ML20236J219
| ML20236J219 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/21/1998 |
| From: | Dicus G NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20236J168 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7, RULE-PRM-50-63, RULE-PRM-50-63A SECY-98-061-C, SECY-98-61-C, NUDOCS 9807080092 | |
| Download: ML20236J219 (4) | |
Text
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NOT ATIO N VOTE RESPONSE SHEET TO: John C. Hoyle, Secretary FROM: COMMISSIONER DICUS i l
SECY-93-061 - STAFF OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING l
SUBJECT:
A PETITION FOR RULEMAKING (PRM-50-63 AND 50-63A)
RELATING TO A RE-EVALUATION OF THE POLICY REGARDING THE USE OF POTASSIUM IODIDE (KI) BY '
THE GENERAL PUBLIC AFTER A SEVERE ACCIDENT AT A' NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Approved X Disapproved X Abstain Not Participating Request Discussion COMMENTS: Please see attachcd.
i A 008 s cu n Si NATL 4R'EJ Release Vote / X / P7 cw e/ /95 P DATE / '
Withhold Vote /___/
r Entered on "AS" Yes x No e827 8om'd g g26 p L ,?"?E W M E PDR { _
i Commissioner Dicus' comments on SECY-98-061 I approve in part and disapprove in part staff's recommendations for resolving Mr. Crane's petition. My reasons follow. j l
Before attempting to reach a decision on Mr. Crane's petition, one shculd ask the question, j "What is the problam that the petition is attempting to fix?" j i
Mr. Crane's amended petition asks for an amendment to be made to 10 CFR 50.47 (b)(10) to I aad a sentence that specifically spells out evacuation, sheltering and prophylactic use of KI as l protective actio 1 to be considered for the plume exposure EPZ for emergency workers and the )
public. This begs the question, "Is there any evidence that licensees and State and local emergency response planners have not considered these three actions, especially Kl?" The petitioner does not provide information that States have failed to consider Kl nor is it asserted.
NRC staff have indicated they are not aware of any such cases. Indeed, it might be argued that, in light of the recent NRC decision and public announcement to offer funding of purchase of KI should States decide to utilize it as a protective measure for the public, there is now a i heightened aivareness of Kl for this purpose by emergency response planners.
I conclude the rulemaking requested by the petitioner is not needed and our scarce resources should not be expended for this purpose.
The issue, if one carefully reads Mr. Crane's petition, is not whether licensees and emerge,1cy response planners consider KI but, rather, whether their decisions on the matter are well informed dacisions. The need to assure that decisions made by licensees and emergency response planners are well informed ones was raised by Commissioner de Planque in 1994 (COM/GD-94-002):
"The role which the NRC should play in this matter is . . to orovide technical information to these decision-makers (state and local governments) which will assist them in determining the appropriate course of action To that end, staff should prepare for Commission approval a user-fricndly information brochure, containing the essential data and analyses in SECY-93-318 and SECY-94-087, to assist these authorities, as well as the general public, in making informed decisions on stockpiling, predistribut;on and use of Kl."
The Commission directed tne staff to proceed with development of the brochure. Unfortunately, I staff has hcd to defer completion of this assignment to respond to Mr. Crane's petition and to
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await Commission resolution of the petition. In SECY-98-061, staff attached its report, l
" Assessment of the Use of Potassium lodide (Kl) as a Public Protective Action During Severe !
Reactor Accidents". While taking no position on the technical merits of its content, I note that, according to staff, this report is intended to serve as the technical basis for the information brochure requested by the Commission in 1994. Staff should make the report available for !
public comment (e.g., by publishing it as a NUREG) and seek a peer review of it. After !
considering the comments, staff should then expeditiously complete development of the information brochure.
Further on this point, if a majority of the Commission should approve Mr. Crane's petition for j rulemaking as modified, then the critical question arises as to what priority should be given by I I
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2 staff to tne rulemaking versus finalization of the information brochure (given limited staff resources). I would argue that priority should be given to the latter. Decisions regarding the use of Kl a'e being made now by emergency planning authorities sometimes as the result of the petitioner's personalintercession (on his own time and expense). For this reason, it is imperative that NRC staff complete the information brochure that the commission requested fouryears ago. Quite obviously, rulemaking to require consideration of KI as a protective measure, if approved and finalized, will make the need for such an information brochure even more critical. Not only shoule d be ready and available well before the rule becomes effective, it becomes obvious that the information brochure must be ready and available vhen the rule is proposed because it will become an integral part of the basis of the decision making by emergency response planners required by the proposed rule. In order to make informed comments on the proposed rule, the public should have in hand the information brochure that would be used by emergency response decision makers.
Mr. Crane c!so requested the insertion of the phrase, " reasonable and prudent" into the Federal Register notice to describe the use of Kl. I have no objection to the use of this phrase in the context of State and local decision-making in emergency response planning, that is, state and local decision makers make this determination for their State and loca/ plans. This recognizes my long standing view in keeping with established policy and practice that the decisions on what constitute appropriate protective actions should be made by the State and local governments. Therefore, with one change, I cc.ncur with Chairman Jackson's comment that
"[0]n a case by case basis, State and local decision makers, provided with the proper information, may find that the use of Kl as a protective measure is 'reascnable and prudent';
therefore, I suppQrt insertion of a statement to this effect in the Federal Register Notice on the revised Federal Policy." The change I would make would be that recommended by Commissioner McGaffigan to use the word, supplement, rather than " measure."
The foregoing comments reflect creful consideration of the lessons of the accidents at Three Mile Island accident and Chernobot and my experience as Director of the Arkansas Division of Radiation Control and Emergency Management. Clearly, public exposure to 1-131 was a significant consequence of the Chernobol accident. One Inust be careful, however, in attempting to apply the findings from the Chernobol accident to emergency respanse planning in the United States:
- 1. The Chernobol reactor did not include a containment structure. TMl did and it was so effective in :imiting public exposures to radionuclides from TMI that, despite a partial melting of the reactor core, no member of the public received a radiation dose in excess of the applicable radiation protection standsds.
- 2. The explosion at the Chernobol reactor resulted in the rapid, widespread dispersal of rac'ionuclides into the environs. Two significant consequences of this were that persons nearby l the reactor had little time to take protective measures, had they been available or ordered and, i j because of the explosion and fire which dispersed the radioactivity from the reactor, many of the persons exposed to 1-131 were located at great d utances from the reactor. In the U.S. ,
} l dispersal of radionuclides will be slower and the amounts will be limited by the reactor deaign l and containment. As a result, potentially exposed populations are those nearby the reactor and there will be time for they evacuation to be considered and carried out.
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- 3. About half of the public r rosure to 1-131 from Chernobol resulted from consumption of contaminated foodstuffs. i ms was the result of a combination of events which included delays in notifying the public of the contamination and the nature of the agribusiness in eastern Europe which made it difficult to interdict local food supplies. The U.S. food distribution system allows rapid, effective interdiction of contaminated food and, as a result, exposure to the release plume would be the main source of U.S. public exposure to 1-131.
- 4. In Europe, evacuation may not be the most effective protective measure because of the smaller land masses and higher population densities. As a result, sheltering assumes a larger role and, with sheltering, the use of KI as an supplementary protective measure assumes a larger role. In the U.S., the primary protective measure is evacuation which saves dose from all pathways and allradionuclides.
- 5. The result is that in the U.S. the potential use of Kl assumes a different role than in Europe.
In the U.S., for those limited cases where evacuation may not be possible, or otner circumstances where exposure to the release plume cannot be avoided, sheltering is the preferred alternative protective measure and Kl may be considered as a supplemental, not primary, protective measure. It is a supplemental measure because its effectiveness is limited to one species of radionuclides, the radiciodines if local er" rgency response planning authorities determine such cases apply to their situation, * :a the stockpiling of Kl would be a reasonable and prudent measure for these local situations The NRC decision to fund the purchase of Kl if requested by emergency response plann is will enable a full range of prctective measures, including Kl to be in place in local swations which warrant it.
In summary, the issuance of the information brochure will enable State and local planners to make informed decisions as to whether Kl is an appropriate supplemental protective measure for their individual plans. The decision by the Commission to fund the purchase of Kl for stockpiling removes some of the potential financial impediments to exercising this option.
Together, these steps will have the effect of granting that part of the petition concerning the need to provide adequate information to decision makers. The requested rulemaking, however, has not been shown to be needed and so would not be an appropiate use of our severely limited staff resources. Therefore, this portion of the petitioner's request should be denied.
Irrespective of the Commission decision on the petitioner's request for rulemaking, staff should proceed expeditiously with publication for public comment and peer review of the report attached to SECY-98-061. Staff should also' proceed on a parallel course to develop the information brochure with the understanding that its final content will reflect revisions to the report that result from the peer review and public comments. Completion of the information brachure should be given highest priority.
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