ML20235C237
| ML20235C237 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1987 |
| From: | COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235C194 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.D.1, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8707090350 | |
| Download: ML20235C237 (28) | |
Text
)
)
)
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ZION STATION
)
DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SUPPLEMENT 2 -
SUMMARY
REPORT JUNE 1987 I
b 3
l I
l I)
,)
I l
l l
8707090350 070630 PDR ADOCK 0500 5
i
}
P
]
D COMMONWFALTH EDISON COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT OF THE DECEMBER 1986 ZION STATION 3
DETAILED COFTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT INTRODUCTION Commonwealth Edicon Company (CECO) submitted the Summary 9
Report for the Bion Station Units 1 and 2 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) to the Nuclear Regulatory I
Commission (NRC) in May 1986, as required by Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
That report was reviewed by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) personnel on contract to the NRC.
As a result of SAIC's review, the NRC requested that S
CECO supplement the Summary Report.
That supplement was transmitted to the NRC in December 1986.
Review of that supplement by SAIC is documented in their Technical Evaluation Report (TER) dated February 5, 1987.
The NRC agreed with the conclusion in this TER and included it in their Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated March 10, 1987.
3 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY'S RESPONSE The Zion Station SER conclusion states that " CECO has O:
satisfied the DCRDR requirements of Supplement i to NUREG-0737 except for the selection and scheduling of design improvements, and verification that improvements, correct the HEDs, on the thirteen items listed in the attached TER",
CECO's response to these areas of concern are included in the section of this report entitled " Commonwealth Edison 3
Company's Reponse To The Zion Station Technical Evaluation Report Appendix A".
The responses are arranged in the same sequence as the concerns were presented in the appendix.
e O
p.
i
)'.
i
)'
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY'S RESPONSE TO THE ZION STATION TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT APPENDIX A
).-
)
)
y
) '-
)
.O ZION STATION O
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED # 363 403 APPENDIX Al HED CATEGORY 1A O
FSR PAGE 14 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL 5-5 FINDING:
O During the Validation, it was observed that the Component Cooling Systems, an Engineered Safety Feature System, do not have an indicant of system pressure.
Subject Matter Experts commented that the lack of this indication can contribute to operational problems particularly in a transient condition involving auxiliary building
()
contamination and component cooling restarts following pump trips.
RESPONSE
O A Component Cooling System pressure indicator with a range q
of 0-200 PSIG will be added to CB06.
i l
NRC/SAIC COMMENT:
O Proposed implementation dates are such that further Justification for implementation is required.
CECO CLARIFICATION DECEMBER 1986:
O During the Validation, it was observed that the Component Cooling Systems, an Engineered Safety Feature System, does not have an indication of system pressure.
Sub]ect Matter Experts commented that the lack of this indication can contribute to operational problems, particularly in a transient condition involving auxiliary building
>O contamination and component cooling restarts following pump trips.
However, there are six annunciators that deal only with Component Cooling (CC) Pumps, one of which identifies Low CC Pump Discharge Pressure.
A Component Cooling System pressure indicator with a range O
of 0-200 PSIG will be added to CBO8.
However, because of the identified indications, it is not detrimental if this Al-1 0
O O.
improvement is not completed until the Second Refueling Outage.
NOTE:
()
This item. remains open pending the assimilation of additional information.
This information will be forwarded per our discussion with the NRC on 12/11/86.
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
O The Justification for the delay to the Second Refueling Outage is inadequate and does not respond to the concern about availability of ESF instrumentation raised at the December meeting.
The licensee should Justify its assertion that the lack of this instrumentation in the
{}
control room will not affect the safe operation of the plant.
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
O The Component Cooling (CC) System is a constant volume, closed loop syatem.
In addition to providing cooling water to contaminated components, its purpose is to assure that the lake water which cools it does not become contaminated.
In order to do that a small head tank, located some distance above the CC pumps, maintains the desired suction O-pressure (due to the water column between the pumps and the tank).
The water level in this small tank is not only a very sensative system for the detection of In or Out leaks, but also maintains a constant system suction pressure.
Redundant level indication and a low level annunciator are on the control boards.
Normally, one CC pump is operating C) on each of the two Zion units.
The standby pump will auto start on low discharge header pressure.
The annunciator
" COMPONENT COOLING PUMP AUTO START" alerts the operator that conditions required a different pump to start.
The control room annunciator " COMPONENT COOLING PUMPS DISCH.
PRESS. LOW" alarms on low pressure to alert the control A3 room operator.
The control room annunciator " COMPONENT COOLING PUMPS.
. TRIP" alerts the operator if a pump trips.
A fifth CC pump is available to be started by the control room operator.
There is an annunciator " COMPONENT COOLING PUMPS.
.NOT AVAILABLE" which reminds the operator that pumps are out of service.
The two units have O
been and are anticipated to be operated with their CC systems cross-tied which helps ensure proper CC system pressures and flows.
Al-2 O-
)
)
Knowing the specific value of the CC pump discharge pressure is not critical for operator decisions / actions nor for the safe operation of the plant.
If alarms indicate problems, personnel are dispatched to investigate and fix the problem.
All action is based on presently available and adequate information.
)
IMPLEMENTATION 2nd Refueling Outage
)
D J
e D
e e
Al-3 9
9 ZION STATION
)
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED # 285 186 188 151 367 APPENDIX Al HED CATEGORY 1A
)
FSR PAGE 22 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL 5-6 FINDING:
)
It was reported in the Operator Survey that a status panel of radiation monitoring meters is needed in the primary operating area.
Presently, these monitors are located on the back panels.
Specifically, the four radiation monitoring recorders (on CB73) would be more appropriately placed in the main operating area.
In addition, the 3
numerals on the point displays for four of the recorders have rubbed off so that the point being monitorerd cannot be determined.
(Photo Log No. C-5 thru 8, G-15, H-16, 17)
RESPONSE
A Ramtek computer will be added to the primary operating area to display all critical radiation monitoring parameters.
Due to the time required for the coordination, design, and procurement of equipment for this modification, it will be completed by the Third Refueling Outage.
]
NRC/SAIC COMMENT:
Proposed implementation dates are such that further Justification for implementation is required.
CECO CLARIFICATION DECEMBER 1986:
It was reported in the Operator Survey that a status panel of radiation monitoring meters is needed in the primary J
operating area.
Presently, these monitors are located on the back panels.
Specifically, the four radiation monitoring recorders (on CB73) would be more appropriately placed in the main operating area.
In addition, the numerals on the point displays for four of the recorders have rubbed off so that the point being monitored cannot be O
determined.
Al-4 0
3 I
D A Ramtek computer will'be added to the primary operating area to display all critical radiation monitoring l
parameters.
Because of the time required for the j
coordination, design and procurement of equipment for this modification, it will be completed by the Third Refueling Outage.
The present situation is not optimum, but has 1
f 9
worked adequately for several years; therefore, the time needed to design and install a new system will not affect safe operations.
Annunciators are available to alert the operator that the
" ARMS ARE HI," which prompts the operator to subsequently D
review the back panel.
This task is not time-critical.
The electrical differences in the instrumentation will require more substantial and complex software programming requiring great design detail.
This, in turn, will have a substantial effect on lead time.
O NOTE:
This item remains open pending the assimilation of additional information.
This information will be forwarded per our discussion with the NRC on 12/11/86.
O NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
A scope of work is required within six months to justify the delay of the implementation date to the Third Refueling O
Outage for the implementation of a computerized Rad monitoring display system.
Additionally, the numerals on the four (4) point display recorders on the back panel that have rubbed off should be replaced in the near future.
C)
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
The existing radiation monitoring system is being computerized so that the items of concern may also be monitored on a CRT in the control room area in front of the control boards.
This CRT display system will involve some O
display, alarm, data storage, and reset functions for about 69 monitors on unit 1 and 37 monitors on unit 2.
This will require a relay panel, multiplexer, microprocessor, and hard disc storage to be installed, also.
Some infrequently required testing functions will still be required to be performed at the presnt back-of-the-board location.
These O
duties will be accomplished by pesonnel other than the unit operators.
It will take about one year to get the final design, obtain the software, and purchase the hardware.
Al-5 O
r O
O This will be a major modification to an old system which will require a significant design engineering effort.
Moreover, it must be installed over an outage and thus, the earliest that this radiation monitor display system could be coordinated and installed would be the Second Refueling Outage rather than the previously indicated Third Refueling C)
Outage.
Every effort will be made to make that date.
Additionally, the recorders with the rubbed off numerals on the point displays are scheduled to be replaced in 1987 for Unit 1 and in 1988 for Unit 2.
'O IMPLEMENTATIOli 12/31/87; 12/31/88; and 2nd Refueling Outge as indicated.
O O
l O
O
'O l
-O Al-G O
3 I
' ZION STATION.
3-REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED # 0124 APPENDIX Al'
%).
HED CATEGORY 2C 1
FSR PAGE 108 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL 5-7 d)-
' FINDING:
There are several annunciators which address more than one specific condition on a single tile.
O
RESPONSE
Printout capability will be provided for all time-critical multi-input alarms.
O NRC/SAIC COMMENT:
Proposed implementation dates are such that further Justification for implementation is required.
l C
CECO CLARIFICATION DECEMBER 1986:
There are several annunciators which address more than one specific condition on a single tile.
Printout capability will be provided for all time-critical
{}
.mult-input alarms.
The design complexity of separating the specific conditions and making the computer printout capability is monumental.
Although not optimum, it has been adequate to use backup information from meters, charts, computer, and local inspections to identify the specific problem related to a multi point input F
O annunciator.
This should continue to be adequate until the Second Refueling Outage when the work will be complete.
i NOTE:
F This item remains open pending the assimilation of to additional information.
This information will be forwarded per our discussion with the NRC on 12/11/86.
Al-7
.O
_T)
HRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
The licensee is required to provide information explaining the " time-criticality" of multi-input alarms and the number of alarms associated with this HED.
D CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
A review of all alarm tiles was accomplished to identify those that are time critical, i.e.,
those requiring immediate operator action / intervention to mediate the O
alarming condition.
The color of those alarms was changed from White to Red to highlight their importance to the operator.
These time critical alarms were subsequently reviewed, in response to the NRC's concerns expressed in the SER/TER, to identify those that had multiple inputs.
Of those alarms, all but one had secondary ind1c'tlon a
D available in the control room of the various inputs' actual status,
- e. g., level or pressure indication on the main control boards.
The one exception was the alarm for the Radiation Monitors which are currently located on a back panel.
However, in response to HEDs 285, 186, 188, 151, and 367 (see previous clarification in this submittal)
O the station has committed to the installation of a Radiation Monitoring CRT in the main control room area.
Once that CRT is in place, the operator will have direct access to Radiation Monitor levels and will be able to determine which monitor caused the alarm on this multi-input tile.
We therefore consider this HED to be
(?
satisfactorily resolved and no further action is warranted.
IMPLEMENTATION Complete 3
0 lO Al-8 O
S ZION STATION g
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED # 0054 APPENDIX Al HED CATEGORY 2C 3
FSR PAGE 283 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL 5-8 o
FINDING:
O Annunciator printouts and tiles do not contain the same wording.
RESPONSE
3 The cited annunciator printouts and tiles w111 be relabeled to contain the same wording.
.NRC/SAIC COMMENT:
D Proposed implementation dates are such that further 1
Justification for implementation is required.
CECO CLARIFICATION DECEMBER 1986:
3 The computer printouts and annunciator tiles will De composed to strive for the same wording.
It is anticipated that the existing annunciators will remain the same, for the most part, with any new annunciators conforming to the standards.
The annunciator wording, subject to limited field space and a compromise between using the abbreviation 3
standard and the existing annunciator wording.
This is a non-time critical problem which will take uniti the Second Refueling Outage to optimize.
NOTE:
O This item remains open pending the assimilation of additional information.
This information will be forwarded per our discussion with the NRC on 12/11/86.
O Al-9 O
O
{}
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
The licensee is required to provide Justificaiton for the delay of the implementation schedule (Second Refueling Outage) for this HED corrective action.
The NRC feels this HED should be corrected by the end of the First Refueling C
Outage.
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
In the interim since the conduct of the DCRDR, the control C) room computer alarm system has been reevaluated and modified.
At the time of the DCRDR every annunciator tile alarm also had a computer point alarm and the HED was correct in that tile legends and computer printout legends for the same alarm did not always match.
That arrangement was determined to be a nuisance for the operator not only O
because of the potential confusion that could arise from the different legends, but because the operator had to in-essence acknowledge two alarms when any one came up; one at the panel and one at the computer console.
To enhance operations the computer system was modified to remove alarms that also alarmed on the main control panel O
annunciator system.
This HED has therefore been addressed and no further action is warranted.
IMPLEMENTATION Complete O
i O
l l
O i
lO Al-10 0
O ZION STATION C)
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED # O290 APPENDIX Al HED CATEGORY 1B C)
FSR PAGE 202 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL 5-41 FINDING:
O Operators reported that the top row of Accumulator meters on CB10 are difficult to read.
The combination of meter location, normal pointer position, shape of meter and glare contribute to the difficulty in reading these meters.
(Photo Log No. J-8)
O
RESPONSE
The Control Room lighting will be modified to minimize the glare.
Alternatives to be considered include configuration of louvers, different size louvers, modifying light O
configuration, or changing wattage of light bulbs.
The location of the meter is adequate for reada!.ility if the glare is eliminated.
NRC/SAIC COMMENT:
O The licensee should describe which of the options presented will be used to correct this HED.
This category 1B HED should be addressed during the First Refueling Outage.
C)
CECO CLARIFICATION DECEMBER 1986:
The complexity of solving lighting problems is such that there are no straightforward solutions.
In addition, the retrofits may require facility alterations, and consideration must be given to acoustical and ventilation C) concerns.
The response given the NRC commits to resolving the issue by completion of the Second Refueling Outge, but it will require analysis and examination to determine the most viable options.
P A1-11 O
O:
();
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
The licensee.should describe the option to'be implemented (louver reconfiguration, different-size. louvers, light configuration modification, or changing light bulb wattage).
and the implementation date.
O CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
i A preliminary evaluation of the lighting and glare problems has been done by an architect engineer.
The light. levels
() -
are basically adequate, but.may require some small l
additions in local areas.
For glare reduction, the j
existing ceiling louvers-will be replaced.
The support 1
structures for those louvers may have~to be upgraded, though presentlyfit appears this effort will be small.
To reduce glare and improve contrast ratios, it is anticipated C) that some counter tops or desk tops will have to be replaced.
To reduce glare, plexiglass covers on CRT's near the ceiling will have to be replaced.
To reduce glare, some control board curved-surface meters may require little hoods.
It is anticipated that the schedule would require about 11-months to solidify the design and prepare for-1
()
installation, as well as to get_the materials delivered.
This project is scheduled for the Second Refueling Outage.
IMPLEMENTATION 2nd Refueling Outage O-0 O
,0 -
Al-12 N
i
)
i 1
i ZION STATION
)
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO
]
IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
i HED # 0406 I
APPENDIX Al HED CATEGORY 2B
)
FSR PAGE 210 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL 5-42 i
FINDING:
)
On OCBO4, the Instrument Air Compressor White indicator f
lights deenergize when the Compressor auto starts.
Equipment status should be indicated by illuminated indicators.
)
RESPONSE
Two Instrument Air Compressors are normally on to maintain pressure.
The White indicator light indicates Standby Compressor.
Operator training is in progress to emphasize this fact.
)
HRC/SAIC COMMENT:
This HED appears to be contrary to Control Room Color Coding where White indicates activiation.
)
CECO CLARIFICATION DECEMBER 1986:
On OCBO4, the Instrument Air Compressor White indicator lights de-energize when the Compressor auto starts.
)
Equipment status should be indicated by illuminated indicators.
Two Instrument Air Compressors are normally on to maintain pressure.
The White indicator light indicates Standby Compressor.
A label will be provided to clarify the
)
meaning of the indicator by the completion of the First Refueling Outage.
NOTE:
This item remains open pending the assimilation of
)
additional information.
This information will be forwarded per our discussion with the NRC on 12/11/86.
Al-13
)
O
()
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
The label proposed.by the licensee is an inadequate solution.
Additional clarification is needed.
C)
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
As indicated in the original respones, the white energized light associated with the Instrument Air Compressors indicates the particular compressor is in " standby", ready to auto start should the need arise.
When it does start, O
the " standby" light deenergizes and the "run" light energizes.
In addition to these two lights each compressor has a " trip" and a "stop" light associated with it.
The indicators function as they should and no modification is anticipated.
However, the color white being used to indicate a " standby" status is inconsistent with the
.()
station's accepted color usage standard.
The color usage standard delimits the color Blue for denoting " standby" status as well as an active Permissive.
The Instrument Air Compressor standby lights' lens caps will therefore be changed to blue by the end of this year, 12/31/87.
l 1
O IMPLEMENTATION 12/31/1987 i
O O
O
)
)
l o
}
)
A1-14 53
]
O ZION STATION C)
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
j HED # 0307 APPENDIX Al HED CATEGORY 3B
()
FSR PAGE 241 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL 5-57 l
FINDING:
0 Fuse ratings are not indicated on equipment.
Delays have occurred when too small a fuse was installed and multiple fuse failures have occurred.
RESPONSE
O Each replacement fuse is appropriatley labeled.
Only like-for-like replacements are made for fuses.
l NRC/SAIC COMMENT:
O While each replacement fuse is appropriately labeled, the licensee should address the need to label the equipment in order to prevent the delays that have occurred.
CECO CLARIFICATION DECEMBER 1986:
O Each replacement fuse is appropriately labeled.
Operating practice dictates that only like-for-like replacements are made for fuses.
At present, fuse size is indicated on electrical prints.
A labeling program is in progress to replace fuse size labels on equipment in the Aux Electric Equipment Room and Control Room.
NOTE:
This item remains open pending the assimilation of additional information.
This information will be forwarded I) per our discussion with the NRC on 12/11/86.
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
Additional information is required to ensure that burnt-out U,
fuses are replaced correctly.
Al-15 O
(3 -
3 i
{}
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
An architect engineer has been hired to identify fuse
{
information so that fuse labels can be provided for the operators use in the control room and aux electric equipment room.
The architect engineer's anticipated level
-()
of effort will involve:
1) identifying and documenting the physical location of the fuses, 2) identifying what each fuse is for, O
3) identifying the drawings of the various fuse
- systems, 4) resolving any differences between the drawings and the fuses or fuse labels presently installed,
)
C) l 5) establishing fuse information where it is incomplete, 6)
Justifying the information that is complete, O
7) providing a list of alternate acceptable fuses, 8) providing drawing changes to incorporate the updated fuse information, and 9) providing suggested labels or a labeling system to
()
be used.
It is anticipated that the label will consist of an alpha-f numeric ID which will be clarified in a station procedure listing all the ID's with appropriate information for each fuse.
A Second Refueling Outage commitment is necessary to
()
ensure adequate time for the project's coordination and review.
IMPLEMENTATION 2nd Refueling Outage O
Al-16 0
),
ZION STATION
)'
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO
'IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED # 133 322 391 134 APPENDIX A2
)
HED CATEGORY 2C FSR PAGE 101 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL 5-52 FINDING:
).
Some annunciator tiles may be better placed on different annunciator panels or in a different location within the same panel in order to group them better functionally.
f
);
RESPONSE
All cited annunciator tiles are located close to the functional control and display groupings.
Redundant cues (visual and auditory) are present to alert the operator to an alarming condition.
)
NRC/SAIC COMMENT:
The review team needs to know which annunciator tiles are referred to in this HED and how close they are to the
)
related control and displays.
CECO CLARIFICATION DECEMBER 1986:
HED Index #s 133, 322, and 391 cite 65 unique annunciator
)
tiles that are not located directly above related controls and/or displays.
A subsequent and independent review of these alarms by an HFS and SME identified three tiles that, for reasons of safety significance and/or time criticality, should be relocated.
These tiles are:
1) the " SYSTEM
).
FREQUENCY LOW" alarm on the Unit 1 CB01 panel which should be in Window Box #22; 2) the " EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER TEMPERATURE HIGH" alarm on the CB10 panel which should be on the CBO7 panel in Window Box 5 or 6; and 3) the " LOW AUTO STOP OIL PRESS OR TURBINE STOP VLVS CLOSED" alarm on the CBO8 panel which should be in the #13 Window Box.
These three tiles will be relocated to the indicated
)
locations by the completion of the First Refueling Outage.
l A2-1
)
)
HED Index # 134 cites 72 unique annunciator tiles that are not optimally grouped within the box in which they are located.
These tiles were also subsequently and independently reviewed by an HFS and SME.
All 72 tiles were determined to be above related controls and displays.
Because these tiles are in the Window Boxes they would be
)
in, no further action is warranted.
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
Two of the three annunciators identified as " time-critical" O
will be relocated by the end of the First Refueling Outage.
The licensee should provide additional Justification for not relocating the third annunciator.
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
]
The tiles identified in these HEDs were independently reviewed by a HFS and station SME prior to the December 11, 1986 meeting in Bethesda with the NRC.
That review identified three tiles that needed to be relocated closer to their respective controls / displays.
The " SYSTEM 3
FREQUENCY LOW" alarm on Unit 1 Window Box #15 on the ICB01 panel will be relocated to Window Box #22 on the OCB03 panel.
The " LOW AUTO STOP OIL PRESS OR TURBINE STOP VLVs CLOSED" alarm on each Unit's Window Box #4 on the CBO8 panel will be relocated to Window Box #13 on the CB03 panel.
These were the two out of three " time-critical" D
alarms to be moved mentioned in the December 26th submittal letter.
The third alarm criginally identified as requiring relocation was the " EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER TEMPERATURE HIGH" alarm on each Unit's Window Box #1 on the CB10 panel.
Subsequent review determined that the space identified as available for the relocation on Unit 2 was 3
not available on Unit 1.
Hence, we informed the NRC via our December 26th submittal letter that inadequate room existed for this relocation.
However, in the interim our Engineering Department has identified an alternative location for the tile that was in the space we intended to relocate the " EXCESS LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER TEMPERATURE O
HIGH" alarm to.
Therefore, this alarm will be completed by the end of the First Refueling Outage.
IMPLEMENTATION ist Refueling Outage A2-2 O
)
ZION STAION
)
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED # 234 392 435 79 227 222 APPENDIX A2 HED CATEGORY 1B
)
FSR PAGE 146 150 147 148 149 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL N/A FIllDING:
)
The Key-Operated controls have keys inserted most of the f
time.
Key-Operated controls should only be used when the j
system requires that the control function should be secured j
against activation by unauthorized personnel.
(Photo Log i
No.
H-1, 2)
)
RESPONSE
Keylock switches in the Control Room will be removed contingent on previous NRC commitments.
)
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
The licensee should provide additional information Justifying the replacement (instead of removal) of keylock switches.
)
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
The Key-Operated controls will be replaced with non-key controls.
This work is scheduled to be completed by the
,)
end of the Second Refueling Outage since this is when other work on the same control board panele is to be completed.
IMPLEMENTATION 2nd Refueling Outage
)
A1-3
)
)
ZION STATION
)
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE HRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
l HED # 0042 l
APPENDIX A2 l
HED CATEGORY 2C
)
FSR PAGE 263 l
DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL N/A FINDING:
)
Abbreviations and contractions are used for the output text for the Alarm Printer and Process Computer.
Abbreviatione and contractions should be avoided.
RESPONSE
j A Standard Abbreviation List (including contractions) has been developed and vill be implemerited for the computer system.
f HRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
l The licensee is required to provide 37ctification for the delay of the implementation schedule (Second Refueling Outage) for this HED corrective action.
The NRC feels this HED should be corrected by the end of the First Refueling
)
Outage.
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
Abbreviations and contractions are used for the output text of the control room computer printouts.
Although abbreviations and contractions should be avoided, they are unavoidable since a complete description is needed and there is limited space for the description.
In the past a significant effort has been expended to make
)
the descriptions clear and consistent with annunciators and the previously accepted abbreviation practices.
The FSR standard abbreviation list (including contractions) has been developed and it, or a revision, vill be implemented for the control room computer system on all new changes.
As annunciators are added or changed and the I
A2-4
)
}
p related computer printouts are added or changed, this abbreviation standard will be used to help keep the computer printout consistent with the annunciator tile and the standard.
Thus, the-abbreviation standard has been developed and will y
be implemented on all new changes to control room computer system indications.
This will be completed by the end of the First Refueling Outage.
We will consider this document to be a "living" document in that occasional revisions will be made as appropriate.
These revisions will be administrative 1y controlled but not forwarded to the NRC.
D IMPLEMENTATION ist Refueling Outage D
D D
D e
S A2-5 O
b ZION STATION 1
).
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) GF THE DCRDR.
HED # 0043 APF"NDIX A2 HED CATEGORY 2C FSR PAGE 264 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL N/A FINDING:
).
'The computer system does not contain prompting and structuring feat des by which the operator can request additional information about the system itself such as a
" Help" function.
It does however, allow for the acquisition of additional information on the various parameters being monitored.
)
RESPONSE
A " Help" function will be added to each menu option function where one is currently lacking.
)
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
l L
The licensee needs to provide additional information to I
explain the modification to the previously accepted HED corrective action.
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
The control room computer does not contain prompting and
,)
structuring features by which the operator can request additional information about the system itself, such as a
" Help" function.
It does, however, allow for the acquisition of additional information of the various parameters being monitored.
)
A " Help" function can not be put on this computer because it does not have file server.
It can not dump ASCII files.
l Thus, it would require excessive memory for each new or different " Help" screen.
All these " Help" screens would require a tremendous amount of development time.
It would therefore be impractical to update the present system for a
" Help" function or to replace the present system.
I A2-6 i
I
'O j
1 1
O-The control room instruction manual for the computers will I
I be reviewed and updated as necessary to provide adequate information-to assist the operator by the First Refueling Outage.
O IMPLEMENTATION ist Refueling Outage O
O O
O O
O O
A2-7 O
1 ZION STATION
)
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO HEDS REFERRED TO 1
IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED# O233 APPENDIX A2 f
HED CATEGORY 1B 4
)
FSR PAGE 157
]
DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL N/A q
FINDING:
Operators experience fatigue when holding the four Steam Generator Feedwater Isolation Valve (on CB12) discrete rotary control switches (OT-2) against the spring torque i
for the duration of certain control acitons.
(Photo Log No. H-10) l
RESPONSE
The cited control switches will be replaced with OT-2 switches which have a long, lever-type handle.
This will allow the Operator to hold the switches against the spring
)
torque more easily.
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
l l
The licensee needs to provide additional information in
)
order for the NRC to ascertain the licensee's position on this HED.
CECO CLARIFICATION MAY 1987:
)
Although a revision of the corrective action was anticipated, none will be done.
Therefore, this HED will be corrected exactly as proposed and presented in the Final Summary Report (see " Response" above).
)
IMPLEMENTATION l
1st Refueling Outage I
A2-8 D
J l
C)
?
i ZION STATION J
() ;
REVISED RESPONSE / CLARIFICATION TO MEDS REFERRED TO IN THE NRC'S SAFETY EVALUATION (SE) OF THE DCRDR.
HED # 0072 APPENDIX A2 HED CATEGORY 3C
()
FSR PAGE 118 DECEMBER 1986 SUBMITTAL N/A 4
FINDING:
()
Periodic testing of annunciators is not required or controlled by Administrative Procedure.
t
RESPONSE
O A requirement will be added to the PTO (Periodic Test) l
. Checklist to have the Operators test the annunciators once f
per shift.
NRC/SAIC TER COMMENT:
O The licensee needs to provide additional clarification to Justify the change in periodic testing of annunciators from once-per-shift to once-per-day.
O CECO CLARIFICAITON MAY 1987:
Periodic testing of annunciators has been implemented into station procedures.
However, the commitment for shiftly testing is too much of a burden because of system complications and the time consumption involved.
- Moreover, O
each annunciator tile has two light bulbs in it.
The chance of both burning out within a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period is very small.
In addition, any problems found with the system (other than burned out bulbs) on any back shift would not j
be addressed / repaired until the following day shift when qualified personnel are available.
The commitment should O
therefore be changed to daily which is adequate to satisfy the basic intent.
IMPLEMENTATION ist Refueling Outage O
A2-9 Q