ML20235K847
| ML20235K847 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1987 |
| From: | Condit R, Garde B GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT |
| To: | Mattox J, Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO), TEXAS, STATE OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235K715 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-467 NUDOCS 8710050253 | |
| Download: ML20235K847 (19) | |
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- TCOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE 1Y PROJECT PT555 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 202 (202)232 8550 Q'oshington, D.C. 20036 January 20,'1987 Victor Stello, Executive Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 James Mattox
~ Attorney. General for the State of Texas tupreme Court Building
Dear Messrs. Stello.and Mattox:
This letter is to inform your respective agencies that the Government Accountability Project (GAP) has formally begun preliminary investigation in.to worker allegations at the South Texas nuclear project.
Since.1980, GAP.has played a significant role in advocating 0 1 on behalf of whistleblowers and concerned citizens on issues involving safety-related problems at various nuclear power s
facilities.
Our approach to nuclear power has been steadfastly the same:
to ensure that'the government enforces the nuclear safety laws and regulations.
As a result of GAP's efforts (alone or in concert with other organizations) to expose safety-related problems, the construction and/or operation of several nuclear power facilities -
previously thought to be fit to operate --
were cancelled or postponed for further review.
The cancelled facilities. include the 98 percent completed Zimmer nuclear power plant and the 85 percent completed Midland plant.
Those which were postponed for further review include the Comanche Peak, Three Mile Island, Diablo Canyon, and Waterford facilities.
GAP currently either represents or is working with approximately 36 current and/or former employees of the South Texas project.
The allegations from the workers range from grand theft of nuclear grade steel to engineering defects in several major safety components.
The allegations concern the failure of f
Houston Light & Power to guarantee subcontractor compliance with industry and federal' safety requirements, including but not limited to: defects in the instrumentation and control division; defects and lack of compliance with federal regulations in the heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system; lack of i
compliance with quality standards in the area of soils i
compaction; failure to complete required QA or QC documentation;
(,_s) falsification of required QA or QC documentation; and harassment
\\Q and intimidation of personnel who attempt to adhere to federal safety standards.
For A %7 8710050253 870930 IIID Frl PDR FOIA 7
RUBINTOB7-467_ PDR EDO -- oggggy
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January 20, 1987 - Page Two
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Additionally, and of specific concern to the State of Texas, there are allegations that include deliberate actions of some of the subcontractors at STP to overcharge Houston Light & Power for goods and services by " charging off" their own unacceptable work j
j to Brown & Root, Inc.
There is also information which suggests 1
that subcontractors have fraudulently charged STP for manhours i
not worked, and for portions of the project which were not completed as claimed.
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GAP is currently conducting interviews with both current and i
former workers who are concerned about the South Texas project.
GAP investigators are accepting calls from workers at our Washington, D.C. office and our Midwest office.
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i once our preliminary investigation is complete, we plan to I
issue a formal public report.
Unfortunately, in the interim, we cannot advise our clients or those we work with to provide their concerns to the Region IV office of the NRC.
Our experience has been (and recently released internal agency reports confirm) that the Arlington office is either unable or unwilling to comply with its regulatory requirements as outlined in governing agency procedures.
Thus, unless the NRC is willing to provide independent
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inspectors to process the allegations pursuant to internal NRC
(,,)a regulations, GAP will provide the allegations directly to the
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state Attorney General office, and/or to the appropriate congressional committees, and/or to other regulatory or municipal bodies which have an interest in ensuring that the South Texas plant is designed, constructed, and financed in a manner that protects the public.
Please direct any inquiries about GAP's South Texas investigation to Richard Condit, Staff Attorney Investigator, 202-232-8550, or Billie Garde, GAP Midwest office, 414-730-8533.
Sincerely, (byh Billie Pirner Garde Director, Midwest Office Richard Condit i
Staff Attorney cc:
Chairman Lando Zech A/
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BG/RC:C30 i
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1 5Ed SOU'TH' I
4 9 1 TEXAS j
a 1 PROJECT
' SAFETEAM*
e.0. Box 408 Wadsworth, Texas 77483 0408 (512)972 7100
(
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January 27, 1987
Dear Concern No. 11227:
l SAFETEAM has completed its investigation of the items l
in your concern which you expressed'to us on November 10 and 11, 1986, as well as those items which were forwarded to us by your previous employer.
SAFETEAM assembled a multi-discipline team led by Houston Lighting & Power (HL&P) to perform the analysis of your concerns.
The results of that analysis are summarized on Enclosure I.
Enclosure I identifies that 12 of the 137 items of your concerns were determined by the team to require appropriate corrective action.
A number of the verified concerns had also been, independent of your concern, identified and scheduled for correction during the conduct of a planned review and verification effort by the project.
All of the planned reviews have not yet been completed and include, for
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example, walkdowns to verify ALARA considerations, Flooding and Spray Effects, Egress Pathways, and Fire Protection Programs.
These activities on Unit 2 will be enhanced by including the results of our evaluation of the items in your concern.
The evaluation of the items in your concern determined that none of them would have had an effect upon safe operation of the plant, the health and safety or the public, nor cause abnormal radiation exposure to plant personnel.
Based upon the results of our evaluation of your concerns and the on-going planned review and verification activities by project personnel, we believe further meetings with yourself are not warranted.
Thank you for your interest in the South Texas Project.
Y,our efforts in helping to assure that the South Texas Project operates safely and reliably are appreciated.
Should you have any further questions about your concerns or any other concerns you wish to identify, please write or call SAFETEAM.
The toll free telephone numbers for SAFETEAM are 1-800-292-5123 if you are in Texas, or 1-800-231-5922 If
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South Texas Project SAFETEAM
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Concern No. 11227 q
Page 2 I
you are outside of Texas.
You will reach our answering machine, so please-leave your code number and telephone number so we can get back to you.
Very' rul
- ours, I. L. G hrie Manager, SAFETEAM Program
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.01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN VALKDOWN SUMMART ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEW INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN
- A A000 Locations of violations of minimun bend radius on flexible electrical conduit.
A001 RCS I /El. 6'+ / Room #103 \\ Tag # on X
conduit - NIXC2BRS853 tag # on junction box which conduit runs into - ESC 3655 A002 RCB I / E1. 11' \\ Tag # on conduit -
X N1XC1DEX286 tag # adjacent to conduit -
ED-LT-7811 - Adj acent to secondary Sump 1A.
A003 MEA 3 I / El. 31' / Room #106A \\0n conduit X
leading to limitorque motor operated valve in passageway on CCP return line Q2 657-CC-8S.
4004 MEA 3 I / E1. 10' / Room #035 \\ Flexible X
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conduit too short on instrument 31CV-TSH-00243.
A005 MEA 3 I / E1. 10' / Room #035 \\ Flexible X
conduit on instrument #C1CV-TSH-0023B violates bend radius.
A006 MEA 3 I / E1. 19' / Room #079B \\ Flexible X
conduit to limit switch #NICV-ZSC-0201 violates bend radius.
A007 MEA 3 I / E1.19' / Room #079A \\ Flexible X
conduit to micro switch #CV02 N1CV-FCV-202 violates bend radius.
co 3 B000 Locations / Identity of inaccessible items.
2001 RC3 I / E1. 6'+ / Room #103 \\The control X
valving on the level control tank is located 12' off the floor out over a drop-off. There is no access ladder.
B002 RC3 I / E1. 11' / Room #007 \\ Access to the X
valve gallery in room #007 is obstructed by the stairway in the hallway outside room
- 007. The steps should be moved out to provide access & reduce exposure to radiation.
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01/28/87' SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN
SUMMARY
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l ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION 4
NUMB SATETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN l
3003 RCB I / E1.
-2' / Ring Duet Plenum Chamber X
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\\The hand rail tround the fan platform is l
welded in place.
It should be attached with slip joints to provide mono-rail access.
3004 RCJ I / E1.
-2' / Room #109 / RHR Pump #1A X
\\The pressure indicator is inaccessible.
It should be outside room #109 in the access room.
3005 RCB I / E1.
-2' / Room #109 \\There is no X
access to pump packing gland for inspection and maintenance.
B006 RCB I / El.
-2' / Room #109 \\The pump drain X
suction line is inaccessible on the far side of the room from door opening.
5007 RCB I / E1.
-2' / Room #109 \\ Electrical X
conduit between the motor and the access hatch would interfere with motor or pump removal.
3008 RCB I / El.
-2' / Room #110 \\The pressure X
monitoring gauge is inaccessible and should be in the access room.
B009 RCB I / E1.
-2' / Room #110 \\The drain line X
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is inaccessible on the back side of the l
pump.
3010 RCB I / E1.
-2' / Room #110 \\An instrument X
and line mounted on the pump between the pump and the access hatch blocks pump removal access.
B011 RCB I / Room #104 / RHR Pump #1C \\The X
location of the drainage valve would impede i
motor or pump removal.
B012 RCB I / E1.19' / Room #202 \\The process X
flow orifice manifold is inaccessible.
The manifold is near flange ICV 03F0Z S.P.1.11.
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'C1/28/87 COUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN VALKDOWN SUMMART t
ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SATETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAXEN 3013 RCB I / E1.19' / Room #202 \\The air X
operated solenoid / control instrument should be in the entry way.
It is directly in Room #202.
5014 RCB I / E1. 19' / RCP Loop B - Suction Side X
\\ valve #1R141T-RC-0058B is installed too close to a concrete pillar base, & allows very limited access for maintenance &
repair.
(azimuth 225 degrees) 3015 RCB I / E1. 19' / RCP Loop B \\ Valve X
- 2R1417-RC-0059B is installed too close to guide conduit for an instrument line to instrument #BIRCFT0429. There is no accessibility to valve.
(azimuth 230 degrees) 016 RCE I / E1. 19' / At column "C/23" \\ Valve X
- 1R141T-RC-0057D is located too close to concrete pillar base to allow maintenance access.
B017 RCB I / E1. 19' / Azimuth 45 degrees X
\\ Hanger #RC-1321-HS5001 interferes with removal of valve seat and manual operation of let down isolation valve #RC-085 CV CF.
Additional valve #'s 2R171XCV254A, IR141X-RC-0085.
3018 RCB I / E1. 26' / Near Cont. Penetration X
H75 \\ Containment isolation valve
- 2R371T-PO-0217 is located too close to an I-beam for accessibility and operation.
(azimuth 40 degrees) 3019 MEAB I / E1. 10' / Room #053C X
\\ Instrumentation is hidden behind the tank.
The pressure gauge should be outside of Room #053C.
3020 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #053C \\The X
isolation valve to the strainer is I
inaccessible.
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Pcto ND.
4 01/28/87^
SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN VALKDOWN
SUMMARY
ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN 3021 NEA3 1'/ Room #053C \\ Access to the strainer X
acreen is difficult due to tank rupports.
3022 MEAS I / Room #053C \\A valve handle on'a X
one inch line hits against the concrete wall.
3023 MIA3 I / Room #053C \\The packing gland and I
coupling on the pump next to the wall are i
inaccessible.
3024 MEAS I / Room #053C \\The thermal indicator X
on the tank faces the wall and is I
inaccessible.
3025 MEA 3 I / Room #053C \\The flow indicators X
nre inaccessible.
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'26 MIA3 I / Room #053C \\The isolation valve X
for the tank level indicating instrument is too close to the tube rack.
3027 HEAB I / Room #053C \\The drain valve X
downstream of the orifice on the discharge side of pump #7R301NPA111A is inaccessible.
3028 MEAS I / Room #053C \\The tank vent is X
inaccessible and would require a ladder.
3029 MEAS I / E1.10' / Adjacent to Room #025 X
\\The strainer manifold and valve under the Fisher control valve is inaccessible and will be more inaccessible after it is insulated.
(PPM tag #V-15410) 2030 MEAR I / E1.10' / Adjacent to Room #025 X
\\The instrument blowdown is not accessible to a drain.
3031 MZAI I / E1.10' / Adjacent to Room #025 X
\\ Instrument #A1AS-TSH-8838A should be out i
in the hallway.
(#14926-4335 item 16.0) l 132 MEAB I / 9 El. 22' / Opposite Room #078 X
\\Above stairway a 2" gate valve against the
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vall is inaccessible for operation or maintenance.
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'01/28/871 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN
SUMMARY
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. ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEN INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAN ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE l WIIL BE UNDERTAKEN 3033 KRAB I / Room #077 \\A 1" angle valve off of X
hanger #BR 1041 NF $001 is inaccessible in an extremely hot area.
3034 MEAB I /'E1. 10'/ Room #023 \\An inntrumeat X
primary valve, a process valve, and vent valves (all small bore) are inaccessible in an extremely hot radiation area.
3035 HEAB I / E1. '10' / At Columns C and 31 \\An X
8" fire main valve is. inaccessible for maintenance and operations. A hanger obstructs the valve operation.
3036 NEAB'I / E1. 10' / Room #067A \\A 1" X
stainless steel angle valve on a 1" process line is hard against an 8" fire main and inaccessible for operation or maintenance.
3037 NEAS I / El. 10' / Room #052 \\A bearing X
cooling water supply line to pump #7R321 NPA114B blocks access to pump-and valve operation and maintenance in a very hot area.
q 3038 HZA3 I / E1. 10' / Outside Room #052 \\The X
valving and pumps behind LWPS seal water panel #9R3012LP710/N1WLELP710 are-inaccessible for operation and maintenance.
3039 HEA3 I / E1. 10' / Room #058B \\The room is X
congested and instruments, valving, and an electrical panel are inaccessible.
3040 NEAS I / E1. 10' / Room #057 \\Six valves on X
i l" lines near the ceiling are inaccessible.
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3041 MEAB I / E1. 10' / Room #058A \\The pump X
I suction drain valve is inaccessible.
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3042 NEAB I / El. 10' / Room #059 \\The X
instrument gauges are inaccessible.
143 MEAB I / E1. 10' / Room #059B \\ Valve X
- P30-1-TV-4035 and the strainer next to it are inaccessible (off hanger #WL1140 HF 5002) i l
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6 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT g.
SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN
SUMMARY
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ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SATETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN 4
- B044 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #061 \\An instrument X
blocks access to filter #7R301TWLO644.
i 3045 MEAB I / E1. 10' / Room #061 \\ conduit out X
of terminal box #N1WLTB0441 blocks passageway access to filter #7R301T WL 0664. The contents of the filter could be hot.
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3046 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #061 \\There is no X
access to valving on top of tanks.
B047 MEAB I / E1.10$ / Room #071 \\There is no X
access to valving on top of the tank. Some of the valves are remote operated.
3048 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #050 \\The valve X
station for the let down heat exchrnger, serial'#2312-1A, is inaccessible and on the wrong side of the heat exchanger.
3049 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #050 \\The service X
valve station in the back of the room is inaccessible.
l 3050 DOLAB I / E1.10' / Room #044 \\The service X
station valve in the corner of the room is inaccessible.
3051 MEAB I / E1.10' /' Room #044 \\A root valve X
and process Valve #1-1A-0803 are terminated in the corner and are inaccessible.
3052 NEAB I / E1.10' / Room #044 \\A temperature X
indicator and valve off the HVAC chiller are not accessible.
The temperature indicator faces the vall.
i B053 MEAB I / E1.10'/ Room #044 \\The detector X
on the ceiling is in a difficult location.
2054 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #044 \\ Instrument X
tubing vent valves are inaccessible behind the HVAC chiller.
2:go Na.
7 01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PF0 JECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN SUMMART j
I ENGINEERING DISPOSITION 1
ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB-SATETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAXEN
.3055 MEAB I / E1. 10' / Room #041 \\ Terminal box X
VIB HON C CHGR PP IBPRDR / N1VMBNYZ0011 blocks access to the back half of tha room.
3056 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #041 \\ Instrument X
- N1HM-11-9372 is obstructed by flexible electrical conduit.
2057 MEAB I / El.10' / Room #041 \\A l' X
isolation valve to the 6"/4" pump suction is in an awkward location.
E058 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room 4041 \\0ne 1/2" and X
one 1" bleed off valves to the left of Westinghouse motor are inaccessible for proper connection.
They are located below the base of the motor.
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.159 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #041 \\The motor and X
pump are in an extremely difficult position for setting and alignment.
3060 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #037 \\The valve off X
the pump head is facing the wrong direction for operation due to a poor piping arrangement at the north and of the pump.
3061 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #037 \\ Hanger X
- CV7516 HF-5001 of f of the pump drain is a stupid design and causes access obstruction.
3062 MEAB I / E1.10'/ r.oom #035 \\The service X
station is in th9 wrong location and blocks instrument #CICV-TSH-00235.
3063 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #035 \\The X
instrument vent tubing valve in the f ar upper right hand corner of the room is inaccessible.
3064 MEAB I / El.19' / Room #079C \\ Solenoid X
valve #V-15169 in the back of the room is in the wrong location for maintenance.
The valve should be relocated to the front lef t wall.
"01/28/87.
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SUMMARY
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ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lWIILBEUNDERTAKf.N B065 MEAB I / El.19' / Room #079C \\The upstream X
double drain valves to control valve I
- CICV-HCV-0218 are inaccessible.
3066 HEAB I / El. 19' / Room #079C \\A valve X
extension brace attaches to the wrong wall i
for room accessibility.
3067 HEAB I / El.19' / Room #079C \\The service X
station is poorly located in the back of the room, and a blow down valve is j ammed against the. wall.
3068 MEAB I / E1. 19' / Room #079A \\An X
instrument transmitter sad a solenoid valve located in the back of the room are inaccessible.
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69 MEAB I / El.19' / Room #079A \\4' orifice X
flanges are inaccessible.
l 3070 MEAR I / E1. 10' / Room #031 \\The service X
station in the far right-hand corner of the room is totally inaccessible.
3071 NEAB I / El.10' / Room #031 \\The X
transducer and solenoid valve to control valve #CV-0381A are inaccessible.
3072 NEAB I / El.10' / Room #031 \\The anglo X
valve at the primary instrument point off control valve #HCV-0387 is inacesssible.
The angle valve is on the floor next to the floor drain, off a 4' line.
60 C C000 Locations of air operated control valves which could endanger personal safety.
l C001 RCB I / E1. -11'/ Room #007 \\1 air operated X
control valve with exposed lugs.
102 MEAB I / El.10' / Room #058B \\1 air X
operated control valve with exposed lugs.
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9' SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN VALKDOWN SUMKARY q
ENGINEERING DISPOSITION 1
ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN C003 MEAB I / El.10' / Room #059 \\9 air X
operated control valves with exposed lugs.
'C004 MEAB I / E1.10' ~/ Room #061 \\18 air X
operated control valves with exposed lugs.
C005 MEAR I / E1.10' / Room #071 \\9 air X
operated control valves with exposed lugs.
C006 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #053B \\1 air X
operated control valve with exposed lugs.
- D D000 I4 cations of mono-rail installations with interferences in paths of travel.
%001 RCB I / E1.
-2' / Ring Duct Plenum Chamber X
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\\The mono-rail crane is too low to have clearance over the fan.
D002 RCE I / Room #109 / RHR Pump #1A \\There is X
a mono-rail to disassemble the motor but no mono-rail to remove the motor through the access hatch.
D003 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #058A \\ Hanger X
- WL1032 H 5001 blocks the mono-rail access in this very hot room.
- D004 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #059 \\An electrical X
conduit support blocks mono-rail access.
D005 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #059A \\ Piping X
blocks mono-rail access for pump removal.
D006 NEAB I / E1.10' / Room #041 \\ Mono-rail is X
off center of equipment and access is blocked by supports.
oc 3 E000 Loestions of drainage problems in Unit I.
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.001 RCB I / El.
-2' / Ring Duct Plenum Chamber X
\\ Drainage for ring duct plenum AC coil is 1
inadequate. The ability to monitor drain stoppage is required.
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U1/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SATETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN
SUMMARY
ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTAELE lWIILBEUNDERTAKEN E002 NEAB I / E1.10' / Room #053C \\The room X
threshold is higher than the pump motors.
If the floor drain plugs up, the pumps and motor will be under water and will abort out.
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F000 Locations of poorly supported or improperly supported items.
F001 MEAS I / E1.10' / Room #053A \\ Air X
operators drV4306 and frV4306A are supported only with baling wire.
T002 NEAB I / E1.10' / Room #059A \\There are X
inadequate supports on the piping, filter, and pump in this room.
(temporary hangers
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only)
T003 MIA3 I / E1.10' / Room f 061 \\Three air
.X operated valves are supported only with rope and are vulnerable to damage.
F004 MIAB I / E1.10' / Room #070 \\The drain line X
and valve need support.
F005 MEAB I/ E1.10' / Room #71 \\1 1/2" line to X
breathing air station No. 45 is unsupported and needs support.
F006 MIAB I / E1.10' / Room #071 \\Two air X
operated valves are supported only by rope and are vulnerable to damage.
F007 MEA 3 I / El.10' / Room #044 \\The X
I temperature indicator and valve off the HVAC chiller are temporarily supported with 2
wire.
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co o GOOD Locations of 2" pipe nozzle connections to I
tanks which require reinforcement.
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.01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT SAFETEAM CONCERN WA!I.DOWN
SUMMARY
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ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEH INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION-NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN
'G001 HZAB I / El. 10' / Room #057 \\A 2' line X
into the bottom of waste hold tank #1A requires reinforcement at point of entry into tank.
(PPM #0645-16)
G002 NEAB I / E1. 10' / Room #059 \\A 2' pipe X
nozzle into the bottom of the check tank requires reinforcement at point of entry into tank.
G003 NEAB I / El. 10' / Room #0595 \\A 2* piping X
nozzle connection into the bane of the tank requires reinforcement at the point of entry into tank.
C004 HEAB I / E1. 10' / Room #061 \\A 2' pipe X
nozzle into the bottom of the tank requires reinforcement at point of entry into tank.
C005 NEAB I / E1.10' / Room #071 \\A 2" pipe X
nozzle into the. base of the tank has partial reinforcement. The nozzle requires additional reinforcement.
co H N000 RCB I/31 19'/ Azimuth 30 dgs\\ Rigid har EVR F3245-S.?-1320-Kr5001 located near press release viv N1SI-PSV-3977/N12-1-PSV-3977 doesn't allow seismic action. Hgr, located 1
at top of safety inject accum tnk f2N121NRC101X, needs to have seismic motion capability H001 X
i co I 2000 Locations of cleanliness barrier (coating) violations.
2001 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #053C \\The pump X
l motor grounding violates the cleanliness barrier at the point where it is anchored to the floor.
Pcg3 Wo.
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.01/28/87 SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT o
SAFETEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN
SUMMARY
ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN l
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l 2002 MEAB I / El. 10 ' / Room 05BB \\Electricc1 X
conduit is fastened to the floor.
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2003 30L0B I / E1.10' / Room #0593 \\ Grounding X
conduit f astened to the floor inside the doorway violates the cleanliness barrier.
2005 MEAS I / El. 10' / Room #061 \\ Electrical X
conduit in fastened to the floor insido the doorway.
2005 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #070 \\ Grounding X
conduit is attached to the floor in this very hot area.-
2006 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #050 \\ Grounding X
conduit is fastened to the floor.
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107 MEAB I / E1. 10' / Room #049 \\ conduit is X
fastened to the floor in three locations.
2006 M2JG I / E1.10' / Room #041 \\ Conduit is X
f astened to the floor.
2009 MEAB I / El.10' / Room #037 \\ Grounding X
conduit is attached to the floor.
1010 MEAB I / E1.19' / Room #079A \\ conduit X
fastened to the floor violates the cleanliness barrier.
1011 NEAB I / El.19' / Roan #060 \\ Conduit to X
transducer #NICC-TY-4494 is f astened to the floor.
1012 HEAB I / E1. 10' / Outside Room 9031 X
\\ Grounding conduit to MAB ventilation monitor #1/fN1RA-RT-8014 is attached to the floor.
2013 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #053B \\ Grounding X
conduit attached to floor violates j
cleanliness barrier.
l l
J14 MEAB I / E1.10' / Room #026 \\ Grounding X
conduit to tank is attached to the floor and violates the cleanliness barrier.
j
( ;' Fago N3.
13' 01/28/87 i
SOUTH. TEXAS NUC12AR PROJECT
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SATETEAM CONCERN VALKDOWN SUMMART ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITZM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SATETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE
.lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN
- J J000 The individual believes room #031 on elevation 10' in MEAB Unit I has no permanent lighting.
J001 The individual believes room #031 on X
elevation 10' in MEAB Unit I has no permanent lighting.
Cc K K000 The individual believes a rubber hose attached to control valve #CV-0381A will be affected by radiation. The hose is located in Room #031 on elevation 10' in HEAB Unit 1.
(
01 X
q j
f i
03 L l
L,000 The individual believea two runs of rigid l
conduit to junction box #NIXM1GKSP57 are l
routed too low.
Conduit is located in Room
- 080 on elevation 19' in MEAB I.
1 L001 X
)
I cc H N000 Locations of remote valve extensions in cuntact with other items.
H001 NEAB I / E1.10' / Room #049 \\The extension X
on the valve operator on valve i
- 1-CD-0092/TCV-0381B hits against hanger i
- CV-1011-RH05.
I H002 NEAB I/ El. 19' / Room #079A \\The extension X
i on valve #1/CV-0254A hits against conduit
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1
- AIXM1GRU025.
Page Ms.
14
'01/16/87 SOUTN TEXAS NUC12AR PROJECT
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SATITEAM CONCERN WALKDOWN SUMMART i
...........a.
I ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION NUMB SATETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN
- N N000 The individual believes the primary valves for the instruments on the section of loop between the steam generators and the Reactor Coolant Pumps should have a double valve configuration in lieu of the installed single valve configuration.
N001 X
C0 O C000 The individual believes there is no oil reservoir drain valve for draining the system when working on the oil transfer pump in room #041 on elevation 10' of HEAB 1.
(
10 1
- P 2000 The individual believes a removable spool is required in lieu of the installed permanent spool in room #035 on elevation 10' in MEAB 1.
The installed permanent spool blocks mono-rail access to the tube bundle shell and piping.
P001 X
ch q Q000 The individual believes the gearing mechanism of a remote valve extension is excessive.
The valve is located in room
- 079C on elevation 19' in MEAB Unit I.
Q001 X
C6 R R000 The individual believes lines coming off an I
LVPS Seal Water Panel will contain radioactive water and require additional protection. Panel #9R3012LP 710/N1WLZLP 710 is located outside room #052 on elevation 10' in HEAR Unit I.
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1 -
4 1
F:go N3.
15 d 6
j
- 01/28'/87 j
i f*
SOUTH TEXAS NUCLEAR PROJECT l
^
l 1
SAYETEAM CONCERN VALKDOVN
SUMMARY
l 1
I l
ENGINEERING DISPOSITION ITEM INSTALLATION CORRECTIVE ACTION 1
NUMB SAFETEAM ITEM UNDER CONSIDERATION ACCEPTABLE lVIILBEUNDERTAKEN f
i R001 X
1
- s 3000 Locations of items which obstruct walkways i
and constitute trip hazards.
5001 NEAR I / E1.10' / Room #053C \\ Drainpipes I
constitute a trip hazard.
S002 NEA3 I / 31. 10' / Room #057 \\ Instrument X
line obstructs walkway.
5003 MEA 3 I / E1.10' / Room #072 \\3/4" I
stainless steel tubing to liquid waste processing system #N1RAPCC8038 constitutes a trip hazard and is vulnerable to bre akage.
(
.004 HEA3 I / E1. 10' / Room #049 \\The sway X
strut to valve #1CV-NCV0133 on the 4" line obstructs the passageway.
3005 MEAS I / El.10' / Outside Room #031 X
\\ Grounding conduit to MAB ventilation monitor #1/N1RA-RT-8014 constitutes a trip hazard.
60 T T000 Locatione of poorly routed flexible electrical conduit which are subject to d amage.
7001 RCB I / E1.19' / Asimuth 30 degrees X
\\ Flexible electrical conduit from Rosemount flow transmitter (Cl-CC-FT-4570 is poorly routed and subject to damage. Conduit is located next to safety injection accumulator tank #2N121NRC101C.
7002 HEAB I / El.10' / Room #041 \\ Electrical X
flexible conduits block access to valves located on back side or motor. Conduits are subject to damage.
______.________a
.I Stello
[
e 4
Roe
/
The Light
- L Company Houston Lighting se Power Houston, Texas 7700f*h 228 9211 P.O. Box 1700
(
Murray i
QD02482 January 28, 1987 Mr Robert D Martin Regional Director, Region IV Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 Re:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Allegations Received By SAFETEAM
Dear Mr Martin:
As you are aware, HL&P is maintaining a SAFETEAM program to receive, investigate, and undertake corrective action where warranted of matters brought to our attention through concerns voiced by employees working at the South Texas Nuclear Project
(
either past or present.
Last fall, the Bechtel Energy Corporation advised one of its field engineers that he was earmarked for layoff as part of an overall reduction in force program.
This employee sub-sequently brought a number of concerns to the attention of Bechtel management which he alleged were related to potential weaknesses associated with the design of the South Texas Nuclear Project in the areas of industrial safety, plant maintenance, and AIARA.
Upon that employee's official notification of layoff, the employee did exit with SAFETEAM, thereupon, he identified similar but not necessarily identical concerns with the SAFETEAM interviewer.
SAFETEAM in accordance with its normal practice undertook to investigate these concerns.
The alleger of these particular concerns has undertaken to make the concerns which he brought to the attention of SAFETEAM, public.
This came about when the alleger provided a rather wide distribution of his particular allegations to various members in the public sector as well as a number of officials within the government.
In view of the fact that the alleger has undertaken to reveal his identity, which is routinely safeguarded by SAFETEAM, I have attached herewith a copy of our 3@-
FoI A-67-Wi p
[0WO Yof WB F3
i.
~...,
7
' Houuon Lighting & Power Company h Mr R D' Martin:
January 28, 1987 response to the alleger to enable the NRC to perform whatever follow-up review it deems appropriate.
I have also taken the liberty to provide copies of this response to the various members within the public' sector who had received copies of the allegations which were supplied by the alleger.
As a matter of record, SAFETEAM does not concern itself
.'with'the motives that inspire in'ividuals to call to the d
' attention of SAFETEAM their particular concerns.
Whether or
. not the individual.is concerned about real problems or whether, owing to a lack of information, perhaps they are concerned about problems that are not necessarily real, makes no particular difference to SAFETEAM. 'As a matter of fact, certain persons who might elect to use SAFETEAM for some selfish and potentially unworthy purpose in no way influence the manner in which SAFETEAM will undertake to thoroughly investigate and subsequently address the issues.
We have information in this particular case that suggests that these particular allegations may well have been raised as part of a strategy to protect the.
individual's continued employment.
The details of our investigations of these particular
{
concerns are on file in SAFETEAM and are available for the NRC's, inspection and consideration.
ry truly yours, J H Goldberg j
Group Vice-P esident, Nuclear j
JHG/aks Enclosure J
b
n...
Houston Lighting & Power Company
-3 Mr R D Martin January 2 8, 1987 cc:
Edward J. Baier, Director Directorate of Technical Support United States Department of Labor Lloyd Bentsen, Texas Senator United States Senate Waldon A. Boecker, Manager Power Plant Engineering Public Utility Commission pf Texas Billie P. Garde, Director Government Accountability Project i
Geoffrey Gay, Attorney office of Public Utility Counsel - State of Texas John Harris, Reporter Austin American Statesman Edward J. Markey, Chairman Subcommittee on Energy Conservation & Power
(
United States House of Representatives Peggy Rosson, Chairman Public Utility commission of Texas Mark Sanders, Reporter The Houston Post Victor Stello, Executive Director for Operations Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jeff Wolff, Attorney
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Fulbright - Jaworski Lando Zech, chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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