ML20236E448

Special Rept 87-13:on 870922,two Fire Breach Permits & Control/Turbine Bldg Fire Wall Penetrations Exceeded 7-day Tech Spec Limiting Condition for Operation 3.7.12.Caused by Asbestos Removal Work.Fire Watches Established

ML20236E448
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	10/26/1987
From:	Nobles L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
87-13, NUDOCS 8710290225
Download: ML20236E448 (3)

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1. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY l

[a Sequoyah Nuclear Plant j Pe.at Office Box 2000 USNRC-DS.  ;

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soc y-Daisy, Tennessee 37379 '

I 1710C129 A 914b l

I October 26,'1987 .

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '

Document Control' Desk Washington, DC 20555' Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.

50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SPECIAL REPORT 87-13 I The enclosed special report provides details concerning a fire. door and fire ,

wall breached greater than 7 days, and the inoperability of a carbon dioxide I fire protection system for geeater than 14 days. This event is reported in )

accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting-Conditions for Operation '

3.7.11.3 and 3.7.12.

Very truly yours,

, 1 1

1lENNESSEEVALLEYAUTHORITY ')

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Ij M. Nobles j llant Manager n

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/ Enclosure t.c (Enclosure): j i

i J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 l

l Records Center i Institute of Nuclear Power Operations l Suite 1500 1100 Circ 10 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 l NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 8710290225 871026 DR ADOCK 0500 7 f,b

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An Equal Opportunity Employer

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l SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

!', UNITS 1 AND 2 '

..SPECIAL REPORT 87-13

. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On~ September. 22,'1987, with units l'and 2 in mode 5.(0 percent power, 3' K pslg, 119 degrees F;and 0 percent power, 84 psig, 120 degrees F,.

respectively) 1two fire breach. permits issued on September 15, 1987, for I# l fire door: C-23.. (to computer room, Control Building elevation 685) and Control Building / Turbine Building fire wall penetrations (elevation 697) exceeded'the'seven-day limit' allowed by Technical Specification Limiting Condition for. Operation.(LCO) 3.7.12. Also, on October 3, 1987, the carbon dioxide' fire.. suppression system for the computer room'was out of service for greater than.the,14-day limit allowed by LCO 3.7.11.3.

The fire breaches were' issued to facilitate the safe removal of asbestos

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' insulation from the computer room ductwork. Door C-23 was maintained ope'n Lalong with five other adjacent area fire doors, including those for the-auxiliary instrument rooms, to ensure negative pressure in the temporary asbestos removal tent.above the computer room. Three penetrations were

breached in the Turbine Building wall to install air and water lines to provide breathing' air for the asbestos workers and water for the p decontamination showers. Also, in implementing the designed asbestos

. controls, the carbon dioxide suppression systems for both' auxiliary instrument rooms and the computer room were removed from service, and the fire detection system for the computer room was rendered inoperable. All fire doors,"with thel exception of door C-23 (which was the first to be breached), were restored to functional status before the expiration of their respective seven-day breaching permit,;and the unit 1 and unit 2 auxiliary Instrument room fire suppression systems and the computer room fire detection system were returned to service within the required 14 days. The .

fire suppression system for the computer room, which was not returned to l

' service due to the continuing work being' performed on the ventilation ducts, l has' remained inoperable for longer than the 14-day limit.

CAUSE OF EVENT The required asbestos removal work was not completed within the seven-day period. A plant management decision was made to maintain the breaches for i the duration of the asbestos removal project. The decision was mandated by j the severity of the airborne asbestos hazard to employee health. As a l result, the fire breaches exceeded the seven-day limit of action statement A I of.LCO 3.7.12. The computer room carbon dioxide fire suppression system,

? which was removed from service for personnel safety reasons, was not restored to operable status within 14 days because of the extent of the work required in completing the computer room ductwork modification.

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l~ , :T W.p.;:l.V AN'ALYSIS OF EVENT This-event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action  ;

statement A of LCOs 3.7.11.3 and 3.7.12. ,

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'A continuous fire watch was stationed in both the unit 1 and unit.2 l

auxiliary instrument rooms, and a roving hourly fire watch was established.

(. 'for the computer' room. Additionally, the'l-inch pipes breaching the

penetrationstin the Turbine Building' wall were installed withLisolation:

valves-on each side of the wall..and the penetrations were sealed!with~ foam-around the pipe. With these compensatory measures in place and;because the -!

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nearby hose: stations were operable and the breached doors were capable of

, -being' closed within minutes in the event of a fire, there was no. danger:to q l-redundant safety-related equipment. ,

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CORRECTIVE ACTION' j 4

1The required fire watches.were establishedLfor the unprotected areas and maintained untilithe~ asbestos. removal workLwas completed, and the breached- 1 '

fire. barriers were'restoredfon September 25, 1987.- An' hourly fire watch for.

.the computor' room has remained in effect while the fire suppression system -

has been inoperable. The computer room fire suppression system will be- d returned to service upon completion of the ductwork modification whichLis I

-scheduled to be completed by November 8, 1987. No further action is required.

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