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Proposed Tech Specs,Requiring Response Time Testing for Containment Ventilation Isolation Function When Initiated by High Containment or Low Pressurizer Pressure Signals
	ML20234F079
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	09/14/1987
From:	; TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20234F047	List: ML20234F045; ML20234F079;
References
	NUDOCS 8709230020
	Download: ML20234F079 (13)
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{{#Wiki_filter:-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ENCLOSURE 1 4 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-87-38) LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 3/4 3-29 3/4 3-30 3/4 3-33a Unit 2 3/4 3-29 3/4 3-30 3/4 3-33a 8709230020 070914 7 j DR ADOCK 0500

    '  -                                               TABLE 3.3-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION                        RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
                              ~        ~    ~ ~ ~

1. Manual

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) Not Applicable Feedwater Isolation Not Applicable Reactor Trip (SI) Not Applicable Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Not Apolicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

                                                                         .Not Applicable Essential Raw Cooling Water System             Not Applicable-Emergency Gas Treatment System                 Not Applicable.

b. Containment Spray Not Applicable Containment Isolation-Phase "B" Not Applicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable es Containment Air Return Fan Not Applicable

e. u) 1<,3 4 c. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Not Applicable Emergency Gas Treatment System Not Applicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable

d. Steam Line Isolation Not Applicable

2. Containment Pressure-Hich R59

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) $ 32.0( ) '

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) 1 3.0 ' '

                                                                           < 8.0(2)

c. Feedwater Isolation

d. Containment Isolation-Phase " A"(3) 18.0(0)/28.0( )

e. Containment Ventilation Isolation ht--Appliccbic 4 5,.5-(9)OQ

f. Auxiliary Feecwater Pumps 1 60

g. Essential Raw Cooling Water System 1 65.0(6)/75.0(9)

h. Emergency Gas Treatment System 5 38.0(9) l-

     .Wh.

.)

-J

May 12, 1987 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-29 Amendment No. 55

                                                                     "-'       ---------___m _ _ _ _ , _ _ _

TABLE 1.3-5 (Continued) ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

3. Pressurizer Pressure-Low

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 1 32.0(1)/28.0(7) R59

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) < 3.0

c. Feedwater Isolation < 8.0(2)

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"(3) 18.0(8).

ceXn)

e. Containment Ventilation Isolation Net ^p;:!ic2M $ f,5

f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps < 60

g. Essential Raw Cooling Water System 65.0(8)/75.0(9)

h. Emergency Gas Treatment System 5 28.0(8)

4. Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-High

a. Safety Injection (ECCS)

1 28.0(7)/28.0(1) R59

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) < 3.0

c. Feedwater Isolation < 8.0(2)

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"(3) 18.0(8)/28.0(9)

e. Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable

f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 1 60

g. Essential Paw Cooling Water System s 65.0(8)/75.0(9)

h. Emergency Gas Treatment System 1 38.0(9) l l

5. . Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines - High Coincident with T --Low-Low

a. Saf ty Injection (ECCS) < 30.0(7)/30.0(1) R59

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) < 5.0 .

c. Feedwater Isolation 10.0(2) -

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"I ) 20.0(9)/30.0(9)

e. Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable

f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 1 60

g. Essential Raw Cooling Water System 1 67.0(9)/77.0(9)

h. Steam Line Isolation < 10.0

i. Emergency Gas Treatment System 1 40.0(9) l l

May 12, 1987 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-30 Amendment No. 55

(- . l . . ,. INSTRUMENTATION l TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued) l TABLE NOTATION (10) The response time for loss of voltage is measured from the time voltage

                    .is lost until the time full voltage is restored by the diesel.                                  The response time for degraded voltage is measured from the time the load                                                                 R33 shedding signal is generated, either from the degraded voltage or the SI enable timer, to the time full voltage is restored by the diesel.                                      The response time of the timers is covered by the requirements on their setpoints.

(11) (c.,-{ainmed fae9e vn b't> 0"lt Y"'"'" b # " " A,,4 a responn -h%s o / 6.5 sero d o' lug *

NOTE: This tech'nical specification to be implemented at the startup following the second refueling outage or following completion of the modification, whichever is earlier. R33 I

l' SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 3-33a

Amendment No. 29 May 5, 1983

r .

                                                                  ----=        - - - -     ~ ~ - - ~ - - - - -

TABLE 3.3-5 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES-1

           -INITIATING' SIGNAL AND FUNCTION                             RESPONSE TIME IN SECONOS

i. 1. Manual

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) Not Applicable Feedwater Isolation Not Applicable

Reactor Trip (SI) Not Applicable

                .              Containment Isolation-Phase "A"             Not Applicable Containment' Ventilation Isolation         Not Applicable Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps                  Not Applicable
                        -Essential Raw Cooling Water System               Not Applicable Emergency Gas Treatment System             Not Applicable-

b. Containment Spray Not Applicable Containment Isolation-Phase "B" Not Applicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable Containment Air Return Fan Not Applicable

c. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Not Applicable Emergency Gas Treatment System Not Applicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable

d. Steam Line Isolation Not Applicable

2. Containment Pressure-High-

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) $ 32.0(I) .

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) 13.0

c. Feedwater Isolation < 8. 0( 2

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"I ) 118.0(8)/28.0( )

e. Containment Ventilation Isolation '!;t ^.pp l i c able- f S,5-(9X'd

f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps $06

g. Essential Raw Cooling Water System 16 5.0(8)/75.0(9)

h. Emergency Gas Treatment System 138.0(9) l l

I 4 May 12, 1987 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-29 Amendment No.47

                                                                                           ' TABLE 3.3-5 (Con'tinued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES ._, INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONOS

3. Pressurizer Pressure-Low :6

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) R47 1 32.0(1)/28.0(7)

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) < 3.0 -

c. Feedwater Isolation 8.0(2) i

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"( ) 18.0(8)

e. Containment Ventilation Isolation Net ipp!!c2 P 55f an>

f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps < #'

_60

g. Essential Raw Cooling Water System 1 65.0(8)/75.0(9) 3 h.

Emergency Gas Treatment System < _28.0(8)

4. Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-High i

a. Safety injection (ECCS)

128.0(7)/28.0(1)

R'7

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) 13.0 y

c. Feedwater Isolation <8.0(2)

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"( ) 18.0(8)/28.059)

e. Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable

f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps <60

g. Essential Raw Cooling Water System 65.0(9)/75.0(9)

h. Emergency Gas Treatment System <

_38.0(9)

5. Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines - High Coincident with T --Low-Low

a. S ty Injection (ECCS) 1 30.0(7)/30.0(1) R47

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) <

_. 5. 0

c. Feedwater Isolation <10.0(2) ~

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A"( ) 20.0(8)/30.0(9)

e. Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable

f. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps <

_.60

g. Essential Raw Cooling Water System 1 67.0(8)/77.0(9)

h. Steam Line Isolation 110.0

i. Emergency Gas Treatment System 14 0,0(9)

May 12, 1987 SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3-30 Amendment No. 47 i

y. , , y3 ,

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t L x i MSTRUMENTATION ) ~ l i

                                                                             ,T,ABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)
                           ,                                i TAf1!E NOTATION
                                                                                  ./

I

                       ')                                                                                                             ., c  {>^
                     ;                                                               (

A (10) The response. time <for loss'of voltage is measured from the time voltage d i is lost untW the time full voltage is restored by the diesel. The' ' response, tirar fdr' degraded voltage is measured f rom.th'e time. the loadf gtg shedding signal is generated, either from the degraded voltage or the 51 enable timer, to the time full voltage is restored by the diesel. The response time of the timers:is covered by the requirements on their setpoints; (II) $ hl;,,,,,,.,a} a p ey, ya/va, only , bf ja,m.J rsd,/an so w L ys /vas I. k^ n ' A keyo st s du ofdJ sn o.,df o a leis, l i l l l f i

                                                                                                                                                                                  . 1 I

I (*fl0TE: This technical specification is to be-implemented during the startup R18

              '4                  following the first refueling outage.,

i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 3 33a Amendment No.18 MAY 5 1933 4

ENC'LOSUR'E 2-f ' h PROPOSED. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH' NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS.1 AND-2. DOCKET NOS, 50-327 AND 50-328

                  .(TVA-SQN-TS-87-38)

DESCRIPTION, AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE ADDITION OF RESPONSE TIME TESTING FOR THE CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION FUNCTION l

W s'

1. .

ENCLOSUR'E 2 Description of Change The proposed change to table 3.3-5 of the TSs will add requirements to response time test of the containment ventilation isolation function when initiated by a high containment pressure signal or a low pressurizer pressure signal. Reason for Change Section 15.4.1.1.5 of the SQN Final Safety Analysis Report-(FSAR) describes the effects of containment purging on the Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis. This analysis assumes that containment purge is isolated 5.5 seconds after the postulated break. The analysis also assumes 6.5 seconds for the isolation of the upper and lower containment air radiation monitors. These assumptions are currently verified by response time testing, but not as a requirement of specification 3.3.2.1. dustificationforChange The containment ventilation isolation function is currently response time L tested by the performance of Surveillance Instruction SI-247.900,

         " Engineered Safety Features Response Time Verification," and Instrument Maintenance Instructions (IMIs)-99 RT-622A and RT-6228, " Response Time Testing Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Slave Relay K622." The proposed change to the TSs adds a requirement to perform the response time testing, which is currently being performed. This is done to ensure that the assumptions made in the FSAR accident analysis are verified by response time testing pursuant to specification 3.3.2.1.

The response times for the containment ventilation isolation function that are added to table 3.3-5 of the TSs are derived from data in the FSAR. Section 15.4.1.1.5 of the FSAR assumes a value of 1.5 seconds for the j generation of a safety injection (SI) signal and containment ventilation i isolation signal. This includes allowances for the initiating parameter i to reach its SI setpoint. Table 6.2.4-1 in turn indicates that the j accident analysis assumes the containment purge isolation valves require j 4.0 seconds to close, and the isolation valves for the upper and lower j compartment air radiation monitors, which also close on the CVI signal, i require 5.0 seconds to close. Table 6.2.4-1 indicates that these valves I isolate on the phase B isolation signal. This discrepancy will be corrected in the 1988 FSAR epdate. These values yield the response time test values of 5.5 seconds and 6.5 seconds for the containment purge isolation valves and the containment air radiation monitor isolation valves, respectively. The response time test for the containment ventilation isolation function l 1s performed only for the high containment pressure and the low I pressurizer pressure initiating signals. This is appropriate since these are the only two automatic SI initiating signals indicative of a LOCA. l l l l u__________________-----------------.-_---- - - . - - - - - J

                   -. -__ . - - _ _ - . - _          ._m. - - - -._.c         __ . _ . . - - .._     _ . . - _ _ - - . _ .

A g ,i ENCLOSUR$3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-87-38) DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS 4

      .__m_______.                          .- - - .                    --- -

4 ENCLOSURL 3 Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed TS change and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on the criteria established in 10 CFR 50.9Ec. Operation of SQN in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The proposed change adds requirements for response time testing of the containment ventilation isolation function. This testing is currently performed, but not as a requirement of TS 3.3.2.1. By requiring the response time testing of the isolation function, the plant is ensured of being bounded by the accident analysis.

2. Create the possibility of a new or.different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. The addition of the requirement for response time testing of the containment ventilation isolation ensures that SQN is bounded by its FSAR accident analysis. Since the response time testing is presently performed, the requirement does not change the function or operation of the equipment.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed testing requirement will be used to ensure that the testing presently performed continues to be conducted. By performing the response time l test of the contatament ventilation isolation function, the current margins of safety for the plant are verified.

i 1 1 1 _ _ - - - _ - _ _ _ _ J

e ENCL.05URE 4 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-87-38) LIST OF COMMITMENTS IDENTIFIED IN ENCLOSURE 2 I I

ENC'LOSURE4 List of Commitments

1. FSAR table 6.2.4-1 indicates that the upper and lower containment air radiation monitor isolation valves isolate on the phase B isolation signal. These valves actually isolate on the containment ventilation isolation signal. This discrepancy will be corrected in the 1988 FSAR update.

1 1 I J

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ML20234F079

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