ML20236A936

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Responds to NRC Bulletin 88-004, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss. New Orifices Installed in Core Spray Pump Min Flow Circuits on 890103
ML20236A936
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/06/1989
From: Brons J
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, JAG-89-009, JAG-89-9, NUDOCS 8903200225
Download: ML20236A936 (4)


Text

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March 6, 1989 JAG-89-009-

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Station P1-137 Washington, D. C. 20555 l

Attn: Document Control Desk

Subject:

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 NRC Bulletin 88-04,' Potential Safety Related Pump less'

References:

1.

NRC Bulletin 88-04, " Potential Safety Related Pump Loss", dated May 5, 1988.

2.

NYPA letter J. C. Brons to NRC, dated November 9,1988 (JPN-88-059),

concerning the same subject.

3.

NYPA letter J. C. Brons to NRC, dated July 22,1988 (JPN 88-036),

i concerning the same subject.

4.

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Safety Evaluation SE-88-216 Rev.1.

Dear Sir:

In Bulletin 88-04 (Reference 1), the NRC asked licensees to investigate potential pump dead-heading in safety related systems. The Bulletin also required licensees to verify the adequacy of the minimum flow line for single pump operation.

In Reference 2, the Authority submitted results of the calculations for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system pumps. This letter submits results of the analyses for the remaining pumps which were identified in Reference 3.

Core Spray Pumps 14P 1A,1B The core spray pump minimum flow calculations based on the sizing of the orifice in the minimum flow line indicated a flowrate 7% less than the recommended design value. A safety evaluation (Reference 4) was performed to justify temporary operation with this reduction in flow. This safety evaluation concluded that this reduction in flow did not affect the intended function of the pumps. To achieve the recommended design flow, the Authority installed new orifices in the core spray pump minimum flow circuits on January 3,1989.

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I 8903200225 890306 PDR ADOCK 05000333 Q

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o Illgh Pressure Coolant Injection (IIPCI) Pump 23P 1 The HPCI pump is designed to produce a flow of 4250 gpm at all reactor pressures from l

1120 down to 150 psig. The HPCI pump is turbine driven, and the pump output is directly related to the speed of the drive turbine. The minimum flow circuit is functional during start-up as the pump accelerates to design speed. During start-up, pump low flow conditbi is automatically regulated using an orificed minimum flow circuit. At injection flow values ofless than 450 gpm, this minimum flowpath is open to ensure pump flow of at least 450 gpm. A flow sensor situated in the discharge flowpath controls the minimum flow circuit. At total pump discharge flow of greater than 450 gpm, the minimum flow circuit is isolated.

During pump surveillance testing, the minimum flow circuit is also active and ensures a minimum flow of 450 gpm through the pump. Thus, the pump delivers the minimum flow of 450 gpm under all normal, test, and emergency operating modes.

Calculations have been performed which demonstrate that the minimum finvpath is capable of at least 450 gpm. Additionally, the manufacturer confirmed that the minimum flow value of 450 gpm is adequate for the pump.

Based on this evaluation, the HPCI pump minimum flow circuit is adequately designed. and no safety concern exists relative to Bulletin 88-04.

Emergency Service Water Pumps (ESW) 46P 2A,2B The ESW pumps supply cooling water to the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) and provide a backup source of cooling water to various safety related equipment normally serviced by the Reactor Building Closed Loop Cooling Water System (RBCLCWS) and Service Water System (SWS). The ESW system contains a test flow circuit which is normally open when the ESW system supplies water to the EDGs. The flowpath to the EDGs is administratively controlled through normally locL _ open valves and is always available to the ESW pumps.

The ESW system pumps automatically initiate upon start of the EDGs or on a loss of pressure in the RBCLCWS. The most limiting flow condition for the ESW pumps occurs when the RBCLCWS loads are isolated from the pump circuit. In this mode, the test circuit and EDG flowpaths are open to pump flow. Under these conditions, the combined flowrate in the ESW system is greater than 50% of the pump design flowrate. This flowrate represents the minimum flow expected during normal and emergency pump operation.

The ESW pumps are tested using test data from operation of the pumps at shutoff conditions. The surveillance procedure for this test contains a caution to minimize the pump operating time at shutoff. No significant degradation of pump performance has been observed as a result of these tests. We are currently evaluating the possibility of using a recently installed annubar in the EDG circuit to measure pump flow. This will allow pump testing at operating points other than pump shutoff. Utilization of this annubar will allow measurement of the pump flow at moderate pump output conditions (approximately 30% of rated flow).

Based on these evaluations, the ESW pumps are adequately designed, and no safety concern exists relative to Bulletin 88-04.

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4, Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RIIRSW) Pumps 10P 1A, IB, IC, ID The RHRSW pumps supply cooling water to the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat

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Exchangers during normal and accident modes of operation. These pumps do not require a minimum flow circuit, because operating procedures ensure a minimum flow of at least 60%

through the pump under all operating conditions.

RHR Holding Pumps 10P 2A,2B Core Spray Holding Pumps 14P 2A,2B Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Pump 13 P1 A detailed review of these pumps shows that they are not functionally safety related, and therefore, not within the scope of the Bulletin.

Summary This analysis, in conjunction with References 2 and 3 submitted earlier, completes the Authority's response to the Bulletin.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. J. A. Gray, Jr. of my staff.

Very truly yours, John C. Brons xecutive Vice President Nuclear Generation STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6A day of 2& tack 1989 Notary Public kYvon M sE NuO ?2 cc:

Listed on following page

32

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I',

475 Allendale Road 2

King of Prussia, PA 19406

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' Office of the Resident Inspector.

- I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

. P.O. Box 136 Lycoming, NY 13093 Mr. David E.12 Barge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Project Directorate I 1 Division of Reactor Projects -I/II Mail Stop 14 B2 Rockville, MD 20852

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