ML20234D365
| ML20234D365 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1987 |
| From: | Andrews R OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20234D154 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, LIC-87-634, NUDOCS 8709220070 | |
| Download: ML20234D365 (3) | |
Text
I Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Omaha, Nebraska 68102 September 15, 1987 LIC-87-634 i
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
References:
1.
Docket No. 50-285 2.
IE Bulletin 85-03, " Motor Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings," dated November 15, 1986 3.
Letter from OPPD (R. L. Andrews) to NRC (Eh-nt Control Desk), dated May 15, 1986 (LIC-86-224) 4.
Letter from NRC (J. E. Gagliartlo) to OPPD (R. L. Andrews),
dated July 30, 1987 5.
Ietter from OPPD (R. L. Andrews) to NRC (R. D. Martin),
dated September 15,1986 (LIC-86-465) 6.
letter from OPPD (R. L. Andrews) to NRC (Document Control Desk), dated August 7,1987 (LIC-87-567) 7.
Intter from NRC (J. E. Gagliardo) to OPPD (R. L. Andrews),
dated August 4, 1987 Gentlemen:
SUBJECI': Response to Request for Additional Information on IE Bulletin 85-03 As a result of References 2 and 4, OPPD submitted References 3, 5, and 6.
The attached responses are provided in response to Reference 7.
The additional information is being submitted as discussed between Mr. D. R.
Hunter of Region IV and Mr. J. J. Fisicaro of my staff on September 4,1987.
If you have any questions, please contact us.
Sincerely, R. L. Andrews Division Manager Nuclear Production RIA/sa Attachment c: leBoeuf, Lamb, Iaiby & MacRae R. D. Martin, NRC Regional Administrator A. Bournia, NRC Project Manager P. H. Harrell, NRC Senior Resident Inspector 8709220070 870915
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- 1. : Unlisted )OVs HCV-2414, -2934, -2954 and -2974 in discharge lines of the safety injection tank system are shown locked open (fail as is) on-Drawirq E-23866-210-130, Sheet 2, Revision 36.
If power is removed from the motors in addition to the locked-open position of these }cvs, please state this in your response. Otherwise, address the effect of assuming inadvertent equipnent operations as required by Action Item of the bulletin, aM revise Table 1 of the response of 09-15-86 to include these valves.
OPPD RESRDISE Power is reoved fran the i itu1.m of the cpuatut= for valves HCV-2414, HCV-2934, HCV-2954 and HCV-2974 during power operation in addition to the valves being locked open.
2.
Has water hammer due to valve closure been considered in the determination of pressure differentials? If not, please explain.
OPPD RESR2iSE:
Potential incraaaan in pressure differential across the valves within the scope of the Bulletin (HCV-311, HCV-312, ICV-314, HCV-315, HCV-317, 3
HCV-318, HCV-320 and HCV-321) because of eter bae were not
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considered. 'Ihe Swified valve closure time is generally greater than 8 aanruids which is considered slow enough to preclude a significant water banunar problen considering the length of piping involved. Additionally, during the performance of surveillance testing during whidt the valve is stroked fran closed to open, no water bananar has been verified.
3.
Please expand the proposed program for action items b, c and d of the bulletin to include the following details as a minimum:
1 1
(a) commitment to a training program for setting switches, maintaining valve operators, usiry signature testing equipment and interpreting signatures, (b) commitment to justify continued operation of a valve determined to be inoperable, and i
(c) description of a method possibly needed to extrapolate valve stem j
thrust measured at less than maximum differential pressure.
OPPD RESPGiSE:
(a) OPPD is developing craft training suga-that cover electrical and mechanical maintenance of motor operated valves. OPPD has utilized a vendor in the performance of DOV testing, incitriing using signature testing agiinnant and intasalation of signatures. OPPD has pur@aaad the signature testing equipnent.
(b)
If a motor operated valve is deemed inoperable (i.e. definitely will not perform its function), the Limiting conditions for Operations as defined in Fort calhoun's Tedinical sreifir ations, Section 2.3 (2)b.,d. apply.
OPPD RESR2iSE (continued)
(c) OPPD does.not foresee the need for a method to extrapolate valve sta thrust measured at less-than the assumed mav4== differential prs== mire..
- 4. -Unlisted }OV HCV-1384 is shown normally closed in Zone C-3 of Drawing 11405-M-253, Revision 51, in a cross-c. sus:ct line which joins the AN and the Inain FW systems. It-is the'only }OV identified as a remotely operated valve in FSAR Table 9.1-2 (Page 9.4-3, R2 7/86) of AEW equipnent. If power is removed frta the motor to ensure that this }OV will remain closed during plant operation, please state this in your response. Otherwise, address the effect of assuming inadvertent equipnent operations as required by Action Item a of the bulletin, and -
revise Table 1 of the response of 09-15-86 to include this valve.
OPPD RESPONSE:
Power is not reaved frm HCV-1384.. HCV-1384 is the interface valve between the Nwiliary Ebedwater ard Feedwater systems. 1%natwe the operaticm of this valve is not assumed in any Section 14 Safety Analysis, the valve was not included in the scope of the original IE Bulletin 85-03 response.
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