ML20236G047

Special Rept 87-07:on 870629,listed Wall Penetrations Found Open.Caused by Inadequate Workplan Instructions for Sealing of Conduits Penetrations.On 870701,all Penetrations Sealed & Verified Functional.Procedure Revised & Personnel Informed

ML20236G047
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	07/28/1987
From:	Nobles L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
87-07, 87-7, NUDOCS 8708040111
Download: ML20236G047 (2)

Text

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. TENNESSEE- VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 July 28, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comraission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.

50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 87-07 The enclosed special report provides details concerning a penetration fire barrier being nonfunctional for a period in excess of seven days. This event is reported in accordance with Sequoyah units 1 and 2 Technical Specification 3.7.12.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Nobles Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 8700040111 870728 PDR ADOCK 05000327 s PDR ((

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l 1983-TVA 5OTH ANNIVERSARY An Equal Opportunity Employer I

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SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT SPECIAL REPORT 87-07 l UNITS 1 AND 2 )

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l DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On June 29, 1987, with unit 1 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 5 psig 133 degrees F) and unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 13 psig, 119 degrees F),

the following wall penetrations were found cpen:

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1. Control Building elevation 732'. main control room to relay room (3/4-inch diameter conduit penetration above suspended ceiling).

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2. Control Building elevstion 732', relay room to Technical Support Center, (a) 2" di oeter conduit penetration (b) 1" diameter conduit  ;

penetration above suspended ceiling. I 1

Upon discovery of the condition, fire barrier breaching permits were initiated and fire watch was established.

The above described conduit penetrations were opened approximately in i V;83-1984 timeframe to allow implementation of Technical Support Center i modifications. The penetration described by item 1 above is a technical l specification fire barrier penetration and remained nonfunctional for more than seven days, thus exceeds requirements. The other two penetrations l l described by item 2 are not located in a fire barrier separating  ;

safety-related areas and therefore not covered by Technical Specification I Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12. These barriers are shown on j the 47W494 fire cell compartmentation drawings and are therefore treated same as item 1; however, there is not an LCO involved. All three penetrations were immediately sealed and verified functional.

CAUSE OF EVENT q 4

These penetrations have been open since installation of Technical Support Center's electrical modifications, due to inadequate workplan instructions for sealing of conduits penetrations.

CORRECTIVE ACTION Upon discovery of this event, three separate work requests (WRs) were written and given priority one (P1) status to seal and verify these penetrations. On July 1, 1987, all penetrations were sealed and verified functional. Subsequently, Surveillance Instruction (SI)-233.1 was performed, and no additional fire barrier was found nonfunctional.

Administrative Instruction (AI)-19 (part IV), " Plant Modifications: After Licensing," was revised to include guidelines for preparation of workplan instructions to provide information regarding wall penetrations. Also Modifications personnel were instructed to ensure that fire barrier penetrations are sealed and verified functional in a timely manner.

0573Q i .

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