ML20236K375
| ML20236K375 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1987 |
| From: | Callan L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Andrews R NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8711090205 | |
| Download: ML20236K375 (2) | |
See also: IR 05000285/1987019
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NOV-
4 1987-
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In Reply Refer To:
Docket:
50-285/87-19
Omaha Public Power District
ATTN:
R. L. Andrews, Division Manager-
Nuclear Production
1623 Harney. Street
Omaha, Nebraska
68102
Gentlemen:
1
Thank you for your letter of September 25,.1987, in response =to=our-
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. letter and Inspection Report No. 50-285/87-19,. dated August.20,:1987. We have
reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the eight deficiencies in the
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report. We will review the implementation of'your corrective actions during a
future inspection to determine that full compliance has been achieved anci will'
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be maintained.
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Sincerely,
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Original Signed By'
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' W. B, Beach
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L. J. Callan, Director
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Division of: Reactor Projects
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cc:
W. G. Gates, Manager
Fort Calhoun Station
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P. O. Cox 399
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Fort Calhoun, Nebraska
68023
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Harry H. Voigt, Esq.
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LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1333'New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, D. C.
20036
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. Program Manager
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FEMA RegionJ7
911 Walnut Street, Room 300
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Kansas Radiation Control Program Director
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T. Bournia, NRR Project Manager
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D. B. Matthews, NRR-
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September 25, 1987
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Document Control Desk
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leferences:
(1)
Docket No. 50-285
(2)
Letter from NRC (J. E. Gagliardo) to OPPD (R. L. Andrews),
dated August 20, 1987
Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
Responses to Deficiencies Identified in Inspection Report
50-285/87-19
Omaha Public Power District (0 PPD) received the subject inspection report on
August 26, 1987.
As requested, a schedule addressing these exercise defi-
ciencies is provided in the enclosure to this letter.
If you have any ques-
tions, please contact us.
Sincerely
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R. L. Andrews
Division Manager
Nuclear Proouction
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Enclosure
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LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
20036
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EIE2$5I6I}E,NRCRegionalAdministrator
A. Bournia, NRC Project Manager
P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
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ENCLOSURE
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Deficiency 285/87_l h01
The information flow between Emergency Response Facilities was deficient in
that:
The Shift Supervisor failed to make announcements in the control room
certaining to the activation of the Emergency Operation facility (EOF)
and the transfer of overall command and control responsibilities to the
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Recovery Manager. As a result, the control room staff was not aware
that the . Recovery Manager was in charge of classifying emergencies.
When the Site Area Emergency was declared at 9:42 a.m. by the Recovery
Manager at the E0I, the control room staff erroneously assumed that'the
decision to escalate to a Site' Area Emergency was made by the Site
Director at the Technical Support Center (TSC).
The control room staff failed to inform the TSC that a second explosion,
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with a potential to jeopardize safety equipment, had occurred in the
auxiliary building. The TSC staff performed independent . leak rate cal-
culations but neglected to inform the control room.
In addition, the
control room did not confirm information requested by the OSC staff dur-
ing a 49-minute period.
Verification of flow through the stack was need-
ed by the health physics staff in the OSC to perform dose assessment.
As a result of deficient information flow, necessary corrective and pro-
tective actions were not coordinated adequately among these facilities.
OPPD's Response
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A request has been initiated to add an additional dedicated telephone line be-
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tween the Control Room, TSC and EOF,
Additionally, OPPD will develop a lesson
plan en communication techniques specifically covering information flow, giving
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and receiving orders and directions.
This training will be given as part of
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the 1988 Annual Training.
The completion date will be _ December 31, 1988.
Reficiency 285/8719-02
The NRC inspectors noted that Procedure EPIP-0SC-2 did not provide an NRC noti-
fication form.
In addition, Paragraph IV 1A3A of the procedure requires use of the initial
notification form (Attachment 1) for all changes in energency classification.
This conflicts with Paragraph IV 2A7 of the same procedure, which refers.the-
user to Attachment 2 - the update form.
The OSC communicator failed to relay information to the Site Director in the
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TSC pertaining to an actual event (a small fire in the Control Room area).
OPPD's Responsq
Procedure EPIP-0SC-2 is being revised to clearly identify initial and update
notification procedures.
Completion date for issuance of a revision is
December 31, 1987.
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Eqficiency 285/8719-03
The TSC communicator did not follow Procedure EPIP-0SC-2 in accomplishing state
and local notification of declaration of the Alert. As a result, the completed
form (Attachment 2) lacked information on release rates, dose assessment, and
protective action recommendations.
In addition, the completed form did not
specify the name of the caller, and was not approved by the Site Director.
OPPO's Resoonse
Additional training has been completed witn 4 of 6 individuals assigned to this
position.
This training emphasized the necessity of completing . notification
forms prior to passing this information to government agencies and the impor-
tance of properly following procedures.
The remaining two individuals are
scheduled to receive this training.
Completion date will be March 31, 1988.
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Deficiency 285/8719-04
The NRC inspector noted that airlock doors in the TSC did not close tightly.
This could result in potential contamination and radiation exposure of per-
sonnel in this facility.
OPPD's Response
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The TSC is maintained at a positive air pressure in relation to adjoining
spaces by a filtered air supply system.
This is done to reduce the possibility
of airborne radioactivity entering the TSC.
Engineering Evaluation and Assis-
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tance Request (EEAR) FC-87-041 has been initiated to determine the adequacy of
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the airlock door seal. Modifications, if necessary, will be made based upon
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this study. This deficiency was previously identified by 0 PPD during drills.
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As a corrective action, warning signs were posted on the doors to remind indi-
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viduals entering and exiting the TSC to shut the door behind themselves.
It is
expected that the study and any modification required, will be completed by
December 31, 1988.
Deficiency 285/8719-05
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Briefings of in-plant repair and corrective action teams were inadequate.
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These teams were not provided technical and radiological information necessary
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to perform their tasks efficiently.
For example, briefers did not provide re-
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pair teams with diagrams, procedures, floor plans, specific instructions on how
to perform complex tasks, radiation dose rates, or ALARA guidelines.
This con-
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stitutes a repeat deficiency (See 285/8619-03) from the previous exercise.
OPP 0's Responig
The Monitor Coordinator currently has this function detailed in his implement-
ing procedure. A check list will be developed for use by the Maintenance Super-
visor and will be included in his implementing procedure, EPIP-RR-21.
This
checklist will detail the briefing requirements to be completed prior to dis-
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patching these teams.
The use and importance of this checklist will be includ-
ed in the 1988 Annual Training. Training will be completed by March 31, 1988.
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Deficiency 285/8719-06
Recordkeeping by the Recovery Manager was not accurate or complete.
In addi-
tion, it distracted him from other more vital duties.
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The maintenance supervisor was unable to keep complete and accurate records
pertaining to activities in the OSC.
OPPD's Response
The Recovery Manager Secretary's duties will be revised to include maintaining
records and logs for the Recovery Manager. The checklist and training devel-
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oped for deficiency 285/8719-05 will also rectify the problem the Maintenance
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Supervisor had with maintenance of records.
Procedure revisions and Annual
Training will be completed by June 1, 1988.
Deficiency 285/8719-07
The NRC inspector determined that in-plant radiological controls were not con-
sistently adequate.
During the performance of some tasks, in-plant repair /cor-
rective action teams performed poorly in the radiation protection area.
For
example, teams did not take representative airborne contamination samples or
general area radiation surveys when entering potentially hazardous areas during
accident conditions.
In addition, the teams did not use correct procedural
sequences when removing anticontamination apparel.
OPPD's Resoonse
Annual Training provided to Health Physics Technicians and other members of the
Repair Teams will emphasize the importance of good health physics practices and
techniques. This training will include proper methods for taking air samples
and general area surveys prior to and while entering a potentially hazardous
Additionally, practical factors have been developed and implemented into
area.
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the Annual General Employee Training for the proper use of anticontamination
clothing. Annual Training of Repair Team members will be completed by June 1,
1988.
Deficiency 285/8719-08
The NRC inspector identified a series of scenario incongruer .es which detracted
from the realism and free play of the exercise. These appeared to be the re-
sult of:
internal inconsistencies in the scenario itself, insufficient control-
1ers, poor logistics or improper timeliness in the positioning of controllers,
and defiuient controller training.
The licensee identified a number of these
deficiencies in their critique.
Some examples follow:
There was no controller available in Room 69 to hand out data to players
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pertaining to ongoing fire.
The scenario did not anticipate that component cooling water pumps were
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safety-related equipment mandating a manual tripping of the reactor when
threatened by fire.
This condition in itself would have terminated the
accident sequence, prevent the continuation of the exercise.
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Control Room operators were not given alarms indicating high radiation
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levels, although this data would be readily accessible to them during a
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real accident.
On two occasions, the scenario required reactor operators to continue
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plant operations in violation of Technical Specifications. At 9:10
a.m., scenario data given to operations reflected temperatures in excess
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of 200*F in the reactor coolant pump seal return, a condition that would
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have mandated tripping the pump and the reactor.
This sequence of
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events was prevented by the scenario.
Another instance when the scen-
ario forced actions against Technical Specifications occurred at 9:55
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a.m. when only one component cooling water pump remained in operation.
This condition would also have mandated a reactor trip but was prevented
by the scenario.
This is contrary to good reactor operational practices
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and opposes the didactic objectives of an emergency exercise.
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The duration of the fire assumed to take place in the auxiliary building
during the scenario was not consistent with type of materials and other
realistic considerations for chat location.
During the fire scenario, there were various instances of unnecessary
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simulation.
For example, fire hoses were not charged with water, the
access to post accident sampling system was simulated, and the re-entry
team simulated dressing and entering into the safety injection rooms.
Furthermore, the players did not climb the extension ladder through
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loading hole that would have given them access to Room 69.
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OPPD's Response
A new procedure, EPT-10, has been developed for use in preparing scenarios for
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the Annual Exercise.
This procedure also addresses quality assurance of the
scenario, controller training, logistics, and activities associated with sim-
ulations. This procedure had been developed prior to the 1987 Annual Exercise
but not implemented early enough to be utilized for that exercise.
This proce-
dure will be fully used for the 1988 Annual Exercise scenario development.
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