ML20217Q592
| ML20217Q592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1998 |
| From: | Gunter P NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE |
| To: | Julian E NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20217Q445 | List: |
| References | |
| LA, NUDOCS 9803120304 | |
| Download: ML20217Q592 (7) | |
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f,n, Nuclear Information and Resource Service 142416tti St. NW, Suite 404, Wastungton, DC 20036, 202-328-0002; fax:202462-2183; e-maitnirsnet@igc.apc.org web.www.ntrs.org February 27,1998 Office of the Secretary ATT: Mr. E. Julian, EsqlRulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 DELIVERED BY HAND TO: Public Document Room,2120 L Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
RE: Comments, responding to NRC Notice in 63 Fed. Reg. 4308-4330 (January 28, 1998), opposing granting No Significant Hazards Consideration to Yankee Nuclear Power Station License Termination Plan (50-29), and requesting that a 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart G public hearing be held convenient to the public living near the reactor site.
Dear Secretary Hoyle (for the Commission):
By this letter I request that the Commission hold a hearing in the above rer renced matter rather than making a No Significant Hazards Consideratica.
I contend, for myself and NIRS members living in close proximity to the Yankee Nuclear Power Station, that the public process which the NRC staff has conducted thus far is sorely lacking in very basic consideration of due process oflaw as guaranteed under the United States Constitution.
Specifically, the NRC staff provided far less than 30 days notice of the public meeting to discuss the Yankee Nuclear Power Station License Termination Plan (LTP). In fact, only 8 days notice was provided. See NRC Notice,63 Fed.
Reg. 275 (January 5,1998) (announcing the January 13,1998, meeting in Buckland, Massachusetts). I was unable to make, the necessary travel arrangements in time to attend that meeting. In lieu of personal attendance, I forwarded the attached comments to be placed in the record of the meeting by Mr. Frederick Katz. Although my comments have now been neatly bound into the text of the " Official" transcript of the public meeting, I have never received any written acknowledgment from the NRC of my comments. I have received no copy of the transcript, but was told about my comments being bound into it.
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'fBU'?/c vDU7 g onne on recrew paper dedicated to a sound non nuclear energy ;dicy.
Further, and most annoying, the NRC staff has not sent me response to my comments. A copy of my comments is attached hereto as Exhibit ' A' and I hereby incorporate them into this comment and request for a 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G hearing on the LTP.
l I was also informed that at the hearing the NRC cut offpublie questioning.
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This meant that many questions went (and remain) unanswered. Not only my own I
comments and those ofNIRS members, but questions and comments from Northeast Utilities consultant Paul Blanch were not answered.
Mr. Blanch had concerns similar to my own. In particular, he asked about the l'
levels of background radiation on the site, given that the site release plan j
l indicated 10 micro-Rad / hour. This is a number way over the NRC's 25 j
millirem /yr limit from all sources. It is also far in excess of the EPA's 15 l
millirem / year standard. It is almost an order of magnitude over the Massachusetts Department of Public Health's 10 millirem / year standard. How can the NRC give No Significant Hazards Consideration to ao LTP that contains such a totally out ofline site release background radiation level? Thus, I ask that the Commission disapprove the Yankee Nuclear Power Station LD and direct that a public hearing be held in the vicinity of the Yankee facility.
l I am also deeply concerned that the NRC staff (and Commission, it would seem) l are poised to acced No significant Hazards Consideration license amendment approval to the LTP when it proposes that Yankee build and place its spent fuel in an ISFSI under a 10 CFR Part 50 operating license. This suggestion is i
outrageous for several reasons.
Not surprisingly, Yankee will be given a windfall benefit if the Commission approves the LTP. Specifically, Yankee will avoid the $283,000 per year Part I
72 licensing fee. This reward will be given, along with mitigation of many of the very circumstances which lead Congress to pass the Nuclear Waste Policy Act: less surveillance of the site, greater danger of sabotage, lower level of inspections by NRC and Yankee, everything done on an uncertified / experimental basis (uncentified and untested casks, uncertified and untested casks method i
of dealing with leaking casks, uncertified and untested methods of moving l
degraded fuel, etc.). Plainly, when one looks at the dangers which Part 72 l
was intended to avert, the use of 10'CFR 50.59 as the basis of execution and oversight is totally inappropriate. Congress did not intend that licensees would be allowed to develop experimental ways of dealing with spent nuclear fuel, including storage in areas without adequate safety and surveillance.
Yankee's LTP offers a hazardous, untested proposal for dealing with spent j
fuel. Not only should the NRC require Yankee to submit to a full public hearing process on the LTP, it should direct the staff to conduct a Part 72 licensing all of Yankee's high-level waste storage schemes.
Again, I raise all of the issues raised in my attached comments.
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For the reasons stated therein and above, the NRC should not grant approval of Yankee's LTP on a No Significant Hazards Consideration basis. There are unanalyzed hazards. A hearing should be held under 10 CFR Part 2, subpart G, and is hereby requested on behalf of NIRS and its members whose lives and property are at risk through yet another experiment at the Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Rowe, Massachusetts.
Sin
/7 Paul Gunter, Reactor Watchdog Project Nuclear Infonnation and Resource Service Enc / Comments submitted to January 13,1998, Public Meeting in Buckland, Massachusetts, attached hereto as Exhibit 'A' cc:
Attorney for Licensee; Office ofGeneral Counsel, U.S.NRC 1
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Nuclear Information and Resource Service 142416th Street NW Suite 404 I
Washington, DC 20036 Tel: 202/328-0002 Fax: 202-462-2183 Website: http://www.mrs.org i
Statement of. Paul Gunter Director of the Reactor Watchdog Project January 13,1998 l
Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Public Meeting on the Termination of the Yankee Rowe License
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l Mohawk Valley Regional High School Auditor;um Buckland, Massachusetts I would like to thank the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for this opponunity to address l
the license termination of the Yankee Rowe nuclear generating station.
l However, my opening remark must be framed as a criticism of the NRC's overall effon to circumvent meaningful public involvement in the decommissioning process. My organization recognizes that to date, the NRC has actively subverted the public interest in discovering the true and potential impact of a major decommissioning operation at Yankee Rowe by thwarting the public's right to a hearing with discovery process and the cross examination of the licensee as l
required under the Nr.tional Environmental Protection Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Atomic Energy Act.
It is our view that the NRC originally cbandoned its decommissioning regulations and then rewrote its law to accommodate the economic interests of Yankee Atomic Electric Company by expediting the decommissioning process. This view is bolstered by the remarks ofJudge Ponser in the Springfield Federal Court and the First Circuit Appellate Coun decision in CAN vs NRC.
It is now our concern that at the behest of Yankee Atomic Electric Company, the NRC is seeking to expedite the removal of the Yankee Rowe nuclear power station irradiated fuel pool through dry cask storage of the reactor's high level radioactive waste and the demolishing of the l
irradiated fuel pool and building. There are several issues that NIRS seeks to address before Yankee proceeds with this plan.
Central to our concerns is that the NRC has bankrupted its credibility for effective regulatory oversight of the cask cenification program.
l Long standing problems with two cask designers and vendors have demonstrated that the federal regulator has failed to adequately mersee Quality Assurance and Qt.ality Controlin the certification and implementation of the Sierra Nuclear Corporation VSC-24 (vertical storage modules) dry cask system and the VECTRA Technologies Inc. NUHOMS-52 B (horizontal storage modules) dry cask system. NIRS believes that the NRC failed its regulatory and oversight 1
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' function as a result of attempting to accommodate the nuclear industry's interests and schedules in such areas as retaining operational flexibility (i.e. the ability to have full core ofDoad.)
Specifically; On August 21,1991, the NRC exempted and permitted Sierra Nuclear Corporation to build eight VSC-24 Dry Shielded Casks (concrete casks) and 3 metal storage baskets for the Consumer Power's Palisades nuclear generating station before desian aooroval was issued. The exemption was grantsi by NRC stating that approval was given "at vendor's own risk".
By' April,1992, NRC inspections identified quality control / quality assurance problems with Sierra Nuclear VSC 24 construction involving inadequate design control and control of subcontractors and by May 29,1992 issued a Notice of Violation. The following day, May 29,1992, Michigan's Conumers Power directed Sierra Nuclear to cease all construction of cask being built under the exemption process at Palisades.
In December 1992, the Michigan Office of Attorney General requested that NRC hold a public I
hearing ort the Palisades day cask storage system which the agency then denied.
I On May 7,1993 the NRC certified the VSC-24 design for five nuclear power stations without l
requiring site specific studies, an Environmental Impact Statement, and ba: Ting a public hearing process at any of the reactor locations.
On May 11,1993, Consumers Power loaded its first VSC-24 cask.. That same month, a j
consulting firm to the NRC, The Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses of San Antonio l
Texas, commented on dry cask storage policy stating " dry environment has the potential of l
producing such problems as further fuel cladding oxidation, cladding stressing, and creep i
deformation as a result ofinternal rod pressure."
In February,1994, an NRC soil expert visited the Palisades dry cask storage site which is located in a "high risk erosion site"just 150 yards from the shore ofLake Michigan. Dr. Ross.Lindeman found that the lack of site specific studies under the NRC licensing policy was seriously flawed and could lead to " catastrophic consequences."
l L In June,1994, an NRC inspection report finds continued QA/QC problems at Sierra Nuclear and determined that Sierra Nuclear has "a lack of management commitment."
On August 2,1994, a Consumers Power initiated radiograph finds weld flaws on a VSC-24 cask already loaded with highly irradiated fuel. A subsequent meeting between the licensee and the NRC on August 25,1994 at NRC Headquarters introduced problems with unloading faulty casks where introducing 400 degree F. fuel to 100 degree F. fuel pool water will result in a radioactive steam flash and thermal shock to irradiated fuel in the dry cask This issue introduces problems with the unloading of faulty casks.
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By March,1995, Consumers Power identified further multiple cracking in the closure welds on the VSC-24 shield lids. This will not be acknowledged until an NRC inspection March 17 -27, 1997 identifies cracking at a VSC-24 cask at Wisconsin Electric Power Company's Point Beach reactor.
On May 28,1996, while loading irradiated fuelinto a VSC-24 cask at Wisconsin's Point Beach nuclear generating station, borated water from the fuel pool electroAamk=Hy intested with the zine liner of the VSC-24 design generating hydrogen gas. The hydrogen gas detonsted.when an arc welded used to seal the cask lid ignited the gas lifting the 3 ton shield lid into the air setting it upright on top of the cask. The accident initiated an NRC OfBce of the Inspector General l
i investigation into NRC staff criteria for safety evaluations and the vendor certification and review process.
In June,1996, Consumers Power canceled its preparations to unload the faulty cask at Palisades because of the issue of hot radioactive fuel coming in contact with cooling water in the fuel will create a steam flash and nimWaaaansly generate more explosive hydrogen gas.
On July 5,1996 NRC ordered a halt to any further loading of casks at reactors as a result of the galvanic reaction and hydrogen detonation at Po*mt Beach.
I On October 18,1996, the citizen's group Dont Waste Michigan submitted a petition to the NRC requesting an independent review of the VSC-24 design through the National Association of Corrosion Engineers Dr. Rudolph Hausier submits a report in support' of the petition identifying that flaws in both the utilities' and the NRC safety evaluations of the VSC-24 design and construction, including the lack of upeiscwital verification for temperature calculations and heat l
transfer====ments, all of which have potential adverse impact on the public health and safety.
The NRC rejected the petitic. -s lacking sufficient merit to warrant emergency enforcement action. Dr. Hausler states thadRC is "stunningly ignorant on certain aspects the chemistry of I
metals."
In an NRC inspection report dated March 17-21,1996, cracking is observed in the closure welds on inner and outer shields of fuelloaded VSC-24 casks at Palisades, Po* t Beach, and Arkansas m
Nuclear One units. The inspection identifies the root cause ofcmMug to involve unauthorized weld repairs, the cask design, the welding environment and procedures.
To date, NRC and the industry have not resolved the issue of what to do with faulty casks where cracking of closure welds is observed on the loaded casks at these three nuclear power stations. The NRC and the industry remain in a gnaada y without a strategy to unload irradiated fuel from failing casks. There are currently 19 VSC-24 casks loaded at reactors. Sierra Nuclear and the licensees remain under NRC Confirmatory Action Letters with regard to any further
~ loading of the VSC-24 design.
Nuclear Information and Resource Service asserts that these problems and similar QA/QC problems with the VECTRA Technologies Inc. NUHOMs-52B dry cask system can be attributed to the lack ofNRC aggressive oversight and enforcement ofits regulations and a rigorous i
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certification process. Essentially, NRC has deferred it regulatory responsibilities to the industry that it is supposed to be regulating. NIRS cautions the NRC,'the licensee and the affected l
communities to not allow the these identified problems or similar problems to be repeated at the j
Yankee Rowe site.
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Therefore, NIRS submits:
- 1) The NRC must be required to obtain an independent and reputable third party review (such as the National Association of Corrosion Engineers) of all dry cask design systems as part ofits certification process.
- 2) The current NRC licensing process for dry cask storage must be resended to require site specific reviews at all potential sites with a complete Environmental Impact Statement and that such process will be opened to the right to a public hearing with full adjudicatory review.
- 3) Yankee Atomic Electric Company must retain full liability for its nuclear waste generated at Yankee Rowe and that both a wet storage and hot-cell capability be provided for.the full retrievability ofirradiated fuel in the event that a duly certified dry cask develop problems.
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