ML20217Q148

Corrected Page 1 of Forwarding NOV & Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty for Violations of Security Requirements.Corrections Made to Insp Rept Ref & Date of Insp

ML20217Q148
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	08/15/1997
From:	Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
Shared Package
ML20217Q139	List: ML20217Q137 ML20217Q148
References
50-244-97-08, 50-244-97-8, EA-97-339, NUDOCS 9708290216
Download: ML20217Q148 (1)

Text

l

• ENCLOSURE

• uNITEo STATES NUCl. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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J' 475 ALLINDALE RoAo KING or prussia, PENNSYLVANIA 1940rr1416

, f August 15,1997 EA 97 339 Dr. Robert C. Meeredy Vice President, Ginna Nuclear Production Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14049

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF civil PENALTY $55,000 (NRC inspection Report No. 50 244/97-08)

Dear Dr. Mecredy:

This letter refers to the NRC Inspection conducted on May 27 30,1997, at the Ginna Nuclear Power Station, for which an exit meeting was conducted on May 30,1997. The purpose of this inspection was to review your security program, including your installation of a vehicle barrier system (VBS) in February 1990. The VBS was installed in response to an NRC August 1994 amendment to 10 CFR Part 73 which modified the design basis threat for a radiological sabotage. The inspection report was sent to you on July 10,1997. As described in the laspection report, apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified. On August 5,1997, a predecisional enforcement conference was conducted with you and members of your staf f to discuss the apparent violations identified during the inspection, their causes, and your corrective actions.

Desed on our review of the inspection findings, and Information provided during the conference, two violations are being cited and are described in the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice). Each violation involves inadequacies in the vehicle barriers deploved outside the outer isolation zone to prevent the malicious use of a vehicle to gain entry to the protected and vital areas. The first violation was based on the discovery of three openings ir the barrier large enough for a vehicle to get through. Regarding the second violation, approximately 1200 feet of the barrier cables were secured to the barrier posts by nylon ties. These nylon ties could be easily removed with hand held tools, thereby defeating the ability of the fence to withstand a vehicular attempt to penetrate the barrier.

The VBS is designed to prevent intrusion of a vehicle into an area by stopping the forward motion of the vehicle. This design is intended to prevent adversaries from transporting personnel and their hand carried equipment by vehicle to the proximity of vital areas. The design is also intendeo to preclude the use of a land vehicle bomb. NUREG/CR 0190 specifically indicates that the vehicle barrier must be capable of resisting vehicle impact and providing continuous protection in all arons where approach by a land vehicle is possible. At Ginna, your vehicle barrier did not meet these requirements at the time of the inspection.

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