ML20236D464

Safety Evaluation Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Parts 1 & 2) Concerning Equipment Classification & Vendor Interface for Reactor Trip Sys Components

ML20236D464
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	03/15/1989
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20236D458	List: ML20236D456 ML20236D464
References
NUDOCS 8903230116
Download: ML20236D464 (3)

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5AFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION REGARDING GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 1 AND 2) i CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NO. 50-324/325

1.0 INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant startup. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (ED0) directed the staff to investigate and to report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem incidents are reported in NUREG-1000 " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requested by Generic Letter (GL) 83-28, dated July 8, 1983, that all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for operating licenses, and holders of construction permits respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

We have evaluated the November 7, 1983 letter submitted by Carolina Power and Light Company, the licensee for the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Brunswick 1&2), which responded to Item 2.1 (Parts 1 and 2) of GL 83-28. Item 2.1 (Part 1) of GL 83-28 requires the licensee to confirm that all Reactor Trip System (RTS) components are identified, classified and treated as safety-related, as indicated in the following statement:

Licensees and applicants shall confirm that all components j whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are '

identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.

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Item 2.1 (Part 2) of GL 83-28 requires the licensee to confirm that an interface has been established with the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) or with the vendors of each of the components of the RTS which includes:

e 1. periodic communication between the licensee / applicant and the NSSS or the vendors of each of the components of the RTS and,

2. a system of positive feedback which confirms receipt by the licensee / applicant of transmittals of vendor technical information. 1 2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 ITEM 2.1 (PART 1) EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION The licensee responded to the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) with a submittal dated November 7, 1983. The licensee stated in this submittal that all components which are required to' perform the reactor trip function were reviewed to verify that these components are classified as-safety-related equipment and described the system used to determine this classification. The licensee further stated that activities such as testing, maintenance, and replacement parts procurement that affected these components were required to be performed using safety-related procedures.

CONCLUSION Based on our review of this response, we find the licensee's statements confirm that the components required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related, and that plant documentation that initiates and controls design, maintenance, testing, and procurement activities require identification of safety-related components. This program meets the requirementsofItem2.1(Part1)oftheGL83-28,andis,therefore, l acceptable.

2.2 ITEM 2.1 (PART 2) VENDOR INTERFACE PROGRAMS - RTS COMPONENTS 1

l The licensee also responded to the requirements of Item 2.1 (Pa.t 2) l in the same submittal, dated November 7, 1983. The licensee stated that General Electric (GE) is the.NSSS vendor for the Brunswick 1&2 plants and that the RTS is included as part of the GE interface program established for this plant. The response also confirms that this interface program includes both periodic communication between GE and the licensee, as well as positive feedback to GE from the' licensee, in the form of signed receipts for technical information transmitted by GE to the licensee, i

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• CONCLUSION Based on our review of this response, we find the licensee's statements confirm that a vendor interface program exists with the NSSS vendor for components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function.

, This program meets the requirements of. Item 2.1 (Part 2) of the Generic Letter 83-28 and is, therefore, acceptable.

Principal Contributors: D. Lasher i N. Le Dated: March 15,1989 l l l

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