ML20217K652
| ML20217K652 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1998 |
| From: | Hood D NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Mueller J NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| References | |
| IEB-96-002, IEB-96-2, TAC-M95613, TAC-M95614, NUDOCS 9805040058 | |
| Download: ML20217K652 (12) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20066-0001
%..... April 23, 1998 Mr. John H. Mueller Chief NuclearOfficer Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Operations Building, Second Floor P.O. Box 63 '
Lycoming, NY 13093
SUBJECT:
COMPLETION OF LICENSING ACTION FOR NRC BULLETIN 96-02 FOR NINE ,
MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 (TAC NOS. M95613 and M95614)
Dear Mr. Mueller:
On April 11,1996, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 96-02, " Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," to all holders of operating licenses. The NRC issued NRCB 96-02 for three principal reasons:
- 1. Alert addressees to the importance of complying with existing regulatory guidelines associated with the control and handling of heavy loads at nuclear power plants,
- 2. Request that all addressees review their plans and capabilities for handling heavy loads in accordance with existing regulatory guidelines and within their licensing basis as previously analyzed in the final safety analysis report, and
- 3. Require addressees to report to the NRC whether and to what extent they have complied with the actions requested in this bulletin.
The bulletin also requested that addressees determine whether certain activities were within their licensing bases and to submit license amendment requests as necessary.
The NRC staff's evaluation of the responses to the bulletin by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation and other nuclear power plant licensees is contained in the enclosed generic safety evaluation.
You responded to the bulletin by letter dated May 13,1996, for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, g
Units 1 and 2. The NRC staff has determined that no further information is required.
Accordingly, TAC No. M95613 for Unit 1 and TAC No. M95614 for Unit 2 are closed.
The NRC staff acknowledges that your evaluation of a heavy load lift planned in 1998 in 4' connection with a second spent fuel pool storage rerack modification for Unit 1 will be submitted to the NRC in support of a related license amendment request to change the Technical pO \
Specifications. This planned activity will be reviewed by the NRC under a separate TAC No.
upon receipt of your application for license amendment.
9805040058 980423 hh OMV '~N 9 PDR ADOCK 05000220 G PDR
J. H. Mueller The NRC will continue to review the issue of heavy loads through an ongoing Task Action Plan for heavy loads. Any additional information required for the completion of the Task Action Plan will be obtained on a plant-specific basis.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me by phone at (301) 415-3049 or by electronic mail at dsh@nrc. gov.
Sincerely, h/[/ vi .
Darl S. Hood, Senior Project Manager l Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation l
Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410 i
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: See next page 1
1 i
l a
- April 23, 1998 i
l J. H. Mueller The NRC will continue to review the issue of heavy loads through an ongoing Task Action Plan for heavy loads. Any additionalinformation required for the completion of the Task Action Plan will be obtained on a plant-specific basis.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me by phone at (301) 415-3049 or by electronic mail at dsh@nrc. gov.
Sincerely, J v
Original Signed by:
Darl S. Hood, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate 1-1 Division of Reactor Projects- t/fl Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1
Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410 Enclo.sure: As stated I cc w/ encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION:
IDocket Filei PUBLIC PDI-1 R/F J. Zwolinski S. Bajwa S. Little D. Hood OGC P. Ray .
B. Thomas l ACRS C. Hehl, Region I DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NMP1-2\NM95613.LTR To r:ceive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E"
= Copy with attachment / enclosure "fi" = No copy j OFFICE PM:PDI-1 lE LA:PDI 1 M i D:PDI-1 , /$ l l l l NAME DHood/lec D]/f Sllttl I $8ajwa [M k j DATE 04/ 2 & 98 04/&')/98 04/'/3 /98 04/ /98 _
{
l Official Record Copy '
,4 e ' ) .s.
April 23, 1998 J. H. Mueller The NRC will continue to review the issue of heavy loads through an ongoing Task Action Plan for heavy loads. Any additionalinformation required for the completion of the Task Action Plan will be obtained on a plant-specific basis.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me by phone at (301) 415-3049 or by electronic mail at dsh@nrc. gov.
Sincerely, Original Signed by:
Darl S. Hood, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate 1-1 i Division of Reactor Projects - 1/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-220 and 50-410
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ encl: See next page DISTRIBUTION:
Docket File PUBLIC PDI 1 R/F J. Zwolinski S. Bajwa S. Little D. Hood OGC P. Ray B. Thomas ACRS C. Hehl, Region i DOCUMENT NAME: G:\NMP1-2\NM95613.LTR To r:ceive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E"
= Copy with attachment / enclosure "ti" = No copy 0FFICE PM:PDI 1 lE LA:PDI 1,D. l D:PDI 1 J$, l l l NAME DHocd/lec D]8 SLitti f $8ajwa fs %
DATE 04/ 2 5/98 04/&5/98
- 04/'/ 4 /98 04/ /98 Official Record Copy
I, .
John H. Mueller Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Unit Nos.1 and 2 cc:
l Regional Administrator, Region l Charles Donaldson, Esquire U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Assistant Attomey General ,
475 Allendale Road New York Department of Law I King of Prussia, PA 19406 120 Broadway New York, NY 10271 ,
Resident inspector )
i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Paul D. Eddy P.O. Box 126 State of New York Department of Lycoming, NY 13093 Public Service Power Division, System Operations Mr. Jim Rettberg 3 Empire State Plaza New York State Electric & Gas Albany, NY 12223 Corporation Corporate Drive Mr. Timothy S. Carey Kirkwood Industrial Park Chair and Executive Director P.O. Box 5224 State Consumer Protection Board Binghamton, NY 13902-5224 5 Empire State Plaza, Suite 2101 Albany, NY 12223 Supervisor l Town of Scriba Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire Route 8, Box 382 Winston & Strawn Oswego, NY 13126 1400 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20005-3502 Mr. Richard Goldsmith Syracuse University Gary D. Wilson, Esquire College of Law Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation E.I. White Hall Campus 300 Erie Boulevard West i Syracuse, NY 12223 Syracuse, NY 13202 l Mr. John V. Vinquist, MATS Inc. Mr. F. William Valentino, President P.O. Box 63 New York State Energy, Research, l Lycoming, NY 13093 and Development Authority Corporate Plaza West 286 Washington Avenue Extension l Albany, NY 12203-6399 l l
1
i
SUMMARY
OF THE STAFF'S REVIEW OF LICENSEE RESPONSES TO NRC BULLETIN 96-02 Introduction The following summarizes the results of the staffs review of licensees' responses to NRC Bulletin (NRCB) 96-02, " Movement of Heavy Loads over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor Core, or Over Safety-Related Equipment," dated April 11,19g6, and to the NRC staffs associated Requests for AdditionalInformation (RAl). The bulletin reminded licensees of their responsibilities for ensuring that heavy load-handling operations are performed safely. It also requested that licensees review their plans and capabilities for handling heavy loads, and ensure that their load-handling operations are in accordance with existing regulatory guidelines and the plant's licensing bases. The bulletin also requested that licensees identify and present schedules for licensing actions needed to support implementation of their heavy load-handling operations involving spent fuel dry storage casks. The licensees also were to provide schedules
, for moving dry storage casks. The RAI requested that selected licensees evaluate the hazards associated with an in-plant tip-over of spent fuel dry storage casks that could dislodge the cask lid and spent fuel elements.
.This summary closes the staffs review of licensee responses to both the bulletin and the associated RAl. Future issues regarding the handling of heavy loads will be addressed generically under the Heavy Loads and Crane issues Task Action Plan (TAP) and on a plant-specific basis as needed. Plant specific reviews needed in the future may require the NRC staff to obtain additional information from individual licensees.
Backaround NRCB 96-02 was issued as an urgent generic communication that requested licensees to -
respond to the following:
(1) For licensees planning to cany out activities involving the handling of heavy loads over spent fuel, fuel in the reactor core, or safety-related equipment within 2 years after the date of the bulletin, provide the following: A report within 30 days of the date of the bulletin that addresses the licensee's review of its plans and capabilities to handle heavy loads while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled) in accordance with existing regulatory guidelines. State whether the activities are wKhin the licensing basis and, if necessary, submit a schedule for requesting a license amendment.
Additionally, indicate whether changes to Technical Specifications (TSs) are required.
(2) For licensees planning to perform activities involving the handling of heavy loads over spent
' fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled) that involve a potential load drop accident that was not previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), submit an application for license amendment 6-9 months before the planned movement of the loads.
Enclosure
.2 (3) For licensees' planning to move dry storMe casks over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled) include, in item 2 above, a statement of the capability of performing the actions necessary for a safe plant shutdown in the presence of a radiological source term that may result from a breach of the dry storage cask, damage to the fuel, or damage to safety-related equipment due to a load drop inside the facility.
(4) For licensees planning to por' form activities involving the handling of heavy loads over spent fuel, over fuel in the reactor core, or over safety-related equipment while the reactor is at power (in all modes other than cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled), determine whether changes to the TSs will be required to allow the handling of heavy loads (e.g., the dry storage canister shield plug) over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool and submit the appropriate information for NRC review and approval 6-9 months before the planned movement of the loads.
Discussion The levels of detail in the licensees' responses to NRCB 96-02 varied significantly, Although some licensees presented detailed information about their heavy load-handling operations, some licensees (Catawba, Crystal River, Farley, Indian Point 2, Salem, St. Lucie, Summer, Dresden, FitzPatrick, Hope Creek, LaSalle, Quad Cities, and WNP-2), either omitted information pertinent to the staff's review in their submittal or referenced previous submittals associated with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." However, all of the licensees responded to the bulletin.
In response to the bulletin, all the licensees reviewed their plans and capabilities to handle heavy loads and indicated that their plans and capabilities are adequate. Some discussions about licensees' plans and capabilities to move heavy loads addressed the plant mode of operation (at power or during shutdowns), the type of crane used (non-single-failure-proof, single-failure-proof, or upgraded cranes), and the methods and procedures for implementing the guidelines in NUREG-0612, Phase 1. All the licensees indicated that their load-handling operations are in accordance with the guidelines in NUREG-0612, Phase 1.
The bulletin requested that licensees determine whether their load-handling operations are within the licensing bases of the plant. Some licensees stated that their operations are within the licensing bases; other licensees committed to evaluate their licensing bases. Some licensees identified issues to be addressed with the NRC through licensing actions (amendment requests or 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations), and projected schedules for submitting the actions for NRC review. Following the responses to the bulletin, a few licensing actions have been reviewed and approved by the NRC concoming the bulletin. The issues involve proposed changes to TSs, scope changes to accident analyses, changes in loads and load paths, and updates to UFSAR requirements.
The bulletin also asked licensees to determine if their movement of heavy loads involves potential load drop accidents that were not evaluated previously in the FSAR and, if needed, submit a license amendment request. Most licensees stated that they move only analyzed loads.
Other licensees indicated that they performed load drop, consequence analyses, or both even though the guidance in Generic Letter (GL) 85-11 canceled the need to perform any analyses.
Some licensees committed to evaluate the heavy loads identified previously when they responded to NUREG-0612. Despite the analyses performed, alllicensees stated that they satisfy the recommended guidelines in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612.
l 3-t l Licensees moving heavy loads at power and using load drops and consequence analyses indicated that they have Edequate capabilities to safely shut the plant down if a heavy load drop should occur and cause a release of radiation or damage safety-related equipment.
l The bulletin also requested that licensees identify plans and schedules for moving spent fuel dry l storage casks. Some licensees stated that they planned to move casks in the near future; other .
licensees indicated that they had not yet considered onsite dry cask storage.
Based on requests ;.. the bulletin, the NRC staff reviewed the licensees' responses to identify: $
(1) plant mode during the handling of heavy loads (at power or during plant shutdowns); j (2) type of crane used to lift heavy loads; (3) evaluation of the licensing bases for handling heavy l loads, including planned licensing actions associated with heavy loads (i.e., license amendment requests); (4) plans and schedules for moving heavy loads (particularly spent fuel dry storage and transportation casks); and (5) the type of analysis performed (load drop analysis, c,ansequence analysis, or both). Although the bulletin did not specifically request this inic.rmation, the NRC staff believes that this type of information covers the areas of concem abo at the licensees' heavy load-handling operations. On the basis of its review, the NRC staff not sd the following points.
(1' PJant Mode Durino load-Handlino Operations Licensees for approximately 38 percent of the plants (21 PWRs and 20 BWRs) plan to move heavy loads at power. Some of these licensees indicated that they move analyzed heavy loads at power and unanalyzed heavy loads during plant shutdowns. These licensees also indicated that heavy load movements over safety-related equipment are !
minimized to the extent practical and, in accordance with NUREG-0612, their procedures do l not allow movements of heavy loads over fuel or over the reactor core. Licensees of some PWRs (i.e., Callaway, Shearon Harris, and Calvert Cliffs) indicated that their heavy load )
movements involve casks moved within a separate fuel building. As indicated by the l licensees, the movement of casks in PWRs that have a separate fuel building involves little or no cask travel over systems needed for safe shutdown functions. As a result, a dropped cask would not cause significant damage to safe shutdown equipment and, therefore, would have negligible effect upon the licensees' ability to safely shut down the plant.
Licensees for approximately 39 percent of the plants (28 PWRs and 15 BWRs) indicated that they move heavy loads at plant shutdowns, and licensees for about 23 percent of the plants (23 PWRs and 2 BWRs) did not clearly indicate the plant status when heavy loads are moved. Licensees for a few plants (e.g., Oyster Creek) that plan to move heavy loads during plant shutdowns also indicated that they plan to perform dry runs at power, before initially loading the cask.
The NRC staff finds that although some licensees have committed to move only analyzed i loads at power, these licensees may not adequately consider the adverse safety consequences of a load drop during the movement of heavy loads. Some licensees' analyses consider methods that may be used to preclude a load drop (e.g., enhancements to the load handling system, including upgrades to brakes, instrumentation, and controls, and the use of energy-absorbing structures throughout the load path). However, they may not consider the adequacy of their capabilities needed to mitigate or manage the adverse consequences of a load drop. Some examples of such capabilities are the abilities to shut down the plant safely, continue normal operation, maintain personnel access to various areas in the plant, and mitigate potential accidents that could expose individuals to releases.
a 4
The NRC staff is also concemed that some licensees may not adequately address the potential consequences of a load drop during practice runs of cask movements while the reactor is at power. The drop of an empty cask during practice movements could result in l similar adverse consequences to the operation of the plant as does the actual movement of a fully loaded spent fuel cask. Therefore, it is the NRC staffs view that activities involving actual heavy load movements or practice runs of moving spent fuel dry storage casks are to .
l be evaluated by the licensee for potential accidents and consequences.
In addition, the NRC staff is concemed with BWR licensees that move heavy loads while the reactor is at power because, in general, the safety-related systems required for safe shutdowns are susceptible to damage from a dropped heavy load. These licensees should exhaust all options of establishing safe load paths to minimize the risk of affecting safe shutdown equipment in the event a heavy load is dropped.
(2) Types of Cranes Used in the responses to the bulletin, licensees for approximately 27 percent of the plants (6 PWRs and 23 BWRs) indicated that they use single-failure-proof cranes to lift heavy loads; licensees for 14 percent of the plants (12 PWRs and 3 BWRs) indicated that they have upgraded the reliability of their load-handling system in accordance with NUREG-0612,
- Section 5.1.6 (see explanation below); and licensees for about 8 percent of the plants (5 l PWRs and 4 BWRs) indicated that their crane is non-single-failure-proof. However, i licensees for almost half the plants (49 PWRs and 7 BWRs) did not clearly indicate the type of crane they use.
l l NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, " Single Failure Handling System," provides the attemative of upgrading an existing crane in lieu of complying with certain recommendations of NUREG-l 0554, " Single Failure Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," to achieve improved reliability in load-handling systems. Accordingly, several licensees have upgraded their overhead load-handling crane to single-failure-proof status, or they have improved reliability by I increasing the factors of safety or by providing redundancy in certain active components of I
the cranes. Licensees for a few plants (i.e., Oyster Creek, Dresden, Yankee Rowe) have l indicated that they are considering upgrading their cranes or installing new cranes to ,
l achieve single-failure-proof capability. '
Licensee information regarding the types of overhead cranes indicsdet that many plants have either single-failure-proof cranes in accordance with NUREG-0554," Single-Failure-Proof Cranes for Nuclear Power Plants," or cranes upgraded in accordancs with guidelines in NUREG-0612 (Section 5.1.6, and Appendix C, " Modification of Existing Cranes)."
Although licensees for several plants were not clear about the type of crane they possess, no licensee indicated that it had a crane or lifting system that was inadequately designed, installed, or tested.
The NRC staff concludes that many licensees previously performed adequate evaluations of their crane design for lifting heavy loads and the evaluations were accepted by the NRC staff. However, the NRC staffis concemed that licensees for some facilities could have weaknesses in their load-handling operations. These weaknesses may include insufficient training of personnel involved in the lifting and rigging procedures, procedures lacking in requirements for evaluating loads and ensuring that the design limitations of the hoisting system are not exceeded, insufficient inspection and preventive mal.mtenance of cranes and lifting devices, and inadequate review of loading capacities. The NRC staffs view is that the potential exists for any of these weaknesses to result in a single failure involving heavy loads being dropped and causing adverse consequences. As a result, future NRC staff
T reviews will be focused on licensees' evaluations of their cranes and lifting devices, and related methods and procedures used for complying with the requirements of NUREG-0612.
(3) Evaluation of Licensina Basis for Handlina Heavy Loads Review of the responses to the bulletin indicated that all of the licensees believe that their heavy load-handling operations are in accordance with the licensing basis of the facility.
l Licensees for approximately 24 percent of the plants (10 BWRs and 16 PWRs) did not l address the licensing bases in their responses. The NRC staff is concemed that some l
l licensees that believe their load-handling operation is within the plant's licensing bases may, in fact, be outside the licensing bases. For example, the NRC staff's reviews of load-i handling operations at Oyster Creek (OC) determined that the licensee would have operated '
beyond its licensing bases. This is because the licensee for OC was planning to move loads that exceeded the size of the loads previously evaluated in the FSAR. Approximately l
10 percent of the licensees indicated that they will review and modify their licensing bases as needed. As indicated in the submittals, licensees' reviews of the licensing bases resulted in one or more of the following:
l l l
Identification and analysis of new heavy loads beyond tne loads previously addressed in l the licensing bases, commitments to only move heavy loads that were previously analyzed, determinations that heavy load-handling operations deviated from previous commitments and the licensing bases, and
. determinations that changes to the TSs are needed.
l Licensees' reviews of their plans and capabilities to handle and control heavy loads have resulted in some licensees undertaking licensing actions to implement their load-handling l operations. The following are examples of planned licensing actions noted in the responses l to NRCB 96-02:
Facility Planned Licensina Actions i
l Brunswick License amendment request to make the FSAR consistent with actual l plant operations (completed).
l FitzPatrick Changes to the TSs to allow the movement of spent fuel dry storage casks at power (schedule to be determined).
Nine Mile Point Design change involving reracking of the spent fuel pool. (Schedule to be determined).
, North Anna - Various license amendments regarding heavy load-handling issues l (schedule to be determined).
Oyster Creek TS changes to remove the weight restriction for lifting the dry storage
, canister (DSC) shield plugs over fuel in the DSC. (completed).
r.
Watts Bar Design change for reracking of the spent fuel pool (currently under review).
i
I 6-The NRC staffs review of the information submitted indicates that some licensees' load-handling operations may have been implemented inconsistently with the licensing bases of the facility. Some licensees either have inadvertently deviated from their load-handling procedures, implemented procedures that are inconsistent with the licensing bases, or l misinterpreted the design features of theirload-handling system. The NRC staff also
) believes that since the issuance of NUREG-0612, many changes have evolved in licensees' plans to handle heavy loads. As a result, severallicensees have identified changes in their load-handling operations that were not previously addressed in their licensing bases, Therefore, the NRC staff will continue to perform audits and inspections on an "as needed" basis in order to evaluate licensees' movements of heavy loads.
(4) Plans for Movino Spent Fuel Dry Storaoe Casks Licensees for approximately 17 percent of the plants (10 PWRs and g BWRs) indicated that l they plan to store spent fuel dry storage casks. Most of these licensees plan to move casks within 2 years from the date of the bulletin. The remainder of the licensees either did not address the issue or have not yet begun planning for the storage of spent fuel.
(5) Load Droo and Consecuence Analysis Performed Licensees for approximately 33 percent of the plants indicated that they have performed load drop and consequence analyses in support of their plans to move heavy loads. The remaining licensees did not show that any analysis exists. In the future, the NRC staff will review the load drop and consequence analyses on an as-needed, plant specific basis. The NRC staff has found that severallicensees have done load drop and consequence analyses, even though Generic Letter 85-11 canceled Phase ll of NUREG-0612 and dismissed the need for licensees to perform these analyses. The results of the analyses have led some licensees to modify their load-handling operations, incluoing upgrading the
' crane and associated components of the lifting system, and modifying the bad paths.
Conclusion l The NRC staff finds that NRC Bulletin 96-02 achieved its objective that licensees evaluate their load-handling activities to ensure that these activities are performed safely and in the best interest of protecting health and safety of the public. The bulletin was effective in that licensees reviewed their plans and capabilities, licensing bases, and regulatory guidelines for carrying out i activities involving the movement of heavy loads. Although the licensees' responses to the ;
bulletin contained varying levels of detail regarding load-handling operations at the plants, sufficient information was available to enable the NRC staff to reach the conclusions noted below.
Although several licensees have increased the reliability of their load-handling systems, the NRC j staff will continue to review load-handling operations on an as-needed basis to ensure that i licensees adequately address their ability to preclude potentialload drop accidents. As determined through earlier NRC reviews, licensees have reliable lifting systems as required by :
NUREG-0612. However, licensees need to continue to address other activities surrounding the i crane operation that could help to minimize weaknesses in their load-handling operations that may contribute to load drop accidents. Such weaknesses could include insufficient training of personnel involved in applying the lifting and rigging procedures, procedures lacking in requirements for evaluating loads and for ensuring that the design limitations of the load-lifting system are not exceeded, insufficient inspection and preventive maintenance of cranes and lifting devices, and inadequate review of loading capacities, j
{ . .. .
d l
The NRC staff finds that because some licensees plan to move heavy loads at power, they may l need to a.isess their capabilities to both mitigate and manage the adverse consequences of a heavy load drop. Licensees should consider, among other things, possible plant shutdowns r during the movement of heavy loads, limiting personnel exposure from required entry into contaminated plant areas following an accident, and recovering from the adverse conditions caused by an accident. Accordingly, the NRC staff is particularly interested in future evaluations of load drops and consequences associated with the load-handling operations of the licensees.
The NRC staff also finds that several licensees have determined, after reviewing their licensing bases, that their load-handling operations may be inconsistent with their licensing bases.
Consequently, several licensees have undertaken actions to correct or resolve this condition, including reviewing the FSAR, TS requirements, and procedures goveming the conduct of operations involving the movement of heavy loads. The NRC staff will continue to pursue enforcement actions for matters involving noncompliances with regulatory requirements whenever appropriate.
Accordingly, the NRC staff will continue to review issues regarding the handling of heavy loads -
on a plant-specific basis as needed. Generic issues regarding this subject will be addressed through an ongoing Task Action Plan (TAP) for Heavy Loads. Any additionalinformation required for the completion of the TAP will be obtained on a plant-specific basis.
)
Principal Contributor: Brian E. Thomas I