ML20217N393
| ML20217N393 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000036 |
| Issue date: | 03/02/1998 |
| From: | Harry Felsher NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| TAC-L30995, NUDOCS 9803090006 | |
| Download: ML20217N393 (2) | |
Text
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March 2,1998
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NOTE TO FILE:
Docket No. 70-36 FROM:
Harry Fetcaer, Engineer gpo,/e Section 2, licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS
SUBJECT:
PHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH CE-HEMATITE CONCERNING CRITICALITY SAFETY FOR THE UNRESTRICTED RELEASE OF HF ACID (TAC NO. L30995)
During a January 20,1998, phone conversation between NRC and C'E, NRC staff requested the folicwing information to support the criticality safety review of Unrestricted Release of HF Acid:
Provide a process description (which includes dimensions of tanks, if that information was used in the criticality safety analysis performed by CE to determine that the system was safe).
State which controls will be used to satisfy the double contingency principle. State which controls are primary. Siate which controls are secondary. State what ottor (if any) controls CE will use. For each of these controls, state the limits of the controls, why CE believes the limits are appropriate, and the methods of ensuring their availability and reliability.
List the parameters and values of the parameters that CE used to represent ' normal
- e operations. List the accident scenarios that CE investigated to represent " abnormal" operations. List the parameters and values of the parameters that CE used to represent i
the highly reactive accident scenarios.
i For the " normal" and highly reactive " abnormal" operations, prev de the results of CE's e
criticality safety analysis. State why the " normal" and most reactive " abnormal" operations are safe.
i in the case of a process upset when transferring from the Qualification Tanks to the Bulk e
Storage Tank, state how the container which is used is safe from a criticality safety point of view.
Provide a definitive statement that from a crit!cality safety viewpoint, the process and e
equipment of the HF absorber is safe based en CE's analysis and evaluation.
CE committed to provide answers by January 30,1998.
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During the week of February 2,1998, there wera phone conversations between NRC and CE.
NRC staff requested clarifications for the criticality safety review of Unrestricted Release of HF Acid:
CE indicated that the absorber system will be monitored by the current criticality alarm o
system.
CE clarified the modeling of the material used in the piping was the actual polymer.
e CE clarified the use of the appropriate validated computer code SCALE 4.3 and e
associated cross-section library.
During the week of February 23,1998, there were phone conversations between NRC and CE.
NRC staff requested clarifications for the criticality safety review of Unrestricted Referse of HF Acid:
CE clarified the criticality controls used in the HF absorber system o
in the SIU bulk storage tank, concentration control of uranium.
in the rest of the absorber system, favorable geometry and interaction.
CE clarified the methods used to assure concentration control of the SIU bulk storage e
tank:
valves and interlocks before the HF absorber system will not allow uranium into the system.
CE has committed to provl ding the assurance that the controlled parameter, concentration control of uranium, is maintained within the defined limits for aqueous solution transfers from favorable to unfavorable geometry in the HF absorber system by at least two independent representative samples.
Docket 70-36 Licensee SNM-33 DISTRIBUTION:
Docket 70-36 NRC File Center PUBLIC Region ill SSoong NMSS r/f FCSS r/f FCLB r/f PHighland, Rill PShea
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