ML20235P195

Amend 7 to License NPF-49,revising Tech Specs to Change Number of Reactor Coolant Loops in Operation During Hot Shutdown Conditions

ML20235P195
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/09/1987
From:	Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Northeast Nuclear Energy Co (NNECO)
Shared Package
ML20235P198	List: ML20235P195 ML20235P200
References
NPF-49-A-007 NUDOCS 8707200384
Download: ML20235P195 (7)

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eg UNITED STATES y

v. (f g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/. e WASHINGTON,0. C. 20555 l

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY, ET AL.*

DOCKET NO. 50-423 2

MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 3

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AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 7 License No. NPF-49 l

1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:

1 A.

The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, l

ct al. (the licensee) dated January 5, 1987, complies with the l

standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

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B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

• Northeast Nuclear Energy Company is authorized to act as agent and represent-ative for the following Owners: Central Maine Power Company, Central Vermont Public Service Corporation, Chicopee Municipal Lighting Plant, City of Burlington, Vermont, Connecticut Municipal Electric Light Company, Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company, Montaup Electric Company, New England Power Company, The Village of Lyndonville Electric Department, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, and Vermont Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative, Inc., and has exclusive responsibility and control I

over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.

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. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to.the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachnent to this license amenonent, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operatino License No. NPF 49 is hereby arended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.

7

, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7

o n.. Stolz, Directorj Pr ject Directorate 14- -

sJ) vision of Reactor Projects I/II l

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: July 9,1987 e

l ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDVENT NO. 7 FACILTIY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49 DOCKET NO. 50-423 1

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with i

the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove Insert 3/4'4-3 3/4 4-3 B3/4 4-1 E3/4 4-1 1

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HOT SHUTDOWN LIMITING CO,NDITION 1-OR OPERATION 3.4.1.3 At least two of the reactor coolant loops listed below shall be l

OPERABLE, with at least two reactor coolant' loops in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are closed. At least two of the loops listed bel;w shall be OPERABLE and at least one of these loops shall be in operation'with the Reactor Trip System breakers open:*

a.

Reactor Coolant Loop 1 and its associated steam generator and

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reactor conlant pump,**

b.

Reactor Coolant Loop 2 and its' associated steam generator and -

reactor coolant pump,*

• c.

ileactor Coolant Locp 3 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,"

d.

Reactor Coolant Loop 4 and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,**

e.

RHR Loop 1, and f.

RHR Loop 2.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

With less than the above required loops OPERABLE, immediately.

a.

Initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; if the remaining OPERABLE loop is an RHR loop, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b.

With no loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initate corrective action to return the required loop to operation.

All reactnr coolant pumps and RHR pumps may be deenergized for up to I hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 100F below saturation temperature.

• A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or e, qual to 3500F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam _ generator is less than 500F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/44-3 Amendment No. 7

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REACTOR COOLANl SYSTEM HDT SHUTDOWN f

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS s

l 4.4.1.3.1 The required reactor coolant pump (s), if not in operation, shall be i

determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignnents and j

indicated power availability.

i 4.4.1.3.2 The required steam generator (s) shall be determined OPERAELE by verifying secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to 17?c at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

4.4.1.3.3 At least one reactor coolant or RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reattor coolant at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

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l MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 4-4

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3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES The plant is designed to operate in MODES I and 2 with three cfr fou'r reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients.

With less than the required reactor coolant loops in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least' HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

in MODE 3 and t, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers. Single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single

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reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operaticn of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting an RCP with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to 3500F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the Secondary Coolant System, which could exceed the

. limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 30. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by either:

(1) restricting the water volume in the pressurizer and thereby providing a volume for the reactor coolant to expand into, or (2) by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is j

less than 500F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

The requirement to tr.aintain the isolated loop stop valves shut with power removed ensures that no reactivity addition to the core could occur due to the startup of an isolated loop. Verification of the boron concentration in an idle loop prior to opening the stop valves provides a reassurance of the adequacy of the boron concentration in the isolated loop. Draining and refilling the isolated loop within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to opening its stop valves ensures adequate mixing of the coolant in this loop and prevents any reactivity effects due to boron concentration stratifications.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. 7 E"

REACTCE COOLANT SYSTEM f

BASES 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its safety Limit of 2750 psia.

Each safety valve is designed to relieve 420,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve Setpoint.

The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown.

In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization.

In addition, the Cold Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

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During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to l

prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2750 psia.

The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum l

surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no Reactor trip until the first Reactor Trip System Trip Setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trio on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutcown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

l 3/4 4.3 PRE 55URIZER The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR.

The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions.

The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation.

The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system.

The requirement that a minimum number of pressur#.?er heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design trtnsients up to and including the l

design step load decrease with steam dump.

Operation of the PORVs minimizes l

the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves.

Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

Requiring the PORVs to be OPERABLE ensures that the capability for depressurization during safety grade cold shutdown is met.

MILLSTONE'- UNIT 3 B 3/4 4-2

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