ML20235Z377

Discusses 870709 Telcon Re Differences Between Plant 821230 10CFR50,App R SER & Current Plant Safe Shutdown Configuration.Listed Differences Due to Util Continuing Commitment for Ensuring Compliance to App R

ML20235Z377
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	07/17/1987
From:	Johnson I COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Murley T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
3330K, NUDOCS 8707270282
Download: ML20235Z377 (2)

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[/7)O Comm:nwrith Edison Ons First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois

(' C Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 0767 July 17, 1987 Mr. Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Quad Cities Station Unit I and 2 10 CFR 50 Safety Evaluation Report dated December 30, 1982 NRC Docket Nos. 50-254 and 50-265__

References (a): T. J. Rausch letter to D. G. Eisenhut dated July 1, 1982 (b): December 30, 1982, Quad Cities safety Evaluation Report for Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 (c): B. Rybak letter to H.R. Denton dated December 18, 1984

Dear Mr. Murley:

On July 9, 1987, in a conference call with members of your staff, differences between the Quad Cities Station December 30, 1982, Appendix R to s 10 CFR 50 Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (Reference (b)), and the current plant safe shutdown configuration were discussed. The differences have arisen due to commonwealth Edison Company's continuing commitment for ensuring compliance to Appendix R and have been identified in preparation for the upcoming Appendix R audit. The differences were described as follows:

1. SER Section 3.1.2 states that the backup water supply for the safe shutdown makeup pump is the service water system. This is not the case.

The backup supply is actually the fire water system as noted in Reference (c). The fire water system consists of two fire pumps, each capable of producing 100% of the anticipated demand. The service water system was not used due to the problems of cable separation for the five service water pumps and loading the service water pumps to the diesel generator.

Both the service water system and the fire water system are non-safety-related. The fire water system has been hydraulically evaluated to ensure ,

that either pump can supply the maximum fire demand and the safe shutdown makeup pump room cooler simultaneously. Safe shutdown makeup pump room suction would not be required from the fire water system until well after the fire has been extinguished. (The primary source of makeup water is 90,000 gallons of water in the contaminated condensate stora9e tank which will last approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.)

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Mr. T.E. Murley July 17, 1987 4

If any additional information is required pertaining to the firewater system, it would be made available at the time of the audit to the inspectors. ,

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2. SER Section 3.1.5 states that RHR flow indication has been included in the SSD analysis. At Quad Cities Station, RHR flow indication is not considered as necessary diagnostic instrumentation. The RHR systm is initially used for torus cooling to maintain hot shutdown. The diagnostic instrumentation required for torus cooling is suppression pool temperature and RRR discharge pressure.

3. SER Section 3.3 states that no repairs are planned or'are necessary to comply with the Appendix R post-fire safe shutdown requirements.

Reference (c), however, has identified several hot and cold shutdown repairs. The hot shutdown' repairs for fuse pulling and replacement were identified in submittals subsequent to Reference (c). The cold shutdown repairs.were described in Section 2.4 of the December 18, 1984, Appendix R Exemption Request submittal.

4. SER Section 3.4.1 stated that all instrumentation and power circuits are protected or will be provided with coordinated protection by either circuit breakers or fuses. Quad Cities Station does not have documented breaker / fuse _ coordination. The safe shutdown procedures address high i impudence faults on non-safe shutdown loads by instructing the operator to  !

pull the control power fuses for electrically-operated 4-kV switchgear and 480-V switchgear breakers that feed non-safe shutdown' loads and then to ,

manually trip such loads. All of the safe shutdown loads on a given bus J are known to be free of fire induced faults whenever the bus is called upon to power safe shutdown loads.

This information is being provided to your staff for their review and possible inclusion in their Safety Evaluation Report.

Please direct any questions you may have regarding this matter to this office.

Very truly you s, I. M. Johnc Nuclear Licensing Administrator 1m cc: T. Ross - NRR Regional Administrator - RIII NRC Resident Inspector - Quad Cities 3330K'

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