ML20236M112
| ML20236M112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/09/1987 |
| From: | Baker E, Harper J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236M107 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99901099 99901099-87-01, 99901099-87-1, NUDOCS 8711120078 | |
| Download: ML20236M112 (13) | |
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ORGANIZATION:
C&S VALVE COMPANY WESTMONT, ILLIN0IS REPORT INSPECTION 1 NSPECTION NO.: 99901099/87-01 DATES: 07/21-24/87
( N STTF HollR9-do CORRESPONDENCE AD, DRESS:
C&S Valve Company 40 East Chestnut Street Westmont, Illinois 60559 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT:
M. L. Seshagiri QA Manager TELEPHONE NUMBER:
319-789 RQnn NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Valve manufacture.
i ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:
M
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/I r e7 J. Gj Fhrper, Prografn Development and Reactive ate Inspection Section (PDRIS)
OTHERINSPECTOR(S): Michael Villaran APPROVED BY:
U f/
E. T. Baker, Acting Chief. PDRIS, Vendor Inspection Branch Date I
INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:
A.
BASES:
10 CFR Part 21 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B.
B.
SCOPE:
The inspection at C&S Valve was to determine the merits of allegations that there has been inadequate transferring of material heat codes and improper selection and use of materials of construc-tion for valve parts.
PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY:
Limerick 1/2(50-352,50-353), Peach Bottom 2/3 (50-277,50-278), Arkansas 1/2 (50-313, 50-368), Nine Mile Point 2(50-418)'.
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ORGANIZATION:
C&S. VALVE COMPANY
- WESTMONT, ILLIN0IS REPORT
' INSPECTION un. aconinoo/A7.n1 RFSill TS
- 07/21-24/87
) AGE 2_of la,
A.
INSPECTION FJNDINGS:-
1.
Violations None.
2.
Nonconformances Contrary to Criterion XVII of Appendix B to'10 CFR'50, and!the a.
C&S Valve QAM, Revision A, Section 6.4.2, the mater.ial release and verification, material cutting,- heat code transfer /verifica-tion activities were not documented and signed-off as a separate step for various nuclear travelers in the sequence that these activities were being performed'(87-01-01).
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b.
Contrary to Criterion XIV of-AppendixL B to 10 CFR Part.50, and the C&S' Valve QAM, Revision-A,.Section 12.5, QA Deficiency Reports numbers.2738, 2746, and 2743 were not properly admini-stratively dispositioned.
(87-01-02)-
l c.
Contrary to Criterion VIII of' Appendix B to 10 CFR 50,:and:the C&S Valve QAM, Revision A Section 5.7.3, one bar of 5" dia..x' 14'10", heat M0723B material, was incorrectly ' marked as heat.
I codeQSBinsteadofthecorrectheatcodeGSB(87-01-03).
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l B.
UNRESOLVED ITEMS:
None.
C.
OTHER FINDINGS AND COMMENTS:
~1.
Background:
The inspection was conducted as a result of an allegation ~ pertaining to inadequate transferring of material heat codes and; improper selection and use of material of construction for valve parts.-
On July 31, 1985, the C&S Valve Company wasl formed by purchasing the assets of Clow Valve Company.
In a relative size comparison, Clow Valve operated an average of:$190 million in; annual sales as compared.
I to $5-6 million in annual sales.by the C&S Valve' Company. <C&S-Valve-Company retajned the Clow technical procedures,-occupies th4 former Clow facilities, and much of the: staff is from.the original l
company.
Records and documentation for Clow supplied components are:
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ORGANIZATION: C&S VALVE COMPANY l'
1 WESTMONT, ILLIN0IS q
,l$h REPORT INSPECTION-un.
ocon1noc/R7.n1 RESul:TS f 07/21-24/87- ~.
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still maintained by C&S, and'the: operating, manufacturing and.
i quality procedures have been carried over by C&S..
The C&S QA group. consists of aLQA Manager, a-QA Assistant, and two-
~
QA Inspectors.one of whom.is in training (at the time of the:inspec-l tion) and has. not yet assumed fyll. responsibilities. At the time of the inspection, a third QA Inspectot.had been' terminated two to
.h three weeks prior to the inspection.'$
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m 7p In the transition from Clow. Valve Company, C&S(was forced tc. reduce '
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their work' force by 60-70%. Lappa'rently, the 4 educed workfofce,
'lQs management / personnel' relations and cash. flow problems contributed to
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a large-percentage of disgruntled' employees.
An interview with one j
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of the QA Inspectors (a Clow and C&S esp! vee ;for;10 years)%,si
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9 conducted in order to gain insight into the,has,is Lfor the ? allegations and the reasons for the relatively:large employee turnover, a During-the interview the QA inspector. informed the inspection team' that t Y
some employees, particularly machintts, used the' experience g4frad at C&S Valve to step up' to better jobs outside.of the company..'
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Several peopl_e listed on the company roster are part-timers who are l
r 7-brought on and let go, based on workload. Morale was a problem.
4 after the C&S take over. Streamliningof.the size of the' company
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led to personnel cut backs and cash flow problems. Morale. improved' somewhat after 1987-salary raises wer'ejlssued.,During anj inferme/l interview with the shop superintend'nt, he spoke'of one' instance where an employee was laid off from't&S during persetnelcutbacks and then he later contacted C&S threatening to~ report them to the.
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NRC.
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The Clow ASME N-stamp Certificate of Aut teization-expired 'on d ',
I July 1, 1985.
No nuclear orders were take.n.until April-8,:19,86 when the N-stamp was reinstated for C&S.
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On June 12, 1987 allegations were made against C&S Valve Company by if 4
1 a former employee to Region III of, the NRC. The foll6uirg allegations
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~1 were made to Region III*
4 Allegation Item #1 JJ The alleger was told _to sign a " nuclear traveler" for a valve manu-factured at least two years priorytorthe beginnin He could notyrecall any of.the details regarding!g of his employment.-.
the matter but he remembered.that it pertaine'd t,o-" attesting to heat code transfers."
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yj M ' JORGMlZATION: C&S VALVE COMPANY
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Allegat. ion Item 12 I'
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. C&S was 'hinching pennies" and using low grade materials.
Inithe
/ Mawroom, heat codes were not always being transferred betweer s f
Vgterials and travelers, j
The alleger was Selhphoned by the lead inspector on July 22,.1987 x
lat'his home in order to obtain details.about the allegations. The.
alleger could not recall details, however, he provided further' M
0' information regarding;his original statements.
ment he:provided(signature approval os/ a, ion from the C&S Valve manag According to the alleger, under instruct
'.welear traveler for a sawcut step foq one valve manufactured,twotyears prior to.his-employment.
HeptrSed that the tr@eler wa During a training sessiltn h 1d on the s~utdgrd,s a C&S traveler.f 10 L
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9 brought the incident tohthe attention of the C&S management and '
management explained t h t the' incident was n9t.a' problem.
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lth The alleger went on to say prior to the.saw cutting operation that he would notify the QC. department to transfer heat codes, however, at times they would not respond. Therefore, manufacturing personnel g
were transfe ning heat % odes onethese' materials or.the heat codes l
were not being transferred., He 'could not recall any. other details.
l TheHeatCodeisdefUudbyC&S.Valyaas"C&S'suniqueidentification~
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number (represented by '2, 3, or.4 digits) and 1s tassigned for mill
- l X-beat / lot numbert except for weld material where.the' manufacturer's heat / lot / batch numbers are used."
t t Theallegerwas/iskedfordetailsabouthis'statementregardingC&S a
using low grade materials in the.vMyes. He responded by saying that C&S used foreign steel _ produce'r3 to make valve bodies.
In one, case a valve body contained "holehind rocks within'the holes,"
e therefore, they could not be cutnby the machinist because the machine tools would break. C&S would holes and send the valve to the nucTB, subsequently " weld over the e/ p ar plant" without any mention of the problem. He could not recal M ny'other details.
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The alleger claimed thatIhe Idnew of both present hnd former i
employeeswiUingtoattestto"theproblemsw)tbC&SValveCompany j
that he mentioned. At that pgintW e.waslgherc the~ lead-ins )ector!s-hoteltelephpnenumberso%hatthe)peoplementionedcouldma(e -
statements. ' No additional people contacted the -lead inspector; during this inspection.
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ORGANIZATION: CSS VALVE COMPANY l
WESTMONT, ILLIN0IS j
REPORT INSPECTION l
M n,. opon1nco/R7 01
_ M LTS:
07/21_.f,4 gf l AGE 5 of 13 l
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Di scussion L
j Allegation Item #1 could not be substantiated.
The alleger claims that he signed one C&S nuclear traveler for a 1
valve manufactured two years prior to his employment date. His
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s empicyment start date was August 1986. The typical CAS traveler is J
light green and contains information regarding travelsr number, tab number, QA approval, ANI acceptance, heat code, P0 number, material description, part number, drawing number, part description, number of pieces.
In addiv.icn, each job function during the manufacture and a hold point were' delineated on the traveler (See nonconformance 87-01-01). According to the C&S QA manual paragraph 6.3.2, "The traveler is the primary constructica control document for a part or an item...The traveler is identifieci with the job number, drawing number, and so marked with Nuclear or Q as applicable." Also, paragraph 6.8.1, "QC shall witness and sign-off all traveler sequences identified as QC hold points.
In addition; QC may determine to witness any other operation when a problem is detected or suspected. QC inspection shall include verification of material prior to release and documents the Heat Code on\\the traveler...."
In this case, the traveler indicated a sign-off step for saw cutting, and for material release and verification (see i
Noncoqfonnance 87-01-01).
It should be noted that each traveler j
contains a dark bold job number.
The first two digits of this j
number are the year that the salve job was' quoted to the customer by i
C&S.
It is common practice that a quote would be placed one or two 4
years before the commencement of actual valve manufacturing.
According to the C&5 QA manual the job number is the governing identification number for all documents throughout design, construction and archiving.
According to the alleger 3 statements,, the valve that he signed-off had to have been manufactured in the 1984 time frame and was a C&S nuclear traveler. C&S Valve Company did not exist in 1984.
Prict to July 1985, Clow Valve Company was in existance.
Due to the color difference bewteen the Clow and C&S travelers, t.hy are easily distinguishable. Nevertheless, the inspection team examined approximately 600-700 Clow and C&S shop travelers from the years 1984-87. The number of travelers reviewed represents approximately 70% of the total travelers written during that period.
Nuclear travelers from 1984-85 were reviewed for evidence of the alleger signing-off on the saw cut step and on the QC verification release m
m ORGANIZATION: C&S VALVE COMPANY
.WESTMONT, ILLINDIS REPORT INSPECTION wn - QQ4nn44/A7-n1 RESULTS:
07/21-24/87
) AGE 6 of 13 block.
Travelers from August 21, 1986 - February 11, 1987 were examin6d and evaluated for missing heat code verification / material release sign-off on jobs worked by the alleger, and personnel sign-offs inconsistent with their employment dates.
Only one case was noted: a date on a saw cutting sequence step was apparently improperly signed-off with a signature dated one year earlier than the other sign-offs on traveler 004 for job 86-4774-01Q (see nonconformance 87-01-01). This sign-off was noted and corrected by C&S at the time that traveler 004 was'being executed. -The inspec.
tion team reviewed and evaluated 129 nuclear document packages which contained the various nuclear travelers.
According to the C&S training records the alleger was qualified as a machinist / welder. The extent of his sign-off responsibilities were I
to document the physical act of saw cutting material. According to the C&S QA manual paragraph 6.7.2, "When material is to be divided into sections during manufacturing, the manufacturing personnel shall notify QC to transfer heat codes prior to cutting." Materials for nuclear jobs are all stored in a locked and controlled area.
According to the C&S Assembly and Weld Shop Foreman, the QC Inspectors have sole possession of the keys to the controlled area.
l Therefore, prior to any material being delivered to the saw, the QC l
inspector had to physically release the material from the controlled area. Once the material was divided 'into sections, the operator signs-off on the traveler's cutting operation block.
The QC inspector was to transfer the heat code and subsequently sign-off the traveler's verification / material release opeation block. There was no I
ebjective evidence to support that heat codes were not being I
transferred properly.
It was noted that there'was no specific procedure to cover the process.
However, QA manual paragraph 6.7.2 l
does give instructions covering the cutting and transferring of heat code process which should suffice as a procedure.
Furthermore,.the traveler for this process does not describe the flow of the l
operation in exact terms. The traveler usually itemizes the material release and verification step (as the first sign-off step l
and subsequently the saw cutting step traveler type 1). Only on occasion will there be a transfer heat code and verification step I
on the traveler following the saw cutting step (tr6veler type 2).
If " verification" is meant to describe verification that the proper material has been released from the storage area, then there is no distinct heat code transfer verification step in traveler type 1.
If " verification" is intended to mean both verification that the l
correct material has been released from the storage area and that l
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=0 ORGANIZATION: C&S VALVE COMPANL
- l WESTMONT. ILLIN0IS-f
?
REPORT
-INSPECTION un. oooninco/R7.n1 RFRill TS t 07/21-24/B7
>AGF 7 nf 11
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heat code markings have been properly transferred after saw cutting, _
j then the construction sequence listed on traveler type 1 does not.
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l' conform to tthe consnitments of Section 6.4.2 of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Mar.ual. Section 6.4.2 states,.in'part, "... construction j
1 activity shall be in accordance with'the sequence provided inLthe -
Travelers and Manufacturing personnel shall! perform those specified 1
activities to the documents referenced on the Travelers.",According:
H to C&S " verification that heat codes were transferred was made.by.
a verification step block-on the traveler regardless of. its physical ~
j location on the traveler." Therefore, construction activities in the -
case of traveler type 1 were not performed in'accordance with the sequence provided in the travelers.
(See nonconformance 87-01-01.')
In some cases, there were steps on the nuclearf traveler involving a saw cutting operation that-did not require a heat code documenta-tion, for example cutting parallel key actuators-(traveler 0096 &
0138) and gland. tubes (traveler 0116 & 0139).
The NRC inspector toured the Nuclear controlled area'in orderito verify that it was controlled and that heat codes were correctly' l
affixed to the materials. The storage area was clearly designated J
as a nuclear material hold area.and was_ locked. Seven randomly picked heat codes were checked against the master file. -Materials were marked with heat codes.QSB, HC-LBE, HC-VLB, HC-ZOB, BQB, MH, 140 BN. All materials checked.in the storage room'had proper heat I
codes with the exception of QSB.. It appeared that QSB was. written in white marker on 1 bar, 5" dia. x 14' 10", Heat M0723B... However, after further checking of the heat code master. file it was evident:
that it should have been marked GSB.- Upon careful; examination of-the stenciled marking on the material the G in GSB was superimposed i
by a stamped number which made it appear as a Q.; The _ person writing j
the heat code on the material in white marker. (for easy identifica-tion) misread the G for a Q and subsequently marked it as such.
(Seenonconformance 87-01-03.)
Allegation Item f2 could not be substantiated.
An attempt was made to determine whether C&S Valve was_" pinching.
pennies" and using low grade' materials or foreign supplied material.
j in their valve components as stated by the alleger. ' Deficiency-Reports (DR) from 1983 - 1985 were reviewed'and all of.'the Engineering _
ChangeNotices(ECR)fortheyears 1984 - 1987 were reviewed.
In no case was there any evidence that materials of construction were used without the approval of the C&S customer or of the material.-
being in compliance with applicable codes ^and standards. DR.2029, l
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s i ORGANIZATION: C&S VALVE' COMPANY WESTMONT, ILLINDIS REPORT INSPECTION.
un - oooninoo/n7.01 RFSill TS ! '07/21-24/97 l ' AGE R nf 13
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describes valve body OD undersized at 7,5/16", the drawing ~ called for 7 3/4 00.
The. corrective action sent the bodies out for repair--
by weld buildup.
DR 2074 involved 14" aluminum bodies. The bodies.
failed the liquid penetrant test because of porosity.and linear indications in the ID bore and flange faces. The bleedout exceeded the 3/16" maximum diameter bleedout for 5/8!' and greater wall thickness. The corrective action was -to return the material. to the supplier to repair the porosity and linear indication by welding.
DR 2033 and DR 2032 involved a 6" and a 3" dual check valve, respectively,'which failed hydrostatic testing.
The corrective action was to bond new-seat material to the valve bodies, reassemble and test.
DR 2001 involved a casting that failed a liquid penetrant test on the machined surface of the flange face ^. The corrective action was to scrap the body casting and procure a new casting and remachine.
ECRs were required for new travelers.
DR1952 involved valve bearing material.
The bearing material specified on the traveler did not match the material on the drawing.
The order was for P0 #NMP2-P302X, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2, Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, Jobs #83-2221-04,.05, 07, 09, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33. The traveler material was B505 and Metcar M10 (for 83-2221-28,'29, 31, 32 33).
The material on the print (design condition) was Teflon and Carbon /
Antimony,MetcarMID(83-2221-28,29,31,32,33). The alternate l
material was acceptable per TWX from Stone & Nebster Engineering Corporation for Nine Mile Point, "The alternate. materials per your ref TWX are acceptable in accordance with the requirements of the subject specification." DR 1950-involved the same situation and was dispositioned the same as DR 1952. 'DR 1947. involved 6" cast dual plate check valve bodies with shrinkage cavaties found at the l
junction of the machined ID wall and seat surface.
The casting was.
returned to the vendor. OR 1858 and 1954, involved:30"' valve body (Job #83-2063-02
- 82-2739-01-N-02)(N)-02,03(N)-01)andvalvebody' machining (Job respectively. The problem in both cases was excessive porosity.
The corrective action was to drill out the porosity and plug weld.
ECR #1968 was of interest since it involved a major repair of a valve body. The alleger claimed that on occasion C&S Valve would try to process valve bodies with porosity-(holes) that' contained rocks. Machining these valve bodies could not be done as a result of numerous machine tool failures. And the porosity would be~ weld repaired, then subsequently sent to the nuclear plants. 'ECR #1968 involved DR #2654 from Job Order #83-2462-01 (N) -03, a '12"' wafer..
body valve for IL Power (Baldwin). The body material was purchased l
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ORGAN 1ZAT10N:.C&S VALVE COMPANY-
. ESTMONT, ILLINOIS :
W
' REPORT
-INSPECTION un'.
oooninco/n7 nl RFStil TS - '07/21-24/B7 i 'AGF 9 of 13 by C&S Jrom a domestic manufacturer,-Jorgensen Steel' Company'. C&S obtain6d approval from IL Power for the weld repair procedure on.-
o the subject valve on June 24, 1985. The DR stated that the material.
"l was found unsatisfactory since it failed the radiographic examination 1
due to porosity and slag inclusions. 'The corrective action recomended by C&S was to reissue a supplement to the. original' traveler to perform the repairs as required and re-examine by, radiography.
Applicable approved procedures were EPS 30-69-825, Revision A; EPS 30-20-103, Revision 0; and'EPS 30-49-70, Revision Bi The weld..
repair report stated the repair description as drill oversize holes and plug weld. The parent metal was SA516 grade.i70, the weld metal and heat number was E7018-3/16, 431C3231. The cavity size was 5/8"-
radius in four places. The customer. approved weld procedures used in the repair were EPS-30-49-825, Revision A and EPS-30-20-103, Revision 0.
The customer approved radiographic' procedure was EPS '
30-49-702, Revision B.
The report'of radiographic examination was 1
reviewed by the NRC inspector and all four repairs were-found acceptable.
The report of ultrasonic testing.(UT) of ~ the plug welds. stated that j
the areas were machined smooth and an Aerotech 1/2", 2.25 MHZ, O
transducer was used to scan the repairs. No defects' were found.
The test was performed by a certified Level II UT inspector on June 21, 1985.
ECR #1942 for Job 84-2993-^01.(N) Arkansas Power & Light involved an alternate material, SA240-T3166, substituted by C&S for. a clamp ring. The normal clamp ring material was' T316 or T304 stainless-steel (SS). C&S used 316L since it was available..This was acceptable by the customer since 316L in most cases offers better corrosion resistant properties with an ultimate tensile. strength (UTS) of only 5000 psi less. than 316 or 304.. 'ECR #1911 for Job 84-2948-01 (N) -02 (N), Arkansas Power & Light involved DR ~2610 for a 8" lugged wafer stop-valve clamp ring. - Again, the same situation.
occurred and disposition was reached as in ECR #1942.
As a result of two Clow Corporation butterfly. valve failures at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), the Philadelphia Electric Company submitted a Part 21 report to the NRC in 1986. ;The problem involved seizing of the. valves shafts and bearings which rendered-the valves inoperable after approximately one. year of service. The subject valv.es with carbon bearings were in service at Limerick and PBAPS. The M-57 valves were containment isolation valves.
If an accident occurred during purging (when the valves are'open), they-may not close within the required time period'(5, 6, 9 seconds per
ORGANIZATION: C&S VALVE COMPANY WESTMONT ILLIMOIS REPORT INSPECTION QQQrinCQ/A7 01 RFStHTS!
07/21-24/87
> AGE ' 10 of la NO
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Tech. Spec. Table 3/4.6.3) upon receipt of a containment isolation signal'.
From review of the Philadelphia Electric Company's (PEC)
Metallurgical report, it was concluded that'the shaft and bearing.
seized due to improper material selection which caused pitting strictly from galvanic corrosion and a subsequent build up of-corrosion products between the valve shaft hnd bearing material.
C&S valve had two inc'ependent laboratories evaluate the problem.
Packer Engineering Assnciates performed a metallurgical analysis and determined that seizing was due to pitting which was chloride induced crevice corrosion. The crevice was created by the stainless steel shaft in the carbon bearing. The Packer Engineering report states, in part:
"It should also be noted that g'raphite is more noble
)
than stainless steel. Thus, some galvanic acceleration j
of any corrosion processes is expected."
...The subject i
carbon bearing was found to contain significant amcunts-of chloride, using two separate test methods (leaching and spectrographic). Neither of the new bearings were found to contain significant quantities of chloride. This service exposure.
indicates that the chloride was probably picked.up.from Corrosion testing has shown that chloride containing water can pit 17-4 PH stainless steel in a manner similar to that observed on the subject.
Further, that crevices composed of subject metal and chloride, containing carbon bearing 1
material, produce corrosion pits in six days when exposed to pure (deionized) water.
Patel Engineers (PEA) performed a literature search and recommend a material change'of the bearing to " bronze, babbit, etc." or change the shaft material to "316SS.."
It appears from review of the evidence submitted in the PEC and the PEA metallurgical reports that the chloride level in the environ-ment experience by the failed valves was the cause of the seizing, i
since similar valves have been in service at other facilities for.
several years without reported failure.
Yet, C&S decided to change the bearing material to B505 Alloy 932 (bronze).in lieu of Mercar M-10 or PTFE or Duralon. Approval for the material selection was granted by t)1e customer. The original M-10 material was specified since it was accepted as an industry standard for bearing material.
The material selection was based on technical merits as well as.the
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financial advantages of material.
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ORGANIZATION:
C&S VALVE' COMPANY
'WESTMONT, ILLIN0IS' REPORT.
INSPECTION un -
ooantnoo/A7_n1 DFRill TR.
07/71.74/87-
>ArJ 11 nf 1'4 An attempt was made to establish whether'C&S Valve'used foreign.
materiils to manufacture valves._ All purchase orders (PO) from job.
. orders reviewed were evaluated for foreign manufacturers or/ material certification from foreign ~ manufacturers.
None~were found.- In-addition, the ANI who has been auditing Clow and C&S for at least
- 11. years was interviewed. He stated that'at.no time has he~ever had any knowledge' of. C&S using any foreign supplied materials / metals for.'
valves manufactured for nuclear plants.
In summary, there is no objective evidence to prove that C&S' Valve has hedged on quality by inadequate material selection'due-to i
financial. incentives.
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Training and QA Deficiency reports were reviewed.'in order to deter--
mine'if those people named in the allegations were adequately performing their job functions. The 1987: training-schedules for-personnel in the engineering, receiving, painting and crating,-
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quality control, welding, machining,-assemblyiand testing areas were-
'l reviewed. The lists of personnel requiring training and their.'
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schedule for training were-maintained by the QA Manager in accor--
j dance with the C&S Valve. Company Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (Revision A), Section-15.4. The areas reviewed were found to be.
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adequate. The training files covered were found to.be. satisfactory.
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j A review of all completed QA Deficiency Reports (Exhibit 9,.C&S
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Valve Co. Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual) during the time period from June 1,1986 to present was performed to verify the effective-I ness of this aspect of the C&S QA program. -.A total of forty-six l
Deficiency Reports were examined. Three of these, ecch in a i
different area of the QA function, were investigated 41n. greater j
detail:
a.
DR 2769, dated Juno 29, 1987. The QA inspectur noted that l
thread gauges being used on Job 87-5149(N), the manufacture of stop and hinge pin retainers, were past their calibration due l
dates. The finding was substantiated and all' gauges were sent for calibration. All items in the job were checked by the-alternate wire gauge method as given in ANSI'B2.1 and.
conformance was verified. The cause of the deficiency was attributed to a'QC oversight in the scheduling and update of.
H calibration lists. Calibration schedules were to be. maintained i
monthly as a corrective action.. The auditor reviewed the C&S-j i
e e
i ORGANIZATION:
C&S VALVE COMPANY WESTMONT, ILLIN0IS REPORT INSPECTION.
j un. oconinoo/n7.n1 RFSill TS-07/21-24/87 l 'AGF 12 of 13 I
M&TE Control program to verify the corrective action and the effectiveness of the M&TE program in general.
The areas 1
reviewed were found to be adequate.
b.
DR 2766, dated June 12, 1987. While verifying dimensions of work performed on an 8" valve body under Job 87-5032-01 001, traveler 002-1, the QA inspector noted improperly located holes. The finding was justified, holes were weld repaired, re-drilled, and surface penetrant tested per C&S procedure 30-49-700, Revision E.
Cause was attributed to machinist not-verifying the drawing required dimensions and QA hold poi _nts not properly identified on the. traveler. Machinists were
)
notified of the error and travelers on a generic basis were -
corrected to prevent recurrence.
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c.
DR 2749, dated February 20, 1987. QA' inspector noted that an incorrect alloy was used in a shipment of plates and bodies for Job 86-4665 under Purchase Order No. TON-00078.
Finding was justified.
Alloy 952 was supplied instead of Alloy 954, as stated in the Purchase Order, as a result of an error. by the vendor's order correspondent. A Corrective Action Requestion i
001-87 was issued to the vendor in accordance with C&S procedure 30-49-676 Revision A, to identify the cause and implement appropriate corrective actions.
Measuring and Test Equipment Control. As part.of the. review of QA Deficiency Report 2769 (Section E.3.2), the C&S Valve Company measuring and test equipment controls were investigated.
a.
Calibration Cards.
Calibration cards for equipment with calibration frequencies of from one month to two years were reviewed. The records reviewed were found to be in order, b.
Calibration Stickers. A sample of two tools was selected from the calibration lists to verify the effectiveness of the program. Tool number S0179, an NGK 7"-8" 0.D. micrometer, and tool number DC06, a Mitutoyo 0"-6" Dial Caliper, were chosen at 4
random from the calibration list and then located in the plant. Both measuring tools.were properly marked with their current calibration stickers.
c.
Daily Equipment Log. A daily equipment log is maintained in accordance with Section 10.3 of the C&S Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, Revision A, dated April 9,1986, to provide.
control and traceability of individual tools and the jobs they i
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e ORGANIZATION:
C&S VALVE COMPANY.
WESTMONT, ILLINDIS REPORT INSPECTION hin. ooon1nco/A7.n1 RFRift TS-07/91-94/87 l 'AGF 13 of 13
~
were used on. The log in use ~on July 23, 1983, was reviewed, and found to be in order.
Two items were selected from the current log and val 1dity of their calibration was verified by the inspectors.
d.
M&TE Frocedure. The M&TE-controls at C&S Valve Company are i
regulated by the Nuclear. Quality Assurance Manual, Revision A, i
Section 10.3 and procedure 30-49-675, Revision Q dated l
February 6,1985, "QC Procedure.for Tool and Gage Calibration."
These documents were reviewed and.found to be adequate.
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3.
Part 21 1
The C&S Valve Part 21 procedure was reviewed.and found adequate. All necessary documents were posted in clear view for all C&S employees.
j 4.
Plant Tour I
l As part of the plant tour, the inspection team verified adequate l-nuclear weld rod storage. The nuclear weld rod holding oven
.j temperature was being maintained at 275 F.
The temperature' readings
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were logged daily and maintained at 250 - 300 F in accordance with-1 procedures.
j D.
PERSONS CONTACTED j
- M. Seshagiri 1
- Mary Ann Pankov
- Tom Casale
- Greg LaFrance
)
- Leon Fordhem Scotty MacGregor 1
Habib Jubran l
- Attended the exit meeting.
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