ML20236K632

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Requests Addl Info Supporting Util 860515 & 0915 Responses to IE Bulletin 85-003,including Info Re Discharge Lines of Safety Injection Tank Sys,Water Hammer Due to Valve Closure & Proposed Action Plan Program
ML20236K632
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun 
Issue date: 08/04/1987
From: Gagliardo J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Andrews R
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
References
IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8708070200
Download: ML20236K632 (2)


Text

- _ -

d AUG 4 1967 ld In Reply Refer To:

Docket:

50-285 I

0maha Public Power District ATTN:

R. L. Andrews, Division Manager-Nuclear Production 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letters of May 15, 1986, and September 15, 1986, in response to IE Bulletin 85-03, dated November 15, 1985. As a result of our review, we find that additional information is needed.

Specifically, the information provided in your response to Action Item e was found to be deficient in some areas. Please provide the additional information necessary to resolve the following comments and questions.

1.

Unlisted MOVs HCV-2414, -2934, -2954 and -2974 in discharge lines of the safety injection tank system are shown locked open (fail as is) on Drawing E-23866-210-130, Sheet 2, Revision 36.

If power is removed from tne motors in addition to the locked-open position of these MOVs, please state this in your response.

Otherwise, address the effect of assuming inadvertent equipment operations as required by Action Item a of the bulletin, and revise Table 1 of the response of 09-15-86 to include these valves.

2.

Has water hammer due to valve closure been considered in the determination of pressure differentials? If not, please explain.

3.

Please expand the proposed proaram for action items b, c and d of the bulletin to include the following details as a minimum:

(a) commitment to a training program for setting switches, maintaining valve operators, using signature testing equipment and interpreting signatures, (b) commitment to justify continued operation of a valve determined to be inoperable, and (c) description of a methoc possibly needed to extrapolate valve stem thrust measured at less than maximum differential pressure.

b PI/RPB/8 C/RP8/B RPB RPMullikin:cnm DRHunter JEGag rdo 8/3/87 8/}/87 8/3 /

4 p

f"X8M2Mak PDR

Omaha Public Power District 2

4.

Unlisted MOV HCV-1384 is shown normally closed in Zone C-3 of Drawing 11405-M-253, Revision bl, in a cross-connect line which joins the AFW and main FW systems.

It is the only M0V identified as a remotely operated valve in FSAR Table 9.1-2 (Page 9.4-3, R2 7/86) of AFW equipment.

If power is removed from the motor to ensure that this M0V will remain closed during plant operation, please state this in your response.

Otherwise, address the effect of assuming inadvertent equipment operations as required by Action Item a of the bulletin, and revise Table 1 of the response of 09-15-86 to include this valve.

Please provide the supplemental information within 30 days of the date of the letter.

CMn': P'

"'y J.E. Gas.ac. a J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch bec to DMB (IEll) bec distrib. by RIV:

RPB RRI R. D. Martin, RA RPSB Section Chief (RPB/B)

RIV File DRSP RSTS Operator A. Bournia, NRR Project Inspector R. Kiessel, NRR R. Hall Section Chief (RSB/ES)

.