ML20217J012
| ML20217J012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/26/1998 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Dodd C, Gejdenson, Lieberman HOUSE OF REP., SENATE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9804060147 | |
| Download: ML20217J012 (8) | |
Text
I p[
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITED STATES s
ibution:
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555-0001 g
g 8
HThompson
%*****/
March 26, 1998 PNorry JBlaha CHAIRMAN SCol1 ins, NRR l
RPerch, NRR KCyr, 0GC HMiller, RI G980037 The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Dodd:
I I am responding to your letter of January 22,1998, regarding letters from your constituents to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on issues relating to restart of Millstone Unit 3, and your request that NRC respond to specific issues raised in the letters. The NRC has also responded directly to the parties in each of these letters.
Specifically, in a letter dated January 6,1998, from David Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), the concern was raised that the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) process lacks clearly defined criteria, making it vulnerable to subjectivity.
The UCS recommended the publication of objective criteria, and also recommended that the NRC require additional system assessments before setting a restart date for Millstone Unit 3.
The NRC Confirmatory Order of August 14,1996, states that the purpose of the ICAVP is to confirm the effectiveness of the licensee's program in assuring that the plant's physical and functional characteristics are in conformance with its licensing and design bases. Consistent with the ICAVP purpose, the NRC staff defined in SECY-97-003," Millstone Restart Review Process," dated January 3,1997, the term " defect" to represent any condition identified during the ICAVP review that results in the plant being outside its licensing and design bases. The acceptance criteria being applied for the ICAVP are conformance with the plant's licensing and l
design bases. Nonconformances with the licensing and design bases are being assessed l
through the identification of any " defects," identified during the ICAVP reviews.
The ICAVP reviews go beyond the identification of " defects" and include the identification and assessment of other errors that do not meet the definition of a " defect" (e.g., minor calculational errors). Although such findings do not involve nonconformance with the licensing and design bases, they are being reviewed to determine if any programmatic trends raise a question about I
conformance with the plant's licensing and design bases.
As a result of concerns from members of the public, expressed in periodic briefings held by the NRC, the NRC staff developed four levels of significance which are being used to categorize findings from the ICAVP. The levels illustrate findings (Levels 1,2, and 3) which would indicate nonconformance with the licensing and design bases (i.e., defects) and findings (Level 4) which would not question the licensing and design bases. As such, the condition represented by each level serves to illustrate the type of findings which would result in the plant being outside its licensing and design bases (Levels 1-3). These levels further indicate the graded significance the staff would associate 'with such findings. Given the technical complexity of the Originated by:
[RPerch,NRR]
9004060147 980326 PDR ADOCK 05000423 P
O
~
2 ICAVP reviews, the significance of an identified " defect" could vary markedly, and the significance levels developed by the NRC staff are viewed as appropriate for establishing a clear hierarchical grouping of the ICAVP findings.
In addition to the establishment of the graded significance levels, the NRC developed likely or potential NRC actions corresponding to each significance level. A listing of predetermined NRC actions resulting from ICAVP findings has been requested by some. However, the complexity inherent in detailed licensing and design reviews does not lend itself to the establishment of automatic thresholds to trigger an appropriate expansion of ICAVP scope. The NRC's existing process for performing these reviews, relying on established regulatory requirements and risk insights, provides for a broad consideration of possible ICAVP findings and is consistent in its use of the licensing and design bases as the regulatory standard for measuring the licensee's performance. The NRC has recently provided additionalinformation on the NRC process in letters to the Connecticut Nuclear Energy Advisory Council, NU, and the ICAVP contractors.
This additional information (see enclosure) was also discussed at a meeting with the public on January 27,1998.
In a letter dated January 12,1998, from the Citizens Awareness Network, a list of concerns was provided regarding the findings of Little Harbor Consultants (LHC) concerning the Safety Conscious Work Environment at the Millstone Power Station. As I stated during my visit to the Millstone site on February 2,1998, the NRC recognized, when the NRC2 October 24,1996, order was issued, that it would take a long time for employees to develop trust in a developing and evolving safety-conscious work environment and that it takes time for management to avoid the occasional errors and eliminate actions which may lead to a chilling effect. As specified in NRC's October 24,1996, order, the Independent Third-Party Oversight Program will continue to be implemented until the licensee demonstrates, by its performance, that the conditions that led to the requirements of the oversight have been corrected. Demonstration of sustained performance will be assessed using the continued findings of the third party, licensee self-assessments, performance indicators, and NRC evaluations. The Commissien has reviewed the status of a safety conscious work environment at each Commission meeting. The NRC staff anticipates that independent oversight will need to be in place at least six months following the restart of a Millstone unit to provide a sufficient period to assess sustained performance related to a safety corscious work environment and a capability to handle safety concerns raised by employees and contractors. The Commission will consider the staff's recommendations in reaching a decision whether Millstone Unit 3 is ready for restart.
In a letter dated January 7,1998, from the Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC), concerns were raised relating to the ICAVP performed by Sargent & Lundy and the out-of-scope review performad by the NRC staff. Ms. Luxton's perception that S&L is operating in much the same fashion as other NU contract personnel, discovering problems, and working with NU to provide recommended fixes, is incorrect. The contractors have not been working with the licensee to develop solutions. Rather, they review solutions developed by NU for technical acceptability, to verify the solution is in conformance with the licensing and design bases, and appropriately addresses the identified problem. In order to assure independence of the ICAVP contractor reviews, the NRC established a communications protocol that is included in the NRC approved ICAVP audit plan. Additionally, the Connecticut Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) has I
been observing the interactions among the ICAVP contractors, NU, and the NRC.
{)pQ Senator Dodd l With regard to the actions that have been taken by the NRC staff to notify the public of the significance of the findings from the NRC out-of-scope system review, the following information is provided. The NRC identified and discussed the issue related to potential air binding of the Unit 3 charging system at a meeting with the public on September 24,1997. This preliminary finding (ICAVP Significance Level 1) was also discussed at the public inspection exit meeting -
on September 24,1997, and a public Commission meeting held December 12,1997. The Commission was informed at that time that, given the significance of the issue, a predecisional' enforcement conference with the licensee would take place in January 1998. The purpose of i
the predecisional enforcement conference is to provide the licensee an opportunity to offer additional information and is standard agency practice for fully evaluating such issues. On January 13,1998, a public predecisional enforcement conference regarding this preliminary i
Level 1 finding was held at the Millstone site. During this enforcement conference, the licensee provided the results of its analysis and scale model testing, and their conclusion that the charging and safety injection pumps would be capable of performing their design bases functions during the postulated accident conditions. Based on the information provided by the licensee, the NRC staff determined this issue to be an ICAVP Significance Level 3 finding, as well as a Severity Level ill violation. In the NRC's letter to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company dated March 9,1998, the NRC proposed a $55,000 civil penalty. The NRC also determined
'i that based on the effective corrective actions taken by the licensee, expansion of the scope of the ICAVP was not warranted.
I trust this information is responsive to your request.
Sincerely pigInal Signed by; Shirley Ann Jackson
\\
Docket No. 50-423
Enclosure:
M As. stated
/
%o Distribution: see next page Identical letter.to Senator Lieberman and Representative Gejdenson DOCUMENT NAME:A:\\dodd.ltr (*see previous concurrence) l To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box "C" copy w/o attachtenci "E" co>y wlattach/enct "N" no copy I
l.
CFFICE TA:SPO D:SPO D:NRR EDO OC NAME RPerch/sr*
WTravers*
SCollins*
LCallan*
SJackson DATE 2123/98 2/23/98 2/25/98 3/3/98 3 M98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Y
Y k0
I j
4.
3
, With regard to the actions that have been taken by the NRC staff to notify the public of the -
significance of the findings from the NRC out-of-scope system review, the following information is provided. The NRC identified and discussed the issue related to potential air binding of the Unit 3 charging system at a meeting with the public on September 24,1997. This prelimipary finding (ICAVP Significance Level 1) was also discussed at the public inspection exit meeting on September 24,1997, and a public Commission meeting held December 12,1997. The Commission was informed at that time that, given the significance of the issue, a predecisional
- enforcement conference with the licensee would take place in January 1998. The purpose of the predecisional enforcement conference is to provide the licensee an opportunity to offer additional information and is standard agency practice for fully evaluating such issues. On January 13,1998, a public predecisional enforcement conference regarding this preliminary Level 1 finding was held at the Millstone site. During this enforcement conference, the licensee provided the results of its analysis and scale model testing, and their conclusion that the charging and safety injection pumps would be capable of performing their design beiss functions during the postulated accident conditions. Based on the information provioed by the licensee, the NRC staff determined this issue to be an ICAVP Significance Level 3 finding. The NRC assessed this item as a Severity Level lli violation in accordance v.ith our Enforcement Policy, in the NRC's letter to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company dated March 9,1998, the j
l NRC proposed a $55,000 civil penalty.- The NRC also determined that based on the effective l
corrective actions taken by the licensee, expansion of the scope of the ICAVP was not i
warranted.
L I trust this information is responsive to your request.
Sincerely, t
Q~.~
Enclosure:
As stated
Letter for Senator Dodd dated:
March 26, 1998 Distribution:
Docket File (w/originalincoming)
PUBLIC SPO R/F ~
EDO G980037 CRC 0058 NRR Mailroom (w/ incoming)
RPerch WTravers Elmbro PMcKee SReynolds i
PEselgroth SCollins FMiraglia BBoger BSheron JRoe JCallan AThadani HThompson PNorry JBlaha SBurns l
HMiller, RI i
l
B i
DISCUSSION OF NRC ACTIONS RELATED TO ICAVP FINDINGS l
A further discussion of corresponding NRC actions related to the ICAVP findings, as follows, is intended to better explain and document the process being used by the NRC staff.
. Level 1:
System does not meet licensing and design bases and cannot perform its intended function.
l
- NRC Action: Would likely result in selection of additional system (s) for ICAVP review l
Additional Discussion:
i If either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC staff review confirms a Level 1 finding, the j.
NRC staff anticipates that, as a minimum, an additional system or systems will be added to the current scope of the ICAVP review. Following confirmation of a Level 1 finding, the Special Projects Office (SPO) staff will immediately present the finding and recommendations for ICAVP scope expansion to the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), and the Executive Director for Operations (EDO). Expansion of ICAVP scope will involve an additional system or systems review by the ICAVP contractor, the NRC staff, or both. Absent a negative l-determination by the EE J, the SPO staff will require the expansion of the ICAVP scope. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
L Level 2-Single train of redundant system does not meet licensing and design bases and cannot perform its intended function.
NRC Action: Would likely result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate fo, similar nonconformance issues in other systems Additional Discussion:
If either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC staff review confirms a Level 2 finding, the NRC staff anticipates that the scope of the ICAVP would be expanded to, as a minimum, require the evaluation of similar operational, procedural, or design attributes in other safety-related or risk significant systems for potential nonconformances. Following confirmation of a i
Level 2 finding, the SPO staff will immediately present the finding and recommendations for ICAVP scope expansion to the Director, NRR. The extent of reviews required under any expansion of the ICAVP will be based on (1) an NRC staff assessment of the licensee's root cause of the Level 2 finding, and (2) an NRC staff assessment of the corrective actions taken by the licensee to address both the staffs specific finding and any broader programmatic implications. Absent a negative determination by the Director, NRR, the SPO staff will require the appropriate expansion of the ICAVP scope. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
Level 3:
System does not meet licensing and design bases but able to perform its intended function.
NRC Action: Could result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate for similar nonconformance issues in other systems
l L
2; I
i
-j l
- Additional Discussion:
]
If either the ICAVP contractor review or the NRC staff review confirms a Level 3 finding, the -
1 NRC staff will consider expanding the scope of the ICAVP to require the evaluation of similar
- operational, procedural, or design attributes in other safety-related or risk-significant systems l
for potential nonconformances The SPO staff will present confirmed Level 3 findings and recommendations regarding ICAVP expansion to the Millstone Restart Assessment Panel l.
(RAP). The staff recommendation on possible ICAVP expansion for individual findings will -
consider the specific finding, and the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions. The -
.l effectiveness of corrective actions will be independently verified by the NRC staff, or the ICAVP contractor, and will consider the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion XVI, and the guidance of GL-91-18. The staff expects that, for an individual Level 3 finding, effective licensee corrective -
_ action to address both the specific " defect," as well as any broader implication for other j
l systems, would lead to an NRC staff determination that the ICAVP need not be expanded.
Conversely, a negative determination on effective licensee corrective action would be expected to result in a decision to expand the ICAVP..The RAP decision on ICAVP expansion will be documented in the RAP meeting minutes, and the Director, NRR, will approve any expansion of i
ICAVP scope. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be
- communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
In addition to evaluating individual Level 3 findings, the NRC staff (Chief, ICAVP Branch, SPO, l
NRR), will periodically, at least biweekly, consider the collective group of confirmed Level 3 findings identified during the conduct of the ICAVP reviews. Negative trends established by these Level 3 findings, which raise a question about licensing and design bases conformance in other systems, would, in the absence of effective corrective actions by the licensee, be expected to result in expansion of the ICAVP to. address possible similar nonconformances in other systems. In its evaluation of possible trends, the NRC staff will consider whether or not (1) the findings represent a large fraction of items reviewed; (2) the findings are implementation errors (e.g.', program or procedural requirements were not properly performed; (3) the findings are concentrated in a particular discipline (e.g., mechanical, electrical, instrument and controls, j
or structural); and (4) the findings are concentrated in a particular type of document (e.g.,
operating procedure, calculation, drawing, FSAR, maintenance procedure). Any decision to ~
expand the scope, based on negative trends associated with Level 3 findings, will be approved by the Director, NRR. The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
Level 4:
System meets licensing and design bases but contains minor calculational errors or inconsistencies of an editorial nature.
NRC Action: Multiple examples could result in expansion of ICAVP scope to evaluate for similar errors / inconsistencies in other systems
i e
e l-3 Additional Discussion:
Although they do not result in the plant being outside its licensing and design bases (i.e., the ICAVP regulatory standard / acceptance criteria), Level 4 findings will be assessed by the NRC staff. Level 4 findings will be assessed to determine whether trends exist which could raise a
. question regarding the plant's licensing and design bases. Confirmed Level 4 findings are being assessed initially by the contractors to determine if licensee corrective actions are appropriate. The NRC staff, on an ongoing basis, is also reviewing these findings for identification of multiple examples of specific findings and corresponding trends. In its evaluation of possible trends, the NRC staff will consider whether or not (1) the findings represent a large fraction of items reviewed; (2) the findings are implementation errors (e.g.,
program or procedural requirements were properly performed); (3) the findings are concentrated in a particular discipline (e.g., mechanical, electrical, instrument and controls, or structural); and (4) the findings are concentrated in a particular type of document (e.g.,
operating procedure, calculation, drawing, FSAR, maintenance procedure). The staff anticipates that if licensee corrective actions are determined to be effective, and trends which l
raise questions about the licensing and design bases are not identified, the scope of the ICAVP would not be expanded. The status of Level 4 findings are periodically presented to the RAP.
l Any expansion of ICAVP scope resulting from Level 4 findings will be approved by the EDO.
The NRC staff determination and bases for requiring scope expansion will be communicated to the licensee by written correspondence.
l 1
r