ML20235M514
| ML20235M514 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1989 |
| From: | Widell R FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 3FO289-13, NUDOCS 8902280286 | |
| Download: ML20235M514 (3) | |
Text
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i a t
Power COR POH ATl0N February 22, 1989 3F0289-13 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory hinaian Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
20555
Subject:
Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License DPR-72 Inspection Report 88-34
Dear Sir:
Florida Power Corporation (FPC) provides the attached as a response to NRC Inspection Report 88-34.
Should there be any questions, please contact this office.
Yours very truly, Rolf C. Widell Director, Nuclear Operations Site Support WIR: mag Att.
xc: Regional Mministrator, Region II Senior Resident Inspector 8902280286 890222 $
PDR ADOCK 05000302:
O PNV,
POST OFFICE BOX 219
- CRYSTAL RIVER, FLORIDA 32629-0219 * (904) 563-2943 I
A Florida Progress Company
FINIIR IUWER C[RRRATIN INSPECfION REH RP 88-34 REPIX 10 NGITG CF V10DG7IN VIOIATIN 88-34-01 7bchnical Specification (TS) 2.2.1 requires the Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Instrumentation setpoints be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shwn in Table 2.2-1.
Table 2.2-1, item 4 requires the Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow and Axial Power Imbalance trip setpoint to not exceed the limit line of Figure 2.2-1.
The action statement associated with this TS requires that with a RPS instrumentation setpoint less conservative than the value required, the channel be declared inoperable and the applicable action statement of TS 3.3.1.1 be couplied with.
TS 3.3.1.1, action statement number 2, is applicable for the Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow and Axial Power Imbalance instrumentation and requires that the inoperable channel be placed in the tripped condition within one hour.
This action statement further specifies that powar operation may proceed provided that a minimum of three channels remain operable.
Contrary to the above, fran September 29 until November 1,1988, following the performance of surveillance testing and calibration of the RPS, the plant was operated at power with the "B" RPS Nuclear Overpower Based on RCS Flow and Axial Power Imbalance protective trip setpoint set non-conservative and in excess of the limit line of Figure 2.2-1.
The non-conservative setpoint was not detected during subsequent supervisory review of the canpleted surveillance test arx3 resulted in the "B"
RPS channel not being placed in the tripped condition.
Also during this period of time, the "C" RPS channel was placed in the bypassed condition for approximately three hours for surveillance testiry which rendered only two RPS channel operable and capable of initiating a protective trip signal.
This is a Severity level IV Violation (Supplement I).
FLOR 11R IUWER CIRPWATIN (FPC) RESKNSE Florida Power Corporation (FPC) accepts the violation.
This violation was reported in acocIdance with 10CFR50.73 as IER 88-25.
APPARENP CAUSE OP VIOIATI N l
The cause of this event was personnel error by the Instrument aryl Control (I&C)
)
Technician performi2g the surveillance.
The way the acceptability limits of the procedure were presented also contributed to the technician's failure to identify that he was outside of the procedural limits.
As identified in the violation, a w % ent supervisory review also did not detect the non-I conservative setpoint.
uneex;nVE MPIN A nonconforming report was written and the surveillance was re-performed to declare the channel operable.
IRTE W PUII, CMPIDNCE Full col.aliance with Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 was achieved by 1600 on Nevermber 1,1988.
ACTIW TMEN 'IO PREVENT RBCMRENCE I&C supervisory and shop personnel were counselled on their responsibility for the accuracy of the work which they are required to perform.
FPC will revise the surveillance procedure to provide the limits of acceptability in the form "between 3.195 and 3.205" as specified in the Surveillance Procedure Writer's Guide, instead of "3.2 i.005".
FPC has instituted - the practice of providing prompt, independent technical review of sections of Surveillance Procedures which involve multiple Channels i
of the Reactor Protective System.
Such a technical review is to be completed l
and signed off as satisfactory by an independent reviewer prior to allowing the i
removal of another Channel of RPS for maintenance.
. _ _ _ - -