ML20235V213
| ML20235V213 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1987 |
| From: | Zwolinski J NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS |
| To: | White S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8707230091 | |
| Download: ML20235V213 (6) | |
Text
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Docket No. 50-328 July 15, 1987 l
Mr. S. A. White Manager of Nuclear Power Tennessee Valley Authority 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401-2801
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Dear Mr. White:
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON l
Re:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 Enclosed are requests for additional information (RAls) related to several of the Employee Concern element reports that need resolution before the start-up of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 2.
These RAI's have been telefaxed to Ron Gagne and Martha Martin of your staff to facilitate the review process. We believe a telecon to discuss these issues followed by a written response from TVA would be the most efficient method of resolving these issues. The schedule for the telecon and the written responses will be negotiated with your staff.
The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L.96-511.
Sincerely.
Oggneld John A. Zwo11nski, Assistant Director 4
for Projects TVA Projects Division Office of Special Projects
Enclosure:
Information Request cc w/ enclosure:
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f Mr. S. A. White Tennessee Valley Authority Sequoyah Nuclear Plant cc:
General' Counsel Regional Administrator, Region II Tennessee Valley Authority U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccomission f
400 West Summit Hill Drive 101 Marietta Street, N.W.
E11 B33 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Resident Inspector /Sequoyah NP Mr. R. L. Gridley c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tennessee Valley Authority 2600 Igou Ferry Road SN 157B Lookout Place Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 i
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801 Mr. Richard King Mr. H. L. Abercrombie c/o U.S. GA0 I
Tennessee Valley Authority 1111 North Shore Drive Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Suite 225, Box 194 P.O. Box 2000 Knoxville, Tennessee 37919 Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Tennessee Department of i
Mr. M. R. Harding Public Health j
Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Director, Bureau of i
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Environmental Health Services
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P.O. Box 2000 Cordell Hull Building i
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379 Nashville, Tennessee 37219 l
Mr. D. L. Williams Mr. Michael H. Mobley, Director Tennessee Valley Authority Division of Radiological Health 400 West Summit Hill Drive T.E.R.R.A. Building W10 885 150 9th Avenue North Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Nashville, Tennessee 37203 County Judge Hamilton County Courthouse Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402 i
i ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SEQUOYAH, UNIT 2 Employee Concern Report 20601(B) Rev. 1 l
1.
Conclusion C of report 206.1(B) dated Februtry 17, 1987 states that "only the control room drawings will be up-dated to red-lined status before plant restart." What safety-related systems will still need to be updated?
2.
What is the schedule for updating the drawings of the safety-related systems?
Employee Concern Reports 20501(B Rev. 3 i
20502(B Rev. 2 1.
At the time of the preparation of report 205.1(B) in December 1986, several reviews concerning calculations were in progress or were being planned. Are the results of these reviews available?
2.
Have the results of the reviews caused modifications to the plants?
3.
Has the review caused a change in the conclusions or the extent of the corrective action plan?
Empioyee' Concern Reports 215.9(B Rev. 1 222.5(B Rev. 2 1.
TVA has committed (TCAB-049 APP A5N) to sampling mixed connections.
When will this be completed?
2.
TVA has committed (TCAB-049A and APP A5V) to analyzing the mixed connections found at SQNP. Will the calculations use nominal drawing dimensions or the actual weld sizes, both diameters, hole sizes, and base plate thickness?
3.
AISC structural steel for Building, 8th Edition Commentary 1.15.10 allows mixed connections if the welds are made after the bolts are tightened.
Does TVA intend to follow this procedure?
4.
Our copy of Report 222.5(B) does not contain Page 5 of 12.
. Employee Concern Report 220.1(B) Rev. 1 A portion of the concern states " allow hangers or box anchors or structural features to be acceptable, even when they do not conform to the requirements of detail drawings." Do the drawing notes allow features to be acceptable which do not conform to TVA or AISC design requirements?
Employee Concern Report l
222.2(B) Rev. 1 TVA did not respond to the concern, "when all that metal is welded on, the pipe has to get so hot that it could adversely affect the pipe material."
l 1.
Based on actual pipe support measurements for 3/4 in. and 1 in. stainless steel pipe, could there have been a heat input of sufficient energy and length of time to cause the interior of the pipe to become ' sensitized' t
and thereby susceptible to corrosion and cracking?
2.
Does the pipe material provide inherent protection against sensitization such as the use of low carbon stainless steel?
3.
Does the water chemistry provide minimal corrosion activity by having low amounts of free oxygen and chlorides and sulfates?
Employee Concern Report 229.2(B) Rev. 0 1.
Specify maximum and average experienced radioactive airborne concentrations during normal operation in areas of concern.
2.
Describe how ventilation affects radioactive airborne concentration in l
areas of concern.
3.
Third paragraph on page 15 states that " potential exposure of operating personnel is consistent with ALARA guidelines and accepted health physics practices." This is misleading. Regulatory guide 8.8, Rev. 3 states in paragraph C that "the goals of the effort to maintain occupational exposures ALARA are (1) to maintain the annual dose to individual station personnel at low as is reasonably achievable and (2) to keep the annual integrated (collective) dose to station personnel (i.e., the sum of annual doses (expressed in man-rems) to all station personnel) as low as is reasonably achievable. Therefore, potential exposure to operating personnel, which can be avoided, should be avoided in order to comply with R.G. 8.8.
Please clarify the TVA position regarding ALARA.
^
. Employee ~ Concern Report 235.8(B) Rev. 1 1.
Does the Central Laboratory qualification test include the energy contribution resulting from superheated steam during the steam line break accident?
Employee' Concern Report 235.11(B) Rev. 2 1.
On page 5 of the report, the chronology itemizes an 11/86 K-form which was submitted to TVA Describe the contents of this item.
2.
This employee concern was initiated by TVA operators because of the misleading indication of equipment condition given a W-2 control switch failure. ' Corrective action (e) on page 12 states that "All plant operators will be notified of the possible failure mode of W-2 switches and the effect on control board status light indication." Since the operators initially discovered this and have expressed concern for this unacceptable condition, it appears that this is not corrective action but rather acknowledgement of the operator concern. Can the operators perform their duties effectively given potentially misleading equipment condition information? Please discuss this aspect.
3.
Supply the projected completion dates for 235.11(B) corrective action items SON 01, 02, 03 and 04. -Additionally, TVA reports which present scope, methods and findings for each corrective action should be submitted to NRC.
Empioyee' Concern Report 241.1(B) Rev. 1 1.
Did TVA provide Raychem with samples of all affected cables containing splices?
2.
Is Raychem heat shrink tubing WCSF-N the only tubing used for all SON splices?
3.
Does TVA consider the 100 day test to be a sufficient basis for accepting flooded splices for periods much greater than 100 days? If yes, please describe the basis. If not, please indicate how flooding is detected and eliminated.
4.
TVA Electrical' Standard Drawing SD-E12.5.3 (APP.A 5.1, 9/13/77) specified splicing procedures and materials for cables of the 5-15KV class. The j
Raychem tests were apparently only tested to 8 KV.
Please explain the adequacy of the splices for 8-15 KV applications.
5.
Did the Raychem testing include samples of Raychem heat shrink tubing over 3M tape splice kits?
. 6.
Page 6 of the report states that splices have been in service under adverse conditions for some time without a failure and also that no splice installation records were identified. What are the adverse conditions and how is splice integrity checked and verified especially since there are incomplete records.
7.
How will manhole and hand hole splice electrical integrity be verified?
Employee Concern Report 241.2(B) Rev. 2 1.
A September 15, 1986 TVA memo from Wallace to Wilson stated that "PIDG connectors on surge suppression networks associated with solenoid valves required to perform a safety function must be replaced or soldered prior to restart." corrective action 2 states that safety related PIDG terminals..." will be replaced or soldered if the solenoid valve circuit I
current exceeds the inductive rating of the circuit contact...".
Explain how this relates to the crimped connections limited current carrying condition. 'Can the current carrying capacity be conservatively estimated 3
for the crimped PIDG terminals?
{
Employee' Concern Report 241.4(B) Rev. 0 l
1.
A problem description regarding use of the "old" Amphenol connector.
2.
A description of how this problem is avoided with the new corrected connector assemblies including confirmatory test or similar data.
)
3.
A documented trail which shows replacement of old connectors with new and l
successful installation test data or equivalent.
I l
l Employee Concern Report 241.5(B) Rev. 0 1.
On the Jan. 9 and Jan. 20 evaluation team walkdowns, was penetration corrosion specifically reviewed?
2.
Which team member (s) are expert in detecting and diagnosing this corrosion condition?
3.
What percentage of penetrations were inspected by the evaluation team on Jan. 9 and 207 4.
The GE penetration problem exhibited a decrease of insulation resistance between conductors. Was an insulation resistance check made at Sequoyah?
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