ML20235F607
| ML20235F607 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/21/1987 |
| From: | Merschoff E Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Nolan H HADCO & ASSOCIATES, INC. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235F555 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99901063 NUDOCS 8707130463 | |
| Download: ML20235F607 (3) | |
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- April 21, 1987 Docket ho. 99901063/86-01 Hadco & Associates Incorporated ATTN: Mr. Harold L. Nolan President 1914 Elmhurst Drive Arlington, Texas 76012
Dear Mr. Nolan:
SUBJECT:
ALLEGATION NO. RIV-86-A-060 We are in receipt of your letter dated December 4,1986 on the above subject and have the following comments:
With regard to your statement, " Thirty (30) to fifty (50) feet of documents exist that proves [ sic] the manufacturer fraudently represented, and sold his product for use on U.S. Military Projects and o?her dangerous installations...,"
we recomend that you provide this infonnation to t.he Fraud-Waste Abuse Hotline of the Department of Defense.
The text of your letter contains the following statements:
" Evidence further proves the material cannot be successfully welded for any extended lifetime duration."
"...I saw, with both eyes, the defective E-Brite piping during the June 10, 1986 ABC evening news."
- Ycu hcve a highly defective ferritic stainless steel metal called E-Brite 26-1
- tich wcs developed for use in nuclear reactor shielding, condensers, condenser r1 ping, and condenser tubing which has failed due to an unstable ductile to brittle temperature which metallurgical [ sic] test, in your and my posession
[ sic], incicates to be from below 0*F to in excess of 400'F."
The following discussion is presented to aodress these statements and clarify the material characteristics of the alloy design 6ted as E-Brite 26-1 also identified as ASTM XM-27. E-Brite 26-1 is a member of the ferritic family of stainless steels, which are generally less weldable and more notch sensitive than austenitic stainless steels. This is usually due to grain coarsening.
E-Brite has superior ductility and impact strength as compared to the conventional ferritic types due to.the ultra-low carbon ano nitrogen contents.
l For many years, E-Brite 26-1 has been used in various applications within 1
8707130463 870707 PDR GA999 ENVBOC 999001063 P1)R l
y ch2mical process plants, oil. refineries and food processing plants. The alluy jj was produced to give protection against general, pitting, cr2Vice, intergranular and stress corrosion.
Due to problems welding E-Brite 2 in the early stages of its development.
considerable research was undertaken.
It has been recognized and documented that it is essential to prevent any carbon, nitrogen, or oxygen contamination during welding in order to produce sound welds.
If this high level of l
i cleanliness is maintained and welds are produced insnediately following
. cle6ning, successful welds have been made without sacrificing any base
'. metal ductility in the heat-effected zone of the weld. Welding techniques to minimize contamination include using a stringer bead as opposed to the weaving technique. Preheating at 300-450'F to eliminate cracking is also recommended.
With ferritic stainless steels, welding heat has an effect on ductility and grain size. Variations within standard chemical composition limits can lead to the fonnation of austenite during heating at elevated temperatures.
Subsequently, during cool down the austenite transforms to martensite siving a duplex microstructure of ferrite and residual amounts of martensite.
Obviously, martensite reduces both the ductility and toughness of the steel.
hen the steel is heated near or above the This situation occurs only w(approximately 1600'F) during welding.
transformation temperature Notches an(,
points of stress concentration must be avoided whenever possible due to the notch sensitivity of the material.
If an E-Brite 26-1 weld were made at a nuclear power plant in a safety-related application, it would have been welded 1
with approved procedures meeting the requirements of Section III and Section IX,
Welding and Brazing Qualifications" of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
These procedures are designed to avoid the welding and notch sensitivity croblems of ferritic stainless steels including E-Brite 26-1.
The ductile to brittle transition temperature (DBTT) of E-Brite 26-1 depends on several factors including section thickness, cooling rate, and microstructure.
Depending on the characteristics of tubing, the DBTT could be in the range of 0*F to -60*F.
The elloy does not have a physical characteristic which would permit a visual examination to differentiate it from any other ferritic stainless steel.
Generally, it would be difficult to identify any type alloy in a nuclear plant 1
ty visuel inspection since the majority of components (e.g., piping, tanks, and cundenser tubes) are either hidden from view or coated (e.g., insulation, point,corrosionproduct).
Conventional methods of alloy identification are by chemicel analysis, mechanical properties, and microstructural analysis 4
(greaterthan200x).
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Finally, the second paragraph states, " Overwhelming evidence... indicates the manufacturer provided false test data to obtain code approvals." The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is interested in any specific information you have supporting this statement. Accordingly, please provide copies of all i
documentation in your possession and identify the specific areas that show Airco Vacuum Metals, (currently the BOC Group and the developer and initial patent holder for the alloy calledsf-Brite 26-1) falsified test data pertaining to the issuance of ASME Code Cases 1490-1 and 1505.
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1.2sant' specific information supporting your allegation that false test data 9as provided to obtain ASME Code approval of this material, we have no basis to tddress the issue. Once again, we urge you to submit the overwhelming evidence" to which you refer. A copy of your December 4,1986 letter and this, letter will be provided to ASME for their information.
This information is provided to you in addition to the meeting we had with you in August 1986 and the letter we sent you dated November 3,1986.
i Sincerely, Ellis W. Herscho Acting Chief Yendor Inspection ranch I
Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc:
M. Green, ASME l
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II" Absen%' specific information supporting your allegation that false test data was provided to obtain ASME Code approval of this materiel, we have no basis to j
1 address the issue. Once again, we urge you to submit the " overwhelming evidence" to which you refer. A copy of your December 4,1986 letter and this letter will be provided to ASME for their information..
This information is provided to you in addition to the meeting we had with you in August 1986 end the letter we sent you dated hovember 3,1986.
Sincerely, Ellis W. Merscho Acting Chief Vendor Inspection ranch Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc:
M. Green, ASME O
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