strong attention as they 14 should.
15 Another one I'd bring to people's attention is the 16 fourth one down:
Pay strict attention to equipment 17 installation and to reduce EMI, electromagnetic interference.
18 New plants keep learning this lesson where they find some 19 equipment is more subject to spurious signals than others, and 20 there are efforts that can be done in terms of 21 grounding / shielding reviews that would reduce this spurious 22 actuation.
23 Could I have the next slide, please.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Before you go off that one, let me 25 just make a comment on that
_ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - _ _ - _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
21 I
1 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
About the middle of the chart there, l
3 your last comment under " Management," it says:
" Establish l
4 training for routine operations."
l 5
I'd just like to emphasize the importance of that 6
one.
I often ask at the plants whether they are going to use a l
7 simulator, for example, to practice their startup procedures or 8
something rather routine like that, and I'm always -- not 9
always pleased with the answer.
Sometimes they do, and
)
10 sometimes they don't.
11 It seem to me, especially during an outage, startup 12 after an outage, or certainly on the new plants, every shift 13 ought to go through not only the emergency and casualty drills, 14 that they really should practice the routine startups and 15 shutdowns and things like that.
16 I don't think that is emphasized enough, and I 17 appreciate the fact you've got that as one of your improvement 18 lessons.
But I hope you can focus on that.
19 My experience is that there's a lot of room for 20 improvement in that particular area.
21 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, sir.
Could I have the next slide, 22 the improvement lessons for NRC?
23 (SLIDE.]
24 MR. JORDAN:
We felt that no one was immune to l
25 looking for ways to improve so we looked within the NRC in
22 1
' terms of things that we could do differently.
Some of these 2
are'already being done.-
i 3
The first one is track-new plant progress through 4
periodic on-site root cause reviews.
The regions are doing 5
this to different degrees.
We think that is a very important i
6 thing to do.'
1 7
A comment fed back from utilities was the NRC should
'8 support expeditious review of tech specs.
They have given some 9
cases that tech spec difficulties cause them operational 10 difficulties. That was a lesson they-fed back to us.
11 One that we initiated in October is the review of 12 individual new plant progress in the semi-annual senior l
13 management meetings.
We do take time to review separately the 14 new plants as opposed to the mature plants.
15 Finally, once again, increased attention to balance I
16 of plant.
That's a lesson that we think will improve plant 17 safety performance.
18 Could I have slide seven, please.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Before you go off, Mr. Stello, I 20 think these are important lessons for NRC to take aboard.
I 21 hope you will be able to kind of assign action for some of 22 these particular things to certain parts of your staff so we 23 really can follow through on these.
24 For example, the second one, orient readiness reviews 25 toward management of operations.
As we get more and more
0 23
)
1 plants operating now and fewer under construction j
2 responsibilities, operations should take a very large part of 3
our effort.
That particular one kind of goes across the board 4
on a good part of your staff.
~
I would ask you to take a look at those and perhaps 6
assign somebody to make sure we are following through on those 7
improvements that are pointed out for NRC.
I think they 8
certainly appear valid to me.
I think we want to do something l
9 about them rather than just look at them.
I would just submit 10 that perhaps some kind of follow-up system, and maybe you want 11 to make Mr. Jordan do that for you, but some way to make sure 12 we do that.
13 Increased attention to balance of plant, we have 14 talked about enough.
You mentioned it a few minutes ago and I 15 agree with you.
{
l 16 These are the kinds of things I think we should focus 17 on.
This is a valuable briefing we are getting.
These are 18 lessons learned and lessons learned for NRC.
I would like to 19 make sure we follow through.
20 MR. STELLO:
Done.
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
l 22 (SLIDE.)
23 MR. JORDAN:
These are industry activities.
Some of 24 these we have discussed already in terms of the Commission 25 being briefed by INpo and Mr. Stello sending a letter to NUMARC
24 1
that initiated the industry response.
2 I will simply go through them briefly.
INPO is 3
conducting periodic assistance visits with a different priority 4
and frequency to new plants than for mature plants.
They visit i
5 those plants one to two years prior to fuel loading, again six 6
months before fuel leading, recognizing that fuel loading slips 7
in terms of schedule dates, and three to six months 9fter 8
achieving full power, and then annually until the plant 9
performance is better than the, industry average.
They have set 10 a priority for this family of plants.
11 They have begun a lessons learned report of their own j
j 12 l
that would be developed and distributed to industry, to these 13 new plants.
They give priority to new plant senior management 14 in the senior managers' training.
As recently as today, we j
i 15 learned that they are planning a further action, and it is not 16 on the slide, conduct of a lessons learned meeting this year, 17 this calendar year, with new utilities.
18 This would maximize the transfer of the lessons 19 learned from the NRC study, from and between utilities and from 20 INPO to these new plants, and we think in the shortest time 21 possible.
j
{
22 I am very pleased with that action on their part.
I
{
23 Licensee actions, from the meetings with licensees, 24 the new plants generally recognize the need for improved j
25 performance.
It is not the lack of recognition.
It is really
1 c
l 25 l
1 the lack of implementation..
I 2
Performance enhancement programs have been adopted at i
I 3
some plants and have been very effective.
4 The owners groups and the NSSS vendors, have i
l 5
conducted sessions in order to improve performance.
They have
]
6 been aimed toward safety system challenges principally and 1
l 7
experience sharing between the NSSS groups.
j 8
[ SLIDE.)
9 MR. JORDAN:
We have listed the plants that could 10 benefit from the study.
In the group of operating plants, 11 those that have operating licenses are on the left; Shoreham; 12 Clinton; Seabrook; Braidwood, and so forth.
The plants that 13 are under construction, not yet licensed, Comanche Peak; Vogtle 14 2; Watts Bar.
I 15 This gives you the population of plants that are 16 eligible for further action on the part of industry and the 17 staff.
I think the attention is on the plar.ts that are either 18 very early in operations or have not yet received an operating 19 license, to get the maximum benefit.
20 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Or perhaps due to the long 21 outages, like Browns Ferry and the like.
[
22 MR. JORDAN:
That had not occurred but that may well 23 be an appropriate consideration.
24 MR. STELLO:
Good point; yes.
25
[ SLIDE.]
1 I
m____._
O 26 1
MR. JORDAN:
This is en current NRC progrhms.
Rich 2
Starostecki is here to discuss this.
l 3
MR. STAROSTECKI:
The points that Ed has mentioned I 4
think have to be looked at in an integrated sense.
There is an 5
awful lot of specific examples given in the draft report as to 6
what utilities could do better.
I think one of the best l
initiatives we have going is an integrated look at what these l
7 8
utilities are doing to improve plant performance through their i
9 own self evaluation process.
l l
10 I
We in fact have instituted programs to go out prior l
l 11 to licensing a new plant, to look at what activities, what kind i
12 of review committees they have in place, to actually review 13 operating experience from similar piants and walk through with 14 them and the regions and AEOD, to get an appreciation of how j
15 they are making this transition from construction to 16 operations.
t 17 The regions have instituted over the years a number l
l
\\
18 of different mechanisms to get better insights into how the i
19 utilities are conducting these self evaluations.
Some regions 20 have been doing periodic meetings.
Others have been looking at l
21 the root cause analysis the utilities have been performing.
i 22 All of this, I think, just points out to us the need 23 to get the utilities better informed as to some of the i
24 mechanisms the more successful plants have used, to make this 1
25 transition from construction to operations.
I l
o 27 1
As an example, when you look at some of the plants 2
that the AEOD study has identified, where there has been good i
3 performance, there are review groups, some of which are called 4
independent safety engineering groups, ISEGs, where they do 5
perform this type of review function and do in fact anticipate 6
problems sufficiently in advance so they don't have a 7
recurrence of issues that have been experienced elsewhere.
8 We tend to put a lot more focus on encouraging self 9
assessments by the utilities using operating experience 10 feedback mechanisms.
I tend to believe that such mechanisms l
11 are in place through organizations like.ISEG, that have been 12 implemented at the plants since Three Mile Island.
l l
13 We are going to be getting improved guidance to the 14 regions to get some more uniform and consistent review and an improved understanding of how these groups in fact are l
15 16 functioning.
17 The same approaches, same concepts that we use for 18 newly licensed plants, observing them for power escalation and 19 start-up testing, also is going to be applied.
We are making 20 plans right now for applying them to the re-start of problem 21 plants, such as Rancho Seco, Pilgrim and Peach Bottom.
22 It is the integration of the regional views and 23 people from headquarters who have this kind of operating 24 experience to oversee how the utility is adopting this 25 experience without us dictating to them what they have to do in
1 I
'I 28 q
1 each and every issue that has been identified.
2 With that, we believe this kind of initiative will be l
3 a lot more productive rather than focusing on each individual
)
4 recommendation that the report highlights.
As Ed has said, if 5
the utilities can get together and focus-in on the; specifics,_
6 they will manage the specific recommendations and we will get a 7
lot more success by assuring that will be fed back into their 8
organizations.
i
-l 9
That is all I have on this slide.
i 10
[ SLIDE.]
i 11 MR. STAROSTECKI:
This pretty much repeats in summary l
12 fashion what I was trying to dwell on in some detail.
We have 13 improved emphasis in this area to try to get the transition 14 programs obviously to operation better understood.
We are in i
15 fact looking more at how the ISEG groups will be working with 16 the utilities' line organization, keeping in mind that 17 something like an independent safety engineering group does not 18 have the day to day responsibility for operations.
This allows 19 them to do that much better a job in critically evaluating 20 their own organization's performance and learning from 21 experience.
22 Similarly, INPO puts out an awful lot of information, 23 SOERs snd SERs, that contain valuable insights.
This kind of 24 group can accept those and incorporate them-into the line 25 organization.
6 29 1
With that, we think that the improved plant readiness 2
reviews rather than focusing on what hasn't been done, by 3
focusing on what the utility has accomplished, will give us a 4
better understanding of why the transition will be successful 5
and why the operations will proceed smoothly.
6 MR. JORDAN:
I would like to pick up the conclusions, 7
the last slide.
8
[ SLIDE.]
9 MR. JORDAN:
This is a restatement that new plants do 10 not need to experience high safety system challenge 11 frequencies.
We have plants in the U.S.
that have not.
Many 12 foreign plants have gone through the early start-up experience 13 without high challenge frequencies.
It is an obtainable goal.
14 We believe that effective action by licensee 15 management on preventive measures, root cause analysis and 16 corrective action can result in those improvements.
It is, as 17 I mentioned, some licensees have recognized these lessons and l
18 have achieved excellent start-up performance.
1 l
19 There is, although not pre-destination, that once bad 20 always bad, but there is a view that unless the licensee takes 21 aggressive actions, that high frequencies in the early stages 22 of operations may continue into early commercial operations.
I 23 There is certainly a way to get out of the learning curve but it takes action on the part of the utility.
24 25 There is close monitoring of plants in these final l
l 30 1
stages of licensing and early operations by the regions, NRR 2
and AEOD.
We do have additional tools, performance indicators 3
and reviews that will identify earlier plants whose performance i
4 is not matching up to what we would like, and a management 1
5 process, the semi-annual management meetings that identify the 6
actions if needed on specific plants.
7 A continuing focus on new plant performance will 8
provide this overview, so we can take the appropriate next 9
action.
10 The lessons learned report or new plant report, does 11 provide a focus for the improvements in the balance of plant 12 area for all plants.
We intend to distribute this report 13 widely and work with INPO in communicating lessons to industry.
i 14 Another conclusion I can add to that is industry is
)
l 15 reacting favorably.
INPO is taking on itself to initiate that 16 communication with these utilities this calendar year.
17 In final summary, it is the staff's belief that this 18 combination of industry and NRC staff actions is appropriate in 19 view of our understanding of the problem, and the numbers of 20 plants that remain in this start-up mode.
2 21 CRAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
22 Are there questions from my fellow Commissioners?
23 Commissioner Roberts?
24 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
No questions.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Commissioner Bernthal?
1 l
-9
31 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: ' Well, I have a comment or 2
two.
3 First of all, I'm astonished that we have 24 or 25 4
plants in the first two years of operation this year, right?
5 MR. JORDAN:
That's correct, this fiscal year.
i 6
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Twenty-five percent of our j
l 7
plants are, this year, in the first_two years of operation.
I 8
MR. JORDAN:
That population spike sort of surprised 9
us as well.
10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's extraordinary.
I 11 COMMISSIONER CARR:
I didn't realize how hard you've 12 been working.
13
[ Laughter.]
14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I do have one or two 15 questions on -- I'm sorry, I was late; I had a phone call that 16 I couldn't avoid and certainly missed some of the early 17 presentation -- I had one or two questions, however.
1 18 First of all, did you-try and correlate our 19 experience here and what you've learned with any foreign plant l
20 data?
Do we have any idea at all of how the Japanese and the 21 Europeans are doing in this regard?
22 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, we d!i look at the Japanese 23 experience, and they were doing much better on the startup of 24 these new plants than the average of our new plants.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Why is that?
)
32 1
MR. JORDAN:
I would guess the same reason that their 2
mature plants are doing still substantially better than the 3
average of our nature plants.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Why is that?
5
[ Laughter.)
6 MR. JORDAN:
My view is -- and I have made a visit to 7
Japan -- the attention to detail, the corrective actions, the i
8 very strong management, and also the fact that they do have 9
more nearly standardized plants to deal with.
There are a 10 large number of factors.
I 11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Mr. Stello, do you want to add to 12 that?
13 MR. STELLO:
Two points.
We are very quick to 14 compare the performance of those plantr> today, but if you look 15 back in history, you find that they had periods when 16 performance was very poor.
And I think what they did is, they 17 learned.
They learned that they had to do it right; they had 18 to pay attention to the details; they had to be very careful 19 about the maintenance of the plante, and they turned around 20 their improvement.
21 I think if you look at the performance of those 22 plants eight, nine years ago, I think you'll find that they 23 were not doing very well.
24 The plants that do a good job in the United States l
25 compare very favorably with the plants that do a good job in l
1
l l
33 1
Japan.
And I think if the management of the plant is such that 2
they're first class, excellence is what they're' going to make l
3 sure they get, I think we see.the performance being the same.
4 It's attention to detail, maintenance,_ attention to 5
balance-of-plant, all of those things that you find'that came 6
out of the lessons.
If you do all of those things well, J
7 whether you're in the United States or Japan, the results are 8
the same.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Well, the question is, j
10 though, were their plants ever subject, even back when they 11 were having a lot of troubles -- and a lot of the Japanese 1
12 troubles some years back -~ I don't know, but I'm guessing --
j 13 were not so much in the category that we're seeing here in the i
14 early operating periods of the plants for the same reason, i.e.
l 15 a lot of human error, a lot of SCRAMS caused by improper 16 testing procedures.
17 MR. STELLO:
The answer is, we didn't look.
l 18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay.
So we don't know l
19 whether, in fact, to the extent that apparently is the case in i
20 our country, they also had trouble with not following 21 procedures, poor training -- we don't know the answer to that 22 one.
23 MR. STELLO:
It's a good question, but we don't know 24 the answer to that.
We'll see'if we can find that out.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, because I see that that i
=
34 1
la a theme that seems to run through a good deal of the paper 2
and, I would presume, through the part of the briefing that I missed here today -- things.like not having adequate provision 3
4 for testing, for example, so that you've got to short things 5
out or lift leads and play around with wires.
Those are 6
hardware problems, and there are some other things in that 7
category as well that it seems to me could be addressed and 8
fixed.
You put in jacks for testing, and you put appropriate 9
covers.
Human engineering, I guess, is what it all comes down 10 to.
11 Would you agree with that?
I mean, my senne is that 12 there's a fair amount of stuff in that category.
13 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
And that was, in fact, one of the 14 lessons out of this, that the utilities indicated that there 15 were things they needed to do to improve their ability to do 16 surveillance, to reduce their risks, such as installing jacks 17 and looking at the workplace where the surveillance had to be 18 done.
Precisely.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Changing attitudes is one 20 thing, but doing a hardware fix, that's something else.
1 21 MR. JORDAN:
That's correct.
22 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And that's something we can 23 jump on very quickly, it seems to me.
24 One of the things that I had asked in the SRM that 25 went out to you awhile back -
gee, it was longer ago than I l
35 1
realized, about seven u.onths ago, I guess -- was the question 2
of whether we see a significant difference in the large, newer 3
design, more complicated plants in these respects than we see I
4 in the older plants, and there are older plants -- I don't know I
I 5
whether you went back in years to study what the experience was j
l 6
then, and we also have some older plants coming online yet j
7 today, post-TMI fixes -- could you comment on that a little 8
bit?
l l
9 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
We did look at it and did make a
{
t 10 statement -- let's have Slide 42, please.
I think it will make l
i I
11 the point and not be redundant.
12
[ Slide.]
13 This was looking back at SCRAM performance, a set of 14 plants going back some years and comparing what amount to two, 15 three, and four-loop plants in that set with the most recent 16 plants in the startup, and you find that their SCRAM 17 performance was actually poorer in those earlier plants than it i
18 is in the more current plants, which was surprising.
I 19 And if we look at Slide 43, we find a similar thing 20 with the General Electric plants, comparing the older 21 performance -- that is, BWR-4, 5s, with 6s today.
22
[ Slide.)
23 There is not a correlation between the ages or the 24 timeframes.
It's really dependent on the utility itself, on 25 the management of the plant and the attention to detail.
36 1
MR. STELLO:
I think Commissioner.Bernthal -- I'think 2
his question is much broader.
You're answering in terms of 3
specific parameters.
1[ think the Commissioner also has in mind 4
that some of the' earlier designs were simpler; they have less-5 equipment.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
There are two elements, 7
that's right.
8 MR. STELLO:
And they naturally'-- there should be-9 fewer errors overall in starting up a plant with less-10 complicated equipment and less equipment, and we have data --
11 MR. JORDAN:
Well, that's what I really feel this 12 does show as well, is that some of these plants were-simpler.
13 and had the same sort of SCRAM rates, indicating the same kinds 14 of problems that they're having today.
15 I was an inspector in Region III during startup of a 16
'large number of those plants, and I must' confess that they had 17 similar problems then that they have now.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Okay, but there are two 19 things here.
One, old plant /old design, which is the only 20 thing we can look at; we can't look at old plant /new design.
21 So'is the single element that you've-looked at, that it was in the 1970s or the late '60s, and from what I hear you 22 23 saying, we weren't any better, and we may have been worse.at 24 the early stages of startup.
25 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, sir.
37 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But the other thing that you 2
can look at, because we do have some old designs that are just l
l 3
coming online now, when those older design plants come online 4
now, new plant /old design, are they easier to operate?
Do they.
1 5
have a smaller SCRAM rate than do the new plant /new designs,-
6 the more complicated newer plants?
l I
7 MR. JORDAN:
I guess I'm convinced that statistically j
8 we won't be able to make a case with a correlation coefficient 9
that would support it, but in terms of --
10 MR. DENNIG:
We only had enough data --
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
There wouldn't be a lot.
I 12 MR. DENNIG:
-- to get a couple of BWR-4s into the 13 study, which is not much.
One of those was a second unit at a 14 site, which kind of complicates things as far as trying to i
15 decide whether the design is the issue or whether experience is 16 the issue.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
We've got some MARK-I and 18 MARK-II containments that have come online in recent years, 19 though, too, early generation BNRs.
20 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, Hope Creek is one.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But they don't fare any 22 better than the more complicated, larger, newer design plants?.
23 I take it, that's --
24 MR. JORDAN:
Not discernible.
I guess my personal 25 view is, from looking at this material, is that it's much more
38 1
important -- the management element, the personnel element, is 2
much more important than the design element or the age of the 3
design element.
l 4
COMMISSIONER CARR:
Looking at those two charts, I'd l
5 have to assume that the operators are getting better.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It sounds that way, yes.
l 1
7 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
I think that we do have B
improvements.
INPO believes that plant performance is 1
9 improving with time through their performance indicator I
10 program, and I certainly would like to believe that.
That data l
)
11 seems to support it from the standpoint of SCRAMS.
12 COMMISSIONER EERNTHAL:
Well, I have to say that's 13 somewhat reassuring.
I would be troubled if you were finding l
14 that the older, simpler plants turned out to be a great deal 15 more reliable and easier to operate.
That has been suggested 16 from time to time, and it's good that we're not really finding 17 that in practice.
18 But I still think it's something we ought to keep an 19 eye on as old design /new plants come online.
20 MR. JORDAN:
Yes.
And I should add that in the 21 performance indicator program, we are putting that data in that 22 fashion to see if there are populations that break out.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
One other item.
I assume l
24 that you've done this, but just very broadly speaking, all of l
25 these data that you've presented somehow are corrected for
)
39 1
plant capacity -- well, time online really is what I'm saying.
2 I mean, I got the sense that they're all per thousand hours a
3 normalized.
4 MR. JORDAN:
They were normalized per thousand 5
critical hours, yes.
We have the data just raw without 6
normalization, and it doesn't affect your conclusions from it.
7 The same issues stick out in terms of feedwater being the l
8 dominant equivalent type problem, and the same personnel errors 9
show up.
It was a handier yardstick to use.
l 10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
And the fact that balance-of-l 11 plant seems to be a significant problem is a major issue, too.
12 MR. JORDAN:
Yes, sir.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It makes one wonder about our 14
-- what's that stuff we haven't finished yet -- safety-related 15 versus important-to-safety and neither designation.
16 I guess no further comment right now.
That's all I 17 have to say right now.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you.
Commissioner Carr?
19 COMMISSIONER CARR:
No questions.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
What is the status of NUREG-1275?
21 Have we disseminated it yet?
Are we ready to disseminate it?
22 MR. JORDAN:
It's in printing right now, sir.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
It seems to me it would be important 24 to disseminate it promptly with all these plants that you 25 showed us on that spiked curve there that might benefit from L______.______.
40 l
1 these important lessons.
2 I'd like to ask Mr. Starostecki regarding the j
3 guidance to the regions, based on the lessons learned; do we intend to do anything special as it regards submitting this 4
1 5
report to the regions?
6 MR. STAROSTECKI:
I think issuing this report 7
highlights the need for us to consolidate all the practices, 8
some of the good practices the regions have, putting it into 9
one document and issuing it as guidance.
We are on track.
We 10 are in fact doing that now.
l J
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good.
That's an important 12 initiative.
I'm pleased to hear that.
Giving the NUREG out to
)
13 the utilities is important, too, but I think from our 1
14 standpoint, we should try to perhaps get the regions involved I
15 and make some kind of follow through effort.
It does look to 16 me like there is great value in what you have been working on.
I 17 MR. JORDAN:
The regions did provide substantial
)
18 comments on the draft peer review copy.
They were quite 19 active.
I 20 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I understand they have been involved 21 in it.
I would hope that now that you have come to this point, 22 they can follow through to the point of maybe get some kind of i
guidance out to them that they would agree would correlate with 23 24 what you have done and be a rather permanent document, l
25 I want to thank all of you for a very fine
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7 as well as for us.
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those.
Some of thd lessons we keep talking about all the time; t
i 9;
I think if'we can focus on them and bring them to the-floor, 10 perhaps maybe in a more forceful or aggressive way, especially l
s 1
,to some of the utilities thkt'are still, aede$ nee in the first 11
.y 12 ye.ars of operation, I think im will be making a contribution.
t 13 I think we are talking about safety of operations and theconstructive;approachektosafety.
The utilities do indeed 14' s
15 hnve the responsibility for, cafe operations of their plant,
{
3 3-18 maStenance and so forth.
When we find these lessons time and l
17 tian again, I think it is important that.we recognize that s
l 18'
( perhaps we can focus more on' operational safety than, for
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'4 19
' example, licensing and amendments and things like that, which
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. of course are always necessary to focus on, but operational 20 l*
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21 7 safety of these plants, we are getting more and more plants.on l'
22
[.
- lido, and I think that kind of a focus is very important..
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23
,5 That is why I think your effort here is extremely 24 valuable.
.p >.
I think I can speak on behalf of all my fellow I
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.g 25 Commissioners, when I say we look forward to your coning back
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L 42 1
to the Commission in the future to present the results of the 2
efforts that are ongoing still with the near term operating 3
license planta, and have this kind of a briefing.
I think it will be very interesting for all of us to see if we are getting 4
5 any results.
That is what we are looking for.
Are plants 6
getting safer operations, are we reducing the challenges and so 7
forth.
8 It looks to me, and I think we all can see, that 9
perhaps we do see some improvements.
That is encouraging.
I I
10 think it gives us all the feeling that we are doing something 11 right and something important and we can give emphasis to l
12 operational safety, i
13 I thank you for a very fine briefing.
I 14 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I want to ask one quick short
{
15 one here.
Did you correlate these dat'a with SAIP ratings or anything else for that matter, just to get a sense of how the 1
16 i
17 experience in the early operations compares with SALP ratings?
j l
18 MR. JORDAN:
Not in this study.
We did do it in the
{
19 performance indicator program.
I could discuss that with you 20 at some point.
i 21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You want to give me a clue on 22 roughly what the result was?
Three of the four of these are 23 performance indicators, so I would assume they are basically 24 the same thing.
I j
25 MR. JORDAN:
There clearly is a correlation.
l l
I l
43 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
When you have poor SALPs, you 2
tend not to do well on these?
3 MR. JORDAN:
That's correct.
4 COMMISSIONER CARR:
Or vice versa, if you don't do j
1 5
Well, you get poor SALPs.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes; could be.
7 MR. STELLO:
It is an indicator when the performance 8
is not doing very well.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You would be surprised but I 10 suppose the fair thing to do would be to look at the SALP just 11 before the plant goes up.
l 12 MR. STAROSTECKI:
I would offer another opinion on 13 that.
When you look at the SALP that is issued prior to i
14 initial operation, you are looking at a determination of a 15 construction project and you'are looking at the staffing at 16 that plant that is augmented with an awful lot of vendor type 17 people who are helping in a pre-op testing program.
It is not 18 necessarily a good indication of how that utility and staff is 19 going to operate once they are commercial.
20 MR. STELLO:
You don't look at the SALP at how well 21 they constructed the plant, you want to look at the SALP on how 22 well they started up the plant.
23 MR. JORDAN:
Comparing the SALP for the same time 24 period.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Then the correlation is
(
44 1
almost automatic.
2 MR. STELLO:
That's my point.
It ought to be.
3 MR. JORDAN:
We did do that for the performance 4
indicator program and found a mathematical correlation.
We didn't do it for this particular set of data for the study.
5 6
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
It would seem to me that you 7
could pull out the several SALP areas that would not be directly related to actual plant scrams and these performance 8
i 9
indicator type things, and there are several.
10 How have they done in all the other areas, radwaste 11 program, fire protection, licensing activities, to see whether l
l 12 they correlated?
That would be something I would be interested 13 in seeing.
I
\\
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much for an excellent 15 presentation.
We stand adjourned.
16
[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the meeting was adjourned.]
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 l
1 1
2 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE L
3 i
4 This is to certify that the attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
j 6
l 7
TITLE OF MEETING:
Briefing on Performance of New Plants 8
PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
t 9
DATE OF MEETING:
Tuesday, August 4, 1987 I
t 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original l
12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken
{'
13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by l
14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the.
I 16 foregoing events.
17
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