ML20217Q523

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Expresses Belief That NSHC Approval of Plant License Termination Plan Inappropriate,For Listed Reasons.Public Hearing on Approval of Subj Plan Requested to Be Offered
ML20217Q523
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 02/26/1998
From: Block J, Katz D
NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To: Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman
NRC COMMISSION (OCM), NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
Shared Package
ML20217Q445 List:
References
LA, NUDOCS 9803120278
Download: ML20217Q523 (7)


Text

1 DOCKETED USNRC l

Jonathan M. Block ArrORNEY AT 38 FEB 27 P4 :02 LAW OREr ~ Main street .

RUL P.O. Box 566 AD. LJ " .Putney, Vermont 05346-0566

'02) 387-2646(vox) 902) 387-2667 (fax)

Febmary 26,1998 -

Chainnan Shirley A. Jackson, Commissioners, Secretary of the Commission, EDO, Chief Rules and Directives Branch United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 RE: Notice of Proposed No significant Hazards Consideration,63 Federal Register 4308-4330 (January 28, 1998), Yankee Nuclear Power Station License '

Termination Plan (50-29), Comments in Opposition to No Significant Hazards

, Consideration Approval of License Tennination Plan and Request for 10

! C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart G Hearing on the Plan.

Dear Chairman Jackson,

Commissioners l Mr. Secretary, Mr. Meyer, and other Required Recipients of this Letter: .

In addition to attempting to follow the fonnal requirement for objecting to the proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration approval referenced above and requesting a hearing on the proposed license termination plan (which requirements, we contend, are not plainly stated for the general public in the referenced Federal Register notice), we are writing to you to be sure you are aware of the conduct of your staffin the above referenced matter.

For the following reasons, we believe that No Significant Hazards Consideration approval of the Yankee Nuclear Power Station License Termination Plan is inappropriate, and ask that you offer a public hearing on approval of the plan:

L Lack of Minimum Due Process To Public In This Matter.

Your agency has failed to provide the minimum due process to the public in terms of adequate notice and a meaningful opponunity to be heard in this matter.

9003120278 990306 PDR ADOCK 05000029

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Citizens Awareness Network's Comrnents to the U.S. NRC Page 2 Opposing No Significant Hazards Consideration for Yankee Rowe LTP i

First, the notice of public meeting to discuss the plan appeared less than 30 days prior to the scheduled meeting. Specifically, the Federal Register Notice of the meeting was published on Januanj 5th announcing the January 13th meeting. 63 Fed. Reg. 275 (January 5,1998). This is in no way adequate formal notice of a public meeting.

People who may be interested in the subject of die meeting require 30 days notice, reasonably calculated to infonn them of the time, place, manner, and content of the meeting.

Second, at the meeting, Morton Fainile, NRC project manager for Yankee, stated that the NR.C's questions to Yankee Atomic Electric Company [YAEC] conceming the plan, YAEC's responses to those questions, and YAEC's plan had not yet been made available to the public. Transcript of Public Meeting at Shelboume [ sic], MA (Yankee Nuclear Power Station License Termination Plan) at 58-59 (January 13,1998)

[ Transcript]. Thus, the public had been invited on extremelv short notice to particinate in a discussion of a olan that had not been made public at the time of the meetine.

This, too (in case there is any doubt), in no way comports with the mimmum requirements of due process which your agency owes to the people of the United States under the United States Constitution (and most generally accepted standards of meeting protocol in civilized countries).

Third, during the meeting the moderator stated that the building had to be vacated by 11:00 p.m. for cleaning. Transcript at 3. The moderator stated that he would try to I keep the meeting to 10 :00 p.m. despite better part of an hour available. Given this limited time, Mr. Faintile began the NRC's portion of the meeting with the 1 introduction of every NRC staff person present, despite the fact that only a few participated in the meeting. See Transcript at 29-35. Perusal of the Transcript of this meeting will show that questioning was arbitrarily cut off for the sake oflimiting the meeting time until 10 p.m. This meant that questions had to be posed as unanswered comments. Among such comments, Mr. Paul Blanch, an energy consultant working for Nonheast Utilities, raised some serious questions about the apparent illegalities and  ;

inadequacies of the plan, including apparent violations of 10 C.F.R. Parts 20,50 and

72. Transcript at 72-76. Your staff did nothing when questions were cut off and has, ,

to our knowledge, made no attempt to answer these questions.

1 Fourth, despite statements that questions and comments would be answered l d

subsequently (in what one might hope would be a timely fashion), to otir knowledge there have been no answers provided to any of the oral or written questions and comments docketed at the meeting after questioning was cut off.

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Citizens Awareness Network's Comments to the U.S. NRC Page 3 Opposing No Signi6 cant Hazards Consideration for Yankee Rowe LTP Because of these flagrant violations of the minimum standards of due process owed to members of the public under the United States Constitution, No Significant Hazards -

Consideration is not appropriate for the Yankee Nuclear Power Station License -

Tennination Plan.

IL No Significant Hazards Consideration Is'Not Appropriate For The Yankee Nuclear Power Station License Termination Plan Due to Violations of NRC Regulations, Federal Law, And Previously Unanalyzed Safety Questions .

Approval of the plan should ' not be granted under No Significant -Hazards Consideration and without a public hearing because there are potentially significant hazards involve' h YAEC's proposal for activities to be conducted under the License

' Termination Plan and the radiological condition in which YAEC intends to leave the site. In pertinent pait, the License Termination Plan (including incorporated documentation) does not take into account the following:

1. Accident evaluation involving fuel storage in the fuel pool. Evaluations in the License Termination Plan (and FSAR) do not consider any credible accidents other than cask drop into the fuel pool. Although this may be the most likely catastrophic ' accident, there are plenty of other more likely.but less serious i

(although potentially lethal) accidents not considered in the plan. For example, the plan (and incorporated documents) does not take into account the following i potential accidents:

(a) Loss of water in the fuel pool resulting in shielding loss This accident condition, if there is a draw-down to within 6"of the fuel, would be lethal in seconds to any person at the fuel pool railing, and could also be significantly damaging to persons at the site boundary; (b) Loss of cooling of the fuel could also result in unplanned exposures and releases with potential consequences at the site boundary; (c) Loss of control of water chemistry in the pool could cause degradation of the fuel cladding and result in unplanned exposures with serious consequences; (d) Sabotage; (e) Accidents related to lower levels of surveillance of the site, including the fuel pool.

Citizens Awareness Network's Comments to the U.S. NRC Page 4 l Opposing No Significant Hazards Consideration for Yankee Rowe LTP

2. Accident evaluations related to storage of the fuel in casks. Again, there is no evaluation in the Plan or incorporated documents to account for potential and likely accidents related to _ cask storage including: (1) leaking, (2) explosions -

(such as that involving a 300 pound cask lid during welding at Point Beach, see PNO-III-96-033A), (3) sabotage, (4) low levels of surveillance. ,

L 3. Proposed casks are still in the expedmental stage. None have been approved.'

In fact, they are still in the design stage. ,

4. The License Tennination Plan does not describe how YAEC intends to deal with leaking casks.
5. The License Tennination Plan does not describe how YAEC intends to deal with unloading and loading casks that have deteriorated.
6. The License Terminauon Plan does not describe how YAEC intends to deal with deteriorated fuel.
7. The License Termination Plan does not describe how YAEC intends to deal with the movement of fuel over the pool. It does not adequately describe the _ -

load capacity of the cranes, s'afety features and measures, or a cask drop accident and mitigation of same under the current conditions at the facility (i.e.

lower safety staff, lessened surveillance, lower levels of security, etc.). {

8. The License.Tennination Plan fails to account for (discuss or conduct any Environmental Report on) the enviromnental consequences of the construction of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations (ISFSI) which includes building a road and dealing with an extreme grade. Potential consequential envirorunental degradation includes erosion, leachates, leaking fuel. Rese would have an impact upon the Deerfield River ecosystem. Such l enviromnental assessment is required under 10 C.F.R. Parts 50 and 51.
9. There is limited staff to monitor the ISFSIs. No fuel pool has ever been removed before under such circumstances and with such a result. All forms of Monitored Retdevable Storage (MRS) are at operating reactors where there are trained staff with great cumulative experience in dealing with fuel-related ,

problems and many staff trained in emergency cleanup and safety.

10. There is no Emironmental Impact Study on the potential effects of canisters leaking radioactive contaminants into the Deerfield River and the River Valley.

Citizens Awareness Network's Comments to the U.S. NRC Page 5 Opposing No Significant Hazards Consideration for Yankee Rowe LTP lt will take time to get the proposed (but only vaguely described)'bver-pack" into place around a leaking canister. How long will leaks go on before the

'bver-pack'7 There is no assessment of the potential hazards.

11. No Significant Hazards Consideration is not appropriate under the NRC regulations or the Atomic Energy Act, U.S.C. 2239, for work that is in the design stage. This is the stage YAEC's proposals are at this point.

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12 In tenns of removal of the spent fuel pool, there are no specifics in the License Termination Plan concerning clean up of the pool area, ion exchange pit, and contamination in and around the ion exchange pit. No efforts have been made to determine if there is a plume of contaminated liquid waste under the fuel pool and ion exchange pit, nor has there been any attempt to account for earlier data YAEC acquired which showed higher levels of radioactivity in deeper test borings around the site. This would seem to be indicative of the presence of some kind of plume under the site, and YAEC should be investigating this likely (and dangerous) potentiality.

13. There is no discussion of how over-packed canisters may be transpotted to a permanent spent fuel repository. Such over-packed canisters will be extremely l large and heasy, and YAEC needs to account for the safe eventual relocation of such canisters.
14. There is no certified 'bver-pack"under Part 72. YAEC should not be allowed to say they intend to utilize a method still in design stage.  ;
15. The fonn of cask storage YAEC intends to use has not been certifie.d under Part 72, and it is still in the design stage. YAEC should not be allowed to say they  ;

intend to use a fuel storage container that has not been certified under Part 72.  !

16. YAEC has not taken account of the actual radiation level above background that will remain at the site upon license termination. In particular, according to the numbers presented in the Plan, YAEC will be leaving the site with a radiation level above background of 10 micro-Rads / hour. This means over 87 millirem / year above background to any person living on the site. YAEC has not accounted for the discrepancy between this figure and the maximum ,

exposure standards of the NRC (25 millirem /yr), EPA (15 millirem /yr), l Massachusetts Department of Public Health (10 millirem /yr). l l

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Citizens Awareness Network's Comments to the U.S. NRC Page 6 Opposing No Significant Hazards Consideration for Yankee Rowe LTP It is inappropriate under NRC, EPA, and Massachusetts Department of Public Health regulations on radiation exposure to the public for the NRC to approve the YAEC License Termination Plan. All the more reason why No Significant Hazards -

Consideration approval is not appropriate. Moreover, the Plan plainly violates the letter and spirit of Part 72 by allowing the licensee to build and operate an ISFSI under a Part 50 license. The purpose of the Part 72 license was to assure public health and safety by requiring licensees to provide the level of security, emergency planning, and other features ordinarily part of an operatLig Part 50 licensed facility. .

The absence of such features at an ISFSI site as is proposed for Yankee Rowe means that public health and safety are being compromised. Why should this take place?

Allowing a spent-fuel storage site under a Part 50 license provide, a $283,000 per year incentive to YAEC (and any other licensee) who does not elect to use the legally required Part 72 license process (and pay the annual license fee). Your agency needs a public hearing process to review such contradictions rather than placing approval on the fast track railroad of No Significant Hazards Consideration. Part 50 was implemented under the notion that NRC inspection and enforcement would ensure compliance with the temis of the license. Part 72 was implemented with the realization that reduced or non-existent NRC inspection and enforcement had to be accounted for in making independent fuel storage safe--hence, the system .of regulations mandated by Congress to govern " stand alone" or independent facilities.

Pennanently closed nuclear power stations do not receive the level of NRC oversight necessary to assure public safety for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation unless the NRC enforces the need for licensees to go to Part 72 licenses.

Because the Yankee License Termination Plan includes going outside current NRC regulations without required environmental impact studies, it is in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act, as well as 10 C.F.R. Part 51. Because the plan includes going outside current regulations without making specific applications for license amendments pursuant .to NRC regulations, its is in violation of those regulations and the Atomic Energy Act,42 U.S.C. 2239. Finally, should the NRC choose to approve the plan under No Significant Hazards Consideration in the circtunstances described above, you will be in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. In particular, by retroactively expanding the basis of your licensee's license without rulemaking or hearing as required under the Atomic Energy Act, and by pennitting a major federal action that will affect the quality of the emirorunent to go forward.without the requisite emironmental consideration under the National Emironmental Policy Act, you will be acting arbitrarily, capriciously, and not otherwise in accordance with law in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.

' Citizens Awareness Network's Comments to the U.S. NRC Page 7 Opposing No Significant Hazards Consideration for Yankee Rowe LTP

'ILL Requested Relief.

On behalf of Citizens Awareness Network, Inc., of Rowe, Massachusetts,' many of -

whose members live and own property (which may be damaged by any accident at the Yankee Nuclear Power Station) well within the 10 mile evacuation zone sturounding Yankee, and downstream on the Deerfield River from the Yankee site (and any fuel storage facility on that site), we request that the NRC:

1. Reject approval of the Yankee License Tennination Plan under No Significant

' Hazards Consideration;

2. Provide another public meeting in the vicinity of the Yankee Rowe facility. Be sure to provide 30 days notice of the meeting after you have placed in the public document room the written answers to all of the comments and questions raised a: the last meeting. Be sure to ascertain that the public meeting will take place after the public has had a full 30 days to review the current plan and related documents.
3. Offer a 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart G hearing in tb vicinity of the Yankee Rowe facility on approval of the License Termination Plan prior to approval of the plan.

Invite Citizens Awareness Network, Inc., arid other similarly situated persons to participate in the public hearing process upon adequate (i.e., 30 days notice) in the Federal Register, ' plainly stating your rejection of No Significant Hazards Consideration, and plainly stating the tenns and ' conditions upon which the hearing will be held. Be sure to hold the hearing in a place reasonably calculated to permit maximum citizen participation.

Sincerely, bmdr2.b.fth.,,w..n) w& WM' Deborah B. Katz, President nathan M. Block, Attomey Citizens Awareness Network,Inc. Citizens Awareness Network, Inc.

I, Jonathan M. Block, Attorney for Citizens Awareness Network, certify under penalty of perjury by signing above that on this 26th day of February,1998, I caused to be placed into the mail, pre-paid postage, copies of the above document to the following:

~ Office of the Secretary, U.S. NRC; Chief Rules and Directives Branch. U.S. NIC; Office of General Counsel, U.S NRC; Attorney for the Licensee