ML20236M502
| ML20236M502 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236M488 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-65318, NUDOCS 8708110092 | |
| Download: ML20236M502 (2) | |
Text
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NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 9 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-42 KANSAS GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY KANSAS CITY POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY KANSAS ELECTRIC POWER COOPERATIVE, INC.
WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION j
DOCKET N0. 50-482 l
l INTRODUCTION By letter dated May 7,1987, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation acting as agent for the Kansas Gas & Electric Company, Kansas City Power and Light l
Company, and Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (the licensees), informed l
the staff that Westinghouse Electric Corporation recently discovered that it had assumed simultaneous, rather than sequential, operation of valves in the calculation of time it takes to get a safety injection (SI) of 2000 ppm borated water into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS).
Since the valves that transfer the charging pump suction from the Volume Control Tank (VCT) to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST), which contains 2000 ppm boron, are operated sequentially, it was found that safety injection (ECCS) response times listed in Table 3.3-5 of the Technical Specifications (TS) were not achievable.
They are too short by the 15-second delay encountered by the sequential operation of the two valves.
EVALUATION The primary function of the ECCS is to supply water to the RCS in the event of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Since a LOCA is not a reactivity induced accident, the 2000 ppm boron is not immediately needed.
It is only needed to maintain subcriticality in the.long term.
Therefore, for those SI actuation signals that are only intended to provide protection against a LOCA, this 15-second delay in the delivery of 2000 ppm borated water has no effect on the safety analysis.
The only non-LOCA transient impacted by this increased response time is the steam line break event.
No other Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR)
Chapter 15 transient takes credit for short-term boration from the RWST.
The licensee compared calculations of the steam line break accident with and without the additional SI delay.
The calculations showed no significant change in the consequences.
One of the reasons for this is that the additional delay occurs early in the steam line break event when the RCS pressure is high 1
and the SI flow rate is relatively small.
In addition, the licensee stated that studies of the steam line break accident have generally shown that the 8708110092 870B04 PDR ADOCK 050004B2 9
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. l consequences are not sensitive to large changes in SI flow or boron concentra-tion.
The licensee, therefore,. concluded that the departure from nucleate i
l boiling design basis for the steam line break analysis is still met and that the conclusions presented in the USAR remain valid.
A Wolf Creek specific review of the steam line break analysis remonstrated that there is sufficient margin available in the analysis such that the USAR conclusions remain valid.
The staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and finds the licensee's conclusions acceptable.
Thus, the staff concludes that the requested technical specification changes satisfy the applicable regulatory requirements and are l
acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION l
The amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the install-ation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposures.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the atr.endment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligi-bility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Section 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), r.o environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
CONCLUSION The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense l
and security or to the health and safety of the public, l
Date:
August 4, 1987.
Principal Contributors:
Paul W. O'Connor
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